A Judge Ordered Microsoft to Split. Here’s Why It’s Still a Single Company
I t was Friday, Nov. 5, 1999 when then-Microsoft CEO Bill Gates got the bad news. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson had declared that his company was a monopoly. And not just any monopoly, but the very worst kind: one that uses its power to squash would-be rivals before they’re even out of the gate. At the time, Microsoft packaged its Internet Explorer web browser with its Windows operating systems, which gave Microsoft an incredible advantage over rivals like Netscape in an era when dial-up Internet meant that downloading and installing alternative web browsers was a slog at best.
“It’s actually hard to imagine how, for Microsoft, it could have come out any worse,” TIME wrote in a Nov. 15, 1999 cover story on Jackson’s decision. But Jackson wasn’t done yet — the declaration that Microsoft was a monopolist was only the first half of his decision. Jackson’s conclusions and remedy wouldn’t come until April and June of the next year, respectively, after Gates had already stepped down as CEO and transitioned into the newly created role of “chief software architect.”
“Assuming he says yea [to the question of whether Microsoft’s monopoly was used to violate antitrust laws]–a near certainty considering Friday’s findings–he can impose a remedy as far-reaching as the total dismemberment of the Gates empire,” TIME wrote in 1999. “The gamut of possible outcomes runs from a mild go-forth-and-sin-no-more to the truly Draconian stuff: forcing Microsoft to share its Windows source code with its competitors or carving up the company into the so-called Baby Bills.” (“Baby Bills” was a clever riff on the “Baby Bells” born of the 1982 breakup of the Bell telephone system.)
In 2000, Judge Jackson took the harsher path, decreeing that Microsoft should be split into two halves, one dedicated to Windows and the other to everything else Microsoft.
So why aren’t there two Microsofts today?
Jackson’s word was far from final. The case found its way to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected Jackson’s remedy and accused him of unethical conduct after it was revealed he had private conversations with reporters about the trial while it was still ongoing. Microsoft would settle the case with the Department of Justice in November of 2001 by agreeing to make it easier for Microsoft’s competitors to get their software more closely integrated with the Windows operating system — a tough pill for Microsoft to swallow, but hardly on the same level as a forced breakup.
These days, it’s harder to see Microsoft as the big monopolist bully Judge Jackson once described. Microsoft Windows operating systems still dominate the PC OS market, but PC OSes are less important than they’ve ever been before, diminishing Microsoft’s ability to use Windows’ market share to make life harder for its rivals. Thanks to the rise of high-speed Internet, web-based solutions and cloud computing in general, it doesn’t really matter what OS you use — Facebook and Gmail don’t care if you’re accessing them from Windows, OS X or Linux. On top of that, we do more of our daily computing on mobile devices like smartphones and tablets, a sphere that’s owned not by Microsoft but by rivals Apple and Google . (Interestingly, that latter company has increasingly run afoul of antitrust regulators, particularly in Europe, where a four-year investigation of Google’s potential abuse of its dominance in search to favor its own secondary products over those of its competitors was just reopened . As the power has shifted from Microsoft to its rivals, so have the watchful eyes of regulators.)
Sure, there have been fresh calls to split up Microsoft — except they’re not coming from regulators, but from Microsoft stockholders and analysts, surely inspired by the trend of corporate spinoffs that’s already hit massive players in tech like eBay, HP and now, potentially , security and storage firm Symantec. Microsoft, the spinoff advocates say , would be better off jettisoning its consumer-facing products, like the Xbox and its Bing search engine, so it can focus on enterprise solutions for corporate customers.
Will we ever see the birth of the Baby Bills? Maybe, but not for a long while: Microsoft’s newest CEO, Satya Nadella, hasn’t even had the reins for a full year yet, but he’s already well underway in changing course to a mostly software-oriented, platform-agnostic company . Microsoft’s stockholders seem to be willing to give Nadella some time to enact his vision, which could preserve the single Microsoft that’s been around since Gates and Paul Allen founded it in 1975 — a single company, even if that’s not so threatening anymore.
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The government's case against Microsoft for trying to monopolize the personal computer market
What was the Microsoft Antitrust Case?
The Microsoft antitrust case came to be one of the high-profile cases a few decades ago. In the 1990s. U.S. federal regulators sued Microsoft, which was at that time the world’s leading software company. The Federal Trade Commission launched an investigation as a response to the rising market share of the company in the personal computer market.
The investigation aimed to determine whether Microsoft was trying to monopolize the personal computer market. The federal agency soon ended its investigation, only to be brought up again by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1998.
The Justice Department filed antitrust charges against the software company. The charges came about in response to Microsoft bundling additional programs into its operating system. It meant that for customers who wanted to access a particular Microsoft application, buying the Microsoft Windows operating system was a prerequisite.
Moreover, Microsoft distributed its browser software, Internet Explorer, among consumers for free. It led to a concentration of the market share and the eventual downfall of Netscape, the company’s top competitor at the time. The DoJ case alleged that Microsoft was intentionally making it extremely difficult for consumers to install software by other companies on personal computers that ran on Microsoft’s operating system.
Summary
In the 1990s, the U.S. government sued Microsoft for trying to monopolize the personal computer market.
The charges brought against the company involved sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which included laws designed by governments in order to ensure fair competition in the market.
District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ruled that the company violated multiple sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
What are Antitrust Laws?
Antitrust laws are designed by governments in order to ensure fair competition in the market. The laws prohibit practices that result in a negative impact on free markets and create entry barriers. Common examples of such practices include industry-wide price-fixing, corporate mergers that are anti-competitive, predatory pricing done to maintain monopoly power, etc.
The bottom line of antitrust laws is to protect consumers from the harms of market monopolies. The harms usually accrue in the form of higher prices of goods and services for consumers. Many companies try to circumvent legal liabilities by establishing themselves as industry leaders and creating monopolies by buying out or knocking out the competition.
In the U.S., antitrust laws were enshrined by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 . It was unprecedented legislation that outlawed trusts, cartels, etc.
The Verdict
Microsoft lost the case against the government, and the presiding judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, ruled that the company violated multiple sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act. However, the trial was not a smooth one. The case was riddled with false and misleading statements, tampering with evidence, such as executive emails, and a plethora of courtroom distractions.
Microsoft was considered one of the biggest innovators of that era, and CEO Bill Gates was widely considered a genius. Moreover, a large group of economists alleged that antitrust laws not only stifle innovation but they also hurt consumers.
The biggest argument made by Microsoft’s defenders was that antitrust laws stifle the success of domestic firms on a global level, hence making them less competitive. It was because most other countries, barring the ones in the European Union, lack a high standard of national antitrust laws.
The Legal Case
Microsoft was formally charged with constituting a market monopoly by making it difficult for users to install competing software and simultaneously making it difficult to uninstall the company’s browser, Internet Explorer.
The company argued that these practices were non-coercive and that consumers enjoyed the freedom of choice due to the presence of products such as Macintosh, Unix, etc. The government also found that the company, by stifling competition, threatened innovation in the software industry. The company was also forced to share its data with other third parties.
Microsoft was highly critical of the ruling and alleged bias in favor of the prosecution.
Breaking Up Big Tech
The government also ruled that the company should be divided into two, thus creating two separate entities. One would be solely for the Windows operating system, while the other entity would be responsible for all other software products offered by Microsoft.
The ruling was challenged by Microsoft, and an appeals court overturned the ruling. However, it did successfully set a precedent that is echoed in calls for breaking up big tech among progressive American politicians. For example, many lawmakers suggest that Amazon should be divided into two separate entities, one for e-commerce and the other for the Amazon Web System.
Impact of the Ruling
Despite the apparent deterioration in the enforcement of antitrust laws in the U.S. in recent years, the Microsoft case was instrumental in creating a market environment favorable for the emergence of the biggest companies today, such as Google and Apple.
Related Readings
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Clayton Antitrust Act
Barriers to Entry
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Periodic Commentaries on the Policy Debate Release 7.4 April 2000
In our view, it is quite clear that Microsoft has violated the law and harmed consumers. Further, we believe that one type of remedy -- a "competitive" structural remedy that would create four companies from the current one and so restore competition to the market for operating systems -- is clearly preferable to other alternatives. In this paper, we summarize the factual evidence and legal analysis that lead us to conclude a remedy is desirable, and describe briefly the remedy we have concluded would best serve consumers.
While we believe these issues are all worthy of debate and discussion, such discussion can only be constructive if it acknowledges the voluminous factual and legal record that has already been established during the course of the trial. Some of Microsoft’s defenders apparently view the trial record as unimportant -- or even biased. Rather than argue the facts, or the law, they have cast aspersions on the ideological leanings (too liberal?) or even the ethical standards (politically motivated?) of those involved in prosecuting the case.
For those who might be inclined to accept such arguments, it is important to remember that the Microsoft case has been prosecuted by an Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Joel Klein, who was confirmed by the Senate on a vote of 88-12 -- with all 12 of those opposing his nomination being liberal Democrats concerned that he would be too "pro-market" in his approach. Speaking in favor of Klein's nomination, former Judiciary Committee Chairman Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) defended his pro-market approach, calling him "within the mainstream of antitrust law and doctrine."
