political killings in the philippines essay

Published daily by the Lowy Institute

The killings in the Philippines grow more brazen

The recent murder of a well-known activist signals a turning point in the campaign to eliminate dissent.

• Philippines
• Human rights

Earlier this month, days after Manila went back into a hard lockdown due to a sharp rise in Covid-19 infections, unidentified assailants slipped past the Philippine capital’s strict quarantine measures and approached the home of Randall Echanis, a left-wing party leader and longtime activist. When they left on the morning of 10 August, Echanis and his flatmate were dead, marked with stab wounds and alleged signs of torture.

City and national police launched into a cycle of denial and contradiction all too familiar to the families of slain activists in Mindanao, Negros and the provinces far from the capital where environmental and land defenders have been killed at alarming rates since President Rodrigo Duterte took power in 2016.

Police initially refused to identify Echanis, then moved his body without his wife’s consent and held it for three days before releasing it to his family. They claimed Echanis’ flatmate, Louie Tagapia, may have been the target of the killing because an alleged tattoo indicating an affiliation with a criminal group. One police chief claimed there was “no forcible entry” in the case, despite a photo showing a broken doorknob on the apartment door .

When Duterte put Mindanao under martial law in 2017 and other areas, including Negros island, under a heightened “state of national emergency” the following year, critics warned that the regions were a “ laboratory ” for the rest of the country. As killings of activists continued to rise in rural areas – the Philippines was Asia’s deadliest country for environmental defenders last year, according to  Global Witness – Duterte’s critics in Manila wondered when the bloodshed would enter the capital city. The death of Echanis, at the height of a strict lockdown and in the wake of a controversial anti-terrorism law, has thus signaled a turning point in the wider campaign to eliminate dissent. Any pretense that the killings resulted from local conflicts over rural land struggles, out of sight and mind from Manila, is now gone.

Most people in Manila’s legal activist network have, at some point during Duterte’s rule, been red-tagged – falsely labeled as communist rebels.

Echanis’ party, Anakpawis, and other left-wing voices have alleged his killing was “state-sponsored”. There’s no hard evidence for this claim, just as there’s no ironclad proof of state involvement in the killings of the nine sugar workers killed in Negros in 2018 or their lawyer, Benjamin Ramos, who was shot dead by unidentified gunmen weeks later. Police responded to these cases by first naming activists as potential suspects before eventually letting the investigations run cold.

It’s a story familiar to the families of the 318 human rights workers and activists killed between July 2016 and 30 June 2020, according to the human rights group Karapatan, and bringing it to Manila indicates the Duterte administration has become even more brazen in its willingness to watch its political enemies be eliminated.

Last autumn, six activists were arrested in Manila as part of a series of raids carried out throughout the country. One rights worker in the capital, who had vacated his office after being tipped that it could be raided, told me the arrests and killings plaguing far-flung activists had always felt distant to him. The raids, he said, changed everything – it was as if state security forces no longer cared if their work was done in full view of the country’s population, in its diplomatic and media hub.

Manila has seen the majority of killings in Duterte’s deadly war on drugs, which the country’s rights commission estimates has taken over 27,000 lives, but unlike the police-led drug war, attacks on activists are more closely associated with a military counterinsurgency campaign ostensibly targeting the New People’s Army (NPA) communist guerilla group. Echanis, like many slain activists, had been named on a government terrorist list , although his name was later removed. Being named on a terrorist list or on one of the various bulletins and releases falsely labeling legal activists as communist rebels (a practice known as “red-tagging”) is often fatal – and most people in Manila’s legal activist network have, at some point during Duterte’s rule, been red-tagged.

Duterte, who has idolised the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and toyed with placing the Philippines under martial law , now oversees a country where armed police and military roam city streets enforcing lockdowns as Congress and the Supreme Court continue to eliminate legal space for dissent.

The UN human rights chief has called for a probe into drug war and political killings, while a bipartisan group of US legislators asked the Philippines to repeal its new anti-terrorism law . But the international community has been slow to condemn the Duterte administration as the Philippines slides into what hardened activists call a Marcos-like authoritarianism. China has invested heavily in infrastructure projects in the country, while the US retains a strong military alliance with the Philippines and recently approved two possible sales of attack helicopters , which critics warn could be used in operations targeting legal activists.

And outside of Manila, the killings have not stopped. This month, the activist Zara Alvarez, 39, was shot dead in Negros. Alvarez, who played a crucial role in chronicling the deaths of farmers on the island and raised human rights issues in Negros before the UN Human Rights Council, had been “red-tagged” herself.

The culprit behind her death: an unidentified gunman.

Related Content

China’s nine-dash line proves stranger than fiction

You may also be interested in, migration and border policy links: manus, stateless minorities, the next steps on myanmar and more, australia's role in the refugee compact, the high price of cheap oil for saudi arabia.

• +63 917 194 0482
• [email protected]

Uncategorized

Hot issue: political killings in the philippines.

The recent spate of assassinations of local government officials brings to mind a history of political violence that has marred Philippine politics since the last century.

Before Martial Law was declared in 1972, political kingpins ran the areas they represented like fiefdoms. Many employed private armies to assert their power and authority.

During martial rule, enforced disappearances and summary executions threatened activists and other so-called enemies of the state.

In a more recent example, the administration’s two-year War on Drugs has claimed more than 10,000 lives. In other areas, victims of political killings have included left-wing advocates, anti-mining activists, agricultural reform activists, journalists, the political opposition, and outspoken members of the clergy.

According to the human rights organization, Karapatan, there is a pattern to political killings in the Philippines – state security forces (i.e. the military and the police) use forced disappearances or summary executions during “legitimate” operations.

When it comes to political killings, there is no presumption of innocence, a right guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. In fact, political killings upend the very idea of due process.

What is due process of law?

As outlined in Sec. 1, Art. III and Sec. 14(1), Art. III of the Constitution, due process protects citizens from the abuse of government action coming from any of the three branches of government: executive, legislative, or judicial.

There are two kinds of due process:

• Procedural due process US Senator Daniel Webster described procedural due process as “law which hears before it condemns.” The landmark case, “Banco Espanol vs.    Palanca (37 Phil. 921),” said that for due process to take place, the following must be present:
• An impartial court or tribunal with the power to hear and decide the matter before it
• An opportunity for the accused to be heard
• Judgment that is passed only after a lawful hearing
• Substantive due process This principle allows the court to protect constitutional rights from government interference. It states that the government needs sufficient justification to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.

Thus, political killings contravene basic constitutional law as the State or its agents (military and police) have bypassed due process.

Legal basis against political killings

Thus, all political killings are extrajudicial killings (EJKs). In “ Secretary of National Defense v Manalo (GR No. 180906 ),” the Supreme Court defined political killings as violating procedural due process as they are committed without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.

