responsibility essay

Essays About Responsibility: Top 12 Examples and Prompts

We can’t take on the challenge of life without responsibility; If you are writing essays about responsibility, discover our guide below.

The word responsibility describes the state of being accountable for our actions and is one of the main elements that make us human. We are not born with it; instead, it is something to be exercised and improved on over time.

It has often been said that with power or freedom comes responsibility, which could not be more truthful. Each of us is gifted with the ability to make choices, and we are considered superior to all other living things on this planet. However, we have to make informed choices and be responsible for our actions, whether to ourselves, the people around us, and our environment.

5 Top Essay Examples

1. the value of responsibility by simon baker, 2. freedom is not the lack of constraint, but the exercise of responsibility by beulah west, 3. why responsibility is so important by steve rose.

• 4.  The Beneifts of Being Responsible by Frank Terzo
• 5. ​​What It’s like to Feel Responsible for Everything by Duncan Riach

1. The Importance of Responsibility

2. dealing with false responsibility, 3. freedom and responsibility, 4. what is social responsibility, 5. what are your responsibilities, 6. responsibility as a component of success, 7. a time you acted responsibly.

“It’s easy for us to become blinkered or out-of-touch when we’re constantly working with our heads down. Although meeting our commitments is hugely important we bear another responsibility, that is to invest in ourselves and in each other. When we can free our imagination and refresh our minds, we restore perspective and reduce stress. We find time and space to explore new ways to collaborate, be creative and enjoy ourselves to the benefit of our mission.”

Baker writes about why he thinks responsibility is important and discusses factors related to responsibility, namely trust, personal choice, and freedom. A feeling of trust allows you to be more comfortable accepting responsibility, while responsibility allows us to maximize personal choice and freedom. Most importantly, bearing responsibility means freeing our minds, enjoying life, and coming up with great ideas. 

“A lack of constraint means that you can not do everything that you want. In a perfect world this would be fine, but we don’t live in a perfect world. However everyone’s view of a perfect world is different, if this coincides with the law and you are happy, then you can be free still living under laws and legislations. If you believe that freedom is making your own choices then the only way that we can be “free” is if society does not exist.”

West discusses how just as personal freedom is vital to a healthy society, so is accountability for our actions. Freedom also has a negative side; it can be described as a lack of constraint in our choices. Without constraint, our actions may hurt others or even ourselves. Therefore, it must come with the responsibility to make these choices from a more thoughtful, educated perspective. 

You might also be interested in our list of essays about effective leadership . You can also check out these articles and essays about attitude .

“Taking responsibility creates long term resilience and a sense of purpose. This sense of purpose can be fostered by taking responsibility for one’s self by engaging in self-care. Responsibility can also be developed on a familial and societal level, offering a sense of purpose proportional to your ability to contribute your unique abilities.”

Rose explores the importance of being responsible for one’s health. It gives us a sense of purpose and helps us build resilience; however, we must first be responsible for ourselves by practicing self-care. This includes resting, exercising, taking breaks, and going to the doctor if something is bothering us. This makes us more responsible for the people around us, allowing us to perform different societal roles. You might be inspired by these essays about success and essays about overcoming challenges .

4.   The Beneifts of Being Responsible by Frank Terzo

“If we take care of our commitments, even if it something we might like to ignore, we feel better about ourselves. Each step we take towards being responsible and productive helps to raise our self-esteem and our relationships with friends, family and co-workers improve ten-fold. Being responsible pays big dividends – we have much less stress and chaos in our lives and we gain the respect of others.”

In this short essay, Terzo provides insight into the many benefits responsibility can provide you with. We must always be responsible, even if we might not feel like it, because it can improve our productivity, self-esteem, relationships with others, and overall peace. Though it might not always be easy, responsibility is key to achieving a happy life. 

5. ​​ What It’s like to Feel Responsible for Everything by Duncan Riach

“I hold responsibility when others are not taking responsibility. I was holding all of the responsibility, guilt, and shame that Billy McFarland was disowning. It’s a survival mechanism that I developed when I was a child. I had a step-father who was some form of psychopath or malignant narcissist, a person who was completely out of control and completely irresponsible. The only way that I could feel safe in that environment was to try to hold the responsibility myself.”

Riach reflects on a habit by which he constantly felt responsible for things out of his control, things as minor as events he saw on television. He developed this habit due to his upbringing- his childhood and family life were less than ideal. He is fully aware of his problem but still struggles with it. His case is an excellent example of false responsibility. 

6 Writing Prompts on Essays About Responsibility

Responsibility is, without a doubt, essential, but how important is it really? Reflect on the meaning of responsibility and explain its importance. Discuss this from a practical and personal standpoint; combine personal experience and research as the basis for your points. 

False responsibility is an attitude by which one feels responsible for things they are not. This is a widespread issue that encompasses everyone, from humble workers to some of the most influential people in the world. For your essay, research this phenomenon, then define it and explain why it occurs. Give suggestions on how one can identify false responsibility and work to stop feeling that way. 

The topics of freedom and personal responsibility are deeply intertwined; for freedom to work correctly, there must be a certain level of responsibility instilled in people so society can function correctly. In your essay, discuss these two concepts and their connection. Do proper research on this topic, then conclude this issue: are we responsible enough to be given total freedom? You may also link this to topics such as the law and regulations. You might be inspired by these essays about goals .

Social Responsibility seems straightforward and self-defining, but it is broad, especially with society putting a higher value on awareness, community, and social justice. Research this term and its history and discuss it in your essay; define and explain it, then describe what it means. 

Whether in your studies or at work, as a family member, friend, or even a member of society, we have a unique set of responsibilities that vary depending on the person. Reflect on the different roles you play in life and decide what your responsibilities are. Briefly describe each one and explain how you fulfill these responsibilities. You can also check out these essays about conflict .

This value is important because it is present in all successful individuals. Based on your opinions and research, discuss the relationship between responsibility, success, and some other factors or traits that influence success. Give examples of successful people who have shown responsibility, such as government officials, celebrities, and business leaders. 

When we are responsible, we are pretty proud of ourselves most of the time. Think of an experience you are most proud of in which you acted responsibly. Retell the story, reflect on how you felt, and explain why it is important- be as detailed as possible. Or, you may opt to do the opposite, telling the story of a time you did not show responsibility and thinking of what you would do if given a chance to repeat it. 

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Essay Samples on Responsibility

Community responsibility: culture of care and accountability.

Community responsibility is a cornerstone of building strong, resilient, and harmonious societies. This essay delves into the significance of community responsibility, its role in fostering positive change, the benefits it brings to individuals and communities, and the ways in which individuals can actively contribute to...

• Accountability
• Responsibility

Why is Responsibility Important in Everyday Life

What is social responsibility, why is responsibility important? Social responsibility is a duty every individual has to perform to the community. A better future is what we seek for the upcoming generation and youth and the best to bring about the expected changes is when...

• Ethics in Everyday Life
• Socialization

Why Is Responsibility Important For Health

Whose responsibility is it to keep you well?  Yours or the doctors, it is our own bodies, should you not be the one to look after it? or is it simply what a doctors supposed to do? People love to pass there problems on,  but...

• Health Care
• Public Health

Various Kinds of Responsibility Cost Accounting Centres

Responsibility accounting is a bit of the display appraisal structure and an evaluation system used to measure the working outcomes of the organization.The decision rights relegated to a subunit order such as a cost center, a profit or investment center. The specific choice of rights...

• Cost Accounting

The Rights And Responsibilities Of A Citizen In America

In order to be eligible to vote for any government election, there are requirements that need to be met; being eighteen years old by election day, a citizen of the United States, meeting your state residency requirements, and being registered to vote by your state’s...

• Citizenship
• Individual Rights

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My Personal Responsibility: Taking Responsibility For Your Actions

First of all, I have a personal responsibility to know who I am, what I can do and what I want in my life. What's going to help me set my goals, know the strategies I'm going to use, and know how to fight for...

• Personal Beliefs
• Personal Growth and Development

Corporate Social Responsibility: Taking Responsibility For Actions In Businesses

Many consumers require companies to change the way they carry out their operations by becoming more transparent and taking responsibility for the issues in society. Consequently, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has taken root in today's corporate world. Organizations that fail to incorporate CSR programs within...

• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Social Responsibility

Exploring Citizen's Engagement And Responsibilities Of A Citizen

This paper examines in a first place different forms of citizen’s engagement and his responsibilities toward society. In a second place, it discusses the background or the framework of these forms. What is the social role of a citizen? How valid morality could be the...

Moral Vegetarianism: Responsibility Or Necessity

Recent trends in modern eating habits have brought upon a wave of new discussions and one of them being the never seemingly ending debate of vegetarianism. The trend rose to convert our standard diets and health recommendations that mankind has known and followed for centuries...

• Eating Habits
• Vegetarianism

Age Of Consent And Age Of Responsibility

This essay plan is going to use theoretical context, with case studies, to critically assess the challenging arguments based upon the issues of reducing the age of consent from 16 to 14 in the UK. The topic of the age of consent has been very...

• Age of Responsibility

Themes of Responsibility and Respect in The Cask Of Amontillado by Edgar Allen Poe and Trifles by Susan Gaspells

The Definition of responsibility is having an obligation to do something. Responsibility to me means making sure you get stuff done the way its expected. The definition of respect is a regard for the feelings, wishes, rights, or traditions of others. What it means to...

• The Cask of Amontillado

The Appropriate Age for Driving Among Teenagers

How old is old enough to drive? Most would argue the legal driving age of sixteen appears appropriate for somebody to start taking the wheel, whereas others say that twenty-one could be a more decent age. For many teenagers obtaining their license once they turn...

• Driving Age
• Teen Driving

The Social Responsibility of the Educators and Education Department

Educators are the greatest resource in society due to the fact that every individual within society has received their first foundation/start-up to be successful in life due to them. Educators are the power tools in society, the better they are at doing their jobs the...

• Department of Education
• Role of Education

Reasons behind Kanhaiya Gulati Kanwhizz Sucess

Making a dedication isn't any sort of joke. Making a dedication is actually quite genuine issue in business and thus it ought to never be messed with. Individuals frequently don't comprehend the significance of duty, they feel it's anything but difficult to make responsibility and...

Overview of Seth Lazar Views on Self-Defence and Responsibility

In Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defence, Seth Lazar argues that the defender is liable to defensive force if the risk of harm imposed by the attacker follows his conditions of proportionality, agent-responsibility, and necessity. In this paper, the first section will discuss Lazar’s argument...

• Self Defence

The True Conductor of the Julius Caesar Train in Shakespeare's Play

In the average person’s life, there is typically a highly influential person who drives the emotions and thought process of that said person, and often to the point where this influence and authority becomes problematic. In William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Julius Caesar, Brutus is...

• The Tragedy of Julius Caesar

Accountability and Responsibility Which are Key Concepts in Healthcare

This essay is going to discuss accountability and responsibility. These concepts are going to be related to scenario ward 6 (see appendix). The focus will be on the accountability and responsibility of the health care assistant (HCA) and student nurse in the scenario and will...

• Universal Health Care

Friedrich Nietzsche Psychological Concepts of Morals in Genealogy of Morals

The psychological state Friedrich Nietzsche terms as ressentiment in the Genealogy of Morals is a human condition attributed to a feeling produced when placed within a hostile environment. One which man is found powerless to alter through physical action. Those inflicted on this deprived orientation...

• Friedrich Nietzsche

Responsibilities and Failures of Civil Engineering Profession

When you become a civil engineer, you take on the responsibility to serve the public and improve the quality of life within the community. The ASCE Code of Ethics was established for civil engineers to practice ethical behavior in their profession. The ASCE Code of...

• Civil Engineering

Exploration of Themes of Regret and Responsibility in A Christmas Carol

Written in 1843 by Charles Dickens, across five staves, A Chistmas Carol depicts the mean-spirited and miserly character of Ebenezer Scrooge, who is haunted by four spirits, in an attempt to transform him into a kinder; more charitable man. On a surface level, the First...

• A Christmas Carol

The Responsibilities and Obligations of Police Officer

Abstract For my term paper I’m going to write about the responsibilities and the life of a police officer. I had a hard time deciding what I wanted to write about because there are so many different topics in the criminal justice field that interests...

• Police Officer

Immense Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Businesses

Introduction Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) develop an economic of the business to contribute the achievable success in competitive advantage that build the reputation and acquire the trust of people. Providing in quickly improving that need for enhancing transparency, firm citizenship, maintain on social, ethical and...

Analyzing Responsibility in Business Management

Meaning of Responsible Management Responsible management has become very crucial in an era of growing governmental and public scrutiny of managerial practices and accountability. During the past years, a succession of instances of poor managerial practices, or even malpractices, unethical behaviour and questionable bonus and...

The Fear of Adult Responsibilities in "The Catcher in The Rye"

J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye is a coming-of-age novel that explores the fear and anxiety of growing up and assuming adult responsibilities. The protagonist, Holden Caulfield, is a disillusioned teenager who struggles with the transition from adolescence to adulthood. In this essay, we...

• Catcher in The Rye

Our Responsibility For The Earth

“Anxiety is typically the result of being placed in situations that we cannot understand or control. We are most anxious when we cannot find a way to make sense of what’s happening, and when we feel as if there is nothing we can do to...

Argument Men and Particularly Princes

Princes may be beneficent which seems to be a distinctive feature but it may be giving them an awful recognition amongst their subjects. That is due to the fact that such princes may be beneficent and turn out to be using up all their sources...

• Personal Qualities

Parents Need To Be Educated In The Proper Nutrition

All expecting parents need to be educated in the proper nutrition for an infant. This causes these soon-to-be new parents to seek new information and acquire new knowledge which differs from their current education on nutrition. Many people know the proper nutrition for adults however,...

Do Legal-Status Mothers Take On More Responsibility Than Their Unauthorized Spouses?

Families all around the world have immigrated to the United States for a variety of reasons. My family came into this country during the wave of the 1960s created from the Bracero Program where hundreds of Mexicans entered the US. My grandfather was able to...

• Family Values

Importance Of Corporate Social Responsibility & Governance

Corporate Governance Corporate governance refers to the standard of relationship between the board of directors, management, shareholders, auditors and other stakeholders that determines how a company is functions. In corporate governance it identifies who has the power to make the decisions. Corporate administration guarantees that...

• Corporate Culture

College Education In Crucet's Story "Make Your Home Among Strangers"

Most students coming into college think that it’s their time to be independent, have fun, make new friends, and get a degree. Jennine Capo Crucet acknowledges that college is more than just having fun partying with friends and just getting to that degree you strongly...

Best topics on Responsibility

1. Community Responsibility: Culture of Care and Accountability

2. Why is Responsibility Important in Everyday Life

3. Why Is Responsibility Important For Health

4. Various Kinds of Responsibility Cost Accounting Centres

5. The Rights And Responsibilities Of A Citizen In America

6. My Personal Responsibility: Taking Responsibility For Your Actions

7. Corporate Social Responsibility: Taking Responsibility For Actions In Businesses

8. Exploring Citizen’s Engagement And Responsibilities Of A Citizen

9. Moral Vegetarianism: Responsibility Or Necessity

10. Age Of Consent And Age Of Responsibility

11. Themes of Responsibility and Respect in The Cask Of Amontillado by Edgar Allen Poe and Trifles by Susan Gaspells

12. The Appropriate Age for Driving Among Teenagers

13. The Social Responsibility of the Educators and Education Department

14. Reasons behind Kanhaiya Gulati Kanwhizz Sucess

15. Overview of Seth Lazar Views on Self-Defence and Responsibility

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• Personal Experience

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Essay on Responsibility

Essay generator.

Responsibility, an essential virtue, plays a pivotal role in shaping an individual’s character and contributing to societal progress. It encompasses a wide range of actions and attitudes, from personal accountability to civic duty. This essay delves into the multifaceted nature of responsibility, its importance in various aspects of life, and ways to foster it.

Responsibility

At its core, responsibility is the moral obligation to act correctly and make decisions that positively impact oneself and others. It involves recognizing and accepting the consequences of one’s actions. Responsibility is not just about fulfilling duties; it is about being reliable, trustworthy, and making decisions that are considerate of others.