Further, the trial has been presided over by a Reagan-appointed judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, who is not known for having anti-business views. Even as staunch a critic of the Microsoft case as editorial page said "it was hard to find much wrong with Judge Jackson’s rendition of the ‘facts’."
Rather than casting about for conspiracy theories, everyone interested in this matter would do well to focus on the facts, the law -- and the choice now before the courts, which is not whether, but how, to remedy the damage being caused by the Microsoft monopoly.
Judge Jackson’s 205-page "Findings of Fact" convincingly establishes three facts that are crucial to understanding this case:
, Microsoft possesses monopoly power in the market for Personal Computer (PC) operating systems;
, Microsoft engaged in a wide-ranging effort to protect its operating system monopoly, utilizing a full array of exclusionary practices; and
, Microsoft’s actions were harmful to innovation and to consumers.
Judge Jackson’s Findings leave no serious doubt that Microsoft is a monopoly -- that is, that it possesses market power in the market for Intel-compatible operating systems. Judge Jackson bases this conclusion on three factors:
Findings ¶¶34.
While some Microsoft defenders have argued that new developments in the computer marketplace have eroded Microsoft's monopoly power, they fail to acknowledge that Judge Jackson specifically addressed such developments, including the Linux operating system; the growing popularity of hand-held information appliances, such as Palm computers; and the growth of Web-based applications, . Findings ¶¶ 48-50, 22-26.
On the question of monopoly power, Jackson's finding is consistent with virtually all the available data, as well as the public and private statements of such industry leaders as Microsoft's own chairman, Bill Gates. To be credible, contrary arguments should either provide new information or suggest some flaw in Judge Jackson's reasoning. All of the arguments we have seen, however, do nothing more than repeat speculation about how technological change will soon make Microsoft's monopoly irrelevant -- speculation conclusively and persuasively rejected by the Court.
T he fact of Microsoft's monopoly is important not because having a monopoly is in and of itself illegal, but because only firms that possess such power are able to engage in certain activities that are harmful to consumers. Since Microsoft has been established to have market power, the next question is whether Microsoft actually engaged in such behaviors. Judge Jackson finds that it did.
Judge Jackson finds that Microsoft was especially concerned about technologies, such as Netscape’s Navigator browser, that could support platform-independent computing and thereby erode Microsoft’s position. In response to the Netscape threat, Microsoft undertook a broad array of anticompetitive practices to increase the market share of its Internet Explorer.
Findings ¶ ¶139.
Note that Judge Jackson's finding with respect to Microsoft and Netscape is not limited to the question of "technological tying" -- i.e. whether Microsoft could legally bundle its browser with its operating system. Instead, Jackson identifies a broad pattern of activities for which Microsoft advanced no credible efficiency rationale, but which can easily be understood as being designed to harm competition. For example, Judge Jackson found that Microsoft was able to use its Windows license as leverage in disputes with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), such as Compaq, over which browser would be featured on their products.
Findings ¶ 206.
The Findings of Fact also establish that Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct was not limited to its battle with Netscape, but instead went well beyond the so-called "browser wars." When Intel, for example, began developing software that would go directly to the equipment manufacturers and bypass Windows, Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates went straight to the top.
. Findings ¶ 102.
Similarly, Microsoft attempted to use the leverage provided by the Windows monopoly to persuade IBM to stop competing in the market for applications software.
Findings ¶ 116.
In addition to these examples, the Findings of Fact also establish that Microsoft threatened or otherwise engaged in anticompetitive conduct on numerous other occasions, involving such major companies as Apple, AOL, Intuit, Real Networks and Sun Microsystems.
In summary, far from the cry of Microsoft's defenders that the company is being punished for being more efficient than its competitors, or for "building a better mousetrap," the facts establish that it engaged in a broad, persistent pattern of behavior for which there is no plausible explanation other than an intention to deprive consumers of the benefits of competition. Ignoring these facts, as Microsoft's defenders consistently do, cannot make them go away.
Microsoft's defenders are also wont to suggest that Judge Jackson has ignored the issue of consumer harm. To the contrary, the Findings of Fact identify numerous instances in which Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct had restricted consumer choice, deterred innovation and had a chilling effect on the entire industry.
Findings ¶ 241.
Findings ¶ 409.
. Findings ¶ 412.
The Findings of Fact demonstrate beyond any doubt that Microsoft's conduct had its intended effect of raising the costs to consumers of using products that Microsoft deemed dangerous to its monopoly, and of reducing the benefits to consumers of the innovation that would have taken place in the absence of Microsoft's illegal conduct. This is precisely the sort of consumer harm the antitrust laws seek to mitigate.
The Sherman Antitrust Act is the cornerstone of antitrust policy in the United States. Based on his Findings of Fact, Judge Jackson issued "Conclusions of Law" in which he determined that:
Conclusions p. 2.
In other words, Judge Jackson found Microsoft guilty of monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, both because it used illegal means to maintain its operating system monopoly and because it used illegal means to attempt to establish a monopoly in the market for Web browsers. He also found Microsoft guilty under Section 1 of the Act for illegally tying the Internet Explorer browser to the Windows operating system. However, he exonerated Microsoft on the charge of exclusive dealing under Section 1.
Jackson's Conclusions of Law detail the basis for each conclusion. On the charge of illegally maintaining its operating system monopoly, he finds that:
Conclusions p. 9.
Jackson specifically finds that there was no legitimate economic purpose for Microsoft's illegal conduct.
Conclusions p. 11.
Conclusions p. 16.
Conclusions p. 15.
He also considers and specifically rejects Microsoft's contention that its activities were nothing more than the rough and tumble of the competitive process, redounding ultimately to the benefit of consumers:
Conclusions p. 19.
To the contrary, Jackson concludes that Microsoft's actions were the antithesis of competition on the merits and, in the broadest sense, constitute predatory behavior that is illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Conclusions p. 20.
Conclusions p. 21.
In sum, Judge Jackson's Conclusions of Law are damning to Microsoft and its conduct. After considering each of Microsoft's arguments to the contrary, he demonstrates that Microsoft's conduct, taken as a whole and in its entirety, is both illegal under the Sherman Act and harmful to consumers, whom the Act is designed to protect.
Given the Court's Findings and Conclusions of Law, it is a virtual certainty that Microsoft will be subject to remedial action of some form. The available remedies fall into two broad categories, conduct remedies and structural remedies.
Microsoft's defenders have generally focused their commentary on the prospect of conduct remedies, which would place restrictions on Microsoft's future behavior. While we are not prepared to exclude the possibility that some form of conduct remedy could be beneficial, the ones proposed thus far would appear to do more harm than good.
Given the range of illegitimate behavior documented by the court, and the complexity of the software industry, a meaningful conduct remedy would require a lengthy list of conduct restrictions and requirements. The imposition of such a remedy on Microsoft would be burdensome for the company and difficult, if not impossible, for the government to enforce. The real danger, however, is that a conduct remedy would lead the decree court and the Department of Justice to function as regulatory agencies, monitoring the operations of a firm with 30,000 employees producing dozens of technologically sophisticated products. Because enforcement of conduct restrictions would involve ongoing oversight of virtually all of Microsoft’s operations, including new product introductions, it could interfere with Microsoft’s ability to develop new products and compete. And, because Microsoft has dealings throughout the software industry, oversight of Microsoft by the decree court might well lead to indirect oversight of other firms as well. In sum, there are legitimate concerns about conduct remedies in the Microsoft case.
A well-designed structural remedy, on the other hand, is subject to none of the concerns described above. We have proposed a "competitive remedy" that would replace the current monopoly with a competitive market structure. Specifically, it would separate Microsoft’s operating system products from the rest of the company’s product lines, and then create three equivalent "Windows companies." Each of the new Windows companies would have full ownership over all the relevant intellectual property, and would be allocated an equal share of employees, contracts and other resources to go with the intellectual property.
The competitive remedy we propose would immediately replace the existing operating system monopoly with a competitive market. In so doing, it would
Furthermore, we believe it is highly likely that the competitive remedy would result in far more rapid innovation in computer operating systems than we have witnessed over the course of the past decade, for the simplest of reasons: Competitive firms have an incentive to innovate in order to win business away from their competitors; monopolists do not.
Microsoft's defenders have offered several arguments in opposition to such a remedy, two of which are worthy of rebuttal. The first is that this solution is unworkable because the task of dividing up a complex firm like Microsoft is too difficult, or the costs too great. We disagree. Indeed, the task of dividing up a firm like Microsoft, which has virtually no tangible assets and whose 30,000 employees are mostly young, mobile and well-off, is vastly easier and less costly than dividing up a firm like, say, AT&T circa 1984. We believe the breakup we propose could be carried out quickly and with relatively minimal costs, and have seen no plausible evidence to the contrary.
