ethics of the death penalty essay

Syracuse Journal of Law & Civic Engagement

An inquiry into the ethics of capital punishment.

D. Alicia Hickok , Partner at Drinker Biddle & member of the American Bar Association’s Steering Committee of the Death Penalty Representation Project , & J.J. Williamson , Associate in the Drinker Biddle’s Litigation Group

The word “ethic” is derived from the Greek “ethos,” which itself has taken on multiple meanings. In the traditional Greek, it is used by Aristotle to describe the apparent character of the speaker. The Oxford English Dictionary recognizes that its origin relates to nature or disposition, but instead defines “ethos” as “[t]he characteristic spirit of a culture, era, or community as manifested in its attitudes and aspirations” or “the character of an individual as represented by his or her values or beliefs.” [1] Regardless of the definition, it is apparent that ethical behavior is necessarily an individual action and portrayal in relation to a community – although Aristotle’s definition is more susceptible to an absolute source of such “right behavior” or “moral action” than the Oxford English Dictionary’s.

The United States Supreme Court has certainly recognized that current community values are critical to an analysis regarding whether capital punishment violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [2] But it has also recognized that an examination of those values must be tempered with respect for the “dignity of man” such that punishment must not be excessive, either through “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or by being “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.” [3] These “natural law” values correspond in many instances to moral views set forth in ancient and sacred writing. Any analysis of the ethics of capital punishment thus need to echo the Supreme Court’s recognition of the possibility that something that has become “accepted” in society may nonetheless be “immoral.”

The response to an “immoral” but “accepted” practice represents an ethical choice. Indeed, many people have explored the dilemmas that arise when a community – either through its laws or practices – mandates or prohibits a course of action that is fundamentally at odds with what a person recognizes as an ultimate moral code. This is seen in Judeo-Christian scripture at least as early as Daniel 6, when King Darius was beguiled into signing a law that forbade prayer to any but him. Daniel was a slave who had become a trusted advisor to the king. He continued with his duties, but also continued to pray to God at home daily; the legal consequence of which was that Darius was compelled to throw Daniel into a lions’ den (from which, Daniel 6 explains, God delivered him, thus honoring Daniel’s adherence to the conduct dictated by his faith rather than the law created by the king).

In examining the ethics of capital punishment, then, this article will address three questions: Is there an absolute position on the death penalty that renders it immoral in all circumstances? What does the law permit, command, or prohibit? Does the practice accord with these permissions, commands, and prohibitions – and is the perception that it does? The answer to those questions then prompts a fourth: how is a lawyer in today’s legal system to act ethically in a state that authorizes capital punishment?

I. Is Capital Punishment Wrong According to Traditional Moral Measures?

One might perhaps think that the answer to any question of the ethics of capital punishment begins and ends with moral law. To be sure, in Gregg v. Georgia , [4] the Supreme Court recognized that right and wrong can transcends the laws on the books at any given moment. It certainly is the case that for some religious groups, any notion of capital punishment is contrary to fundamental beliefs. But it is equally the case that not all persons within those religious traditions – and not all religions – condemn capital punishment.

It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the full range of religious responses, which range from a conviction that the taking of a life can be compensated for only by another life to a belief that the sacredness of life can never justify condoning of the taking of another’s life, and include everything in between.

A brief overview of a couple of religious perspectives may, however, give a flavor of the moral reasoning undergirding religious responses. Those who favor the death penalty often cite both to the religious admonitions to honor civil law and to the recognition in Exodus 21 that injury is to be recompensed in kind, admonishing Israel to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.” [5]

On the other hand, of those who are fundamentally opposed to capital punishment, most believe that taking of the life of another is wrong even for the state to do. In addition, many express a belief that capital punishment is an offense against the community, or that it is unfairly harmful to the person delegated to carry out the sentence. The conviction that the taking of life is wrong is heightened by – or in some cases replaced with – concerns that the punishment does not achieve its stated goals and is too fraught with uncertainty to be a viable sentence, even if there is a theoretical authority for a state to take a life.

Thus, for example, the Green Country Society of Friends spoke out about Oklahoma’s death penalty statute in 1996 by first recognizing that people “have the need and the right to seek safety and order for themselves and their communities” but rejecting capital punishment as a means to achieve that because (1) it does not respect the Spirit of God that they believe dwells in each person; (2) it “magnifies the tragedy of a lost life by killing again, ignoring the human capacity for change, quenching forever the possibility of redemption and renewed contribution”; (3) because it harms the community by giving violence a “legitimate status as a way to resolve problems”, sanctioning vengeance as an acceptable response to harm, shifting the focus from healing and help to victims, offenders, and affected families and communities, and because it is possible that an innocent person is being executed; (4) because those persons to whom the task of execution is delegated are at “moral and psychological peril to themselves.” [6] In 1999, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, observing that it had been opposed to the death penalty for over twenty-five years, stated:

We oppose capital punishment not just for what it does to those guilty of horrible crimes but for what it does to all of us as a society. Increasing reliance on the death penalty diminishes all of us and is a sign of growing disrespect for human life. We cannot overcome crime by simply executing criminals, nor can we restore the lives of the innocent by ending the lives of those convicted of their murders. The death penalty offers the tragic illusion that we can defend life by taking life.

We are painfully aware of the increased rate of executions in many states. Since the death penalty was reinstituted in 1976, more than 500 executions have taken place, while there have been seventy-four death-row reversals late in the process. Throughout the states, more than 3,500 prisoners await their deaths. These numbers are deeply troubling. The pace of executions is numbing. The discovery of people on death row who are innocent is frightening. [7]

After Timothy McVeigh, a Catholic, was executed in Indiana, John and Lauren McBride authored an article in the Saint Anthony Messenger, a paper in the area, [8] reflecting on the execution and on a commencement address that Sister Helen Prejean gave at St. Mary of the Woods College in 2001. Sister Helen Prejean had said that that the death penalty was imploding because it “has always been unfair,” remarking on the expense, the lack of deterrence, and the irreversible and irremediable character of the penalty. Quoting Matthew 25, the authors of the article contended that when Jesus taught that what was done to the least of his brothers was done to him, and linked that to Sister Helen’s admonition that scripture teaches not to return hate with hate or violence with violence. The author also quoted Archbishop Daniel M. Buechlein of the Indianapolis Archdiocese (which includes Terre Haute), who wrote that the “death penalty ‘feeds a frenzy for revenge… [which] neither liberates the families of victims nor ennobles the victims of crime. Only forgiveness liberates.’” [9] In conclusion, the authors reflected on a movement in churches across the nation to ring their bells whenever an execution takes place, remembering John Donne’s statement that “any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.” [10] The author also interviewed others who were not opposed to the death penalty per se but nonetheless expressed concerns that the process needed reform and decried the racial and economic disparities in its application.