Furthermore, in the case, “Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. Et Al. v Mary Jean Tagitis (GR No. 182498),” the Supreme Court said that political killings and enforced disappearances violate substantive due process as these crimes mean that State, its agents, and private parties violate constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty, and security.

Republic .Act 10353 or the Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act of 2012 also defines enforced disappearances as a separate crime from kidnapping, torture or murder.

The law defines an enforced disappearance as:

• The victim is deprived of liberty
• The perpetrator is the State or agents of the State
• Information on the whereabouts of the victim is concealed or denied

Those who violate this law can be further prosecuted if they refuse to disclose the whereabouts of the victim. This is the first law of its kind in Asia.

Contact Duran & Duran-Schulze Law at (+632) 478 5826 or send an email to [email protected] for more information.

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Extrajudicial killings in the Philippines

This country spotlight refers to data published in 2019. For the most recent data, go to our Rights Tracker .

‘War on drugs’ is a denial of the right to life

Since the election of Rodrigo Duterte in June 2016, a violent ‘war on drugs’ has claimed upwards of 5,000 lives in the Philippines. Executions by police and militia groups that target drug dealers and users not only exacerbate the drug problem but constitute a violation of the right to freedom from execution by extrajudicial killing.

On July 1st 2016, Oliver Dela Cruz was shot to death in Bulacan province during a police sting operation. He was playing cards at a friend’s house when a group of armed men broke in, interrogated and executed him. Police denied any responsibility, blaming vigilante violence.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Philippines has signed, recognises the right to life. The death penalty was abolished in the Philippines in 1987, and the country signed the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, becoming part of the global movement against the death penalty.

Under the ICCPR, the right to be free from execution also covers arbitrary and extrajudicial killing. The Human Rights Measurement Initiative tracks the performance of countries around the world on upholding these rights.

The killings of Mr Dela Cruz and thousands of others are a denial of the right to life, the right to freedom from execution.

While the current administration is not directly responsible for the authorisation of these extra-judicial executions, Agnes Callamard, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, blamed Duterte’s hard-line approach and rhetoric for exacerbating the violence and denounced the lack of investigation into the killings.

Police and militia groups are not being held to account for their actions. This is a rejection of the government’s obligation to investigate violations of the right to life and the right to freedom from extrajudicial killing.

The right to freedom from execution

According to international law, the right to be free from execution includes freedom from any arbitrary or extrajudicial deprivation of life, as well as freedom from the death penalty even with due process of law (ICCPR, Part III, Article 6; Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Article 1).

This is a fundamental human right that must be respected and governments are legally obligated to do what they can to prevent such killings and hold those responsible to account.

HRMI’s Civil and Political Rights data collection

In 2019, we collected information on civil and political rights in 19 survey countries via a secure online expert opinion survey  (please note this is a link to a preview of the survey only, and any responses you make will not be collected).

These countries were selected based on the following two criteria:

• Sufficient interest from human rights experts in that country for inclusion (so that we could be sure to have sufficient numbers of survey respondents and active engagement during the survey).
• A sub-set of 19 countries that offered diversity of sizes, regions, cultures, income levels, degree of openness etc (so that we could learn how well our survey methodology worked in different contexts).

The graph below shows how the 19 countries in the HRMI survey performed on freedom from execution.

It seems likely that the Philippines would perform poorly relative to the survey countries, due to the number of unlawful executions carried out since 2016, but without data it is harder for human rights defenders to do their work and hold governments to account.

As soon as funding allows, we will extend our civil and political rights data collection to the Philippines and the rest of the world, and expand our full set of data to measure other rights protected by international law.

If you want to help fund our expansion to the Philippines, and all countries in the world, please contact us .

Who can use these data?

All of HRMI’s data are freely available to anyone. You can  explore our data site here , and even download the dataset.

We have data on seven  civil and political rights : as well as  five economic and social rights .

HRMI aims to produce  useful  data. Some of the people we expect will use our data are:

• Journalists, especially those reporting a particular country, and those focusing on human rights, politics, social issues or international affairs
• Researchers
• Government policy advisers
• Human rights advocates
• Human rights monitors within a region, and at the international level
• Companies, for decision-making, to minimise risk for investors, and direct capital flows ethically.

If you know anyone in those categories, please let them know about HRMI, in case our data can be useful to them.

HRMI’s data have been available for only a few months so far, but as different people use them, we want to share stories and case studies. Whenever you see our data in action, please tell us, and we’ll include a link on our website.

Thanks for your interest in HRMI. You are most welcome to follow us on  Twitter ,  YouTube ,  Facebook , and LinkedIn and sign up to receive occasional newsletters  here .

For any website to function, it is necessary to collect a small amount of user data, so by continuing to use this website, you are consenting to that. To find out more, please read our Privacy Policy

Global Labor Justice

Social media.

• Join Our Team
• GLJ-ILRF 2022 Labor Rights Defenders Celebration
• Chocolate Without Child Labor
• Ending Forced Labor in Cotton
• Fair Contracts for Tobacco Farmers
• Fair Labor in Palm Oil
• Justice for Garment Workers
• Legal Aid in China
• SweatFree Communities
• U.S. Labor Education in the Americas Project
• Women's Rights at Work
• Workers' Rights in Seafood
• Child Labor
• Forced Labor
• Health & Safety
• Living Wage
• Migrant Labor
• Right to Organize & Bargain
• Women’s Rights
• Driving Corporate Accountability
• Leveraging Government Procurement
• Trade Justice
• Worker Empowerment
• Press Releases
• In the News
• E-Newsletter
• Publications

Political Killings in Philippines

We, the undersigned individuals and organizations, join our voices in a call for an end to the wave of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. Over the past five years, a stark increase in politically-motivated violence has claimed the lives of pro-democracy activists, human rights defenders, political opposition figures, lawyers, teachers, peasants, students, union leaders, and religious leaders. These murders are committed under the auspices of an anti-leftist, anti-communist military offensive that targets village and community leaders in communities that are suspected of supporting or being sympathetic to leftist insurgent groups.

We voice a special concern for acts of violence perpetrated against trade unionists. These hard-working men and women who organize to protect their basic rights have paid a heavy price. According to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Philippines is now the second most dangerous country on earth for trade unionists. Both government officials and the corporations that employ union members must take strong action to safeguard the lives and rights of all working people in the Philippines.