The second argument has to do with standardization. The idea is that we need a monopoly like Microsoft to provide a standard for operating systems and, in the absence of such a monopoly, we would have "fragmentation" and resulting incompatibility. In Dr. Lenard's longer paper on the remedies issue he shows that this argument fails at several levels. Specifically, all of the new firms would have extremely strong incentives to maintain compatibility with the existing Windows installed base and with each other on a going forward basis. Moreover, those who advance this thesis have the burden of showing why in this particular instance economic efficiency can only be obtained through a monopoly, whereas in all other markets competition produces an efficient balance between standardization, on the one hand, and specialization/diversity on the other. We have not seen such a showing made, nor do we believe one is possible.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law handed down by Judge Jackson address each significant argument Microsoft has made in its own defense -- and find them wanting. Microsoft has a monopoly, has engaged in anticompetitive behaviors, has harmed consumers and has violated the law. Those who would argue otherwise have an obligation to rebut Jackson's factual and legal conclusions on their substance. We have yet to see such a rebuttal. The conspiracy theories that have been offered in place of substantive argument are unsupported by any evidence, and seem incredible on their face.
The danger that a conduct remedy in the Microsoft case could lead to increased government involvement in the software marketplace is not without merit. A structural remedy, on the other hand, would end the Microsoft monopoly, end the threat of government regulation and obviate the need for further litigation now and for many years to come.
, November 23, 1999, p. A22. Findings of Fact in U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) and State of New York, ex re. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer et al., v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ), November 5, 1999 (hereafter, "Findings of Fact" or "Findings"). Conclusions of Law in U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ) and State of New York, ex. re. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer et al., v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1233 (TPJ), April 3, 2000 (hereafter, "Conclusions of Law" or "Conclusions"). Thomas M. Lenard, , The Progress & Freedom Foundation, January 2000.
Antitrust laws apply to virtually all industries and to every level of business. Governments design them in order to make sure there's fair competition in the market. They prohibit a variety of practices that restrain trade including price-fixing, anti-competitive corporate mergers , and predatory acts designed to achieve or maintain monopoly power. In simpler terms, antitrust laws prevent companies from making and boosting their profits by playing dirty.
Without these laws in place, consumers wouldn't have the choices they do and would be forced to pay higher prices in order to get the goods and services they require. Some companies may try to circumvent the laws to try to position themselves as a leader in the market . The government may step in to stop them from establishing a monopoly , thus knocking out the competition. This article focuses on the 1998 Microsoft antitrust case. Read on to learn more about the case and the ruling that followed.
Key Takeaways
Antitrust laws ensure one company doesn't control the market, deplete consumer choice, and inflate prices.
Microsoft was accused of trying to create a monopoly that led to the collapse of rival Netscape by giving its browser software for free.
Charges were brought against the company which was sued by the Department of Justice in 1998.
The judge ruled that Microsoft violated parts of the Sherman Antitrust Act and ordered the company to break up into two entities.
Microsoft appealed the decision, which was overturned.
The Microsoft Antitrust Case
Microsoft ( MSFT ) was one of the world's most successful software companies in the 1980s. The company's rising presence in the personal computing market raised alarm bells with federal authorities. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an investigation in the early 1990s to determine whether Microsoft was trying to create a monopoly. Although that investigation was closed, the Department of Justice (DoJ) picked it up.
On May 18, 1998, the DoJ and the attorneys general of 20 different states filed antitrust charges against Microsoft to determine whether the company's bundling of additional programs into its operating system constituted monopolistic actions. The suit was brought following the browser wars that led to the collapse of Microsoft's top competitor, Netscape, which occurred when Microsoft began giving away its browser software for free.
Charges were brought against Microsoft to determine whether its bundling of additional programs into its operating system constituted monopolistic actions.
The government case accused Microsoft of making it difficult for consumers to install competing software on computers operated by Windows. If Microsoft was found to have made it unreasonably difficult for consumers to uninstall Internet Explorer and use a competing browser, the company's practices would be deemed anti-competitive. The case meandered along with accusations of misleading statements and a variety of courtroom distractions. A group of economists even published a full-page open letter to President Bill Clinton in major newspapers in support of Microsoft stating that antitrust laws hurt consumers as well as the success of domestic firms in global competition. They urged authorities to drop protectionism fueled by antitrust laws.
Problems With the Case
The trial didn't necessarily run very smoothly. In fact, the DOJ's case against Microsoft was plagued with problems. First, there were questions about whether charges should have been brought against Microsoft in the first place. Microsoft claimed that its competitors were jealous of its success. Meanwhile, those who supported Microsoft proposed that if the company was to be considered a monopoly, it was, at best, a noncoercive one. They argued that even with options like Unix, Linux, and Macintosh, consumers demonstrated a preference for the convenience of Microsoft's Windows product on their computers. Windows may not have been the superior product, but it could run on a Toshiba laptop or on a number of clones. The ease of its installation and its other bundled software allowed it to become the norm.
Despite the creative editing of video, facts, and emails, Microsoft lost the case. The presiding judge, Thomas Penfield Jackson, ruled that Microsoft violated parts of the Sherman Antitrust Act , which was established in 1890 to outlaw monopolies and cartels. He found that Microsoft's position in the marketplace constituted a monopoly that threatened not only the competition but also innovation in the industry. Jackson also called for Microsoft to divide the company in half and create two separate entities that would be called baby bills . The operating system would make up one half of the company and the software arm would make up the other.
Microsoft's Appeal
Microsoft didn't take the ruling lightly and appealed the decision. The company took issue with the judge's position, citing bias in favor of the prosecution. The appeals court overturned Jackson's decision against Microsoft. Instead of seeking to break up the company, the Department of Justice decided to settle with Microsoft. In its settlement, the DoJ abandoned the requirement to break up the company, In return, Microsoft agreed to share computing interfaces with other companies.
Post-Antitrust Case
The company saw its once invincible market share erode due to old-fashioned competition. But the lessons learned from the case continue to resound. Many now wonder if bringing antitrust cases against non-coercive monopolies is merely a costly redundancy of work the free market can do at no charge.
The Washington Post. " FTC Deadlocks Again in Microsoft Investigation ."
U.S. Department of Justice. " Justice Department Files Antitrust Suit Against Microsoft for Unlawfully Monopolizing Computer Software Markets ."
Independent Institute. " An Open Letter to President Clinton from 240 Economists Dear President Clinton: on Antitrust Protectionism ."
U.S. Department of Justice. " U.S. V. Microsoft: Court's Findings of Fact ."
U.S. Department of Justice. " U.S. v. Microsoft Corporation ."
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Lessons Learned From The Microsoft Anti-Trust Case That Began In The 1990s
NPR's Mary Louise Kelly speaks with Verge reporter Adi Robertson about today's tech giants being investigated for possible antitrust violations and lessons learned from the Microsoft case in the '90s.
NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.
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U.S. V. Microsoft: Proposed Findings Of Fact
Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, and the evidence on which they are based, demonstrate that Microsoft has engaged in a broad pattern of unlawful conduct with the purpose and effect of thwarting emerging threats to its powerful and well-entrenched operating system monopoly. Most prominent among these was the threat posed by competing Internet browsers, particularly Netscape's Navigator. Non-Microsoft browsers, if widely used, promised to form the center of an emerging middleware platform that could have helped to erode the high applications barrier to entry that protects Microsoft's monopoly.
Microsoft acted quickly to squelch this evolving middleware threat to what it sometimes called its "desktop paradise," first by proposing an illegal division of markets, and then by embarking on a predatory campaign to restrict the distribution and usage of Netscape's browser and, in Microsoft's words, to "cut off Netscape's air supply." But Microsoft's broad anticompetitive campaign has not been limited to preempting the browser threat; Microsoft sought to curtail other actual or potential middleware threats to its operating system monopoly, including Sun's Java, Intel's Native Signal Processing, and Apple's QuickTime. Microsoft's actions demonstrate that it believed it could not win simply by competing on the merits. As one of Microsoft's top executives candidly acknowledged: "we were very concerned that if the user saw Netscape Navigator side by side with Internet Explorer . . . we would lose."
Microsoft's predatory campaign worked. It succeeded in preserving Microsoft's monopoly power by preventing the successful development of alternative platforms that could have eroded its Windows monopoly and given consumers greater choice. In other words, Microsoft prevented consumers from getting what they wanted so that Microsoft could keep what it had -- a monopoly in operating systems.
For a long time now -- and, if Microsoft's actions to maintain its monopoly are not halted, for well into the future -- personal computer consumers are locked into a Microsoft world, one in which a single company essentially controls the configuration of desktop computing. The evidence detailed in these Proposed Findings establishes both the anticompetitive tactics Microsoft employed and the harm to competition and consumers those tactics caused. What can never be fully known, of course, are (i) the innovative products that would have come to market had developers not been deterred by Microsoft's illegal assault on potential competitors; and (ii) the benefits that consumers would have realized if Microsoft's operating systems monopoly had been eroded. Such products and consumer benefits are inevitable wherever market competition flourishes.
Microsoft has monopoly power in the market for operating systems for Intel-compatible personal computers ("PCs"). Microsoft's operating systems account for an overwhelming share -- well over 90% -- of that market and, indeed, of all operating systems for PCs. Microsoft's customers -- computer manufacturers ("OEMs") and the vast majority of PC users -- have no commercially viable alternative to the Windows operating systems. Microsoft is able to, and does, exercise its monopoly power over OEMs and PC consumers in a variety of ways.