These concerns are echoed in Jewish law, which did not proscribe capital punishment, but which did define strict parameters within which it could be applied. The Talmud Sanhedrin, in exchanging views on the Mosaic law from the third to the fifth centuries C.E., stressed the need for procedural protections before a person could be sentenced to death for treason, discussing the scriptural requirement that there be two witnesses. [11] If one witness was disqualified, the evidence of the others was invalid. Witnesses were sequestered and examined and cross-examined, with accusing witnesses permitted to retract testimony but defending witnesses not. Inconsistencies – even as to time or day – disqualified witnesses. These protections were both to “ensure reliability of outcome and to enhance the possibility of acquittal in a capital case.” [12]

A Talmudic brief was submitted as an amicus in Bryan v. Moore . [13] The authors of the brief were addressing only whether electrocution was cruel and unusual. In their analysis, they recognized that from ancient times, rabbis have been divided whether capital punishment could ever be imposed. Even those that sanctioned it required strict standards of proof (before a court of at least 23 judges), and when execution was carried out, the law required a means to be chosen that prevented unnecessary pain and avoided mutilation or dismemberment. Indeed, any in favor point to sacred writings that stress the authority to enforce justice and protect a community but also stress the exceptional nature of the punishment. [14]

These historic and faith-based perspectives, taken together, have led many persons – and an increasing number of states – to conclude that even if it is theoretically possible to have a crime that warrants a sentence of death, the cost (both economically and morally) is too high, the risk of inaccuracy is too great, and the procedural protections are not strict enough.

But many others, including many with deeply-held religious convictions, affirm the decisions of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the legislatures and high courts of many other states that continue to uphold and enforce the death penalty. That said, the law enunciated by the United States Supreme Court has not stagnated over time. Instead, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed the classes of persons who can be subject to the death penalty and has fleshed out the characteristics that need to accompany any capital sentencing scheme in order for it to satisfy the requirements of the United States Constitution.

II. What Does the Law Permit, Command, or Prohibit?

Because statutes ultimately must conform to the Constitution, the starting point for this analysis are the determinations of the United States Supreme Court in holding that capital punishment was not absolutely proscribed by the Constitution. Two days before the bicentennial, on July 2, 1976, the United States Supreme Court issued five opinions, three affirming the constitutionality of state capital sentencing schemes, and two striking down other such schemes as unconstitutional. In Gregg , the Court explained that in an Eighth Amendment analysis of a statute, there is a presumption that a statute is valid, in part because legislative judgment “weighs heavily in ascertaining [contemporary] standards” and to “respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.” [15] After tracing the history of capital punishment in this country, the Court found that the “relative infrequency” with which juries imposed capital sentences did not reflect a “rejection of capital punishment per se” but the belief that the “most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.” [16] The Court also recognized both the retributive and deterrent effects of the death penalty. [17]

But while a state has the right to impose the death penalty, it cannot do so arbitrarily or capriciously, and it must ensure that the sentencer’s discretion is guided and informed. [18] In looking at Georgia’s statutory scheme in particular, the Supreme Court observed that the Georgia Supreme Court was required to “review every death sentence to determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and ‘[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.’” [19] Thus, each instance in which a death sentence is imposed will receive the direct attention of the justices of the state’s Supreme Court, and they will address directly some of the criteria that the United States Supreme Court found needed to be present in a capital sentencing scheme to render it constitutional. [20]

Particularly troubling is that the shortcomings of the Georgia Supreme Court’s review are not unique to this case. In the years immediately following Gregg , it was that court’s regular practice to include in its review cases that did not result in a death sentence. The Supreme Court later clarified in Pulley v. Harris that a comparative proportionality review was not demanded for every capital sentence. [21] More recently, however, the Court explained that it had intended only to “convey our recognition of differences among the States’ capital schemes and the fact that we consider statutes as we find them” – not to undermine the Court’s prior conclusions that “such review is an important component of the Georgia scheme.” [22] As shown in the attached chart, it appears that currently there are at least nine states that have no provision for proportionality review in their state statutes.

In Proffitt v. Florida , [23] the sentencing findings of the jury were advisory only; the actual sentence was determined by the trial judge, but “‘[i]n order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. [24] The Supreme Court found that jury sentencing was not constitutionally mandated. [25] Likewise, in Jurek v. Texas , [26] the Court upheld Texas’s capital sentencing scheme, concluding that Texas’s narrowing of death-eligible crimes to a limited category of murders served the same function as aggravating factors did in Georgia and Florida. [27] But the Court was careful to say that it would not be enough to limit the evidence relevant to why a death penalty should be imposed; there must also be consideration of evidence why the death penalty should not be imposed. In other words, a capital sentencing system must: “guide[] and focus[] the jury’s objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death.” [28] “What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.” [29] Finally, “[b]y providing prompt judicial review of the jury’s decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law.” [30]

In contrast, in Woodson v. North Carolina , [31] the Supreme Court rejected the North Carolina statutory scheme, because North Carolina mandated a sentence of death for first-degree murder – in part because the Court construed such statutes as “simply paper[ing] over the problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion.” [32] The Court explained what it meant to have a jury consider evidence in mitigation:

A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death. This Court has previously recognized that “[f]or the determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender.” Consideration of both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing development. While the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. [33]

Although Louisiana’s statute used “a different and somewhat narrower” definition of death-worthy murder than North Carolina, it was also mandatory, and the Supreme Court found it likewise unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana . [34] In so holding, the Supreme Court reiterated that mandatory sentences simply could not be upheld, because society has “reject[ed] the belief that ‘every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender.’” [35] The Court was also troubled that in order to provide an opportunity to sentence a defendant to less than death, juries were instructed on lesser offenses, regardless of the evidence, which the Court found “plainly invites the jurors to disregard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the death penalty is inappropriate – a result that contained an unacceptable “element of capriciousness.” [36]

Through a series of opinions, the Supreme Court would later clarify that a jury cannot sentence a defendant to death without being allowed to consider mitigating evidence; indeed, “when the jury is not permitted to give meaningful effect or a ‘reasoned moral response’ to a defendant’s mitigating evidence – because it is forbidden from doing so by statute or a judicial interpretation of a statute – the sentencing process is fatally flawed.” [37] And, of course, a jury cannot consider evidence in mitigation that counsel fails to uncover, apprehend, pursue, and present. Accordingly, counsel cannot competently represent a capital defendant without developing sufficient evidence about his or her background to make a reasonable strategic decision about what evidence to present in mitigation. [38]

Of course, evidence may not be put in front of a jury because it was never produced to the defense. The role of prosecutors to ensure a fair trial predates AEDPA by decades.

The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. [39]

These principles have given rise to a series of decisions, beginning with Brady v. Maryland , [40] in which the Supreme Court has articulated the constitutional obligation of the prosecution to provide the defense with exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Claims involving the obligations of the attorneys in a case (so-called Strickland (ineffectiveness) or Brady (withholding of evidence)) are the primary claims raised in collateral changes to capital convictions.