Tomorrow, September 22, marks the one-year anniversary of the murder of Diosdado “Ka Fort” Fortuna, a leading figure in the Filipino trade union movement, at the hands of unidentified assailants. As the Commission on Human Rights Philippines (CHRP) would later declare, this killing was a human rights violation and not an isolated incident of tragedy. Fortuna worked at the Nestlé Philippines facility in Cabuyao, Laguna, where the workers have been on strike since 2002; he was shot and killed on his way home from the picket line. We urge Nestlé Philippines to bring a quick and amicable resolution to the labor dispute at the Cabuyao facility. We call on Nestlé and the Filipino government to respect and protect the lives of all trade unionists, guarantee the right to union activity, and investigate the murder of “Ka Fort” and all extrajudicial killings in the Philippines.

Issues: 

• Violence Against Trade Unions

Countries: 

• Philippines

Search form

Related publications.

• Labor Letter to Secretary Raimondo and Ambassador Tai
• Letter Regarding ILO High-Level Tripartite Mission to the Philippines
• Request for Review of the GSP Status of the Republic of the Philippines for Violations of Worker Rights

LISE GRANDE appointed U.S. special envoy for Middle East humanitarian issues

Ambassador George Moose Acting President and CEO During Her Leave Of Absence

United States Institute of Peace

Home ▶ Publications

Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Strategies to End the Violence

Testimony of G. Eugene Martin, U.S. Institute of Peace Executive Director of the Philippine Facilitation Project, before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs

By: G. Eugene Martin

Publication Type: Congressional Testimony

Gene Martin testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs on "Extrajudicial Killings in the Philippines: Strategies to End the Violence."

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing on the tragic extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. Having lived in the Philippines for six years and now working to facilitate the peace process in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), I am well aware of the many political, economic and social issues underlying these violent acts.

The Philippine Facilitation Project of the U.S. Institute of Peace is an excellent model for active U.S. engagement in conflict situations. At the request of the State Department, the Institute has been working for nearly four years to end conflict between the central government in Manila and the Islamic Moro people of Mindanao. The centuries long conflict has made the southern Philippines one of the most violent areas of the country. The Institute is actively exploring with negotiators from the Philippine government and the MILF alternatives for resolving the long conflict. As an independent, non-partisan federal institution, the Institute is able to promote U.S. interests unofficially. Our work gives us insights into the causes of violence in society, not only in Mindanao but nationwide. That said, my remarks represent my opinion based upon my experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Root Causes of Violence

I believe there are two underlying causes of the violence. First, weak political and social institutions, particularly a corrupt and ineffective justice system, prompt citizens to resolve conflicts on their own. When one cannot obtain justice through the police or courts, alternative means are found. This can be through direct personal action, drawing upon family or clan support, or arranging for criminal or revolutionary organizations to settle matters.

In Philippine society, family is primary. Nearly any action can be justified if it is to support the family. Kinship ties extend well beyond the nuclear family, into clans and tribal or community groups. Identities often are based on familial or, being an island nation, geographical relationships rather than broader nationalism. In Mindanao, much of the violence is caused by clan conflicts, known as “rido,” which can continue for generations. Absent access to, or confidence in, justice through legal mechanisms and institutions, the aggrieved party often takes direct action against the perceived offender to obtain satisfaction.

The fractious nature of society leads to weak political institutions. Elite families who hold political and economic power in much of the country often seek to maintain their power in any way possible. Elections tend to be corrupt, candidates running against incumbents are often the targets of harassment if not violence, and voters are threatened with retribution for opposition to power holders. Prime targets also for threats and violence, including killings, are media or civil society investigators into political and economic corruption.

The second underlying cause of violence is the legacy of the Marco dictatorship. Martial law politicized the institutions of government and violence against anyone perceived to be opposed to government policies was tolerated if not authorized. Soldiers, police, judges and prosecutors became perpetrators of violent actions against broad segments of the population. Extralegal arrest, detention, incarceration, disappearances and killings (known as salvaging) were condoned and used to advance the regime’s power and reduce political opposition.

Many of those who opposed the Marcos regime responded in similar fashion. Lacking legal of safe alternatives, many allied themselves with revolutionary organizations for protection and influence. These included the National Democratic Front (NDF) of the Communist Party of the Philippine (CPP) and, in Muslim areas, the Moro National Liberation Front and subsequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While many if not most of those who affiliated with the NDF during martial law years were not communist, the NDF provided the only available support network against Marcos. Marcos’ militarized response to the historical struggle of the Moros against Manila’s colonial policies enhanced the appeal of those who advocated armed violence to counter military and militia pogroms against Muslim civilians. The violence of the Marcos regime abetted the communist insurgency and Moro decisions that safety was possible only through independence from the Philippines rather than by working within the political system.

Current Situation in the Philippines

I believe the present rash of violence and killings is the result of political instability and weakness. President Arroyo has expressed her determination to address and resolve the killings. She established the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings, headed by former Supreme Court Associate Justice Jose Melo. She also welcomed the investigation of Professor Philip Alston, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council. However, I question her capability to take the necessary steps to end the killings. She has been politically weak since her controversial election in 2004, depending upon support from military and provincial leaders to counter impeachment measures by her opponents in Congress. She has promoted military officers who support her and placed retired military and police officers in high-level civilian offices. Her challenge to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to eliminate the decades old communist New Peoples Army (NPA) insurgency within two years has given the AFP a green light to take any action it wishes against the NPA and their allies. Faced with a persistent low-level NPA insurgency, the military resorts to stretching counterinsurgency strategies to branding leftist organizations as enemies of the state that can be intimidated or eliminated by any means.

The communist insurgency is a serious threat to the Philippine government and democracy. The world’s last remaining Maoist insurgency, the NDF, uses violence and abuses democratic privileges to advance its power. As a legal political movement, NDF leaders are elected to Congress where they continue to oppose the administration and seek to block or destabilize government policies. During election campaigns, the NDF uses kidnappings, “revolutionary” taxes, threats and violence to support its candidates and harass opponents. The Party’s political goals are to weaken the government, gain power through coalitions and eventually replace the democratic system with an ideological communist dictatorship.

One of the legacies of the Marcos regime is the continued alienation of many civil society elements from the government and especially the military. NGOs, religious bodies, academics, small farmers, and indigenous peoples remain suspicious of government officials and military personnel because of the oppression and violence used against them during martial law. Many government officials, particularly in the armed forces and police, reciprocate the mistrust, seeing a communist hand behind civil society protests against administration policies and actions. Powerful elites influence local police or military commanders to use force against farmers’ complaints over land grabs or workers’ demonstrations over working conditions. Murders of activist farmers and labor leaders in rural provinces are covered up. Journalists investigating the crimes become targets. Similarly, prosecutors and judges are intimidated. Tragically, the result is further alienation from and resistance to the government.