Microsoft's monopoly power is protected, and has been protected for years, by high barriers to entry into the operating systems market, the most important of which is the applications barrier. The applications barrier to entry exists because applications written to Windows will not run on other operating systems and other operating systems cannot effectively compete against Microsoft unless they can offer PC users a wide array of applications similar, in depth and breadth, to the vast set of applications that exists for Windows.
In the mid-1990's, Microsoft identified a potential threat to its monopoly: platform level middleware such as Netscape's Navigator browser. Internet browsers run "on top" of operating systems and contain interfaces ("APIs") to which other application programs can be written. Because Internet browsers and other middleware can run on multiple operating systems, they can enable application developers, by writing programs to the APIs on the middleware, to develop programs that are platform neutral -- that is, that can run across a variety of operating systems. By potentially "commoditizing" the underlying operating system, browsers thus offer the potential to erode the applications barrier to entry and, ultimately, Microsoft's operating system monopoly. Netscape's browser posed a particularly serious threat to Microsoft: it was widely adopted by PC users to browse the rapidly emerging World Wide Web, it was cross platform, and it therefore had the potential to become a ubiquitous platform to which other application programs could be written.
Another serious threat to Microsoft was the development of Java by Sun Microsystems. Java too can serve as an alternative platform to which developers can write applications that run across different operating systems. The Java and Netscape threats were mutually reinforcing because the Netscape browser was a primary distribution mechanism for Java and because Java applications are especially well-suited to the Internet and to other network-based computing needs and, therefore, complement the browser.
Background
Microsoft Possesses Monopoly Power Over Operating Systems
Alternative Platform-Level Technologies, Especially Internet Browsers and Java, Threaten Microsoft's Operating System Monopoly
Microsoft Attempted To Enter Market-Division Agreements To Eliminate Platform-Level Software Threatened Microsoft's Operating System Monopoly
Microsoft Engaged In A Predatory Campaign To Crush The Browser Threat To Its Operating System Monopoly
economic justifications Microsoft's witnesses have advanced for tying Internet Explorer to Windows are contrary to the evidence
Microsoft Used Predatory and Anticompetitive Conduct to Impede Other Platform Threats as Well, Thereby Further Entrenching Its Operating System Monopoly
Through its predatory and anticompetitive conduct, Microsoft has maintained its operating system monopoly, dangerously threatened monopolization of the browser market, and inflicted substantial and far-reaching consumer harm
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How Microsoft’s Legal Legacy Shapes the Antitrust Case Against Google
Lawyers for the Justice Department and Google as well as the judge in a monthslong trial have invoked the landmark case against Microsoft from the 1990s.
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By Steve Lohr
Steve Lohr covered the Microsoft antitrust trial.
Antitrust trials are full of long stretches of detailed, often tedious testimony punctuated by telling moments. In the two-month Google antitrust trial that is nearing its conclusion, one of those moments came in a brief exchange in October.
While cross-examining a witness for the Justice Department, John Schmidtlein, Google’s lead trial lawyer, tried to describe how this suit differed from the landmark antitrust case brought against Microsoft in the 1990s. The barriers to competition in search today, Mr. Schmidtlein said, are less daunting than Microsoft’s stranglehold on personal computer software.
The judge cut him off. “Let’s move on,” said Judge Amit P. Mehta, who wrote in an opinion earlier in the year that he would use the Microsoft case as a guiding framework. “I think I can figure out what the Microsoft case was about.”
The antitrust fight against Microsoft in the 1990s has loomed over the government’s showdown with Google. The Justice Department and a group of states say the search giant is running the Microsoft monopoly playbook, just in a different tech market, while Google argues that it is hardly as powerful as Microsoft was back in the day.
The Microsoft antitrust case is also the lone example of the government’s embarking on — and winning — a sweeping suit against a tech giant for illegally protecting its monopoly. Microsoft combined old-style practices, like bullying industry partners to stifle competition, with newer ideas in economics.
One of those new ideas included the dynamics of digital markets, which reinforce the power of a dominant company. In tech markets, there can be a powerful “network effect” as a product or service becomes more valuable as more people use it, attracting still more users and investment. Once on a digital platform, users tend not to switch. These concepts of digital platform economics are crucial to the Google case.
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Operating Systems
Findings of fact: Microsoft is a monopoly that hurts competition and consumers Findings of fact: Microsoft is a monopoly that hurts competition and consumers
As expected, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson has found Microsoft to have monopoly power in the computer operating system market. But more damagingly, the judge also found that Microsoft has harmed competitors and consumers alike by its business practices.
November 4, 1999
As expected, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson has found Microsoft to have monopoly power in the computer operating system market. But more damagingly, the judge also found that Microsoft has harmed competitors and consumers alike by its business practices. And Internet Explorer and Windows are "separate products...with no technical justification" for bundling. The findings of fact in the historic Microsoft antitrust trial were finally released Friday night at 6:30 p.m. and the news, shall we say, wasn't totally unexpected. Corporate monopolies are not illegal in America, but Microsoft violated the law by muscling rivals out of various markets and using a monopoly to gain entry into other markets.
"Microsoft enjoys so much power in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems that if it wished to exercise this power solely in terms of price, it could charge a price for Windows substantially above that which could be charged in a competitive market," the findings read. "Moreover, it could do so for a significant period of time without losing an unacceptable amount of business to competitors. In other words, Microsoft enjoys monopoly power in the relevant market."
The court uses lessons from the failure of OS/2 Warp and the Mac OS as examples of how Microsoft is able to keep competitors at bay. Windows, the findings say, has had over 90% marketshare for over a decade; for the past few years, it's been over 95%. And, most ominously, there's nothing coming down the pipe that will affect its domination of the market. And because of its dominance, Microsoft was able to fix prices.
"A Microsoft study from 1997 reveals that the company could have charged $49 for the upgrade to Windows 98, but the study identifies $89 as the revenue-maximizing price. Microsoft thus opted for the higher price," the findings read. "The firm [also] charges different [PC makers] different prices for Windows, depending on the degree to which the individual [PC makers] comply with Microsoft's wishes."
Microsoft's actions toward other companies, of course, came under fire as well.
"Over the years... Microsoft took actions that could only have been advantageous if they operated to reinforce monopoly power."
The findings discuss Microsoft's attempts to squash competition from Netscape and Sun's Java, for example, only when the market for these products became seen as a danger to Windows. Microsoft, the findings read, attempted to coerce Netscape into a "special (and illegal) relationship" that would have incorporated Navigator's features into Windows 95 while keep Netscape away from the lucrative Windows market. Netscape declined the offer. A variety of firms, including Netscape, Apple Computer, RealNetworks, IBM, and Intel, also testified that Microsoft withheld vital technical information that would have allowed their products to better take advantage of Windows.
The findings represent over 200 pages of documentation, a weighty volume that will take some time to get through. The conclusion, however, is obvious: Microsoft is guilty as charged. So the next phase, where the judge makes his findings of law, will pave the way to a final judgment that could well mean the breakup of Microsoft Corporation. Of course, several years of appeals will precede any planned breakup.
"Most harmful of all," the judge concludes, "is the message that Microsoft's actions have conveyed to every enterprise with the potential to innovate in the computer industry. Through its conduct toward Netscape, IBM, Compaq, Intel, and others, Microsoft has demonstrated that it will use its prodigious market power and immense profits to harm any firm that insists on pursuing initiatives that could intensify competition against one of Microsoft's core products. Microsoft's past success in hurting such companies and stifling innovation deters investment in technologies and businesses that exhibit the potential to threaten Microsoft. The ultimate result is that some innovations that would truly benefit consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft's self-interest.
For the complete findings of fact, please visit the Web site for "Findings of Fact - United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation"
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About the Author
Paul Thurrott
Paul Thurrott is senior technical analyst for Windows IT Pro . He writes the SuperSite for Windows , a weekly editorial for Windows IT Pro UPDATE , and a daily Windows news and information newsletter called WinInfo Daily UPDATE .
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What Are We Learning from the Microsoft Case?
Good morning. I am glad to be here today to offer opening remarks to today's discussion about what we are learning from the Microsoft case and other government antitrust cases against those in high-tech industries. Given the role that high technology, innovation, and the Internet are playing in our economic expansion, this is an opportune time to debate the future of government antitrust enforcement in high-tech industries. The trial of the Department of Justice's ("DOJ") case against Microsoft Corporation -- the world's leading manufacturer of operating systems -- has just been completed before Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson, and it seems as if all the world awaits his findings of fact and conclusions of law. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission (over my dissent) recently issued an order making final a consent agreement with Intel Corporation - the world's leading manufacturer of general purpose microprocessors - to resolve allegations that the company had monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market for general purpose microprocessors. (1) These cases have brought many long-simmering disputes to a boil, and we should take this opportunity to assess where we are with regard to government antitrust enforcement in high-tech industries.
What I would like to do this morning is to provide a thumbnail sketch of the allegations in the Microsoft case, and suggest a discussion of three issues -- monopoly power, consumer injury, and remedies -- that are raised both by the Microsoft case and by other recent antitrust cases involving high-tech. The panelists that follow will be able to engage in provocative debate as to how these issues will play out in the Microsoft case. The rest of us can sit back and enjoy the intellectual fireworks!
Before proceeding any further, I must point out that the views that I will express are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, my fellow Commissioners, or the Department of Justice.