Personal Responsibility

Personal responsibility is fundamental in shaping one’s life. It involves self-discipline, time management, and the ability to make thoughtful decisions. For instance, students demonstrate personal responsibility by completing their assignments on time and preparing for exams. Adults show it by managing their finances wisely and fulfilling their professional obligations.

Social Responsibility

Beyond personal spheres, responsibility extends to social contexts. Social responsibility involves contributing to the welfare of society and the environment. It includes actions like volunteering, recycling, and being informed about social issues. Companies exhibit social responsibility through ethical business practices and community engagement.

Responsibility in Relationships

Responsibility is crucial in building and maintaining healthy relationships. It requires honesty, respect, and the ability to listen and respond to the needs of others. In friendships, it might mean being there for someone in difficult times. In family dynamics, it involves contributing to household chores and supporting family members.

Academic Responsibility

In academic settings, responsibility is key to success. It involves attending classes regularly, engaging in learning activities, and respecting teachers and peers. Academic responsibility also includes academic integrity – avoiding plagiarism and cheating, which are detrimental to one’s learning process.

Civic Responsibility

Civic responsibility entails participation in the democratic process, adherence to laws, and involvement in community affairs. It includes voting, being aware of current events, and possibly engaging in activism or community service. Civic responsibility is the bedrock of a functioning democracy.

Professional Responsibility

In the workplace, responsibility is synonymous with dependability and professionalism. It involves meeting deadlines, collaborating with colleagues, and adhering to ethical standards. Professional responsibility also includes continual self-improvement and contributing positively to the work environment.

The Consequences of Irresponsibility

Irresponsibility can have far-reaching consequences. Neglecting personal health, for example, can lead to chronic diseases. Academic irresponsibility can result in poor grades and lost opportunities. Social irresponsibility can contribute to environmental degradation and societal problems.

Fostering Responsibility

Responsibility can be developed through practice and reflection. Setting personal goals, managing time effectively, and reflecting on one’s actions are ways to cultivate personal responsibility. Participating in community service and staying informed about social issues can enhance social responsibility.

Responsibility is not just a moral obligation; it is a necessary component for personal growth and societal well-being. It manifests in various forms, from personal to professional, and its absence can have detrimental effects. By embracing responsibility in all its forms, individuals can lead more fulfilling lives, and societies can thrive. As we navigate the complexities of the modern world, the value of responsibility becomes even more pronounced, making it an indispensable virtue for the future.

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Essay on Responsibility

Students are often asked to write an essay on Responsibility in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Responsibility

Understanding responsibility.

Responsibility means being accountable for our actions. It involves making decisions and facing the consequences. It’s a vital life skill, crucial for personal growth.

Types of Responsibility

Responsibility can be personal or social. Personal responsibility involves self-care, while social responsibility involves caring for others and the environment.

Importance of Responsibility

Being responsible helps in building trust and respect. It also aids in developing self-confidence and a sense of accomplishment.

In conclusion, responsibility shapes our character. It’s a key to success, making us reliable and respected individuals.

Also check:

• 10 Lines on Responsibility
• Speech on Responsibility

250 Words Essay on Responsibility

Responsibility is a multifaceted concept that encompasses moral, social, and personal dimensions. It is the obligation to carry out tasks and roles effectively and efficiently, and it is integral to the development of an individual’s character and societal structure.

Moral Responsibility

Moral responsibility refers to the duty one has towards oneself and others, encapsulating the principles of honesty, integrity, and fairness. It involves making conscientious decisions that respect the rights and welfare of others. For instance, a journalist has a moral responsibility to report news objectively, without bias or distortion.

Social Responsibility

On a broader scale, social responsibility concerns the obligations individuals or organizations have towards society. It includes actions that contribute to the welfare of the community, such as volunteering, environmental conservation, or philanthropy. Corporations, too, bear social responsibility, aiming to minimize their negative impact on society while maximizing their positive contributions.

Personal Responsibility

Personal responsibility, meanwhile, involves acknowledging and fulfilling personal commitments and obligations. It is about taking ownership of one’s actions and their consequences. For example, a student has a personal responsibility to complete their assignments on time and to the best of their ability.

The Importance of Responsibility

Responsibility is pivotal in shaping a just and harmonious society. It fosters trust, cooperation, and respect among individuals and groups. Moreover, it promotes personal growth, self-discipline, and resilience. Embracing responsibility, therefore, is a stepping stone towards personal success and societal progress.

In conclusion, responsibility is a cornerstone of ethical conduct and social cohesion. It is an attribute that should be cultivated and cherished for the betterment of individuals and society at large.

500 Words Essay on Responsibility

Introduction.

Responsibility is a fundamental concept that permeates all aspects of life. It is a principle that guides our actions, decisions, and relationships, shaping our character and defining who we are as individuals and as members of society. Understanding responsibility and its implications is crucial to personal development and social cohesion.

Conceptualizing Responsibility

Responsibility is a multifaceted construct. It can be seen as a duty or obligation, an expectation to perform certain tasks or uphold specific standards. It can also be understood as accountability, the acceptance of the consequences of our actions. Responsibility implies a moral dimension, an ethical commitment to do what is right and fair.

Personal responsibility involves taking charge of one’s own actions, decisions, and their outcomes. It is about owning up to mistakes, learning from them, and striving to do better. Personal responsibility is a cornerstone of self-improvement and personal growth. It promotes self-efficacy, self-respect, and integrity.

Beyond the personal realm, responsibility also has a social dimension. Social responsibility refers to the duties and obligations we have towards others and society at large. It is about contributing to the common good, respecting the rights of others, and promoting social justice. Social responsibility fosters empathy, cooperation, and social harmony.

Responsibility and Freedom

Responsibility is intrinsically linked to freedom. With freedom comes responsibility. The more freedom we have, the more responsibility we bear for our actions. Conversely, the more responsible we are, the more freedom we are likely to enjoy. Responsibility and freedom are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and interdependent.

Challenges and Opportunities

Responsibility, while fundamentally important, is not always easy to uphold. It requires self-discipline, moral courage, and a sense of duty. It can sometimes be burdensome and demanding. However, responsibility also presents opportunities. It empowers us to shape our destiny, to make a difference, and to lead a meaningful and fulfilling life.

In conclusion, responsibility is a powerful principle that governs our actions and shapes our character. It is a duty, an accountability, and a moral commitment. It is about taking charge of our actions, contributing to the common good, and respecting the rights of others. Responsibility is a challenge, but also an opportunity. It is a pathway to personal growth, social harmony, and a fulfilling life. Embracing responsibility is thus not only a personal choice but a societal imperative.

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How to write a compelling responsibility essay the right way.

February 6, 2020

I’m sure this is a word you’ve heard since your childhood, responsibility. Your parents, teachers, neighbors, and even the famous high school and college motivational speakers have talked to you about this.

What does responsibility mean to you? I remember my mother telling me, “Son if you are not responsible now, you might never get a wife. And remember, I want grandchildren!” So I have been trying to maintain a sense of responsibility so that I don’t miss out on a wife and deny my mum the golden opportunity of having grandchildren.

That aside, let’s get down to why we are here, writing a responsibility essay.

What is a Responsibility Essay?

The word responsibility in itself is a one-sentence definition. It implies a state of having an obligation to deal with something.

A responsibility essay is, therefore, one that shows a person’s grasp of the outcome, which can be caused by his/her actions. In a broad sense, it means that there is a situation at hand, and how it is going to be handled by the person is critical to the final results.

No one is born with this sense of responsibility. It is a value that is cultivated over time by learning either directly or indirectly from others. A mother has a duty of taking care of the baby until a certain age, so does a president has responsibility for a nation.

Responsibility essay assignments for students hardly miss because this is a practical aspect of life.

Writing Ideas on a Responsibility Essay

Are you there stranded on where to begin your 1000 word essay on responsibility? Well, here are some great ideas that you can borrow from for starters:

• Primary responsibilities: You can write about what you are tasked with daily, and you are getting along with those responsibilities.
• Social responsibility: Talk about society’s rights and how they relate to their duty. Is there a conflict between the two?
• Power and responsibility: Is it true that those in power are the ones mandated with greater responsibilities than the others in society?
• Why is it hard to take it? Here you can delve into the issue of why people do not want to take responsibility for their actions. For instance, a man who impregnates a lady and refuses to own up, thus running away and leaving the lady to fend for herself and the child.

I would not be doing justice if I left this section without quoting the famous Peter Parker’s Principle, “with great power, comes great responsibility.” For those who may not be familiar with that, watch Spider-Man, the movie.

A personal responsibility essay is the cheapest to write. I mean, isn’t there a time you were tasked with watching over your siblings, being the captain of a class, or even tending your flock back in the ranch? All that was responsible, and, in your essay, show whether you were good or bad at it, or sooner if you enjoyed working at it.

You can also show in your essay on why responsibility is essential. If you were looking after your little sister and out of your irresponsibility, she slipped into the kitchen and caused a fire, doesn’t that tell you why you need to be responsible?

If your niche is on leadership, then you can write an essay on responsibility and accountability. Show why the leaders need to be transparent in their undertakings and why it is essential to the citizens at large.

For every successful writer, you need to have an outline . A responsibility paper outline will help you achieve the following:

• Know if your thoughts are well interconnected
• Point out potholes in your essay
• Come up with a clear and precise sequence of ideas
• To determine if the sufficiency of the evidence at hand.

Such will save you the agony of taking a lot of time to write your responsibility. The subsequent speech on responsibility will, therefore, be precise and complete, and perhaps compete for audience with Obama’s speeches.

And if that’s not enough, let us look at some topics you can use for your next essay about responsibility.

Top 10 Winning Topic Ideas for a Responsibility Essay

These topics will act as an icebreaker to stir you up for more great ideas that you can write about from today.

Are you ready for this? Here we go!

• With high power, comes great responsibility (I wouldn’t miss starting with this)
• What is the importance of being responsible?
• At what age can someone be considered responsible enough?
• Leadership and responsibility
• Personal responsibility in college
• Is responsibility an obligation to oneself?
• Personal responsibility and academic success
• Responsibility gun control
• Legal and ethical implications of irresponsibility
• Social responsibility and reduction of crime rate
• Responsible parenting
• Am I good at fulfilling my obligations?
• Rights versus responsibilities
• To be or not to be responsible
• Accountability starts with me!

Crafting Great Responsibility Essay

Well, I guess that is enough to get you started and improve your grades, especially in essay writing. Why don’t you choose one of the topics and craft an essay now?

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Responsibility Essay: Topic Ideas & Responsibility Writing Prompts

“You are not only responsible for what you say, but also for what you do not say” Martin Luther

There are a lot of other good quotations that can serve as a good beginning for your essay on responsibility and provide good ideas for writing.

However, responsibility can be viewed from different perspectives, which is why making the final decision for your essay on responsibility can be rather challenging.

If this is your main problem with the responsibility essay, we are glad to help you and offer some brilliant ideas, just check our website .

• 👔 Your Major Responsibilities
• 🔋 Power and Responsibility
• 💻 Social Responsibility Essays
• ❓ Why Is It so Hard to Take It?

✍️ Other Responsibility Essay Topics

1. 👔 your major responsibilities.

If you have absolutely nothing to talk about in the responsibility essay, writing about yourself and your duties can be a good option. So, what are you responsible for? Have your responsibilities changed with time? Do you think you are good at fulfilling them?

2. 🔋 Power and Responsibility

“With great power comes great responsibility” – this can be the main idea of your essay. Do you agree that people who possess power are responsible for many things ? What happens if powerful people act irresponsibly?

3. 💻 Social Responsibility Essays

Do you agree that today people have a lot of rights but do not think much about their responsibilities? Which one of them does a citizen have or a simple person who lives in society along with other people? Answer these questions in your essay on responsibility .

4. ❓ Why Is It so Hard to Take It?

Why are some people afraid to take responsibility for their actions? In your essay on responsibility , introduce several situations like that and tell about the consequences of not taking responsibility.

• Is responsibility a fundamental quality any person must possess?
• Analyze the role of ethics and responsibility at work. 
• How do you understand corporate social responsibility?  
• Explain the role and responsibility of business.  
• The importance of corporate social responsibility in the modern world.  
• Discuss the issues of corporate social responsibility and the ways to overcome them. 
• Describe moral responsibility of each individual for the contribution in global warming.
• Explain why freedom of speech entails a great responsibility to each individual.
• Examine why the sense of responsibility is often considered a driving force of human development.
• Analyze the role of managers in development of corporate social responsibility.
• Explore the complex issue of social responsibility for advertising to children .
• Diverce interpretations interpretations of the term “responcibility” and your personal vision of responsibility .
• Why it is vital to be a responsible person .
• Modern technology, anonymity, and responsibility from a cultural relativism perspective .
• Does Apple show concern for ethical and social responsibility ?
• Discuss the specifics of professional responsibility of lawyers .
• What are you responsible for in your personal life and immediate environment ?
• Describe the peculiarities of ethical responsibility of police administrators.
• Do you feel any responsibility for the things outside of your immediate environment?
• Explain why leadership is a great responsibility.
• Positive and negative impact of globalization on corporate social responsibility in international companies. 
• Analyze the responsibility of citizens for the actions their government take.
• Examine the importance of socially responsible leadership in education .
• What is the student’s responsibility at college?  
• Discuss the connection between social and personal responsibility .
• How to become responsible ?
• Explore the connection between personal responsibility and success.
• The role of parents in formation the sense of responsibility in children.
• The basic aspects of corporate responsibility philosophy. 
• What does personal responsibility towards the society include?
• Discuss the human responsibility for issues outside the immediate environment.
• Are the leaders responsible for social media posts of their team?
• Explore who is responsible for the epidemic of childhood obesity
• Describe the areas of responsibility people have in their personal lives.
• Why do people often shrink from personal responsibility ?
• Benefits of corporate social responsibility. 
• Who is responsible for poverty and violence in developing nations ?
• Explain why you consider yourself a responsible human being .
• Discuss the strong and weak points of the personal responsibility concept.
• People’s responsibility for inhumane acts.
• Describe different points of view on the concept of responsibility.
• Analyze the concept of responsibility from ethical point of view.
• Are parents responsible for children’s crimes?
• What does responsibility mean to you?
• Should celebrities be responsible for being role models?
• Explain why free will is a huge responsibility.
• What are the major traits of a responsible person ?
• Discuss the ethical responsibility in nursing profession.
• Where are the limits of personal responsibility ?
• Describe the connection between responsibility and morality.

Well, this is it for now. If you are asked to cover other complicated topics, remember that we can also help you with essays on leadership and many-many others.

Learn more on this topic:

• Efficient Essays on Environment vs Development: Useful Tips
• Disaster Management Essay: Great Ideas for Effective Plan
• How to Write a Narrative Essay: Easy Guide and Useful Tips
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How to Write Catchy Responsibility Essays in 2023

Writing great responsibility essays and getting them to read and rank is not easy. Here are top-notch tricks to help you achieve these two.

What is a Responsibility Essay?

Responsibility entails our ability to make decisions that serve our interests as well as those of others.

Therefore, an essay on responsibility has the following crucial aspects:

An in-depth understanding of trust in life The critical consequences related to it Factors that lead to its recognition in the society

Most students find essays on responsibility a hard nut to crack, which should not be the case. Read on to find out how you can craft a masterpiece responsibility essay for your assignment.

How to Write Essays About Responsibility: Structure

Now, to beat the rest of your classmates and stand a chance of attaining an A+, you have to master the secret ingredients behind all this. Keep your eyes peeled.

Before you embark on writing, a persuasive outline would correctly set the pace for you. What should your framework entail?

• Identify a Thematic Area of Interest on Responsibility

It contains the title and, subsequently, the basis of your thesis statement. Such should be a topic that interests you (and your readers) so that you can write it with a smile.

The topic should be:

• Relevant to your readers
• One that you can research on
• Precise and appealing to anyone who comes around it

For instance, if your focus is on personal responsibility essays, you can choose from the following topics:

• Maturity and personal responsibility
• How to deal with obligations systematically
• Personal responsibility and blame on oneself
• Personal responsibility plays a significant role in college

From these topics, you can then derive an A-grade thesis statement that will be the rest of your essay’s driving force. Here is an example:

• Personal responsibility is the hallmark of maturity. Here is why it is so.