In addition, in recent years, certain classes of persons have been determined incapable of being sentenced to death, including persons who are mentally retarded (in Atkins v. Virginia ) [41] and juveniles ( Roper v. Simmons ). [42] In extending the rationale of Atkins to juveniles, the Supreme Court found that there were three characteristics of juveniles that rendered the death penalty inappropriate: (1) the lack of maturity and “underdeveloped sense of responsibility;” (2) a heightened susceptibility to “negative influences and outside pressures;” (3) and a less “well formed” character. [43] The Supreme Court concluded that:

These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders. The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means “their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole environment. The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed. Indeed, “[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside. [44]

There are also constraints upon the execution [45] and trial of persons who are mentally incompetent, [46] but these constraints have not led to a blanket prohibition against capital sentences for persons with specific mental illnesses – or to a suspension of all proceedings while a person is incompetent. [47]

There is one more factor that has not yet been addressed specifically by the United States Supreme Court but that bears on the reliability of the verdict and the information that is in front of sentencers to consider. There is wide variation in the statutory (or rules) requirements for notice of intent to seek the death penalty by the prosecution, with most states requiring notice at some point after arraignment (typically sixty days or less), but others requiring notice only at a certain point before trial . Indeed, in Alabama, the death penalty may be sought in any case in which a district attorney has charged a defendant with capital murder, with no notice other than the charge itself required. [48] And in New Hampshire, the only requirement is that notice occur before trial or acceptance of a guilty plea. South Carolina and Tennessee require notice only thirty days prior to trial. [49] If a defendant is provided with ample resources to prepare for a capital penalty phase – whether or not it is to occur – notice may not be problematic. But where resources are limited, it appears unreasonable to ask a lawyer – or for that matter, a trial court – to authorize extensive resources to prepare for a case in mitigation that may or may not be a part of the trial. And yet, mitigation preparation – with its requisite investigation and consultation of experts – cannot be authorized and carried out in only a month without seriously undermining the reliability of the information that is placed before the sentencer.

At the moment then, a capital sentence can be upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional only if there is a trial in which the community can have confidence. That, in turn, requires a competent defendant represented by counsel who has the resources, time, and skill to present a sentencer with evidence in mitigation that informs the sentencer’s decision whether to impose death for the narrow class of the most serious crimes by making a non-arbitrary, non-capricious, guided decision.

The standards that are applied to evaluate the fairness of the capital process are increasingly narrowed, however. On the one hand, state and federal law permit collateral attacks on allegedly unfair processes, through state and federal habeas or other post-conviction relief mechanisms. But on the other hand, such attacks are subject to significantly heightened levels of deference and narrowed bases for challenge, some statutory (such as that imposed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”)), and others by the standard recognition that the presumption of the finality of a judgment increases with each level of review. In collateral review, traditional criminal precepts in multiple contexts (including ineffective assistance and non-disclosure of evidence) require a showing of prejudice that is defined, not by “whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” [50] This concept is notoriously subjective and uneven in its application, thereby undermining the confidence that is the stated goal.

More fundamentally, the Court has grappled – beginning with Woodson – with the recognition that fair procedures and reliability are more essential in the capital sentencing context than in any other, because death is different in kind, and not merely in degree – indeed “[d]eath in its finality differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two.” [51] And yet, in a system in which the focus – and expenditures of money – increase disproportionately at the very stages when the standard of review becomes the hardest to satisfy, the public message is that procedures are not fair, sentences of death are not reliable, and verdicts are not worthy of confidence.

III. What is the Community Practice?

Because the United States Supreme Court has determined that capital punishment is not absolutely proscribed by the Constitution, current practice has largely been placed into the hands of the states, and more specifically the state legislatures, to determine how such a process will function, as well as to define its limits. Eighteen states, as well as the District of Columbia, have chosen to abolish the death penalty outright: Michigan was the first in 1846, and Maryland the most recent in 2013. Most recently, Governor Tom Wolf of Pennsylvania imposed a moratorium on the Commonwealth’s execution of individuals pending a review of a forthcoming report by the Pennsylvania Task Force and Advisory Committee on Capital Punishment. [52] The death penalty, then, remains a viable form of punishment for thirty-two states, as well as the federal government and the U.S. military, though the exact contours of the implementation of this ultimate type of punishment varies widely by jurisdiction.

One area in which the states that continue to employ the death penalty differ is in the qualification standards each state has set (or not set) for the lawyers who represent capital-eligible defendants at the trial level. The idea of standards for capital counsel is not new; in fact, suggested qualifications have been published since 1989, when the American Bar Association (“ABA”) published the Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. [53] A little over ten years later, the campaign to implement capital counsel qualifications began anew when, in 2001, the ABA commissioned the Death Penalty Representation Project to revise the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (the “ABA Guidelines”). [54] The revised ABA Guidelines were subsequently adopted on February 10, 2003 by the ABA House of Delegates, intended to “set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or execution of a death sentence by any jurisdiction.” [55] Interestingly, the scope of the ABA Guidelines was purposefully broad, and meant to

apply from the moment the client is taken into custody and extend to all states of every case in which the jurisdiction may be entitled to seek the death penalty, including initial and ongoing investigation, pretrial proceedings, trial post-convocation review, clemency, and any connected litigation. [56]

In setting qualifications for capital defense counsel, ABA Guideline 5.1 lists several factors that a state agency establishing such qualifications should consider, including whether counsel has:

a license to practice in the jurisdiction;
demonstrated commitment to zealous advocacy and high quality legal representation in the defense of capital cases;
a completion of suggested training requirements;
substantial knowledge of relevant federal and state law governing capital cases;
skill in oral advocacy;
skill in investigation, preparation, and presentation of evidence bearing on mental status;
skill in investigation, preparation, and presentation of mitigating evidence;
skill in the elements of trial advocacy, including jury selection, cross-examination of witness, and opening statements and closing arguments.

The ABA Guidelines also call for such measures as a monitoring of capital counsel’s workload, in order that the lawyer will “provide each client with high quality legal representation in accordance with [the ABA Guidelines].” [57] Additionally, capital counsel is to create a defense team that includes persons such as a mitigation specialist, mental health specialist, and other such specialists or persons as may be needed to bring a high level of legal representation on behalf of the client. [58] The ABA Guidelines do not address, however, how such a high caliber team should be funded, suggesting only that counsel should be compensated “for actual time and service performed at an hourly rate commensurate with the prevailing rates for similar services performed by retained counsel in the jurisdiction, with no distinction between rates for services performed in or out of court.” [59] While most of the guidelines speak to lawyer behavior, funding does not. In most instances, it is the state that funds capital defense, and it is the responsibility of the electorate to hold legislators accountable for ensuring sufficient funds to attract dedicated counsel and to provide them with sufficient resources to provide a thorough defense.