The killings have become a major issue within the Philippines, yet there is little public outrage despite the release of the Melo Commission report and the initial criticisms of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council. Public perceptions are influenced by military and official attributions that most of the killings are internal CPP-NPA purges. Most civil society reaction has been from leftist oriented NGOs rather than mainstream organizations, further limiting public concern.

Short-Term Prospects in the Philippines

While we all hope the killings will stop immediately, I am not optimistic in the short run. I am confident, however, that through conscientious efforts by Philippine political and civil society leaders, as well as international partners such as the United States, this cycle of violence can be halted.

My pessimism over short-term remedial action by the government is based upon the following:

• It is election time again. Campaigning for national elections on May 14 is well underway. Little if any serious effort will be exerted to investigate killings of political significance. In fact, as contesting parties struggle to win by any means, there will likely be an upsurge of campaign related violence.
• Candidates from left-wing political parties will be particular targets. National Security Advisor Norberto Gonzales stated on March 8 that such candidates must not be allowed to win seats in the Congress. The Gonzales view that party-list candidates “are under the direct influence of the communist party” gives a potential hunting license to military and local officials who agree with him.
• The new anti terrorism law, which President Arroyo signed on March 6, gives new “legal teeth” to the government’s war on terrorism. The Arroyo administration describes the law, titled the “Human Security Act of 2007,” as being “very concerned on human rights.” Many observers fear the law may increase unfettered military operations against opponents deemed to be terrorists. National Security Advisor Gonzales has already stated that the NPA will be labeled a terrorist organization when the new law is promulgated. Legal leftist organizations and elected individuals may be designated.
• The new Defense Secretary, Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr., is a retired police officer. He succeeds a civilian. Senior Department of National Defense officials are now mostly former military officers rather than civilians. Secretary Ebdane likely will promote military perceptions of security threats. UN Rapporteur Alston stated “the AFP is in a state of almost total denial...of its need to respond effectively and authentically to the...killings...attributed to them.”

The killings and the state of democracy in the Philippines have implications for U.S. interests. Prolonged United States support for the Marcos regime in order to save our military bases alienated many in the Philippines. U.S. Ambassador Kenny has rightly expressed official U.S. concern over the extrajudicial killings. However, other U.S. interests—counter terrorism cooperation and training opportunities the AFP provide U.S. forces – may limit pressure on the Arroyo administration.

The U.S. Institute of Peace involvement in the Mindanao peace process provides insights into many of these issues. It is readily apparent that there are multiple, often uncoordinated, policymakers in the Arroyo administration with diverse agendas. The President has authorized her negotiators to propose a forward-looking self-determination package to the MILF. Yet, military officers in central Mindanao continue to support local political leaders who use their militia as private armies to contest MILF influence. The Arroyo administration avoids exercising national authority over local political and economic interests opposed to a peace agreement with the Moros so as to retain their support against administration opponents. It expends little effort to counter biased or incorrect media reports on Mindanao events.

Recommendations

The U.S. and other nations are not without influence to help end the violence of extrajudicial killings. The Philippines is sensitive to and dependent on the goodwill and support of its neighbors and international donors. Some useful tools include:

• Donor nations and international financial institutions already have strong anti-corruption requirements for economic assistance. Linking assistance to forceful judicial reform and independent investigations of the killings would enhance the resolution of the cases.
• Philippine desires to qualify for the Millennium Challenge Corporation assistance gives the U.S. influence to demand rigorous action against the killings.
• The sizeable defense relationship the U.S. has with the Philippines provides a mechanism to encourage civilian control over the armed forces.
• Forceful public U.S. official support for human rights reforms and protections would counter some Filipino perceptions that U.S. concern over the killings is tempered by our efforts to counter terrorism.

Model for Success

The U.S. Institute of Peace has established a unique relationship with key players in the peace process in Mindanao. Working with minimal publicity, the Institute has made a significant contribution to the progress in the talks over the past four years. The Institute has worked closely with civil society to foster open debate to mitigate Filipino public prejudice and discrimination against the Moro minority. Engaging NGOs, church leaders, educators, and media representatives, the Institute seeks to change public perceptions of the conflict and the benefits a durable peace agreement would bring the nation. Similar programs focused on highlighting a need to end the extrajudicial killings and to bring perpetrators to justice could help strengthen judicial institutions and public demands for resolution of the killings.

The Institute’s peace efforts supplement Embassy, USAID and the Pacific Command’s counterterrorism and developmental programs and priorities. Working independently but cooperatively with these official U.S. agencies, the Institute addresses the political, religious, historical and social issues underlying the conflict. Parallel programs dealing with judicial reform, civilian control over security forces, and amelioration of the communist insurgency could begin to address the causes of the killings. Institute efforts to reduce intra-Moro clan and tribal conflict through support for dialogue and cooperation among the next generation of Moro leaders could be duplicated in other conflict situations, which now end in political killings.

Regrettably, the State Department’s support for the Institute’s facilitation project is ending just as the peace process is at a critical juncture. Once the negotiators reach agreement on outstanding issues, a politically contentious, long-term transition period to implement the agreement will require close monitoring and engagement. Granting the Moros self-determination will alter power relationships in Mindanao. The potential for extralegal violence is real. Continued Institute presence is critical to help both Muslim and Christian communities through this difficult period. Without renewed funding, however, the Institute’s unique investment of trust and credibility with key players will be lost prematurely.

The coordinated approach U.S. agencies, the Institute of Peace, neighboring countries and international donors have used to advance the Mindanao peace process can be replicated to resolve the extrajudicial killings. U.S. interests would be served and the Philippines would benefit.

Thank you Madam Chairman. I welcome your questions and those of your colleagues.

The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author, not the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not take positions on policy issues.

Related Publications

A Rising Philippines Faces a Crucial Year Ahead

Wednesday, April 24, 2024

By: Haroro Ingram ; Andrew Mines

By virtue of its geography alone, the Philippines is arguably Southeast Asia’s most strategically important country. Yet its actual influence has tended to lag its potential due to decades of socioeconomic struggle and internal instability, especially in its restive southern island of Mindanao. In recent years, however, the Philippines has rapidly emerged as one of the most consequential countries in the Indo-Pacific, driven in large part by President Ferdinand Marcos’ transformative policies on national security, defense and foreign relations.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

The Indo-Pacific’s Newest Minilateral Emerges

Wednesday, April 17, 2024

By: Brian Harding ; Haroro Ingram

Last week, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stepped foot in the Oval Office for the second time in a year. Joining Marcos this time was Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, the leader of the United States’ most important ally in Asia and, arguably, the world. The Philippines has long been among a second rung of regional allies, so this first-ever trilateral summit marks Manila’s entrance as a leading U.S. ally working to maintain order and prevent Chinese revisionism in East Asia.