Briefly, the Department of Justice alleges that Microsoft has monopoly power in the market for personal computer operating systems and that it has engaged in anticompetitive practices to eliminate competitors' browsers as competing platforms for running software applications, thereby unlawfully maintaining its monopoly power. DOJ also alleges that Microsoft has sought to restrict the access of its browser competitors, especially Netscape, to significant channels of distribution, thereby unlawfully restraining competition in the browser market. DOJ further alleges that Microsoft has attempted to obtain a monopoly in the browser market. Finally, DOJ alleges that Microsoft engaged in an illegal tying arrangement by using its position with regard to operating systems to induce consumers to use a Microsoft browser. Microsoft vigorously denies that it has monopoly power in the market for personal computer operating systems, that its acts or practices were unlawful, and that its actions caused harm to consumers.
Monopoly Power
As I mentioned earlier, there are at least three issues raised by the Microsoft case which are worthy of serious discussion. The first is: When does a firm have "monopoly power" in the market for a high-tech product? Courts have defined monopoly power to be "the power to control prices or exclude competition." (2) Because monopoly power is difficult to measure directly, courts have used market share as indirect evidence of the existence of monopoly power. Microsoft allegedly has an 80% or more share of the market for personal computer operating systems, and courts typically have concluded that a 70% or more market share creates an inference of monopoly power absent evidence that overcomes that inference. (3)
I think that it is particularly important in antitrust cases involving high-tech to look beyond mere market share to determine whether monopoly power exists. On the one hand, in antitrust cases involving high-tech much has been made of the theory that a firm's market power may be durable because of what are known as "network effects." Network effects essentially mean that certain products become more useful as more and more people come to use them. Simple examples are telephones and fax machines, both of which became more useful with increased use. The theory underlying network effects is that once consumers become "locked-in" to a product incorporating the current technology, they may be reluctant to switch to another product with a superior technology because of the premium associated with the widespread use of a common technology. Since network effects may make consumers less likely to switch, a firm with a high market share that makes a product including the current technology may be more likely to have monopoly power.
On the other hand, experience teaches that the normal operation of economic incentives in dynamic high-tech markets generally will spur advances in technology that cause consumers to switch to a superior new technology in spite of network effects. For example, in the early 1980s consumers were locked into the technology of vinyl records and turntables, but consumers rapidly switched technologies with introduction of compact disks. Perhaps the threat of similar technological switches explains why some of the titans of high-tech industry today do not appear to behave like the monopolists of old, for whom "unchallenged economic power deaden[ed] initiative . . . [and] immunity from competition [was] a narcotic." (4)
The ultimate determination of whether a firm that makes a high-tech product has monopoly power is a difficult assessment that must be undertaken in light of the particular product market at issue, including an analysis of how technological change may affect the ability of the firm to control price and exclude competition. For example, in the Intel case, I expressed uncertainty as to whether Intel, despite its extremely large market share in general purpose microprocessors, actually had monopoly power because it appeared to face aggressive competition from innovative firms, especially those that were supplying general purpose microprocessors for personal computers costing less than $1,000.
I look forward to hearing from our panelists on the issue of whether Microsoft has monopoly power in the market for personal computer operating systems in light of ongoing technological and other developments in the marketplace.
Consumer Harm
The second issue that I think the Microsoft case and other high-tech antitrust cases raise is whether the alleged unlawful conduct has caused harm to consumers, and not just to competitors. Antitrust law traditionally evaluates whether the conduct at issue has caused or is likely to cause harm to consumer welfare (5) in the form of higher prices, reduced output, and decreased innovation. Markets for many high-tech products have been and continue to be characterized by decreasing prices, increasing output, and robust innovation, often stemming from massive spending on research and development. Such market characteristics do not confer immunity from antitrust challenge on those competing in these markets, but they do transform the relevant questions into whether prices would have fallen even more, output would have increased even more, and innovation would have been even more vibrant in the absence of the alleged antitrust violations.
While there certainly are circumstances under which such harm can be proven, we should be wary of reaching the conclusion that markets that are already creating tremendous benefits for consumers would have done even better. For example, in the FTC's Intel case, the Commission alleged that, in the wake of intellectual property disputes between Intel and three computer manufacturers that purchased Intel microprocessors, Intel decided to curtail the supply of technical information and prototypes to those three firms. The Commission's complaint alleged that Intel's actions entrenched its monopoly position in general purpose microprocessors and diminished the incentives of firms commercially dependent on Intel to develop innovations relating to microprocessor technology. I was unwilling to support the Commission's case against Intel because "[w]hatever injury Intel might have visited on [the three computer manufacturers], I [could not] accept that it could appreciably affect -- much less stem -- the immense tide of invention and improvement that continuously drives this industry." (6) I eagerly anticipate a vigorous debate among our panelists as to whether Microsoft's alleged conduct has caused harm to American consumers.
Finally, we need to address the issue of what kinds of remedies should be imposed when firms in high-tech industries are found to have violated the antitrust laws. As I mentioned above, many high-tech markets are characterized by decreasing prices, increasing output, and robust innovation -- certainly characteristics that yield tremendous benefits to consumers. To avoid "killing the goose that lays the golden eggs," remedies should be very carefully calibrated to address demonstrated consumer harm and to prevent violations that are the same as or similar to the violations that caused that harm. Adherence to the Hippocratic oath -- "First, do no harm" -- seems a standard quite applicable to the remedies that should be imposed in antitrust cases concerning high-tech.
The Microsoft case has generated a flurry of debate as to what sort of remedy the court should impose if Microsoft is found liable. Among others, the remedies that have been discussed have included breaking up the company (vertically or horizontally), mandating that the company allow access to its operating system technology, and prohibiting the company from using certain contractual provisions. One suggested remedy recently caught my eye. Under the heading "Wheel of Fortune," John McCaslin of the Washington Times offered a snippet reporting that David Boies, DOJ's lead trial attorney, had told British consumers that they might receive checks as part of the relief ordered. (7) I will leave it up to the panelists to offer their views as to what will be revealed if and when Judge Jackson, with or without the assistance of Vanna White, turns over his letters with regard to remedy.
Thank you, and I look forward to a stimulating discussion.
1. Intel Corporation, FTC Dkt. No. 9288.
2. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
3. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 235 (4th ed. 1997).
4. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America , 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
5. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 89 (1978) ("the case is overwhelming for judicial adherence to the single goal of consumer welfare in the interpretation of the antitrust laws").
6. Statement of Commissioner Swindle at 3. My statement in the Intel case is available at < www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9908/swindleintel.htm >.
7. Assistant Attorney General Klein this week clarified that Mr. Boies "never expressed an opinion as to whether a private party (American or otherwise) had a claim against Microsoft , nor did he solicit or encourage any party to assert such a claim, or consult counsel regarding such a claim." Joel I. Klein, That Microsoft Vendetta , Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1999, at A25.
How Microsoft KILLS its Competition Silently?: Business Strategy Case Study
Updated: August 22, 2024
Think School
In 1998, the US Department of Justice and 20 states sued Microsoft for anti-competitive practices, leading to a two-decade-long case. Microsoft's dominance stemmed from strategies like integrating Internet Explorer into Windows and limiting compatibility with other browsers. The case highlights the importance of product quality, innovation, and evolving technology trends, showcasing lessons in competition, innovation, and industry standards setting. The video also mentions Scalar Academy, a tech upscaling platform offering training in critical tech skills and job placement assistance at top companies. Viewers are encouraged to delve deeper into the Microsoft case study for valuable insights.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction to Microsoft Lawsuit
Microsoft's business strategy, events in the computer revolution, rise of internet browsers, microsoft's competitive strategies, lessons from microsoft's case study, scalar academy sponsorship, closing thoughts and call to action.
The US Department of Justice and 20 US states sued Microsoft for monopoly and anti-competitive practices in 1998. This led to a historic case lasting two decades, with Microsoft still dominating the market today.
Microsoft's business strategy involved embracing, extending, and exterminating its competition. By integrating Internet Explorer into Windows, providing it for free, and limiting compatibility with other browsers, Microsoft gained dominance in the web browser market.
Key events include IBM introducing personal computers with MS DOS in 1981, Microsoft's revenue growth, introduction of Office suite in 1989, and Windows 3.0 launch in 1990, leading to widespread computer usage.
The rise of internet browsers saw Netscape Navigator dominating the market in the 1990s with innovative features. Netscape went public in 1995 but later faced downfall due to Microsoft's aggressive tactics with Internet Explorer.
Microsoft's strategies to dominate included establishing industry standards with Internet Explorer, targeting competitors like Netscape Navigator and AOL's AIM, and leveraging product integration and dominance to eliminate competition.
Lessons include the importance of product quality and innovation, the risks of focusing solely on competition, and the success of platforms that empower developers like Apple and Google. The importance of evolving trends in technology is emphasized.
Information about Scalar Academy, a tech upscaling platform offering training in data structures, algorithms, and system design with job placement assistance in top companies like Facebook, Amazon, and Google.
Summarizes the valuable lessons from the Microsoft case study and encourages viewers to explore study materials for deeper insights. Promotes engagement with the content and links provided.
Q: What were the key events in Microsoft's history leading to its dominance in the market?