Since their revision, the ABA Guidelines have received some traction among both state and federal courts. [60] These qualification standards set forth by the ABA, however, are merely suggestions; the adoption of the ABA Guidelines, or the development and implementation of a separate code, is ultimately left to the States. This was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Bobby v. Van Hook , a per curiam decision that highlighted the notion that the ABA Guidelines are “‘only guides’ to what reasonableness [in the context of attorney representation] means, not its definition.” [61] So long as capital counsel make objectively reasonable choices in the course of representation, the “states are free to impose whatever specific rules they see fit to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented[.]” [62]

As the chart below illustrates, states have implemented capital counsel qualification standards in various degrees. For example, in 2005 Alabama adopted the ABA Guidelines as its code for capital counsel qualifications, noting, however, that the adoption of said Guidelines was “not to be considered a rule or requirement but only a recommendation.” [63] Texas has adopted a set of guidelines very similar to those promulgated by the ABA, which it calls the Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel. [64] Like the ABA Guidelines, Texas requires defense teams to include a mitigation specialist and the lawyers on the team must complete a comprehensive training program in death penalty cases. [65]

Several states have taken some aspects of the ABA Guidelines a step further, requiring counsel to meet quantifiable benchmarks before being accepted—whether formally or informally—into the capital counsel bar. Arkansas requires its capital counsel attorneys to have at least three years of criminal defense experience, as well as having served as lead or co-counsel at least five capital trials. [66] Additionally, it also imposes an additional requirement of six hours of continuing legal education in the field of capital defense within the year leading up to the capital case. [67] California requires its capital counsel to have at least ten years of litigation experience in the field of criminal law, including ten serious or violent crime jury trials, at least two of which were for murder. [68] Like Arkansas, a CLE requirement (a requirement common to almost all states with capital counsel qualifications) is imposed, requiring fifteen hours of training in capital defense within the prior two years. [69]

Most states have crafted requirements that fall somewhere in between the Arkansas and California requirements, but not all. Colorado, for example, imposes qualifications upon capital counsel, but only at the post-conviction stage of proceedings. [70] And New Hampshire does not have any policies regarding qualification standards for capital defense counsel – although it is worth noting that New Hampshire has not executed anyone since 1939, despite the death penalty remaining in state law. [71]

Although the qualification standards discussed above pertain primarily to trial counsel, the only federal “stick” that is used to ensure the quality of representation is directed not at trial counsel but at post-conviction counsel. Sections 2261 and 2265 of title 28 of the United States Code (part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, “AEDPA”) “provide[] for an expedited review procedure by which state courts are given more deference in the federal habeas review process,” only if certain requirements are satisfied by the states. [72] But both provisions place requirements on the appointment of counsel at the post-conviction stage of the proceedings, i.e ., after a capital punishment sentence has already been imposed by the trial court and affirmed on direct appeal. The deference the state court adjudications receive, then, is based not on the quality of representation when the matter was tried before a finder of fact but the quality of representation in post-conviction collateral attacks – and those state-level collateral attacks are themselves entitled to a deference that a court on direct appeal does not employ.

Two states – Utah and Pennsylvania – do not even fund capital defense at the state level. [73] It is a sobering statistic that Philadelphia’s compensation for court-appointed trial lawyers has been among the lowest of any major metropolitan area in the country – and that of the 100-plus inmates sentenced to death in Pennsylvania since 1978, almost all had their appeals overturned on collateral review. [74] Given the costs associated with post-conviction and habeas appeals, one cannot help but wonder whether the Supreme Court’s requirement of a verdict worthy of confidence needs to be the primary focus of funding for all jurisdictions that choose to maintain the death penalty, and whether, at some point, the Supreme Court will find that a right to a fair trial means that the structure that needs to be in place to ensure a fair trial has to precede trial.

It can thus be argued—as this article does—that the AEDPA statute places its emphasis on the wrong stage of the proceedings – and that creating an incentive to expend large sums of money, employ significant teams of lawyers, and retain multiple experts at the two levels of collateral attack – state and federal – at which the greatest degrees of deference are owed to the state court judgment is not only a poor allocation of resources but a trigger for tension between the bench and bar that ultimately can only harm the interests of the capital defendant.

This tension is a product of an appellate system that, on the one hand, accords deference to the fact-finding of judges and juries – and to the discretion of a trial court to manage the conduct of a trial and the evidence and witnesses that may be considered. That deference extends to the reasonable, strategic decision of a lawyer. On the other hand, habeas counsel and others are required to look at the trial through a prism of standards and scopes of review; even though they see in hindsight defenses that could have been raised, experts that could have been proffered, and mitigation that could have been presented to a jury. As will be seen at greater length below, the more convinced that those not a part of the trial become that capital trials are unfair, the further they push the envelope to force a new trial – and the more entrenched the perspective that all death sentences should be overturned, and the more strident and less respectful the call for that relief, the greater a gulf is placed between the bench and the bar.

The parameters that the United States Supreme Court have articulated for state statutory schemes – trials in which the community can have confidence at which sentencers who are fully apprised of the evidence, including evidence in mitigation, render rational and non-arbitrary sentences – are not advanced by comparing lawyers who are frequently poorly paid and who have to seek court approval for any appointed expert or testing to be measured against what sometimes appears to be unlimited resources and an unlimited appetite for flyspecking a trial in hindsight. It is at least an understandable (and perhaps a natural) reaction to say – as numerous opinions on ineffective assistance do – that the right to effective counsel is not the right to perfect or ideal counsel. [75] Or, as a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion explained, “a defendant’s competency to stand trial must be evaluated at the time of trial” – and contrary evidence produced in hindsight “overlooks this requirement.” [76] But although the response of courts is natural, so is the unease reflected in the public’s reaction to a denial of relief in the face of new information by experts and others.

IV. What is the Ethical Response?

In a provocative article, Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green explain that the nineteenth century debate about what defines a lawyer’s ethical role – that of a lawyer’s ethical responsibility being to his or her client and that of a lawyer beholden to his or her own conscience – creates a false dichotomy. [77] Instead, they posit that a coherent ethic is found in Rush v. Cavenaugh , [78] which said, inter alia , that a lawyer “is expressly bound by his official oath to behave himself in his office of attorney with all due fidelity to the court as well as the client; and he violates it when he consciously presses for an unjust judgment: much more so when he presses for the conviction of an innocent man.” Thus, they conclude, there is a professional conscience that co-exists with a personal conscience and that together set limits on what a lawyer can do in advocating for a client. [79] In this way, “lawyers’ obligations are distinguished from those of other agents because of their office, which imposes countervailing obligations to the court to which the lawyer owes fidelity.” [80]

On this view, there are obligations of professional conscience that transcend the obligations set forth expressly in rules of professional conduct (those being prohibitions against knowingly participating in illegality or fraud, filing frivolous claims, or failing to be candid with a court). [81] In addressing the unwritten obligations, a lawyer must exercise judgment in determining “the legal and systemic considerations that are familiar to lawyers” and weighing those against the client’s interests and the dictates of personal conscience. [82] The challenge here is that in most instances a person presumes that his moral convictions alone will dictate ethical choices and actions. But the legal profession – and particularly in Green’s and Zacharias’s view – requires one’s morality to inform and be informed by one’s obligations to the court and one’s duties to his or her client. This has significant implications for litigating capital cases, and particularly for collateral proceedings, because the goal cannot be to avoid the carrying out of a death sentence; it must instead be to vindicate a particular individual’s right to a fair trial, developed within the (a) law – either as it exists or as extended in good faith; (b) facts and procedural history of the case; and (c) rules of the court and professional conduct.