Vikram Singh on the U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Summit

Tuesday, April 9, 2024

By: Vikram J. Singh

The United States, Japan and the Philippines are holding their first-ever trilateral summit this week. China’s “unprecedented” pressure and aggression over maritime claims will top the agenda. “There’s a fairly clear resolve … to not just let China bully its way to changing the status quo in the region,” says USIP’s Vikram Singh.

Type: Podcast

U.S., Japan, Philippines Strengthen Strategic Bonds to Counter China

Thursday, April 4, 2024

By: Brian Harding ; Haroro Ingram ; Andrew Mines

Next week’s U.S.-Philippines-Japan summit comes against the backdrop of heightened tensions between Manilla and Beijing in the South China Sea, known as the West Philippines Sea in the Philippines. Last month alone saw two incidents of China’s so- called “gray zone” activities, with Chinese ships colliding with Philippines Coast Guard vessels on March 5 and blasting a Philippines supply boat with a water cannon on March 23. These disputes in the West Philippines Sea — an issue on which U.S., Japanese and Philippine interests closely align — will feature prominently when President Joe Biden, Philippine President Ferdinando Marcos Jr. and Japanese Prime Minster Fumio Kishida meet in Washington on April 11.

Type: Question and Answer

Conflict Analysis & Prevention ;  Global Policy

• Election 2024
• Entertainment
• Newsletters
• Photography
• Personal Finance
• AP Investigations
• AP Buyline Personal Finance
• AP Buyline Shopping
• Press Releases
• Israel-Hamas War
• Russia-Ukraine War
• Global elections
• Asia Pacific
• Latin America
• Middle East
• Election Results
• Delegate Tracker
• AP & Elections
• Auto Racing
• 2024 Paris Olympic Games
• Movie reviews
• Book reviews
• Personal finance
• Financial Markets
• Business Highlights
• Financial wellness
• Artificial Intelligence
• Social Media

Rarely seen Rod Serling story, ‘First Squad, First Platoon,’ draws upon his World War II service

FILE - Writer Rod Serling holds the Emmy for best writing of a drama series for his work on “The Twilight Zone,” at the Emmy Awards in Los Angeles on May 16, 1961. (AP Photo, File)

• Copy Link copied

NEW YORK (AP) — In a famous “Twilight Zone” episode from the early 1960s, a bloodthirsty World War II commander stationed in the Philippines finds himself transported into the body of a Japanese lieutenant and, to his horror, expected to help kill an entrapped and wounded American platoon.

“What you do to those men in the cave, will it shorten the war by a week, by a day, by an hour?” he pleads to a Japanese officer. ”How many must die before (we) are satisfied?”

For the show’s host and writer, Rod Serling, World War II was a trauma he would re-imagine often.

Serling, born 100 years ago this December, served in the 11th Airborne Division in the Philippines and received a Bronze Star for bravery and a Purple Heart for being wounded. He left the war with lasting physical and emotional scars and, like such fellow veterans as Joseph Heller and Kurt Vonnegut, with a will to find words for what had happened. He wrote war-related scripts for “Playhouse 90” and other early television drama series and for at least two other “Twilight Zone” stories, including one in which an Army lieutenant can predict who will die next by looking into his soldiers’ faces.

Serling’s “First Squad, First Platoon,” a fictionalized take on the war that he worked on and set aside while attending Antioch College, has now been published for the first time. It appears this week in the new edition of The Strand Magazine, which has unearthed pieces by Ernest Hemingway, Mark Twain, John Steinbeck and many others. “First Squad, First Platoon” is broken into five vignettes, each dedicated to a fallen peer.

“Serling wrote this story in his early twenties, yet it carries a maturity beyond his years,” Strand managing editor Andrew Gulli writes. “It’s a powerful, unvarnished look at war in all its brutality — an unforgettable study of ordinary people in an extraordinarily hellish situation.”

Nicholas Parisi, author of the 2018 biography “Rod Serling: His Life, Work, and Imagination,” helped edit the story. Daughters Jodi Serling and Anne Serling each contributed brief forewords. Jodi Serling wrote that the war “opened up dark horizons of terror” for her father and left him “gut-wrenching memories” that influenced his writing and awakened him at night, “sweating and screaming inconsolably.” Anne Serling told The Associated Press that “First Squad, First Platoon” reminded her of his innocence when he joined the military.

“My reaction was particularly painful because when I read the story, I was writing a memoir about my dad and reading the letters he wrote from training camp before he was sent to the Pacific,” she said. “He was just barely 18 when he enlisted and sounded like a kid at summer camp in his letters to his parents. He was asking for gum, candy, underwear (because he didn’t like the GI ones). Like all of the kids we send into the horror of war — he didn’t know what was waiting on the other side.”

Amy Boyle Johnston, author of the 2015 book “Unknown Serling,” found the story while looking through Serling’s papers at the University of Wisconsin. Serling, who died in 1975, had yet to start a family when he wrote “First Squad, First Platoon.” But he was already thinking about the next generation, including a dedication to his yet-unborn children urging them to remember “a semblance of the feeling of a torn limb, a burnt patch of flesh” and “the hopeless emptiness of fatigue” were as much part of war as “uniforms and flags, honor and patriotism.”

Parasi says that “First Squad, First Platoon” was an early sign of Serling’s ironic touch. One soldier is shot dead as he admires a wooden statuette of Jesus, and another — a true story — is killed by a food relief package.

In the opening section of “First Squad,” Cpl. Melvin Levy is introduced as the squad’s resident comedian, whose usual barrage of jokes had been silenced by the ongoing starvation that threatened to kill them all. But as Levy slept weakly in the mud, dreaming of pastrami and other treats back home, he is startled by the sound of motors — airplanes clearly marked as American. Levy shouts with delight as more than 100 heavy boxes of K-rations fall from on high, fatally unaware that one will land right on him.

“The heavy crates were smashing into the earth close to their holes. Men started shouting in alarm,” Serling writes. “Levy just stood where he was, waving his arms and shouting. Sergeant Etherson pulled at him from behind, trying to get him down in a hole. But Levy was oblivious to all around him except the food which poured down.”

“‘It’s raining chow, boys . . . it’s raining chow,’” his shrill voice pierced the air.”

Utility Links

• University of Pennsylvania
• Office of the Provost
• Penn Global

Secondary Nav Perry World House

Primary nav perry world house, drawer menu perry world house.