There are many other ideas that you can use to start your responsibility essay to win the hearts of your readers.

• Determine the Different Sub-categories to Support Your Major Idea

After having your topic and thesis statement, here comes the heart of the matter, the body. You will need to support your claims with relevant examples, facts, and statistics.

Let us see great prompts that you can use for the following types of essays:

Age of Responsibility Essays

In such kinds of essays, your body should answer the following questions:

• What is the age of responsibility, and who determines it?
• Why that age bracket is considered responsible
• Are there any psychological factors related to that age?

Social Responsibility Essays

One can tackle this type of essay with the following questions in mind:

• What if all the members of the society were responsible?
• What are some of the problems, challenges, and conflicts in society?
• Are people relying much on rights and neglecting responsibilities?
• What are the impacts of such a trait?
• How can we all work towards social responsibility?

Essays on Responsibility and Accountability

Use the following thoughts to write your essay body:

• Who should hold people responsible?
• How does someone learn to be accountable?
• Do you think you people are responsible without someone else over them?
• What is the relationship between responsibility and accountability?
• Can an irresponsible person be liable?

Essays on Power and Responsibility

Liven up your body with some of the ideas listed below:

• Does vast power come with great responsibility?
• What should happen to irresponsible leaders?
• Are the citizens to blame for irresponsible leaders?
• How to attain responsible leadership in society

Remember that the body should present your arguments in a clear, persuasive, and amusing manner. The reader should get all his questions answered in the body.

• Summarize With a Logical Conclusion

If asked, a majority of students would tell you that the conclusion is not that important. However, contrary to that popular belief, the end is as important as the title, intro, and body.

The responsibility essays for students should:

• Be brief and to the point
• Not be a repetition of the points discussed in the body
• Have a call to action (asking the readers to be responsible either at an individual or corporate level)

Essays on personal responsibility are the cheapest to write since you can easily relate them with your own life. Therefore, take caution so as not to be emotional or add your feelings to the paper.

Personal Responsibility Essay Sample The KQ I find the most intuitive in ethical decision making is the “outcomes”. I consider this the key question to be my most important guide to the ethical decision making because actions have consequences and those consequences are not only limited to the person initiating the action but also other people. When we consider the potential outcomes of an action for different stakeholder groups including us, we can make the decisions that will advance the overall interests of all the stakeholders involved. This approach also ensures we do not only consider personal interests but can act in a selfless manner. I believe this approach also serves as a useful guide when making the laws and rules that govern the conduct of communities as well the greater society. I have been influenced to take this approach because I care about the social issues that affect the modern society and such issues include climate change, equal rights for women, and equal rights for minority groups. There are some of these issues that do not personal affect me yet I care about them because they affect many of the people I know and care about and they will also affect many of the people who have yet to be born. I believe I am part of the society and have benefitted from the investments the society has made in me. Thus, it is only fair for me to evaluate the merits of issues on the basis of their outcomes for the different stakeholder groups. I believe this approach also explains some of the laws that make our society better. For example, the current laws do not allow citizens to drive while under the influence of alcohol. This is because the potential outcomes of such an action also involve people other than the driver. In addition, the potential costs of such a conduct far outweigh any potential benefits. When we consider the outcomes of an action for all the potential stakeholders, we make decisions whose benefits are more likely to outweigh the potential costs. This approach also increases the probability of people acting in a selfless manner.

From the discussion above, any student can now be able to develop a thrilling and top-grade responsibility essay.

Do you have a 1000 word essay on responsibility and wondering where to start? Worry not! Our team of expert writers is ready to offer you cheap but quality writing help. On top of that, you can get a responsibility essay sample for free to get you started.

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How to write a great responsibility essay: topic ideas and writing tips

If you are assigned to write an essay on responsibility, it’s not always clear how to get started. After all, we all know what responsibility is (or, at least, we imagine so). We know that some people are responsible and others are not. But all of this does not seem enough for a good essay. More than that, it does not sound exciting enough for any academic work.

Creative ideas on a responsibility essay

The definition of responsibility, how important is responsibility, should one strive to be responsible, social responsibility, how to outline a responsibility essay, extra tips on writing and formatting a responsibility essay.

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Moral Responsibility

Making judgments about whether a person is morally responsible for her behavior, and holding others and ourselves responsible for actions and the consequences of actions, is a fundamental and familiar part of our moral practices and our interpersonal relationships.

The judgment that a person is morally responsible for her behavior involves—at least to a first approximation—attributing certain powers and capacities to that person, and viewing her behavior as arising (in the right way) from the fact that the person has, and has exercised, these powers and capacities. Whatever the correct account of the powers and capacities at issue (and canvassing different accounts is the task of this entry), their possession qualifies an agent as morally responsible in a general sense: that is, as one who may be morally responsible for particular exercises of agency. Normal adult human beings may possess the powers and capacities in question, and non-human animals, very young children, and those suffering from severe developmental disabilities or dementia (to give a few examples) are generally taken to lack them.

To hold someone responsible involves—again, to a first approximation—responding to that person in ways that are made appropriate by the judgment that she is morally responsible. These responses often constitute instances of moral praise or moral blame (though there may be reason to allow for morally responsible behavior that is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy: see McKenna 2012: 16–17 and M. Zimmerman 1988: 61–62). Blame is a response that may follow on the judgment that a person is morally responsible for behavior that is wrong or bad, and praise is a response that may follow on the judgment that a person is morally responsible for behavior that is right or good.

It should be noted at the outset that the above schema, while useful, may be misleading in certain respects. For one thing, it suggests a correspondence and symmetry between praise and blame that may not exist. The two are certainly asymmetrical insofar as the attention given to blame far exceeds that given to praise. One reason for this is that blameworthiness, unlike praiseworthiness, is often taken to involve liability to a sanction. Thus, articulating the conditions of blameworthiness may seem to theorists the more pressing matter. Perhaps for related reasons, there is a richer language for expressing blame than praise (Watson 1996 [2004: 283]), and “blame” finds its way into idioms for which there is no ready parallel employing “praise”: compare “ S is to blame for x ” and “ S is to praise for x ”. Note, as well, that “holding responsible” is itself not a neutral expression: it typically arises in blaming contexts (Watson 1996 [2004: 284]). Additionally, there may be asymmetries in the contexts in which praise and blame are appropriate: private blame is a more familiar phenomenon than private praise (Coates & Tognazzini 2013a), and while minor wrongs may reasonably earn blame, minimally decent behavior often seems insufficient for praise (see Eshleman 2014 for this and other differences between praise and blame). Finally, the widespread assumption that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness are at least symmetrical in terms of the capacities they require has also been questioned (Nelkin 2008, 2011; Wolf 1980, 1990). Like most work on moral responsibility, this entry will tend to focus on the negative side of the phenomenon; for more, see the entry on blame .

A few other general observations about the concept of moral responsibility are in order before introducing particular conceptions of it. In everyday speech, one often hears references to people’s “moral responsibility” where the point is to indicate that a person has some duty or obligation—some responsibility —to which that person is required, by some standard, to attend. In this sense, we say, for example, that a lawyer has a responsibility (to behave in certain ways, according to certain standards) to his client. This entry, however, is concerned not with accounts that specify people’s responsibilities in the sense of duties and obligations, but rather with accounts of whether a person bears the right relation to her own actions, and their consequences, so as to be properly held accountable for them. (Unfortunately, this entry does not include discussion of some important topics related to moral responsibility, such as responsibility for omissions (see Clarke 2014, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, and Nelkin & Rickless 2017a) or collective responsibility (see the entry on collective responsibility and Volumes 30 and 38 of Midwest Studies in Philosophy ).

Moral responsibility should also be distinguished from causal responsibility. Causation is a complicated topic, but it is often fairly clear that a person is causally responsible for—that is, she is the (or a) salient cause of—some occurrence or outcome. However, the powers and capacities that are required for moral responsibility are not identical with an agent’s causal powers, so we cannot infer moral responsibility from an assignment of causal responsibility. Young children, for example, can cause outcomes while failing to fulfill the requirements for general moral responsibility, in which case it will not be appropriate to judge them morally responsible for, or to hold them morally responsible for, the outcomes for which they may be causally responsible. And even generally morally responsible agents may explain or defend their behavior in ways that call into question their moral responsibility for outcomes for which they are causally responsible. Suppose that S causes an explosion by flipping a switch: the fact that S had no reason to expect such a consequence from flipping the switch might call into question his moral responsibility (or at least his blameworthiness) for the explosion without altering his causal contribution to it. Having distinguished different senses of responsibility, unless otherwise indicated, “responsibility” will refer to “moral responsibility” (in the sense defined here) throughout the rest of this entry.

Until fairly recently, the bulk of philosophical work on moral responsibility was conducted in the context of debates about free will, which largely concerned the various ways that (various sorts of) determinism might threaten free will and moral responsibility. A largely unquestioned assumption was that free will is required for moral responsibility, and the central questions had to do with the ingredients of free will and with whether their possession was compatible with determinism. Recently, however, the literature on moral responsibility has addressed issues that are of interest independently of worries about determinism. Much of this entry will deal with these latter aspects of the moral responsibility debate. However, it will be useful to begin with issues at the intersection of concerns about free will and moral responsibility.

1. Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism

2.1 forward-looking accounts, 2.2.1 “freedom and resentment”, 2.2.2 criticisms of strawson’s approach, 2.3 reasons-responsiveness views, 3.1.1 attributability versus accountability, 3.1.2 attributionism, 3.1.3 answerability, 3.2.1 the moral competence condition on responsibility, 3.2.2 conversational approaches to responsibility, 3.2.3 psychopathy, 3.3.1 moral luck, 3.3.2 ultimate responsibility, 3.3.3 personal history and manipulation, 3.3.4 the epistemic condition on responsibility, other internet resources, related entries.

How is the responsible agent related to her actions; what power does she exercise over them? One (partial) answer is that the relevant power is a form of control, and, in particular, a form of control such that the agent could have done otherwise than to perform the action in question. This captures one commonsense notion of free will, and one of the central issues in debates about free will has been about whether possession of it (free will, in the ability-to-do-otherwise sense) is compatible with causal determinism (or with, for example, divine foreknowledge—see the entry on foreknowledge and free will ).

If causal determinism is true, then the occurrence of any event (including events involving human deliberation, choice, and action) that does in fact occur was made inevitable by—because it was causally necessitated by—the facts about the past (and the laws of nature) prior to the occurrence of the event. Under these conditions, the facts about the present, and about the future, are uniquely fixed by the facts about the past (and about the laws of nature): given these earlier facts, the present and the future can unfold in only one way. For more, see the entry on causal determinism .

If possession of free will requires an ability to act otherwise than one in fact does, then it is fairly easy to see why free will has often been regarded as incompatible with causal determinism. One way of getting at this incompatibilist worry is to focus on the way in which performance of a given action should be up to an agent if he has the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. As the influential Consequence Argument has it (Ginet 1966; van Inwagen 1983: 55–105; Wiggins 1973), the truth of determinism seems to entail that an agent’s actions are not up to him since they are the unavoidable consequences of things over which the agent lacks control. Here is an informal summary of this argument from Peter van Inwagen’s important book, An Essay on Free Will (1983):

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (1983: 16)

For an important argument that suggests that the Consequence Argument conflates different senses in which the laws of nature are not up to us, see David Lewis (1981). For more on incompatibilism and incompatibilist arguments, see the entries on free will , arguments for incompatibilism , and incompatibilist (nondeterministic) theories of free will , as well as Randolph Clarke (2003).

Compatibilists maintain that free will (and/or moral responsibility) is possible even in a deterministic universe. Versions of compatibilism have been defended since ancient times. For example, the Stoics—Chryssipus, in particular—argued that the truth of determinism does not entail that human actions are entirely explained by factors external to agents; thus, human actions are not necessarily explained in a way that is incompatible with praise and blame (see Bobzien 1998 and Salles 2005 for Stoic views on freedom and determinism). Similarly, philosophers in the Modern period (such as Hobbes and Hume) distinguished the general way in which our actions are necessitated if determinism is true from the specific instances of necessity sometimes imposed on us by everyday constraints on our behavior (e.g., physical impediments that make it impossible to act as we choose). The difference is that the necessity involved in determinism is compatible with agents acting as they choose to act: even if S ’s behavior is causally determined, it may be behavior that she chooses to perform. And perhaps the ability that matters for free will (and responsibility) is just the ability to act as one chooses, which seems to require only the absence of external constraints (and not the absence of determinism).

This compatibilist tradition was carried into the twentieth century by logical positivists such A. J. Ayer (1954) and Moritz Schlick (1930 [1966]). Here is how Schlick expressed the central compatibilist insight in 1930 (drawing, in particular, on Hume):

Freedom means the opposite of compulsion; a man is free if he does not act under compulsion , and he is compelled or unfree when he is hindered from without…when he is locked up, or chained, or when someone forces him at the point of a gun to do what otherwise he would not do. (1930 [1966: 59])

Since deterministic causal pressures do not always force one to “do what otherwise he would not do”, freedom—at least of the sort specified by Schlick—is compatible with determinism.

A closely related compatibilist strategy, influential in the early and mid-twentieth century, was to offer a conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise (Ayer 1954, Hobart 1934, Moore 1912; for earlier expressions, see Hobbes 1654 and Hume 1748). As just noted, even if determinism is true, agents may often act as they choose, and it is equally compatible with determinism that an agent who performed act A (on the basis of his choice to do so) might have performed a different action on the condition that (contrary to what actually happened) she had chosen to perform the other action. Even if a person’s actual behavior is causally determined by the actual past, it may be that if the past had been suitably different (e.g., if the person’s desires, intentions, choices, etc. had been different), then she would have acted differently. And perhaps this is all that the ability to do otherwise comes to: one can do otherwise if it is true that if one had chosen to do otherwise, then one would have done otherwise.

However, this compatibilist picture is open to serious objections. First, it might be granted that an ability to act as one sees fit is valuable, and perhaps related to the type of freedom at issue in the free will debate, but it does not follow that this is all that possession of free will comes to. A person who has certain desires as a result of indoctrination, brainwashing, or psychopathology may act as he chooses, but his free will and moral responsibility may still be called into question. (For more on the relevance of such factors, see §3.2 and §3.3.3 .) More specifically, the conditional analysis is open to the following sort of counterexample. It might be true that an agent who performs act A would have omitted A if she had so chosen, but it might also be true that the agent in question suffers from an overwhelming compulsion to perform act A . The conditional analysis suggests that the agent in question retains the ability to do otherwise than A , but, given her compulsion, it seems clear that she lacks this ability (Broad 1934, Chisholm 1964, Lehrer 1968, van Inwagen 1983). More generally, incompatibilists are likely to be dissatisfied with the conditional analysis since it fails to give an account of an ability that agents can have, right here and right now, to either perform or omit an action while holding everything about the here and now, and about the past, fixed.

Despite the above objections, the compatibilist project described so far has had significant lasting influence. As will be seen below, the fact that determined agents can act as they see fit is still an important inspiration for compatibilists, as is the fact that determined agents may have acted differently in counterfactual circumstances. For more, see the entry on compatibilism . For recent accounts related to (and improving upon) early compatibilist approaches, see Michael Fara (2008), Michael Smith (2003), and Kadri Vihvelin (2004), and for criticism of these accounts, see Randolph Clarke (2009).

Another influential trend in compatibilism has been to argue that moral responsibility does not require an ability to do otherwise. If this is right, then determinism would not threaten responsibility by ruling out access to behavioral alternatives (though determinism might threaten responsibility in other ways: see van Inwagen 1983: 182–88 and Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 151–168). In a very influential 1969 paper, Harry Frankfurt offers examples meant to show that an agent can be morally responsible for an action even if he could not have done otherwise. Versions of these examples are often called Frankfurt cases or Frankfurt examples . In the basic form of the example, an agent, Jones, considers a certain action. Another agent, Black, would like to see Jones perform this action and, if necessary, Black can make Jones perform it through some type of intervention in Jones’s deliberative process. However, as things transpire, Black does not intervene in Jones’s decision making since he can see that Jones will perform the action on his own and for his own reasons. Black does not intervene to ensure Jones’s action, but he could have, and he would have, had Jones showed some sign that he would not perform the action on his own. Therefore, Jones could not have done otherwise , yet he seems responsible for his behavior. After all, given Black’s non-intervention, Jones’s action is a perfectly ordinary bit of voluntary behavior.