In 1982, the Honorable Ruggero Aldisert used the positioning of competence as first in the then-new Model Rules of Professional Conduct to discuss the responsibility a lawyer has “to his client, the courts, and the development of the law” – a responsibility that was greater than that imposed by other jurisdictions. [83] Focusing on appellate lawyers, he stressed that American lawyers need to be cognizant of their responsibility not only to the client “but also to the court in its law-making function.” [84] He then analyzed what in his mind makes an appellate lawyer competent, stating, inter alia , that the first argument in an appellate brief should be the one most likely to persuade the court and that the brief should set forth “only those arguments which have the capacity to persuade” – and he suggested that no brief should exceed five points and preferably should not have more than three. [85] This message of his – that winnowing is essential to a good appeal – is widely held among judges.

But in representing a capital defendant, this view is in tension not only with the requirement of exhaustion but with the uncertainty that a defendant will be able to avail himself or herself of developing jurisprudence without arguing for it. In Teague v. Lane , the United States Supreme Court determined that most new rules of criminal procedure – unless they came within certain narrow exceptions [86] – could not be applied retroactively. In O’Dell v. Netherland , the United States Supreme Court applied Teague to deny relief to a capital defendant, finding that the rule enunciated in Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154 (1994) – that a defendant must be permitted to inform his sentencing jury that he is parole-ineligible if the prosecution argues that he presents a future danger – was a new rule of criminal procedure and not a watershed one that “implicat[ed] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” [87] Likewise, in Beard v. Banks , the United States Supreme Court found that the invalidation of capital sentencing schemes that required jurors to disregard mitigation that was not found unanimously was a new rule that did not come within either exception. [88]

The response of a zealous advocate is to argue for good-faith extensions of the law – and to try to anticipate any such changes that might be on the horizon. But doing so is inconsistent with the premise with which Judge Aldisert and others begin – that only the strongest ( i.e ., the most likely to persuade a court) arguments should be in a brief. The ABA as well has said that given the legal climate, a lawyer has a responsibility to raise all arguments potentially available. [89] The resultant long briefs, filled with issues and sub-issues, some only partially developed, has led to frustrations by the bench at the time it takes to review (or ferret out) arguments and address them carefully, and a sense that the briefing and other tactics are placing personal agendas above the ethical obligation to the courts.

In the concurrence of Commonwealth v. Eichinger , for example, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice quoted the post-conviction trial court, which had had to reallocate its other cases to senior judges to handle a single post-conviction petition.

A lawyer has a sacred duty to defend his or her client. Our codes of professional responsibility additionally call upon lawyers to serve as guardians of the law, to play a vital role in the preservation of society, and to adhere to the highest standards of ethical and moral conduct. Simply stated, we are all called upon to promote respect for the law, our profession, and to do public good. …. This case has caused me to reasonably question where the line exists between a zealous defense and an agenda-driven litigation strategy, such as the budget-breaking resource-breaking strategy on display in this case. Here, the cost to the people and to the trial Court was very high. [90]

Another justice, also concurring, expressed his frustration this way:

Simply put, those who oppose the death penalty should address their concerns to the legislature. Using the court system as a way to delay, obstruct, and thus, by implication invalidate a law passed by duly elected senators and representatives cannot be characterized as proper, zealous advocacy. That is to say, “the gravity of a capital case does not relieve counsel of their obligation under Rule 3.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct not to raise frivolous claims. . . . While an attorney may have an ethical obligation to be a zealous advocate, he has a duty not to pester the courts with frivolous arguments. In fact, an attorney does his client a disservice by failing to winnow out the weaker arguments and focusing on central, key issues, upon which his client might be granted relief. Adding weaker, particularly frivolous arguments, dilutes the force of the stronger ones and makes it difficult for a court to focus on those issues which are deserving of attention, i.e., those which are non-frivolous. Common sense dictates that, when an attorney raises an excessive number of issues, as occurred in this PCRA case, the motivation for so doing is to paralyze the court system to further political views. It is not hard to discern that, in such cases, the strategy of PCRA capital counsel is not necessarily to put forth the best legal arguments upon which the client may be granted relief, but rather, the strategy is to keep, at all costs, his client from suffering the ultimate penalty proscribed by law. Appellant as PCRA counsel have the duty, like any attorney, to raise and pursue viable claims, and they must do so within the ethical limits which govern all Pennsylvania. [91]

In other words, collateral capital litigation in Pennsylvania and elsewhere demonstrates the divide between those who advocate loyalty to the court and to jurisprudential principles and practices and those who seek to overturn death sentences through whatever procedural or legal means are available or are perceived as potentially available. Those who see the practices as disloyal to the courts also see them as divorced from a lawyer’s loyalty to his client. Those involved adamantly disagree, believing that saving or extending a life is in the best interests of the client.

The ramifications of the dilemma posed by this tension are not merely theoretical, or even philosophical. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained, its recent movement to strict word limits and other briefing parameters in all appeals was in response to what it perceived as briefing abuses in capital post-conviction briefing in that Court. [92] Similarly, while Pennsylvania has refused to find waiver for claims of incompetency that are raised for the first time in collateral proceedings, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s perception that such claims are being abused has led to an increasing number of justices expressing a willingness to overrule the preservation exception. [93] Said differently, what may extend the time that a defendant is alive may come at the cost of credibility and worse, not just for the defendant or petitioner in a given case but for all parties in all criminal – and, often, civil – cases. That is a high price to pay in response to a system that, if it is to work at all, must provide a cost-effective, reliable, non-arbitrary process for determining whether a defendant is death-worthy.

Moreover, when there is a lack of congruence between morality and ethics, those outside the profession question the efficacy of the system itself. Many people decry capital punishment as “too costly” or, at least more costly than life in prison – and empirically, that is true. [94] Some use that costliness as an additional reason that the death penalty should be abolished. Others decry the expense as wasteful and agenda-driven, and call for changes to the system to make it more “efficient.” [95] Part of the reason that the expense is as high as it is is attributable to the resources that are devoted to multiple rounds of review – direct appeal, followed by post-conviction trial court practice and appellate review, followed by federal habeas trial court practice and appellate review – with the potential for seeking a writ of certiorari after each round. And that may be repeated if, for example, claims in federal court are found unexhausted and a defendant is permitted to return to state court to exhaust them. The only way to lessen the costs on the “back end” of state and federal collateral review is to ensure that there are adequate resources at the front end – at the trial that is the focus of the constitutional assurances that a sentence of death can be carried out.