A: Key events include IBM introducing personal computers with MS DOS in 1981, Microsoft's revenue growth, introduction of Office suite in 1989, and Windows 3.0 launch in 1990.
Q: How did Microsoft gain dominance in the web browser market?
A: Microsoft gained dominance by integrating Internet Explorer into Windows, providing it for free, and limiting compatibility with other browsers.
Q: What role did Netscape Navigator play in the browser market in the 1990s?
A: Netscape Navigator dominated the market in the 1990s with innovative features before facing downfall due to Microsoft's aggressive tactics with Internet Explorer.
Q: What were some of the strategies used by Microsoft to dominate the market?
A: Microsoft's strategies included establishing industry standards with Internet Explorer, targeting competitors like Netscape Navigator and AOL's AIM, and leveraging product integration and dominance to eliminate competition.
Q: What are some of the lessons learned from the Microsoft case study?
A: Lessons include the importance of product quality and innovation, the risks of focusing solely on competition, and the success of platforms that empower developers like Apple and Google.
Q: What is the importance of evolving trends in technology according to the case study?
A: The case study emphasizes the importance of evolving trends in technology to stay competitive and relevant in the market.
Q: What type of training does Scalar Academy offer?
A: Scalar Academy offers training in data structures, algorithms, and system design with job placement assistance in top companies like Facebook, Amazon, and Google.
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Journal of Economic Perspectives
Spring 2001
An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
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How Google's huge defeat in antitrust case could change how you search the internet
In the most significant legal ruling against a major technology giant in more than two decades, a federal judge says Google illegally monopolized online search and advertising by paying companies like Apple and Samsung billions of dollars a year to install Google as the default search engine on smartphones and web browsers.
By monopolizing search queries on smartphones and browsers, Google abused its dominance in the search market, throttling competition and harming consumers, U.S. District Judge Amit P. Mehta said in his 286-page decision. Google owes much of its more than $300 billion in annual revenue to search ads.
“ Google is a monopolist , and it has acted as one to maintain its monopoly,” Mehta wrote.
The massive win for the Department of Justice could fundamentally reshape how Google does business . It also could change how we use the internet and search for information.
The DOJ filed antitrust charges during the final weeks of the Trump administration, making good on Donald Trump’s pledge to challenge the runaway power of Big Tech. That mission continued during the Biden administration, which has been aggressive in pursuing antitrust cases.
“This victory against Google is an historic win for the American people,” Attorney General Merrick Garland said in a statement. “No company – no matter how large or influential – is above the law.”
The case is the most significant victory for the DOJ in a monopoly case in decades, said Notre Dame Law School professor Roger Alford, who served in the DOJ’s antitrust division. “Not since Microsoft lost in the 1990s have we seen a case of this magnitude.”
Google said it would appeal the decision. “This decision recognizes that Google offers the best search engine, but concludes that we shouldn’t be allowed to make it easily available,” Kent Walker, president of global affairs, said in a statement.
Shares in Google's parent company Alphabet slipped following the judge's ruling. They closed down nearly 5% Monday, part of a broader tech stock selloff .
If upheld, the decision will be a “major boost” for other antitrust cases pending against Google as well as other major tech players like Amazon, Apple and Meta, said Loyola University Chicago School of Law professor Spencer Weber Waller.
Monday’s ruling did not include remedies. Remedies will be decided separately, likely after an appeal. One remedy could see Google losing its ability to strike device deals that have helped make its search engine so ubiquitous.
Devising the right remedy is critical to restoring competition to the marketplace, Waller said.
“There are no fines or monetary penalties in these types of cases, but the court will have to decide whether Google should be broken up in some way. More likely, it will order Google to eliminate the exclusive contracts and licensing restrictions that have reinforced its monopoly position for years,” he said.
Google has argued that its distribution deals are common in the business world. It pays for its search engine to be on phones the way a food manufacturer pays to promote its products at eye level in a grocery store aisle.
The way Google sees it, if you don’t like Google, you can switch the default search engine on your device. But people don’t switch, Google says, because they prefer Google.
If Google was not the default search engine on so many devices, would consumers still use it for 90% of web searches?
During the 10-week trial, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella testified that Google’s unchallenged dominance created a “Google web.”
“You get up in the morning, you brush your teeth and you search on Google,” Nadella said at one point in his testimony. “Everybody talks about the open web, but there is really the Google web.”
Nadella has expressed concern that Microsoft’s disadvantage would increase as artificial intelligence becomes a major component of search.
In a research note Monday, Baird Equity Research senior analyst Colin Sebastian pointed to a range of tactics Google's arch-competitor Microsoft has used to grow the market share of its Bing search engine over the years, from paying users to use its search engine to embedding it in Office.
“People clearly prefer Google to Bing,” Sebastian said.
Chamber of Progress CEO Adam Kovacevich said Monday's ruling hands Microsoft an unearned boost.
“The biggest winner from today's ruling isn't consumers or little tech, it’s Microsoft,” Kovacevich said in a statement. “Microsoft has underinvested in search for decades, but today’s ruling opens the door to a court mandate of default deals for Bing. That’s a slap in the face to consumers who chose Google because they think it’s the best.”
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Customer Case Study: KPMG Clara AI and Microsoft’s Semantic Kernel
Sophia Lagerkrans-Pandey
August 20th, 2024 0 0
Today we’re featuring KPMG on our Semantic Kernel blog for their work on Clara AI in KPMG. You can learn more about the solution here:
KPMG Announces AI Integration into Global Smart Audit Platform, KPMG Clara
KPMG Partnership with Microsoft’s Semantic Kernel
Here’s a quote from KPMG on the partnership, “Microsoft and KPMG entered a strategic alliance to modernize the work of KPMG professionals. KPMG Clara AI demonstrates the impact of that alliance. Built on Azure AI, KPMG Clara AI provides the latest in AI advancements to KPMG audit professionals in a responsible manner. By using Microsoft’s Semantic Kernel, our development team quickly delivered complex, agentic AI workflows that empower the engagement team. To learn more about KPMG Clara and our Trusted AI capabilities, visit kpmg.com/trustedAI or kpmg.com/kpmgclara”
Learn more about KPMG’s AI work here: KPMG Announces AI Integration using Microsoft Semantic Kernel
From the Semantic Kernel team, we want to thank the KPMG team for their time. We’re always interested in hearing from you. If you have feedback, questions or want to discuss further, feel free to reach out to us and the community on the Semantic Kernel GitHub Discussion Channel ! We would also love your support, if you’ve enjoyed using Semantic Kernel, give us a star on GitHub .
Thanks again to the KPMG team for their amazing work and partnership!
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Google has an illegal monopoly on search, US judge finds
Medium Text
Ruling paves way for trial on remedies including potential breakup of Alphabet
Google paid $26.3 billion in 2021 to maintain search engine dominance, judge noted
Senator Klobuchar highlights bipartisan support for antitrust enforcement against Big Tech
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Google illegally maintains monopoly over internet search, judge rules
A drawn-out appeals process will delay any immediate effects for both consumers and advertisers after a judge ruled Google’s search engine has been illegally exploiting its dominance to squash competition and stifle innovation.
Various Google logos are displayed on a Google search, Monday, Sept. 11, 2023, in New York. U.S. (AP Photo/Richard Drew, File)
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WASHINGTON (AP) — A judge on Monday ruled that Google’s ubiquitous search engine has been illegally exploiting its dominance to squash competition and stifle innovation, a seismic decision that could shake up the internet and hobble one of the world’s best-known companies.
The highly anticipated decision issued by U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta comes nearly a year after the start of a trial pitting the U.S. Justice Department against Google in the country’s biggest antitrust showdown in a quarter century.
After reviewing reams of evidence that included testimony from top executives at Google, Microsoft and Apple during last year’s 10-week trial, Mehta issued his potentially market-shifting decision three months after the two sides presented their closing arguments in early May.
“After having carefully considered and weighed the witness testimony and evidence, the court reaches the following conclusion: Google is a monopolist, and it has acted as one to maintain its monopoly,” Mehta wrote in his 277-page ruling. He said Google’s dominance in the search market is evidence of its monopoly.
Google “enjoys an 89.2% share of the market for general search services, which increases to 94.9% on mobile devices,” the ruling said.
It represents a major setback for Google and its parent, Alphabet Inc., which had steadfastly argued that its popularity stemmed from consumers’ overwhelming desire to use a search engine so good at what it does that it has become synonymous with looking things up online. Google’s search engine processes an estimated 8.5 billion queries per day worldwide, nearly doubling its daily volume from 12 years ago, according to a recent study released by the investment firm BOND.
Kent Walker, Google’s president of global affairs, said the company intends to appeal Mehta’s findings.
“This decision recognizes that Google offers the best search engine, but concludes that we shouldn’t be allowed to make it easily available,” Walker said.
For now, the decision vindicates antitrust regulators at the Justice Department, which filed its lawsuit nearly four years ago while Donald Trump was still president, and has been escalating it efforts to rein in Big Tech’s power during President Joe Biden’s administration.
“This victory against Google is an historic win for the American people,” said Attorney General Merrick Garland. “No company — no matter how large or influential — is above the law. The Justice Department will continue to vigorously enforce our antitrust laws.”