There are questions about whether Frankfurt’s example really shows that Jones is morally responsible even though he couldn’t have done otherwise. For one thing, it may not be clear that Jones really couldn’t have done otherwise: while he performed the action on his own, there was the alternative that he perform the action due to some intervention on Black’s part, and not on his own. Furthermore, though he did not do so, Jones might have given Black some indication that he would not perform the action in question. Alternatively, an objection might be framed by asking how Black could be certain that Jones would or would not perform the action on his own. There seems to be a dilemma here. Perhaps determinism obtains in the universe of the example, and Black sees some sign that indicates the presence of factors that causally ensure that Jones will behave in a particular way. But in this case, incompatibilists are unlikely to grant that Jones is morally responsible if they think that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. On the other hand, perhaps determinism is not true in the universe of the example, but then it is not clear that the example excludes alternatives for Jones: if Jones’s behavior isn’t causally determined, then perhaps he can do otherwise. For objections to Frankfurt’s original example along these lines, see Carl Ginet (1996) and David Widerker (1995); for defenses of Frankfurt, see John M. Fischer (1994: 131–159; 2002; 2010); and for refined versions of Frankfurt’s example, meant to clearly deny Jones access to alternatives, see Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998), David Hunt (2000), and Derk Pereboom (2000; 2001: 18–28).

In response to criticisms such as the above, Frankfurt has said that his example was intended mainly to draw attention to the fact “that making an action unavoidable is not the same thing as bringing it about that the action is performed” (2006: 340; emphasis in original). In particular, while determinism may make an agent’s action unavoidable, it does not follow that the agent acts as he does only because determinism is true: it may also be true that he acts as he does because he wants to and because he sees reasons in favor of so acting. The point of his original example, Frankfurt suggests, was to draw attention to the significance that the actual causes of an agent’s behavior (such as her reasons and desires) can have independently of whether the agent might have done something else. Frankfurt concludes that “[w]hen a person acts for reasons of his own…the question of whether he could have done something else instead is quite irrelevant” for the purposes of assessing responsibility (2006: 340). A focus on the actual causes that lead to behavior, as well as investigation into when an agent can be said to act on her own reasons, has characterized a great deal of work on responsibility since Frankfurt’s essay (see §2.3 and §3.3.3 ).

2. Some Approaches to Moral Responsibility

This section discusses three important approaches to responsibility. Additional perspectives (attributionism, conversational theories, mesh or structural accounts, skeptical accounts, etc.) are introduced in more or less detail in the discussions of contemporary debates below.

Forward-looking approaches to moral responsibility justify responsibility practices by focusing on the beneficial consequences that can be obtained by engaging in these practices. This approach was influential in the earlier parts of the twentieth century (as well as before), had fallen out of favor by the closing decades of that century, and has recently been the subject of renewed interest.

Forward-looking perspectives tend to emphasize one of the central points discussed in the previous section: an agent’s being subject to determinism does not entail that he is subject to constraints that force him to act independently of his choices. If this is true, then, regardless of the truth of determinism, it may be useful to offer certain incentives to agents—to praise and blame them and generally to treat them as responsible—in order to encourage them to make certain choices and thus to secure positive behavioral outcomes.

According to some articulations of the forward-looking approach, to be a responsible agent is simply to be an agent whose motives, choices, and behavior can be shaped in this way. Thus, Moritz Schlick argued that

The question of who is responsible is the question concerning the correct point of application of the motive …. in this its meaning is completely exhausted; behind it lurks no mysterious connection between transgression and requital…. It is a matter only of knowing who is to be punished or rewarded, in order that punishment and reward function as such—be able to achieve their goal. (1930 [1966: 61]; emphasis in original)

And, according to Schlick, the goals of punishment and reward have nothing to do with the past: the idea that punishment “is a natural retaliation for past wrong, ought no longer to be defended in cultivated society” (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in original). Instead, punishment ought to be

concerned only with the institution of causes, of motives of conduct…. Analogously, in the case of reward we are concerned with an incentive. (1930 [1966: 60]; emphasis in original)

J. J. C. Smart (1961) also defended a well-known, forward-looking approach to moral responsibility in the mid-twentieth century. Smart claimed that to blame someone for a piece of behavior is simply to assess the behavior negatively (to “dispraise” it, in Smart’s terminology) while simultaneously ascribing responsibility for the behavior to the agent. And, for Smart, an ascription of responsibility merely involves taking an agent to be such that he would have omitted the behavior if he had been provided with a motive to do so. Whatever sanctions may follow on an ascription of responsibility are administered with eye to giving an agent motives to refrain from such behavior in the future.

Smart’s general approach has its contemporary defenders (Arneson 2003), but many have found it lacking in important ways. For one thing, as R. Jay Wallace notes, an approach like Smart’s “leaves out the underlying attitudinal aspect of moral blame” (Wallace 1996: 56, emphasis in original; see the next subsection for more on blaming attitudes). According to Wallace, the attitudes involved in blame are “backward-looking and focused on the individual agent who has done something morally wrong” (Wallace 1996: 56). But a forward-looking approach, with its focus on bringing about desirable outcomes

is not directed exclusively toward the individual agent who has done something morally wrong, but takes account of anyone else who is susceptible to being influenced by our responses. (Wallace 1996: 56; emphasis added)

In exceptional cases, a focus on beneficial outcomes may provide grounds for treating as blameworthy those who are known to be innocent (Smart 1973). This last feature of (some) forward-looking approaches has led to particularly strong criticism.

Recent efforts have been made to develop partially forward-looking accounts of responsibility that evade some of the criticisms mentioned above. These (somewhat revisionary) accounts justify our responsibility practices by appeal to their suitability for fostering moral agency and the acquisition of capacities required for such agency. Most notable in this regard is Manuel Vargas’s “agency cultivation model” of responsibility (2013; also see Jefferson 2019 and McGeer 2015). Recent conversational accounts of responsibility ( §3.2.2 ) also have an important forward-looking component insofar as they regard those with whom one might have fruitful moral interactions as candidates for responsibility. Some responsibility skeptics have also emphasized the forward-looking benefits of certain responsibility practices. For example, Derk Pereboom—who rejects desert-based blame—has argued that some conventional blaming practices can be maintained (even after ordinary notions of blameworthiness have been left behind) insofar as these practices are grounded in “non-desert invoking moral desiderata” such as “protection of potential victims, reconciliation to relationships both personal and with the moral community more generally, and moral formation” (2014: 134; also see Caruso 2016, Levy 2012, and Milam 2016). In contrast to some of the forward-looking approaches described above, Pereboom (2017) proposes that only those agents who have in fact acted immorally should be open to forward-aiming blaming practices. (For more on skepticism about responsibility, see §3.3 and the entry on skepticism about moral responsibility .)

2.2 The Reactive Attitudes Approach

P. F. Strawson’s 1962 paper, “Freedom and Resentment”, is a touchstone for much of the work on moral responsibility that followed it, especially the work of compatibilists. Strawson’s aim was to chart a course between incompatibilist accounts committed to a free will requirement on responsibility, and forward-looking compatibilist accounts that did not, in Strawson’s view, appropriately acknowledge and account for the interpersonal significance of the affective component of our responsibility practices. In contrast with forward-looking accounts such as J. J. C. Smart’s and Moritz Schlick’s ( §2.1 ), Strawson focuses directly on the emotions—the reactive attitudes—that play a fundamental role in our practices of holding one another responsible. Strawson’s suggestion is that attending to the logic of these emotional responses yields an account of what it is to be open to praise and blame that need not invoke the incompatibilist’s conception of free will. Indeed, Strawson’s view has been interpreted as suggesting that no metaphysical facts beyond our praising and blaming practices are needed to ground these practices.

Part of the novelty of Strawson’s approach is its emphasis on the “importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings” (1962 [1993: 48]) and on

how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people…reflect attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other. (1962 [1993: 49])

For Strawson, our practices of holding others responsible are largely responses to these things: that is, “to the quality of others’ wills towards us” (1962 [1993: 56]).

To get a sense of the importance of quality of will for our interpersonal relations, note the difference in your response to one who injures you accidentally as compared to how you respond to one who does you the same injury out of “contemptuous disregard” or “a malevolent wish to injure [you]” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 49]). The second case is likely to arouse a type and intensity of resentment that would not be (appropriately) felt in the first case. Corresponding points may be made about positive responses such as gratitude: you would likely not have the same feelings of gratitude toward a person who benefits you accidentally as you would toward one who does so out of concern for your welfare. The focus here is on personal reactive attitudes directed toward another on one’s own behalf, but Strawson also discusses “sympathetic or vicarious” attitudes felt on behalf of others, and “self-reactive attitudes” that an agent may direct toward herself (1962 [1993: 56–7]).

On Strawson’s view, the tendency to respond with relevant reactive attitudes to displays of good or ill will implicates a demand for moral respect and due regard. Indeed, for Strawson, “[t]he making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes”, and the attitudes themselves are the “correlates of the moral demand in the case where the demand is felt to be disregarded” (1962 [1993: 63]; emphasis in original). Thus, among the circumstances that mollify a person’s (negative) reactive attitudes, are those which show that—despite initial appearances—the demand for due regard has not been ignored or flouted. When someone explains that the injury she caused you was entirely unforeseen and accidental, she indicates that her regard for your welfare was not insufficient and that she is therefore not an appropriate target for the negative attitudes involved in moral blame.

Note that the agent who excuses herself from blame in the above way is not calling into question her status as a generally responsible agent: she is still open to the demand for due regard and liable, in principle, to reactive responses. Other agents, however, may be inapt targets for blame and the reactive emotions precisely because they are not legitimate targets of a demand for regard. In these cases, an agent is not excused from blame, he is exempted from it: it is not that his behavior is discovered to have been non-malicious, but rather that he is seen to be one of whom better behavior cannot reasonably be demanded. (The widely-used terminology in which the above contrast is drawn—“excuses” versus “exemptions”—is due to Watson 1987 [2004]).

For Strawson, the most important group of exempt agents includes those who are, at least for a time, significantly impaired for normal interpersonal relationships. These agents may be children, or psychologically impaired like the “schizophrenic”; they may exhibit “purely compulsive behaviour”, or their minds may have “been systematically perverted” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 51]). Alternatively, exempt agents may simply be “wholly lacking…in moral sense” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 58]), perhaps because they suffered from “peculiarly unfortunate…formative circumstances” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 52]). These agents are not candidates for the range of emotional responses involved in our personal relationships because they do not participate in these relationships in the right way for such responses to be sensibly applied to them. Rather than taking up interpersonally-engaged attitudes (that presuppose a demand for respect) toward exempt agents, we instead take an objective attitude toward them. The exempt agent is not regarded “as a morally responsible agent…as a member of the moral community” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 59]); though he may be regarded as “an object of social policy” and as something “to be managed or handled or cured or trained” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 52]).

Strawson’s perspective has an important compatibilist upshot. We may be able, in limited circumstances, to take up a detached, objective perspective on the behavior of normal (that is, non-exempt) agents. But Strawson argues that we cannot take up with this perspective permanently, and certainly not on the basis of discovering that determinism is true:

The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction [e.g., about the truth of determinism] might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any such things as interpersonal relationships as we normally understand them; and being involved in inter-personal relationships…precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question. (1962 [1993: 54])

More specifically, the truth of determinism would not show that human beings generally occupy excusing or exempting conditions that would make the attitudes involved in holding one another responsible inappropriate. It would not follow from the truth of determinism, for example, “that anyone who caused an injury either was quite simply ignorant of causing it or had acceptably overriding reasons for” doing so (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 53]; emphasis in original); nor would it follow (from the truth of determinism)

that nobody knows what he’s doing or that everybody’s behaviour is unintelligible in terms of conscious purposes or that everybody lives in a world of delusion or that nobody has a moral sense. (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 59])

Various objections have been raised regarding P. F. Strawson’s general theoretical approach to moral responsibility, his assumptions about human psychology and sociality, and his arguments for the compatibility of determinism and responsibility.

As noted in the previous subsection, Strawson argues that learning that determinism is true would not raise general concerns about our responsibility practices. This is because the truth of determinism would not show that human beings are generally abnormal in a way that would call into question their openness to the reactive attitudes: “it cannot be a consequence of any thesis which is not itself self-contradictory that abnormality is the universal condition” (P. Strawson 1962 [1993: 54]). In reply, it has been noted that while the truth of determinism might not suggest universal abnormality, it might well show that normal human beings are morally incapacitated in a way that is relevant to our responsibility practices (Russell 1992: 298–301). Strawson’s assumptions that we are too deeply and naturally committed to our reactive-attitude-involving practices to give them up, and that doing so would irreparably distort our moral lives, have also been criticized (Nelkin 2011: 42–45; G. Strawson 1986: 84–120; Watson 1987 [2004: 255–258]).

A different sort of objection emphasizes the response-dependence of Strawson’s account: that is, the way it explains an agent’s responsibility in terms of the moral responses that characterize a given community’s responsibility practices, rather than in terms of independent facts about whether the agent is responsible. This feature of Strawson’s approach invites a reading that may seem paradoxical:

In Strawson’s view, there is no such independent notion of responsibility that explains the propriety of the reactive attitudes. The explanatory priority is the other way around: It is not that we hold people responsible because they are responsible; rather, the idea ( our idea) that we are responsible is to be understood by the practice, which itself is not a matter of holding some propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and demands about our treatment of one another. (Watson 1987 [2004: 222]; emphasis in original; see Bennett 1980 for a related, non-cognitivist interpretation of Strawson’s approach)

Strawson’s approach would be particularly problematic if, as the above reading might suggest, it entails that a group’s responsibility practices are—as they stand and however they stand—beyond criticism simply because they are that group’s practices (Fischer & Ravizza 1993a: 18).

But there is something to be said from the other side of the debate. It may seem obvious that people are appropriately held responsible only if there are independent facts about their responsibility. But on reflection—and following R. Jay Wallace’s (1996) influential Strawsonian approach—it may be difficult “to make sense of the idea of a prior and thoroughly independent realm of moral responsibility facts” that is separate from our practices and yet to which our practices must answer (1996: 88). For Wallace, giving up on practice-independent responsibility facts doesn’t mean giving up on facts about responsibility; rather, “we must interpret the relevant facts [about responsibility] as somehow dependent on our practices of holding people responsible” (1996: 89). Such an interpretation requires an investigation into our practices, and what emerges most conspicuously, for Wallace, from this investigation is the degree to which our responsibility practices are organized around a fundamental commitment to fairness (1996: 101). Wallace develops this commitment to fairness, and to norms of fairness, into an account of the conditions under which people are appropriately held morally responsible for their behavior (1996: 103–109). (For a more recent defense of the response-dependent approach to responsibility, see Shoemaker 2017b; for criticism of such approaches, see Todd 2016.)

As noted in §1 , one of the lasting influences of Harry Frankfurt’s defense of compatibilism was to draw attention to the actual causes of agents’ behavior, and particularly to whether an agent—even a causally determined agent—acted for her own reasons. Reasons-responsiveness approaches to responsibility have been particularly attentive to these issues. These approaches ground responsibility by reference to agents’ capacities for being appropriately sensitive to the rational considerations that bear on their actions. Interpreted broadly, reasons-responsiveness approaches include a diverse collection of views, such as David Brink and Dana Nelkin (2013), John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998), Ishtiyaque Haji (1998), Michael McKenna (2013), Dana Nelkin (2011), Carolina Sartorio (2016), R. Jay Wallace (1996), and Susan Wolf (1990). Fischer and Ravizza’s Responsibility and Control (1998), which builds on Fischer (1994), offers the most influential articulation of the reasons-responsiveness approach.

Fischer and Ravizza begin with a distinction between regulative control and guidance control. Regulative control involves the possession of a dual power: “the power freely to do some act A , and the power freely to do something else instead” (1998: 31). Guidance control, on the other hand, does not require access to alternatives: it is manifested when an agent guides her behavior in a particular direction (and regardless of whether it was open to her to guide her behavior in a different direction). Since Fischer and Ravizza take Frankfurt cases ( §1 ) to show that access to behavioral alternatives is not necessary for moral responsibility, they conclude that “the sort of control necessarily associated with moral responsibility for action is guidance control ” and not regulative control (1998: 33; emphasis in original).