For states that have a death penalty on the books, the statutes and schemes must provide for verdicts in which a community can have confidence. That means that resources – mitigation specialists, mental health and other experts, and well-trained and fairly-compensated lawyers should represent defendants at trial and on direct appeal. Post-conviction proceedings and federal habeas proceedings should not be the primary stage at which the fairness of a trial is litigated. In order for that to happen, there needs to be changes, which in some cases or in some states may be radical ones.

First , as the law changes, it should change for all who were convicted under the old system. When Ring v. Arizona was decided, there were 30 resentencings on remand. [96] Until the bar has confidence that defendants will get the benefit of evolving law, lawyers will be unable to avoid arguing for extensions of the law in any way they perceive applicable to the defendants they represent.

Second , those firms and private donors that are assisting on the “back end” – at federal habeas or in state post-conviction proceedings – should help instead to fund trial-level resources, whether retaining and presenting experts, funding mitigation specialists, or donating funds to help pay for sufficient adequately compensated counsel.

Third , federal deference should be determined by how well a state ensures verdicts worthy of confidence, not by how well it structures post-conviction relief.

This article has explored several inverted incentives that call into question whether the constitutional scheme that the United States Supreme Court envisioned can be achieved – and that at the least shows that it is not there now. As lawyers, the authors of this article adhere strongly to the conviction that a lawyer may exercise zealous advocacy and personal belief only within the confines of our duties to the courts in which we practice – and, as Judge Aldisert suggested – to the law itself. In that spirit, we offer the following thoughts:

At the end of the day – whether because one cannot countenance any taking of life or because one believes that it is not possible to create a system worthy of confidence when it comes to a sentence of death, there will be some who will say that none of this matters: that no matter how a capital sentencing scheme is structured or what protections are in place, it is wrong to execute persons at all. There are two vehicles for the expression of that ethical choice: the legislatures, state and federal, which enact the laws defining or abolishing the death penalty; and the views of the community, which the United States Supreme Court has said is critical to an Eighth Amendment analysis. But for those struggling to respond to capital punishment as lawyers, all three duties of loyalty must be kept in balance: to one’s client, to one’s own conscience; and to the jurisprudential system – both the development of the law and the individual tribunal before which one appears. Daniel prayed before an open window, but he also continued to serve the king.

[1] “ethos.” Oxford English Dictionary. 2014. http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/64840 (18 Apr. 2015).

[2] Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).

[4] Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. at 183-84.

[5] Exodus 21:23-25.

[6] Minute of the Green Country Monthly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, on Capital Punishment (May 12, 1996) available at http://www.qis.net/~daruma/cap-pun2.html.

[7] Statement of the Administrative Committee of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, on Ending the Death Penalty (Mar. 24, 1999).

[8] John and Laura McBride, We’d Like To Say: Capital Punishment is Not the Answer , St. Anthony Messenger (Jan. 2002), http://www.americancatholic.org/Messenger/Jan2002/feature3.asp.

[9] John and Laura McBride, We’d Like To Say: Capital Punishment is Not the Answer , St. Anthony Messenger (Jan. 2002), http://www.americancatholic.org/Messenger/Jan2002/feature3.asp .

[11] Sheldon M. Finkelstein, A Tale of Two Witnesses: The Constitution’s Two-Witness Rule and the Talmud Sanhedrin , 43 Litigation 4 (Summer 2010).

[12] Id . at 17.

[13] Bryan v. Moore , 528 U.S. 1133 (2000) (dismissing as improvidently granted a challenge to electrocution because Florida’s law changed in the interim to permit execution by lethal injection).

[14] E.g., Qur’an 6:151 (“Take not life, which God has made sacred, except by way of justice and law. Thus does He command you, so that you may learn wisdom.”).

[15] Gregg , 428 U.S. at 175-76.

[16] Id. at 181-82.

[18] Gregg , 428 U.S. at 189, 194-95.

[19] Id . at 204.

[21] Pulley v. Harris , 465 U.S. 37 (1984).

[22] Walker v. Georgia , 555 U.S. 979, 983-84 (2008).

[23] Proffitt v. Florida , 428 U.S. 242 (1976).

[24] Id . at 208 (quoting Tedder v. State , 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).

[25] Id . at 252.

[26] Jurek v. Texas , 428 U.S. 262 (1976).

[27] Id. at 271.

[28] Id . at 274.

[29] Id . at 276.

[31] Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

[32] Id. at 302.

[33] Id . at 304 (citations omitted).

[34] Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

[35] Id . at 333.

[36] Id . at 335.

[37] Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman , 550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007).

[38] E.g., Wiggins v. Smith , 539 U.S. 510, 535-36 (2003). The first case to define a constitutional right to counsel as a right to effective counsel is Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

[39] Berger v. United States , 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). See also Mooney v. Holohan , 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (rejecting the Attorney General’s contention that a prosecutor’s obligation extends only to evidence in possession of the defendant).

[40] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

[41] Atkins v. Virginia , 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

[42] Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

[43] Id . at 569.

[44] Id . at 570 (citations and internal quotations omitted).

[45] Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (“For centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the Constitution forbids the practice. Today we keep faith with our common-law heritage in holding that it does.”).

[46] Drope v. Missouri , 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (recognizing that it violates due process to fail “to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial.”).

[47] E.g ., Ryan v. Gonzales , 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) (finding no statutory right to a suspension of habeas proceedings during the pendency of petitioner’s incompetence).

[48] Ala. Code § 13A-5-40.

[49] South Carolina Statutes, § 16-3-26; Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.3(b)(1) (“When the indictment or presentment charges a capital offense and the district attorney general intends to ask for the death penalty, he or she shall file notice of this intention not less than thirty (30) days before trial. If the notice is untimely, the trial judge shall grant the defendant, on motion, a reasonable continuance of the trial.”).

[50] Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (emphasis added).

[51] Lankford v. Idaho , 500 U.S. 110, 125-26 & nn. 20, 21 (1991).

[52] See Governor Tom Wolf, Memorandum, Death Penalty Moratorium Declaration, available at http://www.pa.gov/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?agency=PAGovNews&item=16512.

[53] ABA Resolution, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/1989guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf .

[54] ABA Resolution, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf .

[55] ABA Guideline 1.1(A).

[56] ABA Guideline 1.1 (B).

[57] ABA Guideline 6.1.

[58] ABA Guideline 10.4. In 2008, the ABA published the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases (the “Supplementary Guidelines”). The objective of the Supplementary Guidelines is to “summarize prevailing professional norms for mitigation investigation, development and presentation by capital defense teams, in order to ensure high quality representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or execution of a death sentence in any jurisdiction.”

[59] ABA Guideline 9.1.