The case depicted Google as a technological bully that methodically has thwarted competition to protect a search engine that has become the centerpiece of a digital advertising machine that generated nearly $240 billion in revenue last year. Justice Department lawyers argued that Google’s monopoly enabled it to charge advertisers artificially high prices while also enjoying the luxury of not having to invest more time and money into improving the quality of its search engine — a lax approach that hurt consumers.
Mehta’s ruling focused on the billions of dollars Google spends every year to install its search engine as the default option on new cellphones and tech gadgets. In 2021 alone, Google spent more than $26 billion to lock in those default agreements, Mehta said in his ruling.
Google ridiculed those allegations, noting that consumers have historically changed search engines when they become disillusioned with the results they were getting. For instance, Yahoo was the most popular search engine during the 1990s before Google came along.
Mehta said the evidence at trial showed the importance of the default settings. He noted that Microsoft’s Bing search engine has 80% share of the search market on the Microsoft Edge browser. The judge said that shows other search engines can be successful if Google is not locked in as the predetermined default option.
Still, Mehta credited the quality of Google’s product as an important part of its dominance, as well, saying flatly that “Google is widely recognized as the best (general search engine) available in the United States.”
The Consumer Choice Center, a lobbying group that has fought other attempts to rein in businesses, decried Mehta’s decision as a step in the wrong direction. “The United States is drifting toward the anti-tech posture of the European Union, a part of the world that makes almost nothing and penalizes successful American companies for their popularity,” said Yael Ossowski, the center’s deputy director.
Mehta’s conclusion that Google has been running an illegal monopoly sets up another legal phase to determine what sorts of changes or penalties should be imposed to reverse the damage done and restore a more competitive landscape. He scheduled a Sept. 6 hearing to begin setting the stage for the next phase.
The potential outcome could result in a wide-ranging order requiring Google to dismantle some of the pillars of its internet empire, or preventing it from paying to ensure its search engine automatically answers queries on the iPhone and other devices. Or, the judge could conclude only modest changes are required to level the playing field.
“Google’s loss in its search antitrust trial could be a huge deal — depending on the remedy,” said Emarketer senior analyst Evelyn Mitchell-Wolf.
Regardless, she added, a drawn-out appeals process will delay any immediate effects for both consumers and advertisers.
The appeals process could take as long as five years, predicted George Hay, a law professor at Cornell University who was the chief economist for the Justice Department’s antitrust division for most of the 1970s. That lengthy process will enable Google to fend off the likelihood of Mehta banning default search agreements, Hay said, but it probably won’t shield the company from class-action lawsuits citing the judge’s findings that advertisers were gouged with monopolistic pricing.
If there is a significant shakeup, it could turn out to be a coup for Microsoft, whose own power was undermined during the late 1990s when the Justice Department targeted the software maker in an antitrust lawsuit accusing it of abusing the dominance of its Windows operating system on personal computers to lock out competition.
That Microsoft case mirrored the one brought against Google in several ways and now the result could also echo similarly. Just as Microsoft’s bruising antitrust battle created distractions and obstacles that opened up more opportunities for Google after its 1998 inception, the decision against Google could be a boon for Microsoft, which already has a market value of more than $3 trillion. At one time, Alphabet was worth more than Microsoft, but now trails its rival, with a market value of about $2 trillion.
If Mehta decides to limit or ban Google’s default search deals, it could squeeze Apple’s profits, too. Although parts of his decision were redacted to protect confidential business information, Mehta noted that Google paid Apple an estimated $20 billion in 2022, doubling from 2020. The judge also noted Apple has periodically considered building its own search technology, but backed off that after a 2018 analysis estimated the company would lose more than $12 billion in revenue during the first five years after a break-up with Google.
Google’s payments have helped Apple’s steadily growing services division, which generated $85 billion in revenue during the company’s last fiscal year. Apple didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
The Justice Department’s antitrust division has recently taken on some of the biggest companies in the world. It sued Apple in March and in May announced a sweeping lawsuit against Ticketmaster and its owner, Live Nation Entertainment. Antitrust enforcers have also opened investigations into the roles Microsoft, Nvidia and OpenAI have played in the artificial intelligence boom.
The Biden administration has won some big cases, including blocking mergers of some of the world’s biggest publishers as well as JetBlue Airways and Spirit Airlines. It’s also had some notable setbacks, including in the sugar and healthcare industries.
Google faces several other legal threats both in the U.S. and abroad. In September, a federal trial is scheduled to begin in Virginia over the Justice Department’s allegations that Google’s advertising technology constitutes an illegal monopoly.
Liedtke reported from San Ramon, California. Associated Press writers Alanna Durkin Richer and Barbara Ortutay contributed to this report.
Google Breakup A Possibility After Monopoly Ruling: Report
Bloomberg reported that, even without the divestitures, the government will likely seek a ban of the “exclusive distribution agreements” at the heart of the case.
The U.S. Department of Justice is considering a divestiture of Google’s Android operating system, AdWords ad sales platform and web browser, Chrome, after a judge ruled the tech giant is a monopoly in the online search and text advertising markets.
Citing anonymous “people with knowledge of the deliberations,” Bloomberg reported Tuesday that, even without the divestitures, the government will likely seek a ban of the “exclusive distribution agreements” that led to U.S. District Judge Amit Mehta ruling against Google on Aug. 5 in the landmark case.
CRN has reached out to Google and the Justice Department for comment.
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Google Monopoly Case
The government could also pursue less severe punishment to make competition fair again, including forcing Google to share data with rivals and mechanisms to keep Google from gaining an unfair advantage in the growing artificial intelligence market, according to Bloomberg. Google requires websites to allow Google AI products to leverage their content to appear in search results.
Another option is for requiring Google to implement more interoperability with other search engines or license or divest its data to rivals. Google plans to appeal the decision, according to Bloomberg.
In a post on Microsoft-owned social media platform LinkedIn, Marc Rotenberg – a Georgetown University adjunct professor and founder and president of the Center for AI and Digital Policy (CAIDP) – said “remedies in antitrust cases are not easy.”
“You can break up companies, but the parts tend to congeal and reform like the evil robot in the Terminator series that resumed its shape after a shotgun blast from Arnold Schwarzenegger,” Rotenberg wrote. “Scary.”
Rotenberg proposed as remedies the limit of “collection and use of personal data by Internet advertisers … prohibit for kids … encourage the development of advertising techniques that are less privacy-invasive” and “focus on data minimization.”
“Let advertising companies compete based on the quality of their products and messages, not on manipulating consumers,” he said. “That would be a great outcome!”
Alden Abbott – former general counsel for the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and now a senior research fellow at George Mason University – wrote in an article for Forbes that “a federal appeals court may (but is not certain to) overturn the trial court’s decision on liability” and that “this process could drag on for years.”
“The very conduct that Google engaged in enhanced its internet general search engine (GSE) quality, a reality at odds with a finding of anticompetitive monopolization,” Abbott said in the article. “What’s more, there is no good reason to believe that such behavior significantly affected consumer GSE choice. To the contrary, by improving GSE quality, that behavior likely raised consumer welfare, which the Supreme Court has deemed the overarching goal of antitrust enforcement.”
A separate Google antitrust case focused on digital advertising has a trial set for September.
AT&T, Microsoft Set Precedents
A government breakup of Google would mark the biggest dismantling since AT&T in the 1980s. About 2.5 billion devices worldwide use Android, and Google paid upwards of $26 billion to companies to make its search engine the default for third-party browsers and devices. Most of that money went to Apple, according to Bloomberg.
In the 1950s, the Justice Department required AT&T to provide licenses to its patents without royalties to remove unfair competition. And in the landmark Microsoft antitrust case, the vendor had to make application programming interfaces (APIs) available for free to make the competitive landscape more fair, according to Bloomberg.
Phil Walker, CEO of Manhattan Beach, Calif.-based Google partner Network Solutions Provider, told CRN in an interview that he welcomes government regulation when it comes to protecting data privacy.
However, “the timing of government regulation could be too proactive” and stifle areas of innovation such as the emerging generative AI (GenAI) market.
“In the age of AI, we need innovation at a cost and scale," Walker said. "In this new age of change, we need to grow to keep pace with AI, robotics, and what comes next."
Google has more than 100,000 channel partners worldwide, according to CRN’s 2024 Channel Chiefs. Most of these partners work with Google’s cloud and data analytics portfolio as opposed to the ad platforms the antitrust case focused on.
But the case is part of a trend of the U.S. and other governing bodies putting more scrutiny on deals by big technology vendors and how those deals affect competition.
In July, the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) published a letter saying that it can “begin an investigation” into an unusual deal between Microsoft and AI upstart Inflection that resulted in Microsoft hiring Inflection’s co-founder and CEO.
In January, the FTC announced that Microsoft, OpenAI, Amazon, Google parent Alphabet and Anthropic needed to provide information on their recent investments and partnerships.
U.S. antitrust cases against Amazon and Apple are also still on the horizon.
United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), was a landmark American antitrust law case at the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The U.S. government accused Microsoft of illegally monopolizing the web browser market for Windows, primarily through the legal and technical restrictions it put on the abilities of PC ...