A number of factors can undermine guidance control. If a person’s behavior is brought about by hypnosis, brainwashing, or genuinely irresistible urges, then that person may not be morally responsible for her behavior since she does not reflectively guide it in the way required for responsibility (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 35). More specifically, an agent in the above circumstances is not likely to be responsible because he “is not responsive to reasons—his behavior would be the same, no matter what reasons there were” (1998: 37). Thus, Fischer and Ravizza characterize possession of guidance control as (partially) dependent on responsiveness to reasons. In particular, guidance control depends on whether the psychological mechanism that issues in an agent’s behavior is responsive to reasons. (Guidance control also requires that an agent owns the mechanism on which she acts. According to Fischer and Ravizza, this requires placing historical conditions on responsibility; see §3.3.3 .)

Fischer and Ravizza’s focus on mechanisms is motivated by the following reasoning. In a Frankfurt case, an agent is responsible for an action even though his so acting is ensured by external factors. But the presence of these external factors means that the agent in a Frankfurt case would have acted the same no matter what reasons he was confronted with, which suggests that the responsible agent in a Frankfurt scenario is not responsive to reasons. This is a problem for Fischer and Ravizza’s claim that guidance control, and thus reasons-responsiveness, is necessary for responsibility. Fischer and Ravizza’s solution is to argue that while the agent in a Frankfurt case may not be responsive to reasons, the agent’s mechanism—“the process that leads to the relevant upshot [i.e., the agent’s action]”—may well be responsive to reasons (1998: 38). In other words, the agent’s generally-specified psychological mechanism might have responded (under counterfactual conditions) to considerations in favor of omitting the action that the agent actually performed (and that he was guaranteed to perform, regardless of reasons, since he was in a Frankfurt-type scenario).

Fischer and Ravizza thus arrive at the following provisional conclusion: “relatively clear cases of moral responsibility”—that is, those in which an agent is not hypnotized, etc.—are distinguished by the fact that “an agent exhibits guidance control of an action insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action is his own, reasons-responsive mechanism” (1998: 39). But how responsive to reasons does an agent’s mechanism need to be for that agent to have the type of control over his behavior associated with moral responsibility? A strongly reasons-responsive mechanism would both recognize and respond to any sufficient reason to act otherwise (1998: 41). (In Fischer and Ravizza’s terminology, such a mechanism is strongly “receptive” and “reactive” to reasons). But strong reasons-responsiveness cannot be required for guidance control since many intuitively responsible agents—i.e., many garden variety wrongdoers—fail to attend to sufficient reasons to do otherwise. On the other hand, weak reasons-responsiveness is not enough for guidance control. An agent with a weakly reasons-responsive mechanism will respond appropriately to some sufficient reason to do otherwise, but the pattern of responsiveness revealed in the agent’s behavior might be too arbitrary for the agent to be credited with the kind of control required for responsibility. A person’s pattern of responsiveness to reasons would likely seem erratic in the relevant way if, for example, she would forego purchasing a ticket to a basketball game if it cost one thousand dollars, but not if it cost two thousand dollars (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 66).

Fischer and Ravizza settle on moderate reasons responsiveness as the sort that is most germane to guidance control (1998: 69–85). A psychological mechanism that is moderately responsive to reasons exhibits regularity with respect to its receptivity to reasons: that is, it exhibits “an understandable pattern of (actual and hypothetical) reasons-receptivity” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 71; emphasis in original). Such a pattern will indicate that an agent understands “how reasons fit together” and that, for example, “acceptance of one reason as sufficient implies that a stronger reason must also be sufficient” (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 71). (In addition, a pattern of regular receptivity to reasons will include receptivity to a range of moral considerations (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 77). This will rule out attributing moral responsibility to non-moral agents; see Todd and Tognazzini 2008 for criticism of Fischer and Ravizza’s articulation of this condition.) However, a moderately responsive mechanism may be only weakly reactive to reasons since, as Fischer and Ravizza put it (somewhat mysteriously), “reactivity is all of piece” such

that if an agent’s mechanism reacts to some incentive to…[do otherwise], this shows that the mechanism can react to any incentive to do otherwise. (1998: 73; emphasis in original)

Fischer and Ravizza’s account has generated a great deal of attention and criticism. Some critics focus on the contrast (just noted) between the conditions they impose on receptivity to reasons and those they impose on reactivity to reasons (McKenna 2005, Mele 2006a, Watson 2001). Additionally, many are dissatisfied with Fischer and Ravizza’s presentation of their account in terms of the powers of mechanisms as opposed to agents. This has led some authors to develop agent-based reasons-responsiveness accounts that address the concerns that led Fischer and Ravizza to their mechanism-based approach (Brink & Nelkin 2013, McKenna 2013, Sartorio 2016).

3. Contemporary Debates

3.1 the “faces” of responsibility.

Do our responsibility practices accommodate distinct forms of moral responsibility? Are there different senses in which people may be morally responsible for their behavior? Contemporary interest in these possibilities has its roots in a debate between Susan Wolf and Gary Watson. Among other things, Wolf’s important 1990 book, Freedom Within Reason , offers a critical discussion of “Real Self” theories of responsibility. According to these views, a person is responsible for behavior that is attributable to her real self, and

an agent’s behavior is attributable to the agent’s real self…if she is at liberty (or able) both to govern her behavior on the basis of her will and to govern her will on the basis of her valuational system. (Wolf 1990: 33)

The basic idea is that a responsible agent is not simply moved by her strongest desires, but also, in some way, approves of, or stands behind, the desires that move her because they are governed by her values or because they are endorsed by higher-order desires. Wolf’s central example of a Real Self view is Watson’s (1975). In an important and closely related earlier paper, Wolf (1987) characterizes Watson (1975), Harry Frankfurt (1971), and Charles Taylor (1976) as offering “deep self views”. For more on real-self/deep-self views, see §3.3.3 ; for a recent presentation of a real-self view, see Chandra Sripada (2016).

According to Wolf, one point in favor of Real Self views is that they explain why people acting under the influence of hypnosis or compulsive desires are often not responsible (1990: 33). Since these agents are typically unable, under these conditions, to govern their behavior on the basis of their valuational systems, they are alienated from their actions in a way that undermines responsibility. But, for Wolf, it is a mark against Real Self views that they tend to be silent on the topic of how agents come to have the selves that they do. An agent’s real self might, for example, be the product of a traumatic upbringing, and Wolf argues that this would give us reason to question the “agent’s responsibility for her real self” and thus her responsibility for the present behavior that issues from that self (1990: 37; emphasis in original). For an important account of an agent with such an upbringing, see Wolf’s (1987) fictional example of JoJo (and see Watson 1987 [2004] for a related discussion of the convicted murderer Robert Alton Harris). For discussion of JoJo in this entry, see §3.2.1 , and for general discussion of the relevance of personal history for present responsibility see §3.3.3 .

Wolf suggests that when a person’s real self is the product of serious childhood trauma (or related factors), then that person is potentially responsible for her behavior only in a superficial sense that merely attributes bad actions to the agent’s real self (1990: 37–40). However, Wolf argues that ascriptions of moral responsibility go deeper than such attributions can reach:

When…we consider an individual worthy of blame or of praise, we are not merely judging the moral quality of the event with which the individual is so intimately associated; we are judging the moral quality of the individual herself in some more focused, noninstrumental, and seemingly more serious way. (1990: 41)

This deeper form of assessment—assessment in terms of “deep responsibility” (Wolf 1990: 41)—requires more than that an agent is “able to form her actions on the basis of her values”, it also requires that “she is able to form her values on the basis of what is True and Good” (Wolf 1990: 75). This latter ability will be impaired or absent in an agent whose real self is the product of pressures (such as a traumatic childhood) that have distorted her moral vision. (For the relevance of moral vision, or “moral competence”, for responsibility, see §3.2 .)

In “Two Faces of Responsibility” (1996 [2004]), Gary Watson responds to Wolf. Watson agrees with Wolf that some approaches to responsibility—i.e., self-disclosure views (a phrase Watson borrows from Benson 1987)—focus narrowly on whether behavior is attributable to an agent. But Watson denies that these attributions constitute a merely superficial form of responsibility assessment. After all, behavior that is attributable to an agent—in the sense, for example, of issuing from her valuational system—often discloses something interpersonally and morally significant about the agent’s “fundamental evaluative orientation” (Watson 1996 [2004: 271]). Thus, ascriptions of responsibility in this responsibility-as-attributability sense are “central to ethical life and ethical appraisal” (Watson 1996 [2004: 263]).

However, Watson agrees with Wolf that the above story of responsibility is incomplete: there is more to responsibility than attributing actions to agents. In addition, we hold agents responsible for their behavior, which “is not just a matter of the relation of an individual to her behavior” (Watson 1996 [2004: 262]). When we hold responsible, we also “demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with these demands” (Watson 1996 [2004: 262]). The moral demands, and potential for adverse treatment, associated with holding others responsible are part of our accountability (as opposed to attributability) practices, and these features of accountability raise issues of fairness that do not arise in the context of determining whether behavior is attributable to an agent (Watson 1996 [2004: 273]). Therefore, conditions may apply to accountability that do not apply to attributability: for example, perhaps “accountability blame” should be—as Wolf suggested—moderated in the case of an agent whose “squalid circumstances made it overwhelmingly difficult to develop a respect for the standards to which we would hold him accountable” (Watson 1996 [2004: 281]).

There are, then, two forms, or “faces”, of responsibility on Watson’s account. There is responsibility-as-attributability, and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, behavior is properly attributed to her as reflecting morally important features of her self—her virtues and vices, for example. But there is also responsibility-as-accountability, and when an agent satisfies the conditions on this form of responsibility, which requires more than the correct attribution of behavior, she is open to being held accountable for that behavior in the ways that predominantly characterize moral blame.

It has become common for the views of several authors to be described (with varying degrees of accuracy) as instances of “attributionism”; see Neil Levy (2005) for the first use of this term. These authors include Robert Adams (1985), Nomy Arpaly (2003), Pamela Hieronymi (2004), T. M. Scanlon (1998, 2008), George Sher (2006a, 2006b, 2009), Angela Smith (2005, 2008), and Matthew Talbert (2012, 2013). Attributionists take moral responsibility assessments to be mainly concerned with whether an action (or omission, character trait, or belief) is attributable to an agent for the purposes of moral assessment, where this usually means that the action (or omission, etc.) reflects the agent’s “judgment sensitive attitudes” (Scanlon 1998), “evaluative judgments” (A. Smith 2005), or, more generally, her “moral personality” (Hieronymi 2008).

Attributionism resembles the self-disclosure views mentioned by Watson (see the previous subsection) insofar as both focus on the way that a responsible agent’s behavior discloses interpersonally and morally significant features of the agent’s self. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that contemporary attributionist views are interested only in specifying the conditions for what Watson calls responsibility-as-attributability. In fact, attributionists typically take themselves to be giving conditions for holding agents responsible in Watson’s accountability sense. (See the previous subsection for the distinction between accountability and attributability.)

According to attributionism, fulfillment of attributability conditions is sufficient for holding agents accountable for their behavior. This means that attributionism rejects conditions on moral responsibility that would excuse agents if their characters were shaped under adverse conditions (Scanlon 1998: 278–85), or if the thing for which the agent is blamed was not under her control (Sher 2006b and 2009, A. Smith 2005), or if the agent can’t be expected to recognize the moral status of her behavior (Scanlon 1998: 287–290; Talbert 2012). Attributionists reject these conditions on responsibility because morally and interpersonally significant behavior is attributable to agents that do not fulfill them, and such attributions are taken to be sufficient for an agent to be open to the responses involved in holding agents accountable for their behavior. Attributionists have also argued that blame may profitably be understood as a form of moral protest (Hieronymi 2001, A. Smith 2013, Talbert 2012); part of the appeal of this move is that moral protests may be legitimate in cases in which the above conditions are not met.

Several objections have been posed to attributionism. Some argue that attributionists are wrong to reject the conditions on responsibility mentioned in the last paragraph (Levy 2005, 2011; Shoemaker 2011, 2015a; Watson 2011). It has also been argued that the attributionist account of blame is too close to mere negative appraisal (Levy 2005; Wallace 1996: 80–1; Watson 2002). In addition, Scanlon (2008) has been criticized for failing to take negative emotions such as resentment to be central to the phenomenon of blame (Wallace 2011, Wolf 2011; a similar criticism would apply to Sher 2006a).

Building on the distinction between attributability and accountability ( §3.1.1 ), David Shoemaker (2011 and 2015a) has introduced a third form of responsibility: answerability. On Shoemaker’s view, attributability-responsibility assessments respond to facts about an agent’s character, accountability-responsibility responds to an agent’s degree of regard for others, and answerability-responsibility responds to an agent’s evaluative judgments. However, A. Smith (2015) and Hieronymi (2008 and 2014) use “answerability” to refer to a view more like the attributionist perspective described in the previous subsection, and Pereboom (2014) has used the term to indicate a form of responsibility more congenial to responsibility skeptics.

3.2 Moral Competence

The possibility that moral competence—the ability to recognize and respond to moral considerations—is a condition on moral responsibility has been suggested at several points above ( §2.2.1 , §2.2.2 , §2.3 , §3.1.1 , §3.1.2 ). Susan Wolf’s (1987) fictional story of “JoJo” is one of the best-known illustrations of this proposal. JoJo was raised by an evil dictator, and as a result he became the same sort of sadistic tyrant that his father was. As an adult, JoJo is happy to be the sort of person that he is, and he is moved by precisely the desires (e.g., to imprison, torture, and execute his subjects) that he wants to be moved by. Thus, JoJo fulfills important conditions on responsibility ( §3.1.1 , §3.3.3 ), however, Wolf argues that it may be unfair to hold him responsible for his bad behavior.

JoJo’s upbringing plays an important role in Wolf’s argument, but only because it left JoJo unable to fully appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. Thus, it is JoJo’s impaired moral competence that does the real excusing work, and similar conclusions of non-responsibility should be drawn about all those whom we think “could not help but be mistaken about their [bad] values”, if possession of these values impairs their ability to tell right from wrong (Wolf 1987: 57).

Many others join Wolf in arguing that impaired moral competence (perhaps on account of one’s upbringing or other environmental factors) undermines one’s moral responsibility (Benson 2001, Doris & Murphy 2007, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Fricker 2010, Levy 2003, Russell 1995 and 2004, Wallace 1996, Watson 1987 [2004]). Part of what motivates this conclusion is the thought that it can be unreasonable to expect morally-impaired agents to avoid wrongful behavior, and that it is therefore unfair to expose these agents to the harm of moral blame on account of their wrongdoing. For detailed development of the moral competence requirement on responsibility in terms of considerations of fairness, see R. Jay Wallace (1996); also see Erin Kelly (2013), Neil Levy (2009), and Gary Watson (1987 [2004]). For rejection of the claim that blame is unfair in the case of the morally-impaired agent, see several of the defenders of attributionism mentioned in §3.1.2 (particularly Hieronymi 2004, Scanlon 1998, and Talbert 2012)

The moral competence condition on responsibility can also be motivated by the suggestion that impaired agents are not able to commit wrongs that have the sort of moral significance to which blame would be an appropriate response. The basic idea here is that, while morally-impaired agents can fail to show appropriate respect for others, these failures do not necessarily constitute the kind of flouting of moral norms that grounds blame (Watson 1987 [2004: 234]). In other words, a failure to respect others, is not always an instance of blame-grounding disrespect for others, since the latter (but not the former) requires the ability to comprehend the norms that one violates (Levy 2007, Shoemaker 2011).

Considerations about moral competence play an important role in the recent trend of conversational theories of responsibility, which construe elements of our responsibility practices as morally-expressive moves in an ongoing moral conversation. The thought here is that to fruitfully (and fully) participate in such a conversation, one must have some degree of competence in the (moral) language of that conversation.