• Back to main menu
• Meet Our Staff
• Announcements
• Join Our Mailing List
• Our Building
• All Experts 2023-24
• Distinguished Global Leaders
• Non-Resident Senior Advisor
• Visiting Fellows and Visiting Scholars Programs
• Apply to Become or Nominate a Visiting Fellow or Visiting Scholar
• All Distinguished Visiting Fellows
• All Visiting Scholars
• Distinguished Scholars-in-Residence
• All Lightning Scholars
• All Postdoctoral Fellows
• Borders and Boundaries Postdoctoral Fellowships
• Global Innovation Program Postdoctoral Fellowships
• Penn Identity & Conflict Lab Postdoctoral Fellowship
• Faculty Fellows 2023-24
• Report: Responses Against China's Coercion in the Indo-Pacific: Developing a Toolkit from the Philippines and Taiwan
• 2023 Global Order Colloquium | A New Age of Nuclearity? Great Powers and Greater Consequences
• Workshop | The Future of Nuclear Weapons, Statecraft, and Deterrence After Ukraine: April 2023
• Workshop | Economic Security and the Future of the Global Order in the Indo-Pacific: February 2023
• A Fracturing World: The Future of Globalization | Report and Thought Pieces
• 2022 Global Order Colloquium | A Fracturing World: The Future of Globalization: September 13-14, 2022
• Workshop | The Global Order After Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: April 2022
• Workshop | Challenges and Opportunities at the Dawn of the New Space Age: March 2022
• 2021 Global Order Colloquium Report and Thought Pieces
• Keeping Score: A New Approach to Geopolitical Forecasting
• 2023 Global Shifts Colloquium | Living with Extreme Heat: Our Shared Future
• Global Climate Finance Workshop Report and Thought Pieces | October 3, 2022
• Islands on the Climate Front Line: Risk and Resilience | Report and Thought Pieces
• Borders and Boundaries Project Personnel
• Call for Papers: 2022 Conference on International Borders in a Globalizing World
• Global Climate Security Atlas
• Cities, Geopolitics, and the International Legal Order Report and Thought Pieces
• Global Justice and Human Rights
• Past Seminar Series
• Publications
• The World Today
• Global Lens
• Critical Conversations
• Event Policies
• Event Inventory
• IO COVID-19 Online Supplemental Issue
• Penn on the World after COVID-19
• Penn Pandemic Diary
• 'The Global Cable' Podcast
• Apply to Become a Faculty Affiliate
• Faculty Fellows 2022-23
• Lightning Scholars
• Global Career Week 2022
• Meet our 2023-24 World House Student Fellows
• Past World House Student Fellows
• World House Student Fellows Policy Projects
• World House Student Fellows Summer Awards
• Past Graduate Associates
• Graduate Associates Policy Papers
• House Committee
• Undergraduate Essay Prize
• Graduate Essay Prize
• Summer Internship Program
• Attend an Event
• Global Policy Course Enrichment Grants
• International Visitors Grant Program
• Perry World House-Foreign Affairs Emerging Scholars Policy Prize

Asia-Pacific, Power & Security Winning Without Fighting: Maritime Security and Cooperation in Taiwan-Philippines Relations

Basic page sidebar menu perry world house, may 8, 2024 by christina lai, associate research fellow/professor, institute of political science, academia sinica (taiwan) | perry world house.

China, Taiwan, and the Philippines have overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea (hereafter SCS), and these territorial disputes have become a flashpoint for armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Over the last few years, China has undergone a rapid naval modernization, and Beijing’s assertive stances over these disputed waters have raised serious concerns among its neighbors and the United States.1  

Specifically, China’s gray zone operations—coordinated operations executed by military and civilian actors to assert Beijing’s maritime claims—have often increased its presence in the SCS, while imposing costs on the coast guards and naval forces of the other claimant states.2 This leads to urgent questions for Taiwan’s incoming administration: how should the Taiwanese government effectively respond to a more militarized China Coast Guard (CCG) in the Taiwan Strait and the SCS? And what policy initiatives can both Taiwan and the Philippines take to maintain the rule-based order in Asia? Taiwan’s geostrategic significance cannot be easily ignored, as it is situated in the center of the first island chain of the U.S. security network in Asia. How the Lai Ching-te administration promotes exchanges and dialogues with its maritime neighbors will shape the development of regional order. 

This article first highlights some incidents of maritime confrontations among China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Second, it proposes a two-front strategy in countering China’s gray zone operations and assertiveness in the SCS. Specifically, the Taiwanese government should actively disclose China’s provocations in official announcements and seek closer ties with the Philippines Coast Guard (PCG). Finally, it offers concrete policy recommendations for the incoming Lai administration on how to strengthen coast guard patrols and training in the Indo-Pacific region.  

Incidents of Escalation and Confrontation  

Beijing’s passage of a Coast Guard Law in 2021 has led to increasing worries among the claimant states in the SCS disputes, as it granted the CCG more power to safeguard China’s sea boundaries, islands, and reefs. It also stipulated that agencies could use lethal force, such as shipborne or airborne weapons, in waters which China claims.3 The rapid expansion of the CCG and its Maritime Militia (MM) signals more coercive and coordinated efforts to achieve China’s security interests, while avoiding explicitly armed conflicts with its counterparts. Meanwhile, Taiwan and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding on coast guard cooperation to foster closer training and collaboration in 2021.4  

In this sense, the arming of the CCG has transformed this organization into a paramilitary body, and it no longer adheres to the initial rationale of a separation of civilian and military authority. More importantly, China’s warships and coast guard in the Taiwan Strait also pose security challenges for the United States and Taiwan. In June 2023, a Chinese vessel came within 150 yards of a US guided-missile destroyer in a challenge to the US presence near Taiwan’s waters.5 Relatedly, China’s cabbage strategy—an organized strategy adopted by the CCG and MM to impose operational costs on its counterparts and to force them to back down—also undermines peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.6 China’s sand-dredging vessels have been extracting a significant amount of sand off the coast of Matsu, an outlying island belonging to Taiwan, that has led to serious environmental degradation.7  

Furthermore, a shooting incident between Taiwan and the Philippines occurred in 2013, when a Taiwanese fisherman was killed by gunfire from a Philippines enforcement vessel.8 To avoid further causalities and diplomatic friction in the SCS, the two sides signed the Agreement Concerning the Facilitation of Cooperation on Law Enforcement in Fisheries Matters on November 5, 2015.9 Starting in 2016, they set up the Technical Working Group (TWG), which meets yearly to address concerns over issues of fisheries and law enforcement.10 

In 2023, the Philippines became involved in a year-long confrontation with the CCG at the Second Thomas Shoal, accusing China of excessive use of water cannons and dangerous encounters with the PCG.11More recently, both China and the Philippines have agreed to improve communication and negotiations to manage their differences at sea. However, their efforts to lower tensions at the SCS are to be seen in the next few months. .12 In sum, these incidents show that the maritime disputes cannot be settled easily, but both Taiwan and the Philippines can actively manage the contingencies while maintaining the well-being of the fishing industry.  