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Judge Jackson's 205-page "Findings of Fact" 2 convincingly establishes three facts that are crucial to understanding this case: First, Microsoft possesses monopoly power in the market for Personal Computer (PC) operating systems; Second, Microsoft engaged in a wide-ranging effort to protect its operating system monopoly, utilizing a full ...
Antitrust Division
A Microsoft study from November 1997 reveals that the company could have charged $49 for an upgrade to Windows 98 — there is no reason to believe that the $49 price would have been unprofitable — but the study identifies $89 as the revenue-maximizing price. ... Microsoft's monopoly power is also evidenced by the fact that, over the course ...
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PDF The Microsoft Antitrust Case
2. Microsoft has a monopoly in this market "where it enjoys a large and stable market share." 3. Microsoft's monopoly is protected by the "applications barrier to entry," which the judge defines as the availability of an abundance of applications running Windows. 4. Microsoft used its monopoly power in the PC operating systems market to
An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
In the Microsoft case, the government (by which we mean the U.S. Department of Justice, 19 state attorneys general, and the Attorney General of the District of Columbia that brought the case) asserted that Microsoft engaged in anticompeti-tive conduct designed to maintain its operating system monopoly to the detriment of consumers.
Lessons Learned From The Microsoft Anti-Trust Case That Began In The
NPR's Mary Louise Kelly speaks with Verge reporter Adi Robertson about today's tech giants being investigated for possible antitrust violations and lessons learned from the Microsoft case in the '90s.
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U.S. V. Microsoft: Proposed Findings Of Fact. OVERVIEW. Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, and the evidence on which they are based, demonstrate that Microsoft has engaged in a broad pattern of unlawful conduct with the purpose and effect of thwarting emerging threats to its powerful and well-entrenched operating system monopoly.
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United States v. Microsoft Corp.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448. In 1998 the DOJ brought suit against Microsoft for allegedly violating aspects of the consent decree by bundling Internet Explorer 3.0 and 4.0 with Windows 95. The D.C. Circuit held, however, that Microsoft's actions did not violate the consent decree. United States v.
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An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case. Citation
Microsoft Case Study
Microsoft case study - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt / .pptx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. The document discusses Microsoft's monopoly power in the market for personal computer operating systems and the 1998 antitrust case against the company by the US Department of Justice. It provides background on Microsoft's rise to dominance with ...
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IMAGES
COMMENTS
United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), was a landmark American antitrust law case at the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The U.S. government accused Microsoft of illegally monopolizing the web browser market for Windows, primarily through the legal and technical restrictions it put on the abilities of PC ...
November 5, 2014 9:00 AM EST. I t was Friday, Nov. 5, 1999 when then-Microsoft CEO Bill Gates got the bad news. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson had declared that his company was a monopoly. And not ...
The Microsoft antitrust case came to be one of the high-profile cases a few decades ago. In the 1990s. U.S. federal regulators sued Microsoft, which was at that time the world's leading software company. The Federal Trade Commission launched an investigation as a response to the rising market share of the company in the personal computer market.
Judge Jackson's 205-page "Findings of Fact" 2 convincingly establishes three facts that are crucial to understanding this case: First, Microsoft possesses monopoly power in the market for Personal Computer (PC) operating systems; Second, Microsoft engaged in a wide-ranging effort to protect its operating system monopoly, utilizing a full ...
A Microsoft study from November 1997 reveals that the company could have charged $49 for an upgrade to Windows 98 — there is no reason to believe that the $49 price would have been unprofitable — but the study identifies $89 as the revenue-maximizing price. ... Microsoft's monopoly power is also evidenced by the fact that, over the course ...
The Microsoft Antitrust Case . Microsoft was one of the world's most successful software companies in the 1980s. The company's rising presence in the personal computing market raised alarm bells ...
The Microsoft Antitrust Case*. by. Nicholas Economides**. Revised April 2, 2001. Abstract. This paper analyzes the law and economics of United States v. Microsoft, a landmark case of antitrust intervention in network industries. The United States Department of Justice and 19 States sued Microsoft alleging (i) that it monopolized the market for ...
7. Internet browsers pose a competitive threat to Microsoft's operating system monopoly in two basic ways. First, as discussed above, one of the most important barriers to the entry and expansion of potential competitors to Microsoft in supplying PC operating systems is the large number of software applications that will run on the Windows operating system (and not on other operating systems).
Washington, DC - The overwhelming evidence in the Findings of Fact in the U.S. vs. Microsoft trial leaves no doubt as to the magnitude and scope of harm that Microsoft has caused consumers. After analyzing Judge Jackson's Findings of Fact, Mark Cooper, Director of Research for CFA, said, "There can be no doubt that the Microsoft monopoly ...
2. Microsoft has a monopoly in this market "where it enjoys a large and stable market share." 3. Microsoft's monopoly is protected by the "applications barrier to entry," which the judge defines as the availability of an abundance of applications running Windows. 4. Microsoft used its monopoly power in the PC operating systems market to
In the Microsoft case, the government (by which we mean the U.S. Department of Justice, 19 state attorneys general, and the Attorney General of the District of Columbia that brought the case) asserted that Microsoft engaged in anticompeti-tive conduct designed to maintain its operating system monopoly to the detriment of consumers.
NPR's Mary Louise Kelly speaks with Verge reporter Adi Robertson about today's tech giants being investigated for possible antitrust violations and lessons learned from the Microsoft case in the '90s.
U.S. V. Microsoft: Proposed Findings Of Fact. OVERVIEW. Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed Findings of Fact, and the evidence on which they are based, demonstrate that Microsoft has engaged in a broad pattern of unlawful conduct with the purpose and effect of thwarting emerging threats to its powerful and well-entrenched operating system monopoly.
The Microsoft antitrust case is also the lone example of the government's embarking on — and winning — a sweeping suit against a tech giant for illegally protecting its monopoly. Microsoft ...
An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft. An Economist's Guide to. U.S. v. Microsoft. Richard J. Gilbert and Michael L. Katz. W. hile most antitrust cases proceed in obscurity, the case brought against Microsoft by federal and state antitrust authorities was front-page news. Much of the drama and media hype centered on the struggle between ...
Paul Thurrott. November 4, 1999. 3 MinRead. As expected, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson has found Microsoft to have monopoly power in the computer operating system market. But more damagingly, the judge also found that Microsoft has harmed competitors and consumers alike by its business practices. And Internet Explorer and Windows are "separate ...
The antitrust case against Microsoft and their Windows operating system was a landmark case for antitrust interventions. Not only was the U.S. government involved in the case, but also 19 states ...
Date. September 30, 1999. By. Orson Swindle, Former Commissioner. Good morning. I am glad to be here today to offer opening remarks to today's discussion about what we are learning from the Microsoft case and other government antitrust cases against those in high-tech industries. Given the role that high technology, innovation, and the Internet ...
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448. In 1998 the DOJ brought suit against Microsoft for allegedly violating aspects of the consent decree by bundling Internet Explorer 3.0 and 4.0 with Windows 95. The D.C. Circuit held, however, that Microsoft's actions did not violate the consent decree. United States v.
Google's antitrust ruling has experts looking to 25-year-old Microsoft case for answers. A U.S. judge ruled Monday that Google holds a monopoly in the search market, and invoked the case of ...
Microsoft or other monopoly companies can improve their customer satisfaction and what measurement can be used to change the present situation. Keywords: Microsoft Case, Product Quality, Customer ...
The US Department of Justice and 20 US states sued Microsoft for monopoly and anti-competitive practices in 1998. This led to a historic case lasting two decades, with Microsoft still dominating the market today. ... Summarizes the valuable lessons from the Microsoft case study and encourages viewers to explore study materials for deeper ...
Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating system monopoly, and some of Microsoft's conduct very likely harmed consumers. While we recognize the risks of the government's proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two, we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case. Citation
Microsoft case study - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt / .pptx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. The document discusses Microsoft's monopoly power in the market for personal computer operating systems and the 1998 antitrust case against the company by the US Department of Justice. It provides background on Microsoft's rise to dominance with ...
The case is the most significant victory for the DOJ in a monopoly case in decades, said Notre Dame Law School professor Roger Alford, who served in the DOJ's antitrust division ...
Today we're featuring KPMG on our Semantic Kernel blog for their work on Clara AI in KPMG. You can learn more about the solution here: KPMG Partnership with Microsoft's Semantic Kernel Here's a quote from KPMG on the partnership, "Microsoft and KPMG entered a strategic alliance to modernize the work of KPMG professionals.
When it was filed in 2020, the Google search case was the first time in a generation that the U.S. government accused a major corporation of an illegal monopoly. Microsoft settled with the Justice ...
A federal judge is actively considering breaking up Google after a landmark ruling last week that the tech giant has illegally abused its search monopoly. Why it matters: A court-ordered Google ...
The case depicted Google as a technological bully that methodically has thwarted competition to protect a search engine that has become the centerpiece of a digital advertising machine that generated nearly $240 billion in revenue last year. Justice Department lawyers argued that Google's monopoly enabled it to charge advertisers artificially ...
Google Monopoly Case. ... And in the landmark Microsoft antitrust case, the vendor had to make application programming interfaces (APIs) available for free to make the competitive landscape more ...