[60] See, e.g ., Littlejohn v. Trammell , 704 F.3d 817 (10th Cir. 2013); Link v. Luebbers , 830 F. Supp. 2d 729 (E.D. Mo. 2011); State v. Hunder , 960 N.E.2d 95 (Ohio 2011).

[61] Bobby v. Van Hook , 558 U.S. 4, 8 (2009).

[62] Id . at 9.

[63] Alabama Circuit Judge’s Association Resolution (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Standards/State/Alabama_Resolution_for_ABA_Guidelines_Aug_2007.authcheckdam.pdf .

[64] Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, State Bar of Texas , 69 Tex. Bar J. 10, 966-982 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Standards/State/TX_Bar_Association_adopted_version_of_ABA_Guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf .

[66] Alabama Circuit Judge’s Association Resolution (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Standards/State/Alabama_Resolution_for_ABA_Guidelines_Aug_2007.authcheckdam.pdf .

[67] Public Defender Commission, State of Arkansas, available at http://www.arkansas.gov/apdc/news/qualifications.html#Cases.

[68] Cal. Rules of Court, R. 4.117.

[70] C.R.S.A. § 16-12-205.

[71] National Center for State Courts, Indigent Defense State Links, available at http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Indigent-Defense/State-Links.aspx?cat=Capital%20Case%20Representation#New Hampshire.

[72] Wright v. Angelone , 644 F. Supp. 460, 462 (E.D.Va. 1996) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261, 2265).

[73] Daniel Silverman, Death Penalty System Broken, Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 5, 2015, available at http:/qqq/philly/com/philly/opinion/inquirer/20150105_Death-penatly_system_broker.html.

[75] E.g ., Yarborough v. Gentry , 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight.”)

[76] Commonwealth v. Bomar , 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3078 at *33.

[77] Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics , 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (November 2005).

[78] Id . at 8, quoting Rush v. Cavenaugh , 2 Pa. 187, 189, 1845 Pa. LEXIS 306 (1845).

[79] In tracing the disappearance of this concept, they observe that Henry S. Drinker, in Legal Ethics at 145 & n.32 (1953) was the last treatise author to cite to Rush – and he did so as support for his conclusion that “[a] lawyer is not bound to give his client a moral lecture. He should advise what the law requires, but should not further any of the client’s unjust schemes, and should refuse to become a party to them.” Id .

[80] Zacharias and Green at 34.

[81] Id . at 51.

[82] Id . at 52-53.

[83] 11 Cap. U. L. Rev. 446 (1981-82).

[84] Id . at 454.

[85] Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 407 (1989).

[86] Teague recognized exceptions for “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,” and “watershed rules of criminal procedure.” O’Dell v. Netherland , 521 U.S. 151, 311 (1997).

[87] O’Dell , 521 U.S. at 167.

[88] Beard v. Banks , 542 U.S. 406 (2004).

[89] See ABA Guideline 10.8 (stating that lawyer has duty to “consider all legal claims potentially available” in addition to “supplementing claims previously made with additional factual or legal information”); see also ABA Guideline 10.15.1 (stating that post-conviction counsel should “seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality capital defense representation, including challenges to any overly restrictive procedural rules”).

[90] 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3558 at *68-69.

[91] Id . at *83-85.

[92] See Commonwealth v. Spotz , 99 A.3d 866, 916 (Pa. 2014) (post-decisional single justice opinion).

[93] While only one justice called for overruling the exception in Commonwealth v. Bomar , 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3078 (Nov. 21, 2014), three did so in Commonwealth v. Blakeney , 2014 Pa. LEXIS 3517 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2014),

[94] See Senator Caroly McGinn, “Death Penalty Too Costly,” The Witchita Eagle , March 1, 2009, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/new-voices-republican-senator-says-kansas-death-penalty-too-costly; Logan Carver, “Death Penalty Cases More Expensive than Lifetime Imprisonment, But Local CDA Says Cost Never a Consideration,” Lubbock Avalance-Journal, available at http://lubbockonline.com/stories/121309/loc_535156806.shtml .

[95] Arit John, A Botched Lethal Injection Won’t Change Anyone’s Mind About Capital Punishment (posted July 24, 2014), http://www.thewire.com/politics/2014/07/a-botched-lethal-injection-wont-change-anyones-mind-about-capital-punishment/375022 (discussing Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s argument that to prevent executions from being cruel and unusual, a more efficient form of capital punishment, such as firing squads, should be employed).

[96] 536 U.S. 584 (2002)

Moral arguments

Utilitarian arguments, practical arguments, the abolition movement.

Capital punishment in the early 21st century

Arguments for and against capital punishment

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Capital punishment has long engendered considerable debate about both its morality and its effect on criminal behaviour. Contemporary arguments for and against capital punishment fall under three general headings: moral , utilitarian, and practical.

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Supporters of the death penalty believe that those who commit murder , because they have taken the life of another, have forfeited their own right to life. Furthermore, they believe, capital punishment is a just form of retribution , expressing and reinforcing the moral indignation not only of the victim’s relatives but of law-abiding citizens in general. By contrast, opponents of capital punishment, following the writings of Cesare Beccaria (in particular On Crimes and Punishments [1764]), argue that, by legitimizing the very behaviour that the law seeks to repress—killing—capital punishment is counterproductive in the moral message it conveys. Moreover, they urge, when it is used for lesser crimes, capital punishment is immoral because it is wholly disproportionate to the harm done. Abolitionists also claim that capital punishment violates the condemned person’s right to life and is fundamentally inhuman and degrading.

Although death was prescribed for crimes in many sacred religious documents and historically was practiced widely with the support of religious hierarchies , today there is no agreement among religious faiths, or among denominations or sects within them, on the morality of capital punishment. Beginning in the last half of the 20th century, increasing numbers of religious leaders—particularly within Judaism and Roman Catholicism—campaigned against it. Capital punishment was abolished by the state of Israel for all offenses except treason and crimes against humanity, and Pope John Paul II condemned it as “cruel and unnecessary.”

Supporters of capital punishment also claim that it has a uniquely potent deterrent effect on potentially violent offenders for whom the threat of imprisonment is not a sufficient restraint. Opponents, however, point to research that generally has demonstrated that the death penalty is not a more effective deterrent than the alternative sanction of life or long-term imprisonment.

There also are disputes about whether capital punishment can be administered in a manner consistent with justice . Those who support capital punishment believe that it is possible to fashion laws and procedures that ensure that only those who are really deserving of death are executed. By contrast, opponents maintain that the historical application of capital punishment shows that any attempt to single out certain kinds of crime as deserving of death will inevitably be arbitrary and discriminatory. They also point to other factors that they think preclude the possibility that capital punishment can be fairly applied, arguing that the poor and ethnic and religious minorities often do not have access to good legal assistance, that racial prejudice motivates predominantly white juries in capital cases to convict black and other nonwhite defendants in disproportionate numbers, and that, because errors are inevitable even in a well-run criminal justice system, some people will be executed for crimes they did not commit. Finally, they argue that, because the appeals process for death sentences is protracted, those condemned to death are often cruelly forced to endure long periods of uncertainty about their fate.