Coast Guard and Navy: Transparency and Disclosure  

China’s naval modernization is a symbol to project strength in Asia, and its expansive sovereignty claims over the disputed waters also reflect its ambitions in becoming a maritime great power. A more militarized CCG and MM might trigger an arms race and a spiral of animosity among the claimant states in the SCS.13 More importantly, this raises critical questions for Taiwan and the Philippines over how to differentiate whether a ship is a naval or CCG vessel. There is no simple solution to the blurring distinction between the naval and non-military establishments, and the CCG has already aligned with the PLA organizational structure. Instead, this article highlights another aspect that has been overlooked: the Taiwanese government can actively seek joint coast guard training exercises and patrol missions with the Philippines. Coast Guards are a better vehicle than naval vessels for regional cooperation and de-escalating tensions over maritime disputes. 

More specifically, the coast guards of both countries can work closely with each other while maintaining a clear distinction between the military and civilian establishments. The TWG serves as a good start for more substantive and regularized coordination. For example, both sides can establish a clear standard for law enforcement and specify the non-use of lethal weapons at sea. The governments of Taiwan and the Philippines should avoid an arms race in their defense spending, as equipping patrol vessels with anti-ship or lethal force missiles would only serve to add to the spiral of hostility while neglecting the mission of the coast guard.  

In addition, the Philippines government has released videos and photographs of China’s provocations near the Second Thomas Shoal throughout 2023. This is both an effective and credible way to counter China’ assertive claims, while gaining public and regional support. In this regard, the Taiwanese government can learn from the Philippine experience in countering China’s gray zone operations.14 Specifically, the Taiwan Coast Guard could ensure due process in patrolling, including making surveillance videos and radio records during investigations or confrontations, and make them accessible to the public, the media, and the international community. The incoming Lai administration can pursue more transparent ways in disclosing China’s exploitation of natural resources, such as illegal fishing and excessive sand dredging in the Taiwan Strait.  

Policy Implications 

Beijing’s gray zone operations—as conducted by the assertive MM and militarized CCG—pose serious challenges to China’s neighbors. However, its constant presence also leads to great opportunities in strengthening Taiwan-Philippines relations. When Lai Ching-te won the 2024 Taiwan presidential election, Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos Jr. expressed his congratulations. He indicated: “the Philippines look forward to close collaboration and strengthening mutual interests.”15 Taiwan should use its coast guard MoU as a model to build substantive relations with the Philippines government as well. 

It's the right time to address China’s challenge and see if a routinized and joint patrol between the Taiwan and Philippines coast guards prove equally effective in managing the SCS maritime disputes. The coast guards of Taiwan and the Philippines can uphold their core mission of policing and patrolling, and the incoming Lai administration should expedite political negotiations on sharing and managing fishing resources. The safety of the fleets and maritime stability in the SCS are top concerns for the Taiwan and the Philippines coast guards.  

3803 Locust Walk

Philadelphia, PA 19104

T. 215-573-5730

F. 215-573-9371

©2024 University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104   

Footer Menu

• Report Accessibility Issues and Get Help
• Privacy Policy

The Washington Post wins three Pulitzer Prizes

A series on the AR-15’s cultural and political impact won for national reporting. Imprisoned columnist Vladimir Kara-Murza and editorial writer David Hoffman were also honored. The New York Times also won three prizes, and the New Yorker won two.

The Washington Post was awarded three Pulitzer Prizes on Monday, including a win in the national reporting category for an immersive series on the political salience and cultural impact of the AR-15 rifle that used chilling imagery and 3D animation to convey the full scale of the weapon’s deadly capabilities.

Editorial writer ​​David E. Hoffman was recognized for his series on the rise of autocracy around the world. Vladimir Kara-Murza — a Russian political activist and Post contributing columnist who has been imprisoned in Russia since April 2022 for speaking out against the invasion of Ukraine — won the commentary category for essays he wrote from behind bars.

ProPublica, a nonprofit investigative reporting organization, won the public service honor — considered the gold medal of the Pulitzers — for its examination of the close relationships between Supreme Court justices and the billionaire donors who have lavished them with gifts and travel.

The Pulitzer committee took special notice of media coverage of the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent military incursion into Gaza. The New York Times won the international reporting category for its coverage of the conflict, and Reuters won the breaking-news photography category. The committee also issued a special citation honoring the journalists covering Gaza, noting the high number of journalists who have been killed.

In recent years, national news organizations like The Post have dominated the Pulitzers, which are administered by Columbia University: The Times won three prizes Monday, while the New Yorker won two.

But the committee this year also recognized several smaller local news outlets — including the four-year-old Lookout Santa Cruz, which won a breaking-news prize for coverage of devastating floods in central California, and the Honolulu Civil Beat, a finalist for coverage of the August wildfires in Hawaii. Invisible Institute, a nonprofit journalism organization on Chicago’s South Side, shared two prizes with media outlets it collaborated with on local crime stories.

The Post’s AR-15 project first took shape on the morning after a gunman killed 19 students and two teachers in Uvalde, Tex., in May 2022. Investigations editor Peter Wallsten pulled two colleagues aside, he recalled Monday, and they quickly agreed on one thing:

“We needed to find a new way to write about mass shootings,” he said. “The same stories were being written over and over, and produced again and again and again, every time there was a mass shooting.”

Cameron Barr, then the Post’s senior managing editor, suggested a focus on just the rifle that has become most closely associated with mass shootings.

Their goal was to tell the weapon’s story in a more ambitious and eye-opening way that would leave no doubt about its raw capacity to destroy human bodies and decimate communities around the country.

The Style section

One feature of the series, dubbed “American Icon,” used animation to show exactly how bullets fired by an AR-15 can shred the human body. To make the presentation even more visceral, the team got permission from surviving families to depict how two children in two different mass shootings were fatally wounded by the weapon.

“It’s an affirmation of our willingness as a newsroom to take risks,” Wallsten said of the prize. “It’s a reminder of how powerful it can be when a newsroom like The Washington Post decides a really important subject is worth a lot of attention, and we really have a lot of tools at our disposal and we can throw everything we have at a really important topic that’s vital for the country and have a huge impact.”

Another entry in the AR-15 series, “Terror on Repeat,” featured extremely graphic photographs of 11 mass shootings, including the bloodstained floor at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde. Investigative reporter Silvia Foster-Frau and visual reporter N. Kirkpatrick scoured thousands of images and videos of mass shootings — images, Foster-Frau said, “that are seared into our brains forever.” They started to notice “eerie” commonalities. “Seeing that connection basically made it clear that the story of mass shootings in America is one big story,” she added.