Several prominent versions of the conversational approach develop P. F. Strawson’s suggestion ( §2.2.1 ) that the negative reactive attitudes involved in blame are expressions of a demand for moral regard from other agents. Gary Watson argues that a demand “presumes”, as a condition on the intelligibility of expressing it, “understanding on the part of the object of the demand” (1987 [2004: 230]). Therefore, since, “[t]he reactive attitudes are incipiently forms of communication”, they are intelligibly expressed “only on the assumption that the other can comprehend the message”, and since the message is a moral one, “blaming and praising those with diminished moral understanding loses its ‘point,’” at least in a certain sense (Watson 1987 [2004: 230]; see Watson 2011 for a modification of this proposal). R. Jay Wallace argues, similarly, that since responsibility practices are internal to moral relationships that are

defined by the successful exchange of moral criticism and justification…. it will be reasonable to hold accountable only someone who is at least a candidate for this kind of exchange of criticism and justification. (1996: 164)

Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility (2012) offers the most developed conversational analysis of responsibility. For McKenna, the “moral responsibility exchange” occurs in stages: an initial “moral contribution” of morally salient behavior; the “moral address” of, e.g., blame that responds to the moral contribution; the “moral account” in which the first contributor responds to moral address with, e.g., apology; and so on (2012: 89). Like Wallace and Watson, McKenna notes the way in which a morally impaired agent will find it difficult “to appreciate the challenges put to her by those who hold [her] morally responsible”, but he also argues that a suitably impaired agent cannot even make the first move in a moral conversation (2012: 78). Thus, the morally impaired agent’s responsibility is called into question not only because she is unable to respond appropriately to moral demands, but also because “she is incapable of acting from a will with a moral quality that could be a candidate for assessment from the standpoint of holding responsible” (McKenna 2012: 78). This point is related to Neil Levy’s and David Shoemaker’s contention, noted in the previous subsection, that impairments of moral competence can leave an agent unable to harbor and express the type of ill will or lack of regard to which blame responds. By contrast, Watson (2011), seems to allow that significant moral impairment is compatible with the ability to perform blame-relevant wrongdoing, even if such impairment undermines the wrongdoer’s moral accountability for her actions.

For another important account of responsibility in broadly conversational terms, see Shoemaker’s discussion of the sort of moral anger involved in holding others accountable for their behavior (2015a: 87–117). For additional defenses and articulations of the conversational approach to responsibility, see Stephen Darwall (2006), Miranda Fricker (2016), and Colleen Macnamara (2015).

Impairments of moral competence come in degrees. Susan Wolf’s JoJo ( §3.2.1 ) has localized impairments of the capacity to recognize and respond to moral considerations, but it is not clear that he is entirely immune to moral considerations. However, at the far end of the spectrum, we encounter more globally and thoroughly impaired figures such as the psychopath. In philosophical treatments, the psychopath is typically presented as an agent who, while retaining other psychological capacities, is entirely—or as nearly so as possible—incapable of responding appropriately to moral considerations. (This is something of a philosophical construct since real-life psychopathy admits of varying degrees of impairment, corresponding to higher or lower scores on diagnostic measures.)

One interesting question is whether the psychopath’s inability—or at least consistent failure—to respond appropriately to moral incentives is primarily the result of a motivational rather than cognitive failure: does the psychopath in some way know what morality requires and simply not care? If a positive answer is given to this last question (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 76–81; Nichols 2002), then it seems likely that the psychopath could be responsible for at least some of his bad behavior. And some have argued that even if psychopathy is primarily a cognitive impairment, it may still be the case that psychopaths possess a sufficient capacity for distinguishing right and wrong—or that they possess sufficient related capacities—to be held responsible, at least to some extent and in certain ways (Glannon 1997, Greenspan 2003, Maibom 2008, Shoemaker 2014, Vargas & Nichols 2007). On the other hand, many believe that the psychopath’s capacity for grasping moral considerations is too superficial to sustain responsibility (Kennett 2019; Levy 2007; Nelkin 2015; Wallace 1996: 177–78; Watson 2011; see Mason 2017 for the claim that the relevant deficiency is one of moral knowledge rather than moral capacity). And still others have argued that even those who are fully impaired for moral understanding are open to blame as long as they possess broader rational competencies (Scanlon 1998: 287–290; Talbert 2014). However, the psychopath’s possession of these broader competencies has been called into question (Fine & Kennett 2004, Greenspan 2003, Litton 2010).

3.3 Skepticism and Related Topics

This section introduces contemporary skepticism about moral responsibility by way of discussions of several topics that have broad relevance for thinking about responsibility.

If moral responsibility requires free will, and free will involves access to alternatives in a way that is not compatible with determinism, then it would follow from the truth of determinism that no one is ever morally responsible. The above reasoning, and the skeptical conclusion it reaches, is endorsed by the hard determinist perspective on free will and responsibility, which was defended historically by Spinoza and d’Holbach (among others) and, more recently, by Ted Honderich (2002). But given that determinism may well be false, contemporary skeptics about moral responsibility more often pursue a hard incompatibilist line of argument according to which the kind of free will required for desert-based (as opposed to forward-looking, see §2.1 ) moral responsibility is incompatible with the truth or falsity of determinism (Pereboom 2001, 2014). The skeptical positions discussed below are generally of this sort: the skeptical conclusions they advocate do not depend on the truth of determinism.

According to Thomas Nagel, a person is subject to moral luck if factors that are not under that person’s control affect the moral assessments to which he is open (Nagel 1976 [1979]; also see Williams 1976 [1981] and the entry on moral luck .)

Is there such a thing as moral luck? More specifically, can luck affect a person’s moral responsibility? Consider a would-be assassin who shoots at her target, aiming to kill, but fails to do so only because her bullet is deflected by a passing bird. It seems that such a would-be assassin has good moral outcome luck (that is, good moral luck in the outcome of her behavior). Because of factors beyond her control, the would-be assassin’s moral record is better than it would have been: in particular, she is not a killer and is not morally responsible for causing anyone’s death. One might think, in addition, that the would-be assassin is less blameworthy than a successful assassin with whom she is otherwise identical, and that the reason for this is just that the successful assassin intentionally killed someone while the unsuccessful assassin (as a result of good moral luck) did not. (For important recent defenses of moral luck, see Hanna 2014 and Hartman 2017.)

On the other hand, one might think that if the two assassins just mentioned are identical in terms of their values, goals, intentions, and motivations, then the addition of a bit of luck to the unsuccessful assassin’s story cannot ground a deep contrast between these two agents in terms of their moral responsibility. One way to sustain this position is to argue that moral responsibility is a function solely of internal features of agents, such as their motives and intentions (Khoury 2018; also see Enoch & Marmor 2007 for some of the main arguments against moral luck). Of course, the successful assassin is responsible for something (killing a person) for which the unsuccessful assassin is not, but it might be possible to argue that both are morally responsible—and presumably blameworthy— to the same degree insofar as it was true of both of them that they aimed to kill, and that they did so for the same reasons and with the same degree of commitment toward bringing about that outcome (see M. Zimmerman 2002 and 2015 for this influential perspective).

But now consider a different would-be assassin who does not even try to kill anyone, but only because his circumstances did not favor this option. This would-be assassin is willing to kill under favorable circumstances (and so he may seem to have had good circumstantial moral luck since he was not in those circumstances). Perhaps the degree of responsibility attributed to the successful and unsuccessful assassins described above depends not so much on the fact that they both tried to kill as on the fact that they were both willing to kill; in this case, the would-be assassin just introduced may share their degree of responsibility since he shares their willingness to kill. But an account that focuses on how agents would be willing to act under counterfactual circumstances is likely to generate unintuitive conclusions about responsibility since many agents who are typically judged blameless might willingly perform terrible actions under the right circumstances. (M. Zimmerman 2002 and 2015 does not shy away from this consequence, but criticisms of his efforts to reject moral luck—Hanna 2014, Hartman 2017—have made much of it; see Peels 2015 for a position that is related to Zimmerman’s but that may avoid the unintuitive consequence just mentioned.)

Another approach to luck holds that it is inimical to moral responsibility in a way that generally undermines responsibility ascriptions. To see the motivation for this skeptical position, consider constitutive moral luck: that is, luck in how one is constituted in terms of the “inclinations, capacities, and temperament” one finds within oneself (Nagel 1976 [1979: 28]). Facts about a person’s inclinations, capacities, and temperament explain much—if not all—of that person’s behavior, and if the facts that explain why a person acts as she does are a result of good or bad luck, then perhaps it is unfair to hold her responsible for that behavior. As Nagel notes, once the full sweep of the various kinds of luck comes into view, “[t]he area of genuine agency” may seem to shrink to nothing since our actions and their consequences “result from the combined influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not within the agent’s control” (1976 [1979: 35]). If this is right, then perhaps,

nothing remains which can be ascribed to the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a…sequence of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised. (Nagel 1976 [1979: 37])

The above quotations notwithstanding, Nagel himself doesn’t fully embrace a skeptical conclusion about responsibility on grounds of moral luck, but others have done so, most notably, Neil Levy (2011). According to Levy’s “hard luck view”, the encompassing nature of moral luck means “that there are no desert-entailing differences between moral agents” (2011: 10). Of course, there are differences between agents in terms of their characters and the good or bad actions and outcomes that they produce, but Levy’s point is that, given the influence of luck in generating these differences, they don’t provide a sound basis for differential treatment of people in terms of moral praise and blame. (See Russell 2017 for a compatibilist account that is led to a variety of pessimism, though not skepticism, on the basis of the concerns about moral luck just described.)

Another important skeptical argument—related to the observations about constitutive moral luck in the previous subsection—is Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument, which concludes that “we cannot be truly or ultimately morally responsible for our actions” (1994: 5). (Since the argument targets “ultimate” moral responsibility, it does not necessarily exclude other forms, such as forward-looking responsibility ( §2.1 ) and, on some understandings, responsibility-as-attributability ( §3.1.1 ).) The argument begins by noting that an agent makes the choices she does because of certain facts about the way she is: for example, the facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. But if this is true, then, in order to be responsible for her subsequent choices, perhaps an agent also needs to be responsible for the facts about what seems choiceworthy to her. But how can one be responsible for these prior facts about herself? Wouldn’t this require a prior choice on the part of the agent, one that resulted in her present dispositions to see certain ends and means as choiceworthy? But this prior choice would itself be something for which the agent is responsible only if the agent is also responsible for the fact that that prior choice seemed choiceworthy to her. And now we must explain how the agent can be responsible for this additional prior fact about herself, which will require positing another choice by the agent, and the responsibility for that choice will also have to be secured, which will require explaining why it seemed choiceworthy to her, and so on. A regress looms here, and Strawson claims that it cannot be stopped except by positing an initial act of self-creation on the responsible agent’s part (1994: 5, 15). Only self-creating agents could be fully responsible for their own tendencies to exercise their powers of choice as they do, but self-creation is impossible, so no one is every truly or ultimately morally responsible for their behavior.

A number of replies to this argument (and the argument from constitutive moral luck) are possible. One might simply deny that how a person came to be the way she is matters for present responsibility: perhaps all we need to know in order to judge a person’s present responsibility are facts about her present constitution and about how that constitution is related to the person’s present behavior. (For views like this, see the discussion of attributionism ( §3.1.2 ) and the discussion of non-historical accounts of responsibility in the next subsection). Alternatively, one might think that while personal history matters for moral responsibility, Strawson’s argument sets the bar too high, requiring too much historical control over one’s constitution (see Fischer 2006; for a reply, see Levy 2011: 5). Perhaps what is needed is not literal self-creation, but simply an ability to enact changes in oneself so as to acquire responsibility for the self that results from these changes (Clarke 2005). A picture along these lines can be found in Aristotle’s suggestion that one can be responsible for being a careless person if one’s present state of carelessness is the result of earlier choices that one made (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics ; see also Michele Moody-Adams 1990).

Roughly in this Aristotelian vein, Robert Kane offers a detailed incompatibilist account of how we can secure ultimate responsibility for our actions (1996 and 2007). On Kane’s view, for an agent

to be ultimately responsible for [a] choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the past for having the character and motives he or she now has. (2007: 14; emphasis in original)

This position may appear to be open to the regress concerns presented in Galen Strawson’s argument above. But Kane thinks a regress is avoided in cases in which a person’s character-forming choices are undetermined. Since these undetermined choices will have no sufficient causes, there is no relevant prior cause for which the agent must be responsible, so there is no regress problem (Kane 2007: 15–16; see Pereboom 2001: 47–50 for criticism of Kane on this point.)

Of particular interest to Kane are potential character-forming choices that occur “when we are torn between competing visions of what we should do or become” (2007: 26). In such cases, if a person sees reasons in favor of either choice that he might make, and the choice that he makes is undetermined, then whichever choice he makes will have been chosen for his own reasons. According to Kane, when an agent makes this kind of choice, he shapes his character, and since his choice is not determined by prior causal factors, he is responsible for it and for the character it shapes and for the character-determined choices that he makes in the future.

Kane’s approach is an important instance of those incompatibilist theories that attempt to explain how free will, while requiring indeterminism, could clearly be at home in the natural world as we know it (also see Balaguer 2010, Ekstrom 2000, and Franklin 2018). (This is as opposed to agent-causal accounts of free will—Chisholm 1964, O’Connor 2000—that invoke a type of causal power that is less easily naturalized). However, many have argued that any account like Kane’s, which inserts an indeterministic link in the causal chain leading to action, actually reduces an agent’s control over an action or at least leaves it unclear why such an insertion would increase agential control over actions as compared to a deterministic story of action (Hobart 1934; Levy 2011: 41–83; Pereboom 2014: 31–49; van Inwagen 1983: 126–52; Watson 1999).

Accounts such as Neil Levy’s (2011) and Galen Strawson’s (1994), described in the two preceding subsections, assume that the facts about the way a person came to be the way she is are relevant for determining her present responsibility. But non-historical views, such as attributionism ( §3.1.2 ) and the views that Susan Wolf calls “Real Self” theories ( §3.1.1 ), reject this contention. Real Self accounts are sometimes referred to as “structural” or “hierarchical” theories, and John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998: 184–187) have called them “mesh” theories. By whatever name, the basic idea is that an agent is morally responsible insofar as her will has the right sort of structure: in particular, there needs to be a mesh or fit between the desires that actually move the agent and her values, or between the desires that move her and her higher-order desires, the latter of which are the agent’s reflective preferences about which desires should move her. (For approaches along these lines, see Dworkin 1970; Frankfurt 1971, 1987; Neely 1974; and Watson 1975.)

Harry Frankfurt’s comparison between a willing drug addict and an unwilling addict illustrates important features of his version of the structural approach to responsibility. Both of Frankfurt’s addicts have desires to take the drug to which they are addicted, and the nature of their addictions is such that both addicts will ultimately act to fulfill their first-order addictive desire. But suppose that both addicts are capable of taking higher-order perspectives on their first-order desires, and suppose that they take different higher-order perspectives. The willing addict endorses and identifies with his addictive desire. The unwilling addict, on the other hand, repudiates his addictive desire to such an extent that, when it ends up being effective, Frankfurt says that this addict is “helplessly violated by his own desires” (1971: 12). The willing addict has a kind of freedom that the unwilling addict lacks: they may both be bound to take the drug to which they are addicted, but insofar as the willing addict is moved by a desire that he endorses, he acts freely in a way that the unwilling addict does not (Frankfurt 1971: 19). A related conclusion about responsibility may be drawn: perhaps the unwilling addict’s desire is alien to him in such a way that his responsibility for acting on it is called into question (for a recent defense of this conclusion, see Sripada 2017).

One objection to Frankfurt’s view goes like this. His account seems to assume that the addicts’ higher-order desires have the authority to speak for them—they reveal (or constitute) the agent’s “real self”, to use Wolf’s language (1990). But if higher-order desires are invoked out of a concern that an agent’s first-order desires may not stem from his real self, why won’t the same worry recur with respect to higher-order desires as well? In other words, when ascending through the orders of desires, why stop at any particular point, why not think that appeal to a still higher order is always necessary to reveal where an agent stands? (See Watson (1975) for an objection along these lines, which partly motivates Watson—in his articulation of a structural approach—to focus on whether an agent’s desires conform with her values , rather than with her higher-order desires).