During an editorial meeting, the team presented a slide show of some of the images. Those in the room, including Post executive editor Sally Buzbee, were moved by the raw horror.

“I think I got teary-eyed at certain points when they first started showing it to us,” she recalled. “I can’t imagine any human would not get teary-eyed looking at that stuff.”

Considering the sensitivity surrounding the publication of such images, Buzbee wrote a note to readers explaining the paper’s decision-making process, which balanced the societal importance of the story with sensitivity to the families of those killed.

The Post shared the national reporting category with Reuters, which was recognized for coverage of Elon Musk’s automobile and aerospace businesses — stories, the Pulitzer committee said, that “displayed remarkable breadth and depth and provoked official probes of his companies’ practices in Europe and the United States.”

Hoffman , who has worked at The Post since 1982, said he is “absolutely thrilled” to receive the honor. He launched his series after learning about Danuta Perednya, a 21-year-old Belarusian college student sentenced to six years in prison for reposting her boyfriend’s message on the social media app Telegram that was critical of the war in Ukraine.

“Six years for a post,” Hoffman said. “That to me is the animating thing, the injustice of it. I was angry about these young people being imprisoned.”

After his initial story ( “They clicked once. Then came the dark prisons.” ), he started looking for other cases to highlight, finding many examples around the world.

While the story drew a large audience online, Hoffman said he wished it had the desired effect of freeing more of the people imprisoned. “I wish I could think of other ways that we could bring it to the world’s attention and stop it,” he said.

Kara-Murza, 42, was not available to comment on receiving the award because he is serving a 25-year sentence on charges of treason for criticizing Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Editorial page editor David Shipley said that Kara-Murza “has made a long-term commitment to live a life where he is speaking out on things that require a lot of moral clarity to speak about.”

“Columnists develop authority and persuasiveness in a lot of different ways,” Shipley said. “His authority is certainly conferred on him by not just his clarity of thought but also the way that he’s lived his life.”

The writer’s wife, Evgenia Kara-Murza, told a newsroom gathering Monday that their family’s travails began well before he was sentenced to prison two years ago. Hospitalized after alleged assassination attempts by poisoning left him suffering organ failure, he had to relearn “how to walk, how to talk, how to use a spoon,” she said.

“I miss his voice on a daily basis. So I want to thank The Washington Post for making sure that the voice of Vladimir is heard. That he is not forgotten. His vision is not forgotten,” she said.

She added: “I’m truly heartbroken that Vladimir cannot be here today and accept this high distinction by himself. He should be here addressing you. He would be finding the right words. Such is the price of telling the truth in today’s Russia.”

Buzbee, who took the top editor role in 2021, said the awards validate The Post’s editorial mission, particularly amid a broader climate of cost-cutting across the media business. “The industry obviously has so much turmoil facing it that it’s so critical for an organization like The Post to keep this commitment to deep reporting, and I think we’re in good shape on that.”

The Pulitzers also honor excellence in book writing, the arts and music.

This year, the committee received some 1,200 journalism submissions, which were considered by a board made up of 18 veteran journalists and academics. The winners receive $15,000, though the honor looms much larger for a recognized journalist or media organization.

The Post was also a nonwinning finalist in three other Pulitzer categories, including a nod for the AR-15 series in the prestigious category for public service journalism.

In the international reporting category, the Pulitzer Prize committee recognized as a finalist “Rising India, Toxic Tech,” a series focused on the ways in which Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his political party use the internet and social media platforms to achieve their political aims.

Another finalist, in the illustrated reporting and commentary category, was “Searching for Maura,” a beautifully rendered visual telling of the story of an 18-year-old Suyoc Igorot woman from the Philippines who died after coming to the United States to be put on display at the 1904 St. Louis World’s Fair. After she died, a portion of her brain was taken by the director of physical anthropology at the Smithsonian Institution’s U.S. National Museum, who used human body parts to test his theories about biological differences between races.

Full list of 2024 Pulitzer winners:

Public service: ProPublica

Breaking-news reporting: Staff of Lookout Santa Cruz

Investigative reporting: Hannah Dreier of the New York Times

Explanatory reporting: Sarah Stillman of the New Yorker

Local reporting: Sarah Conway of City Bureau and Trina Reynolds-Tyler of the Invisible Institute

National reporting: Staff of Reuters, and staff of The Washington Post

International reporting: Staff of the New York Times

Feature writing: Katie Engelhart, contributing writer, the New York Times

Commentary: Vladimir Kara-Murza, contributor, The Washington Post

Criticism: Justin Chang of the Los Angeles Times

Editorial writing: David E. Hoffman of The Washington Post

Illustrated reporting and commentary: Medar de la Cruz, contributor, the New Yorker

Breaking news photography: Photography staff of Reuters

Feature photography: Photography staff of Associated Press

Audio reporting: Staffs of the Invisible Institute and USG Audio

Fiction: “Night Watch” by Jayne Anne Phillips

Drama: “Primary Trust” by Eboni Booth

History: “No Right to an Honest Living: The Struggle of Boston’s Black Workers in the Civil War Era” by Jacqueline Jones

Biography: “King: A Life” by Jonathan Eig, and “Master Slave Husband Wife” by Ilyon Woo

Memoir or autobiography: “Liliana’s Invincible Summer: A Sister’s Search for Justice” by Cristina Rivera Garza

Poetry: “Tripas: Poems” by Brandon Som

General nonfiction: “A Day in the Life of Abed Salama: Anatomy of a Jerusalem Tragedy” by Nathan Thrall

Music: “Adagio (For Wadada Leo Smith)” by Tyshawn Sorey

Elahe Izadi contributed to this report.

The Post’s Pulitzer Prize history

2024: Washington Post wins three Pulitzer Prizes, including for AR-15 series, editorial writing and commentary | Read the stories

2023: Washington Post wins three Pulitzer Prizes, including for abortion coverage, feature writing | Read the stories

2022: Washington Post wins Pulitzer Prize for public service for Jan. 6 coverage | Read the stories

2021: Reporting about racial justice and pandemic dominates Pulitzer Prizes | Read the stories

2020: Washington Post wins Pulitzer Prize for series that detailed environmental devastation in global hot spots | Read the stories

2019: The Post wins Pulitzer Prizes for criticism, photography; affiliated cartoonist also honored | Read the stories

2018: The Post wins 2 Pulitzer Prizes for reporting on Russian interference and Alabama Senate race | Read the stories

2017: Washington Post’s David Fahrenthold wins Pulitzer Prize for dogged reporting of Trump’s philanthropy | Read the stories

2016: The Washington Post wins Pulitzer Prize for coverage of police shootings | Read the stories

The Washington Post’s Pulitzer Prize awards history