And even if one agrees with Frankfurt (or Watson) about the structural elements required for responsibility, one might wonder how an agent’s will came to have its particular structure. Thus, an important type of objection to Frankfurt’s view notes that the relevant structure might have been put in place by factors that intuitively undermine responsibility, in which case the presence of the relevant structure is not itself sufficient for responsibility (Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 196–201; Locke 1975; Slote 1980). Fischer and Ravizza argue that

[i]f the mesh [between higher- and lower-order desires] were produced by…brainwashing or subliminal advertising…we would not hold the agent morally responsible for his behavior

because the psychological mechanism that produced the behavior would not be, “in an important intuitive sense, the agent’s own ” (1998: 197; emphasis in original). In response to this type of worry, Fischer and Ravizza argue that responsibility has an important historical component, which they attempt to capture with their account of how agents can “take responsibility” for the psychological mechanisms that produces their behavior (1998: 207–239). (For criticism of Fischer and Ravizza’s account of taking responsibility, see Levy 2011: 103–106 and Pereboom 2001: 120–22; for quite different accounts of taking responsibility, see Enoch 2012; Mason 2019: 179–207; and Wolf 2001. For work on the general significance of personal histories for responsibility, see Christman 1991, Vargas 2006, and D. Zimmerman 2003.)

Part of Fischer and Ravizza’s motivation for developing their account of “taking responsibility” was to ensure that agents who have been manipulated in certain ways do not turn out to be responsible on their view. Several examples and arguments featuring the sort of manipulation that worried Fischer and Ravizza have played important roles in the recent literature on responsibility. One of these is Alfred Mele’s Beth/Ann example (1995, 2006b), which emphasizes the difficulties faced by accounts of responsibility that eschew historical conditions. In the example, Ann has acquired her preferences and values in the normal way, but Beth is manipulated by a team of neuroscientists so that she now has preferences and values that are identical to Ann’s. After the manipulation, Beth is capable of reflecting on her new values, and when she does so, she endorses them enthusiastically. But whereas we might normally take such an endorsement to be a sign of the sort of self-governance associated with responsibility, Mele suggests that Beth, unlike Ann, exhibits merely “ersatz self-government” since Beth’s new values where imposed on her (1995: 155). And if certain kinds of personal histories similarly undermine an agent’s ability to genuinely or authentically govern her behavior, then agents with these histories will not be morally responsible. (For replies to Mele and general insights into manipulation cases, see Arpaly 2003, King 2013, McKenna 2004, and Todd 2011; for discussion of issues about personal identity that arise in manipulation cases, see Khoury 2013, Matheson 2014, Shoemaker 2012)

Now one can take a hard line in Beth’s case (McKenna 2004). Such a stance might involve noting that while Beth acquired her new values in a strange way (and in a way that involved moral wrongs done to her), everyone acquires their values in ways that are not fully under their control. Indeed, following Galen Strawson’s line of argument (1994), described in §3.3.2 , it might be noted that no one has ultimate control over their values, and even if normal agents have some capacity to address and alter their values, the dispositional factors that govern how this capacity is used are ultimately the result of factors beyond agents’ control. So perhaps it is not as clear as it might first appear that Beth is distinguished from normal agents in terms of her powers of self-governance and her moral responsibility for her behavior. But this reasoning can cut both ways: instead of showing that Beth is assimilated into the class of normal, responsible agents, it might show that normal agents are assimilated into the class of non-responsible agents like Beth. Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument employs a maneuver along these lines (1995, 2001, 2007, 2014).

Pereboom’s argument presents Professor Plum in four different scenarios. In each scenario, Plum kills Ms. White while satisfying the conditions on desert-involving moral responsibility most often proposed by compatibilists (and described in earlier sections of this entry): Plum kills White because he wants to, and while this desire is in keeping with Plum’s character, it is not irresistible; Plum also endorses his desire to kill White from a higher-order volitional perspective; finally, Plum is generally morally competent, and the process of deliberation that leads to his decision to kill White is appropriately responsive to reasons.

In Case 1, Plum is “created by neuroscientists, who…manipulate him directly through the use of radio-like technology” (Pereboom 2001: 112). These scientists cause Plum’s reasoning to take a certain (reasons-responsive) path that culminates in Plum concluding that the self-serving reasons in favor of killing White outweigh the reasons in favor of not doing so. Pereboom believes that in such a case Plum is clearly not responsible for killing White since his behavior was determined by the actions of the neuroscientists. In Cases 2 and 3, Plum is causally determined to undertake the same reasoning process as in Case 1, but in Case 2 Plum is merely programmed to do so by neuroscientists (rather than having been created by them), and in Case 3 Plum’s reasoning is the result of socio-cultural influences that determine his character. In Case 4, Plum is just a normal human being in a causally deterministic universe, and he decides to kill White in the same way as in the previous cases.

Pereboom claims that there is no relevant difference between Cases 1, 2, and 3 such that our judgments about Plum’s responsibility should be different in these three cases. Furthermore, the reason that Plum is not responsible in these cases seems to be that, in each case, his behavior is causally determined by forces beyond his control (Pereboom 2001: 116). But then we should conclude that Plum is not responsible in Case 4 (since causal determinism is the defining feature of that case). And since, in Case 4, Plum is just a normal human being in a causally deterministic universe, the conclusion we draw about him should extend to all other normal persons in causally deterministic universes. (For an important, related manipulation argument, see Mele’s “zygote argument” in Mele 1995, 2006b, and 2008.)

Pereboom’s argument has inspired a number of objections. For example, it could be argued that in Case 1, the manipulation to which Plum is subject undermines his responsibility for some reason besides the fact that the manipulation causally determines his behavior, which would stop the generalization from Case 1 to the subsequent cases (Fischer 2004, Mele 2005, Demetriou 2010; for a response to this line of argument, see Matheson 2016; Pereboom addresses this concern in his 2014 presentation of the argument; also see Shabo 2010). Alternatively, it might be argued, on compatibilist grounds, that Plum is responsible in Case 4, and this conclusion might be extended to the earlier cases since Plum fulfills the same compatibilist-friendly conditions on responsibility in those cases (McKenna 2008).

The four-case argument attempts to show that if determinism is true, then we cannot be the sources of our actions in the way required for moral responsibility. It is, therefore, an argument for incompatibilism rather than for skepticism about moral responsibility. But, in combination with Pereboom’s argument that we lack the sort of free will required for responsibility even if determinism is false (2001: 38–88; 2014: 30–70), the four-case argument has emerged as an important part of a detailed and influential skeptical perspective. For other skeptical accounts, see Caruso (2016), Smilansky (2000), Waller (2011); also see the entry on skepticism about moral responsibility .

There has been a recent surge in interest in the epistemic, or knowledge, condition on responsibility (as opposed to the freedom or control condition that is at the center of the free will debate). In this context, the following epistemic argument for skepticism about responsibility has been developed. (In certain structural respects, the argument resembles Galen Strawson’s skeptical argument discussed in §3.3.2 .)

Sometimes agents act in ignorance of the likely bad consequences of their actions, and sometimes their ignorance excuses them from blame for so acting. But in other cases, an agent’s ignorance might not excuse him. How can we distinguish the cases where ignorance excuses from those in which it does not? One proposal is that ignorance fails to excuse when the ignorance is itself something for which an agent might be blamed. And one proposal for when ignorance is blameworthy is that it issues from a blameworthy benighting act in which an agent culpably impairs, or fails to improve, his own epistemic position (H. Smith 1983). In such a case, the agent’s ignorance seems to be his own fault, so it cannot be appealed to in order to excuse the agent.

But when is a benighting act blameworthy? Several philosophers have suggested that we are culpable for benighting acts only when we engage in them knowing that we are doing so and knowing that we should not do so (Levy 2011, Rosen 2004, M. Zimmerman 1997). Ultimately, the suggestion is that ignorance for which one is blameworthy, and that leads to blameworthy unwitting wrongdoing, has its source in knowing wrongful behavior. Thus, if someone unwittingly does something wrong, then that person will be blameworthy only if we can explain his lack of knowledge (his “unwittingness”) by reference to something else that he knowingly did wrong.

Consider an example from Gideon Rosen (2004) in which a surgeon orders her patient to be transfused with the wrong type of blood, and suppose that the surgeon was unaware that she was making this mistake. According to Rosen, the surgeon will be blameworthy for harming her patient only if she is blameworthy for being ignorant about the patient’s blood type when she requests the transfusion, and she will be blameworthy for this only if her ignorance stems from some instance in which the surgeon knowingly failed to do something that she ought to have done to avoid her later ignorance. It won’t, for example, be enough that the surgeon’s ignorance is explained by her failure to doublecheck the patient’s medical records. In order to ground blame, this omission on the surgeon’s part must itself have been culpable, which requires that the surgeon knew that this omission was wrong. And if the surgeon wasn’t aware that she was committing a wrongful omission (when she failed to doublecheck her patient’s medical records), then this failure of knowledge on the surgeon’s part must be explained by some prior culpable—that is, knowing—act or omission. In the end, for Rosen,

the only possible locus of original responsibility [for a later unwitting act] is an akratic act …. a knowing sin. (2004: 307; emphasis in original)

Similarly, Michael Zimmerman argues that

all culpability can be traced to culpability that involves lack of ignorance, that is, that involves a belief on the agent’s part that he or she is doing something morally wrong. (1997: 418)

The above reasoning may apply not just to cases in which a person is unaware of the consequences of her action, but also to cases in which a person is unaware of the moral status of her behavior. A slaveowner, for example, might think that slaveholding is permissible, and so, on the account considered here, he will be blameworthy only if he is culpable for his ignorance about the moral status of slavery, which will require, for example, that he ignored evidence about its moral status while knowing that this is something he should not do (Rosen 2003 and 2004).

These reflections can give rise to a couple forms of skepticism about moral responsibility (and particularly about blameworthiness). First, we might come to endorse a form of epistemic skepticism on the grounds that we rarely have insight into whether a wrongdoer was akratic—that is, was a knowing wrongdoer—at some suitable point in the etiology of a given action (Rosen 2004). Alternatively, or in addition, one might endorse a more substantive form of skepticism on the grounds that a great many normal wrongdoers don’t exhibit the sort of knowing wrongdoing supposedly required for responsibility. In other words, perhaps very many wrongdoers don’t know that they are wrongdoers and their ignorance on this score is not their fault since it doesn’t arise from an appropriate earlier instance of knowing wrongdoing. In this case, very many ordinary wrongdoers may fail to be morally responsible for their behavior. (For skeptical suggestions along these lines, see M. Zimmerman 1997 and Levy 2011.)

There is more to the epistemic dimension of responsibility than what is contained in the above skeptical argument, but the argument does bring out a lot of what is of interest in this domain. For one thing, it prominently relies on a tracing strategy. This strategy is used, for example, in accounts that feature a person who does not, at the time of action, fulfill control or knowledge conditions on responsibility, but who nonetheless seems morally responsible for her behavior. In such a case, the agent’s responsibility may be grounded in the fact that her failure to fulfill certain conditions on responsibility is traceable to earlier actions undertaken by the agent when she did fulfill these conditions. For example, a person may be so intoxicated that she lacks control over, or awareness of, her behavior, and yet it may still be appropriate to hold her responsible for her intoxicated behavior insofar as she freely took steps to intoxicate herself. The tracing strategy plays an important role in many accounts of responsibility (see, e.g., Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 49–51), but it has also been subjected to important criticisms (see Vargas 2005; for a reply see Fischer and Tognazzini 2009; for more on tracing, see Khoury 2012, King 2014, Shabo 2015, and Timpe 2011).

Various strategies for rejecting the above skeptical argument also illustrate stances one can take on the relevance of knowledge for responsibility. These strategies typically involve rejecting the claim that knowing wrongdoing is fundamental to blameworthiness. For example, it might be argued that it is often morally reckless to perform actions when one is merely uncertain whether they are wrong, and that this recklessness is sufficient for blameworthiness (see Guerrero 2007; also see Nelkin & Rickless 2017b and Robichaud 2014). Another strategy would be to argue that blameworthiness can be grounded in cases of morally ignorant wrongdoing if it is reasonable to expect the wrongdoer to have avoided her moral ignorance, and particularly if her ignorance is itself caused by the agent’s own epistemic and moral vices (FitzPatrick 2008 and 2017). Relatedly, it might be argued that one who is unaware that he does wrong is blameworthy if he possessed relevant capacities for avoiding his failure of awareness; this approach may be particularly promising in cases in which an agent’s lack of moral awareness stems from a failure to remember her moral duties (Clarke 2014, 2017 and Sher 2006b, 2009; also see Rudy-Hiller 2017). Finally, it might simply be claimed that morally ignorant wrongdoers can harbor, and express through their behavior, objectionable attitudes or qualities of will that suffice for blameworthiness (Arpaly 2003, Björnsson 2017, Harman 2011, Mason 2015, Talbert 2013). This approach may be most promising in cases in which a wrongdoer is aware of the material outcomes of her conduct but unaware of the fact that she does wrong in bringing about those outcomes.

For more, see the entry on the epistemic condition for moral responsibility .

The special issues of Midwest Studies in Philosophy cited in the Introduction are Volume 30 (2006) and Volume 38 (2014), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• The Determinism and Freedom Philosophy Website , edited by Ted Honderich, University College London.
• Flickers of Freedom (multiple contributors, coordinated by Thomas Nadelhoffer, closed 9 February 2017, archive version)
• Eshleman, Andrew, “Moral Responsibility”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/moral-responsibility/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — see the version history .]

blame | compatibilism | determinism: causal | free will | free will: divine foreknowledge and | incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will | incompatibilism: arguments for | luck: moral | moral responsibility: the epistemic condition | responsibility: collective | skepticism: about moral responsibility

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Derk Pereboom for his helpful comments on drafts of this entry.

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Home — Essay Samples — Life — Responsibility — The Nature of Responsibility

The Nature of Responsibility

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Published: Sep 4, 2018

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Works Cited:

• Bartholomew, R. E. (2018). Understanding conversion disorder: A guide for the medical profession. ABC-CLIO.
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• Hansen, C. B. (2017). Witches, Magic, and Transgression in the European Middle Ages. Oxford University Press.
• Kirsch, G. E. (2019). The Salem witch trials: A reference guide. ABC-CLIO.
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• Rosenthal, B. (2013). Salem story: reading the witch trials of 1692. Cambridge University Press.
• Starkey, M. (2015). The Devil in Massachusetts: A Modern Enquiry into the Salem Witch Trials. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.
• Wright, L. (2017). Salem witch trials. Routledge.
• Woolf, A. (2019). The Salem Witch Trials. Pearson Education Limited.

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Why Responsibility Is So Important

Written by Steve Rose

Identity, purpose, and belonging, 13 comments(s).

With all of the social distancing measures over the last year, we have been repeatedly told by public health officials that it is our responsibility to stay home and flatten the curve.

You are not responsible for the problem, but you now find yourself responsible for part of the solution.

It can be frustrating, it can be isolating, and it might not seem fair.

Although we may sometimes want to resist the calls to take responsibility, consider the other areas of life where you are not responsible for the problem but still need to be part of the solution.

If you’ve experienced trauma leading to mental health issues, you are not responsible for the problem, but you are responsible for being part of the solution.

The same goes for a heredity illness. You are not responsible for the problem, but you are responsible for being part of the solution.

Falling into a victim mindset only serves to strengthen the problem.

If you or someone you know is struggling with mental health issues, you can check out my  resource page  for suggestions on how to find help.

Table of Contents

What is responsibility?

Responsibility is the ability to respond.

Not paralyzed by fear, plagued by anxiety, or procrastinating, pretending the problem doesn’t exist.

Responsibility means being prepared, but not panicked. It requires planning, but not perfectionistic plots to control the uncontrollable.

Responsibility consists of accepting uncertainty, knowing you will do what you can control, and letting go of the things you cannot.

Responsibility requires a response proportional to the problem, adapting to obstacles as they arise.

The psychologist Jordan Peterson says the physical posture of responsibility is standing up straight with your shoulders back, in 12 Rules for Life :

To stand up straight with your shoulders back is to accept the terrible responsibility of life, with eyes wide open. It means deciding to voluntarily transform the chaos of potential into the realities of habitable order. It means adopting the burden of self-conscious vulnerability, and accepting the end of the unconscious paradise of childhood, where finitude and mortality are only dimly comprehended. It means willingly undertaking the sacrifices necessary to generate a productive and meaningful reality (it means acting to please God, in the ancient language).

Why is responsibility important?

Responsibility is important because it provides a sense of purpose, in addition to building resilience amidst adversity on an individual and societal level.

Like an addiction, sidestepping responsibility may feel good in the short-term, but leads to exponentially worse pain and suffering in the long term.

A tiger metaphor by Steven Hayes seems fitting here.

Imagine you adopted a tiger cub into your home. It is cute, cuddly, and harmless. You notice it begins to purr loudly, and the only way you can make it stop is to feed it red meat. Over the months and years, you keep doing this, but the tiger is now several hundred pounds, requiring whole sides of beef. Rather than a cute purr, the tiger roars ferociously for its meat. You are terrified, so you keep giving him the meat so he will leave you alone. The more you feed it, the larger it gets, and the more trapped you become.

In this metaphor, feeding the tiger symbolizes sidestepping your responsibilities. There is temporary relief, but a long term cost. Each time you avoid responsibility, you are feeding the tiger, making the problem larger, giving up long term freedom and control.

Why do people choose to become trapped in troublesome tiger relations? Jordan Peterson explains one potential reason in 12 Rules for Life :

Sometimes, when people have a low opinion of their own worth or, perhaps, when they refuse responsibility for their lives they choose a new acquaintance, of precisely the type who proved troublesome in the past. Such people don’t believe that they deserve any better so they don’t go looking for it. Or, perhaps, they don’t want the trouble of better.”

Let’s go deeper into how low self-worth prevents responsibility and look at how to build a sense of purpose through responsibility to one’s self, one’s family, and one’s society.

Responsibility provides a sense of purpose

Avoiding responsibility destroys a sense of purpose. Purpose comes from a sense of contribution and connection to something larger than yourself. But first, it is necessary to take responsibility for yourself. By being the best version of yourself, you can then be the most helpful to others.

Being responsible for yourself

This requires taking care of your basic needs. In the recovery community, it is common to use the acronym, HALT. Are you hungry, angry, lonely, or tired? Regularly check in on your current state and address deficiencies where appropriate.

Another way to maintain self-responsibility is to organize the clutter in your physical environment and the chaos in your day-to-day life. Prioritize your sleep, nutrition, and exercise. If all of this sounds overwhelming, start small. As Jordan Peterson says, “Clean your damn room!” But as he also says, “Cleaning up your room involves cleaning up far more than your room.”

Doing something useful for yourself is the first step in reorienting yourself amidst the mental fog of purposelessness. As the fog begins to thin out, you can start to see beyond yourself. This leads to step two:

Being responsible within your family 

Once you’re adequately useful to yourself and can help from a place of genuine giving, you can be useful to others close to you.

I mention genuine giving because many people try to be useful to others without addressing their own needs first. This often results in codependent relationships where you do things for others to fill a lack of self-esteem in yourself. It is an experience of toxic shame where we constantly feel the need to prove ourselves and receive external validation. This may feel like “taking responsibility,” but it is often unhelpful and is just feeding the internal tiger, masking underlying issues with self-worth.

See my article The Need to be Needed for an in-depth description of this interpersonal dynamic.

If you’ve worked through these personal areas and can engage in close interpersonal relationships based on genuine heartfelt giving, the next step is this:

Being responsible within the broader society

Being socially responsible can happen in various ways. Right now, it simply means staying home to prevent community spread of the viral infection.

During regular times, being socially responsible might take place in your work, volunteer roles, or leisure activities.

The key to maximizing your social responsibility is contributing in a way that fits your unique personal strengths. For example, if your strengths are working with people, and you value compassion, developing and applying these strengths allows you to maximally contribute socially.  

A lack of fit between your strengths, values, and interests can hinder your level of usefulness in your work, resulting in a low sense of purpose within the role. Finding alignment between your abilities and your role requires first knowing your strengths and cultivating them. 

Not cultivating and applying your unique strengths doesn’t just rob you of a sense of purpose, but it also robs the broader society of your potential contributions.

Conclusion 

Although you may not be responsible for personal or social issues, you are still responsible for being part of the solution.

Avoiding responsibility comes with a short term gain at a long term cost.

Taking responsibility creates long term resilience and a sense of purpose.

This sense of purpose can be fostered by taking responsibility for one’s self by engaging in self-care. Responsibility can also be developed on a familial and societal level, offering a sense of purpose proportional to your ability to contribute your unique abilities.

Fascinated by ideas? Check out my podcast:

Struggling with an addiction.

If you’re struggling with an addiction, it can be difficult to stop. Gaining short-term relief, at a long-term cost, you may start to wonder if it’s even worth it anymore. If you’re looking to make some changes, feel free to reach out. I offer individual addiction counselling to clients in the US and Canada. If you’re interested in learning more, you can send me a message here .

Other Mental Health Resources

If you are struggling with other mental health issues or are  looking for a specialist near you, use the Psychology Today therapist directory  here to find a practitioner who specializes in your area of concern.

If you require a lower-cost option, you can check out BetterHelp.com . It is one of the most flexible forms of online counseling.  Their main benefit is lower costs, high accessibility through their mobile app, and the ability to switch counselors quickly and easily, until you find the right fit.

*As an affiliate partner with Better Help, I receive a referral fee if you purchase products or services through the links provided.

As always, it is important to be critical when seeking help, since the quality of counselors are not consistent. If you are not feeling supported, it may be helpful to seek out another practitioner. I wrote an article on things to consider here .

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13 Comments

you’ve seen me comment on your posts before, dear Steve, commending you on your writing abilities, but you outdo yourself here, standing amongst philosophers, Marcus Aurelius, for instance, Epictetus, eminent moralists, in bringing heart to your strong and disciplined account of “responsibility” – philosophy is perhaps your true dimension, just saying – all the very best, R ! chard

Great to see you on here again, Richard! I remember you used to enjoy my articles on veterans in transition to civilian life. Thank you for such kind words. Hope you are well! Take care.

I really appreciate the focus on personal responsibility. A well-written message that people need to internalize. We are part of the solution, and it is tempting to think that we can ‘bend the rules’ for some want or need, with unintended consequences the result. I will reblog this on my blog.

Thanks Eric! I believe the ethics of Emanuel Kant apply here. Universalize your individual Maxim. In other words, ask yourself, if everyone did the same thing, is that the type of world you would want to live in?

Crikey …. well this hit me rather hard. I’ve been feeding that tiger so long now that I don’t even know quite where to start. Everything you said there makes total sense. I look forward to reading more of your posts although frankly I’m rather worried. I think I’m going to be making some monumental decisions before too long. I wish I could just bury my head in the sand. Thanks for the post. Katie

It is, a collective responsibility for us, as a whole group of living organisms, to prevent the spread of this current outbreak, and, we must all, abide by the rules of the government, not just for our own sake’s, but for the good, of the, entire, human population on the planet.

I think one thing that’s regularly missed in the conversation about “needing to be needed“ is that people who are “more needy” tend to be socially marginalized. So we find ourselves looking after one another because others w needs are the people available to us. (Others in an AA group, for instance) And then other folks further justify our marginalization by defining us as “codependent helpers.” Of course the second thing that’s overlooked is the reality that people are wired to be connected with other people (belonging) and experience ourselves as valuable through those relationships (meaning, purpose). All of which you have written about extensively.

Thank you for sharing this! I completely agree. My article on the need to be needed covers this. I do want to go deeper into the marginalization vs. individual agency dynamic a bit deeper though. Thank you for highlighting this! I am planning on doing an article on the meaning of the serenity prayer to explore this dynamic further.

Steve, I may quote you on this definition, “responsibility is the ability to respond” … so well said! Thank-you, Carole

No problem! Thank you!

I agree 100%. It can be deadly for high risk people. I like your perspective. We have a responsibility, so that we don’t spread it and make it worse, and contribute to the pandemic.

4 or 6 million people out of 7 billion people. Think about that for just a moment, really. That in my opinion does not represent a pandemic. 6 million out of 7 billion is not even 1% of the population. It would have to be 20% or more of 7 billion before I would even to begin the notion of a true pandemic. Break away from the heard. Use your brain,don’t fall into a sheeple existence. Don’t be a chump. All these people putting this much trust in the CDC and the media leaves me feeling like there is no hope for our future. I have to remind myself that it’s really not their fault or anyone’s fault,they have been brainwashed and pre-programmed, unknowingly. You don’t need a psychologist or at least I don’t,to come to that conclusion.

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Philosophy and Relationship between Freedom and Responsibility Essay

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Introduction

What is freedom and responsibility in philosophy, relationship between responsibility and freedom, sartre: freedom and responsibility, works cited.

As a human being, it is hard to make a decision because of the uncertainty of the outcome, but it is definitely essential for human being to understand clearly the concept and connection between freedom and responsibility to recognize the existence of human being and it is only by the process of existence that somebody realizes or defines himself.

• A person may acquire freedom, but he has not fulfilled responsibility and this may keep grief inside him.
• Sartre asserted that complete responsibility should not be believed as resignation, but it is just the necessary condition of the outcomes of the freedom.
• Freedom is attained if a person accepts responsibility since responsibility and freedom possess a symbiotic connection in philosophy.
• A man attains his essence by personal selections and activities and it is only by the process of existence that somebody realizes or defines himself.
• The meaning of the expression that existence precedes essence is that, to start with, there is existence of man, develops, emerges on the scene, and, just eventually, defines his identity.
• The first clear value that Socrates declares concerning a society is justice and truth.

Freedom and responsibility play a crucial part in determining our decisions in life. As a human being, it is hard to make a decision because of the uncertainty of the outcome, but it is definitely essential for human being to understand clearly the concept and connection between freedom and responsibility to recognize the existence of human being and it is only by the process of existence that somebody realizes or defines himself.

Freedom and responsibility go hand in hand and if a person does not want to assume responsibility, perhaps, he will not have freedom since the two ideas accompany each other. If a person avoids responsibility, he will eventually undergo slavery directly or indirectly.

Some people can dream about freedom without considering that different responsibilities will accompany their freedom. A person may acquire freedom, but he has not fulfilled responsibility and this may keep grief inside him. Everybody can remove completely this grief through accepting both the responsibility and freedom.

Sartre stated, “the essential consequence of our earlier remarks is that man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders; he is responsible for the world and himself as a way of being” (Sartre 52).

Thoreau (375) stated that the essence of freedom should be also similar in God and to the people, and this shows that every human being has a freedom of indifference.

Additionally, Sartre (98) asserted that complete responsibility should not be believed as resignation, but it is just the necessary condition of the outcomes of the freedom. Sartre does not agree on the existence of inclination or taste, permitting just “choices of being,” although this insufficient inspirational description does not allow someone of his responsibility.

Man can be uninformed about all his selections, but they are owned by him even so. Sartre praises the idea of responsibility; even though he permits that it concurrently attacks and frees man (Sartre 98). Thoreau states, “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived” (Thoreau 116).

This means that by going to the Walden, he showed that he is free to make that decision, but also had to assume responsibility and find all the essentials in life as consequences.

Freedom is attained if a person accepts responsibility since responsibility and freedom possess a symbiotic connection in philosophy. In line with Sartre, every person is basically free and is free to create choices and initiate since there are no previous morals narrow their personal perception.

As free creators, people are responsible for every component for themselves, including emotions, actions, perception, and more importantly, people are free to decide. According to Sartre, “one may choose anything if it is on the grounds of free involvement” (Sartre 48).

Even though all people are free to decide their fate, they should, as well, accept responsibility for their decisions. Personal freedom of perception, hence, is both a curse and a blessing, and it is a blessing since it provides humanity the reward of free will to form a person’s life and the universe. It permits somebody to make an individual kind of values without certain limitations or restrictions.

According to Socrates, virtue and wisdom have close relationship, so his hard work provides to develop society altogether. In line with the perception of Socrates, if human beings are bright, nobody will ever do wrong, and their wisdom will result to healthier and more satisfying life.

Therefore, the philosopher, in accordance with Sartre, does not simply follow conceptual intellectual paths for the benefit of pleasure, but is dedicated in practices of the greatest moral value.

There are no specific reasons for judging a certain action good or bad, or right or wrong, nor are there any reasons for concluding that a change is moral setback or moral advancement. Sartre explains that existence precedes essence, which addresses that freedom and responsibility relative to human decisions or selections.

Only through action and choice do values form, for “value is nothing else, but the meaning that you choose” (Sartre 49). This notion signifies that human being, together with human reality, is in existence before any impression of morals and values.

Therefore, because no preformed essence or implication about the meaning of ‘being human,’ people should create their personal idea of existence through stating responsibility for and control of their activities and decisions.

As a result, a man attains his essence by personal selections and activities and it is only by the process of existence that somebody realizes or defines himself. Whether a person will die or live due to their decisions should be secondary in their decision making and they should simply ask if their actions are wrong or right, or bad or good (Cooper 26).

Sartre said: “in any case, what is that by existentialism we mean a doctrine which makes human life possible and, in addition, declares that every truth and every action implies a human setting and a human subjectivity” (Sartre 10).

Normally, people put focus on the dark side of human life and rarely put the emphasis on the positive side and consider existentialism as anything unattractive. This is the reason people are considered naturalist.

The close relationship between freedom and responsibility informs us about the value of philosophical life. This is demonstrated when Sartre states that if there is no existence of God, at least another being exists in whom existence precedes essence and a human being that was present before may be identified through whichever concept, and this existing being is considered a man.

The meaning of the expression that existence precedes essence is that, to start with, there is existence of man, develops, emerges on the scene, and, just eventually, defines his identity. Just eventually, he will be something, a man himself will have created what he has defined himself to be and this shows that human nature does not exist since God does not exist to conceive it.

Through daily living, everybody is engaging endlessly in the process of forming themselves or one’s identity. With nonexistence of any previous moral principle to adhere to, man has the basic freedom to make their personal system of beliefs and this personal freedom of perception is accompanied with the load of responsibility for the selections and decisions somebody creates.

Every human being should be responsible for the choices they create and if somebody does not accept responsibility for the actions and choices he or she makes, one will be operating in bad faith, a kind of self-deception that results to sense of forlornness, anguish, despair, and anxiety.

The first clear value that Socrates declares concerning a society is justice and truth since he reveals this in the initial step of his defense, which shows these as essential values for him (Cooper 17).

He presented clearly that he does not undervalue justice and truth, and consider them as important elements of nationality and society.

Therefore, citizens might be believed to be ‘good’ in his perception if they adhere to the good value of justice and truth in their community, particularly as Socrates performs during the court proceeding. All through his life, Socrates administered that the unexamined life does not merit questioning whatever thing.

In conclusion, it can be established that freedom and responsibility go hand in hand and if a person makes a choice, he or she must assume the responsibilities that accompany the choices made.

Freedom is achieved if a person accepts the responsibility and it is considered that a man is responsible for all elements for themselves, which contain the ability to make choices and do anything. Through daily living, everybody is engaging endlessly in the process of forming themselves or one’s identity.

Nevertheless, even when operating in bad faith, one is creating the selection of shunning responsibility, and it demonstrates that everybody cannot shun choice that helps them recall the fact that the destiny of a man is within himself. Freedom is also a curse since the responsibility of structuring somebody’s life is accompanied with freedom to decide.

Cooper, John. Plato: The Trial and Death of Socrates. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000. Print.

Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism and Human Emotions: Selections from Being and Nothingness. New York: Citadel, 1957. Print.

Thoreau, Henry. Walden; Or, Life in the Woods. New York: Sterling Publishing Company, 2009. Print.

• Nietzsche’s and Sartre’s Views on Morality
• Philosophical movement
• Relationship Between Body and Consciousness by Jean-Paul Sartre
• Human Freedom as Contextual Deliberation
• Freedom and Determinism
• Susan Wolf’s Philosophy
• Rousseau and Kant on their respective accounts of freedom and right
• Inconsistency of the Compatibilist
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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IvyPanda . "Philosophy and Relationship between Freedom and Responsibility Essay." April 10, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-and-responsibility-2/.