Under the influence of the European Enlightenment , in the latter part of the 18th century there began a movement to limit the scope of capital punishment. Until that time a very wide range of offenses, including even common theft, were punishable by death—though the punishment was not always enforced , in part because juries tended to acquit defendants against the evidence in minor cases. In 1794 the U.S. state of Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction to restrict the death penalty to first-degree murder, and in 1846 the state of Michigan abolished capital punishment for all murders and other common crimes. In 1863 Venezuela became the first country to abolish capital punishment for all crimes, including serious offenses against the state (e.g., treason and military offenses in time of war). San Marino was the first European country to abolish the death penalty, doing so in 1865; by the early 20th century several other countries, including the Netherlands, Norway , Sweden , Denmark , and Italy , had followed suit (though it was reintroduced in Italy under the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini ). By the mid-1960s some 25 countries had abolished the death penalty for murder, though only about half of them also had abolished it for offenses against the state or the military code. For example, Britain abolished capital punishment for murder in 1965, but treason, piracy, and military crimes remained capital offenses until 1998.

During the last third of the 20th century, the number of abolitionist countries increased more than threefold. These countries, together with those that are “de facto” abolitionist—i.e., those in which capital punishment is legal but not exercised—now represent more than half the countries of the world. One reason for the significant increase in the number of abolitionist states was that the abolition movement was successful in making capital punishment an international human rights issue, whereas formerly it had been regarded as solely an internal matter for the countries concerned.

In 1971 the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that, “in order fully to guarantee the right to life, provided for in…the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” called for restricting the number of offenses for which the death penalty could be imposed, with a view toward abolishing it altogether. This resolution was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in 1977. Optional protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights (1983) and to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1989) have been established, under which countries party to the convention and the covenant undertake not to carry out executions. The Council of Europe (1994) and the EU (1998) established as a condition of membership in their organizations the requirement that prospective member countries suspend executions and commit themselves to abolition. This decision had a remarkable impact on the countries of central and eastern Europe , prompting several of them—e.g., the Czech Republic , Hungary , Romania , Slovakia , and Slovenia—to abolish capital punishment.

In the 1990s many African countries—including Angola, Djibouti, Mozambique, and Namibia—abolished capital punishment, though most African countries retained it. In South Africa , which formerly had one of the world’s highest execution rates, capital punishment was outlawed in 1995 by the Constitutional Court, which declared that it was incompatible with the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment and with “a human rights culture.”

Capital Punishment: Our Duty or Our Doom?
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Capital Punishment:Our Duty or Our Doom?

But human rights advocates and civil libertarians continue to decry the immorality of state-sanctioned killing in the U.S. Is capital punishment moral?

About 2000 men, women, and teenagers currently wait on America's "death row." Their time grows shorter as federal and state courts increasingly ratify death penalty laws, allowing executions to proceed at an accelerated rate. It's unlikely that any of these executions will make the front page, having become more or less a matter of routine in the last decade. Indeed, recent public opinion polls show a wide margin of support for the death penalty. But human rights advocates and civil libertarians continue to decry the immorality of state-sanctioned killing in the U.S., the only western industrialized country that continues to use the death penalty. Is capital punishment moral?

Capital punishment is often defended on the grounds that society has a moral obligation to protect the safety and welfare of its citizens. Murderers threaten this safety and welfare. Only by putting murderers to death can society ensure that convicted killers do not kill again.

Second, those favoring capital punishment contend that society should support those practices that will bring about the greatest balance of good over evil, and capital punishment is one such practice. Capital punishment benefits society because it may deter violent crime. While it is difficult to produce direct evidence to support this claim since, by definition, those who are deterred by the death penalty do not commit murders, common sense tells us that if people know that they will die if they perform a certain act, they will be unwilling to perform that act.

If the threat of death has, in fact, stayed the hand of many a would be murderer, and we abolish the death penalty, we will sacrifice the lives of many innocent victims whose murders could have been deterred. But if, in fact, the death penalty does not deter, and we continue to impose it, we have only sacrificed the lives of convicted murderers. Surely it's better for society to take a gamble that the death penalty deters in order to protect the lives of innocent people than to take a gamble that it doesn't deter and thereby protect the lives of murderers, while risking the lives of innocents. If grave risks are to be run, it's better that they be run by the guilty, not the innocent.

Finally, defenders of capital punishment argue that justice demands that those convicted of heinous crimes of murder be sentenced to death. Justice is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated equally. It is unjust when a criminal deliberately and wrongly inflicts greater losses on others than he or she has to bear. If the losses society imposes on criminals are less than those the criminals imposed on their innocent victims, society would be favoring criminals, allowing them to get away with bearing fewer costs than their victims had to bear. Justice requires that society impose on criminals losses equal to those they imposed on innocent persons. By inflicting death on those who deliberately inflict death on others, the death penalty ensures justice for all.

This requirement that justice be served is not weakened by charges that only the black and the poor receive the death penalty. Any unfair application of the death penalty is the basis for extending its application, not abolishing it. If an employer discriminates in hiring workers, do we demand that jobs be taken from the deserving who were hired or that jobs be abolished altogether? Likewise, if our criminal justice system discriminates in applying the death penalty so that some do not get their deserved punishment, it's no reason to give Iesser punishments to murderers who deserved the death penalty and got it. Some justice, however unequal, is better than no justice, however equal. To ensure justice and equality, we must work to improve our system so that everyone who deserves the death penalty gets it.

The case against capital punishment is often made on the basis that society has a moral obligation to protect human life, not take it. The taking of human life is permissible only if it is a necessary condition to achieving the greatest balance of good over evil for everyone involved. Given the value we place on life and our obligation to minimize suffering and pain whenever possible, if a less severe alternative to the death penalty exists which would accomplish the same goal, we are duty-bound to reject the death penalty in favor of the less severe alternative.

There is no evidence to support the claim that the death penalty is a more effective deterrent of violent crime than, say, life imprisonment. In fact, statistical studies that have compared the murder rates of jurisdictions with and without the death penalty have shown that the rate of murder is not related to whether the death penalty is in force: There are as many murders committed in jurisdictions with the death penalty as in those without. Unless it can be demonstrated that the death penalty, and the death penalty alone, does in fact deter crimes of murder, we are obligated to refrain from imposing it when other alternatives exist.

Further, the death penalty is not necessary to achieve the benefit of protecting the public from murderers who may strike again. Locking murderers away for life achieves the same goal without requiring us to take yet another life. Nor is the death penalty necessary to ensure that criminals "get what they deserve." Justice does not require us to punish murder by death. It only requires that the gravest crimes receive the severest punishment that our moral principles would allow us to impose.

While it is clear that the death penalty is by no means necessary to achieve certain social benefits, it does, without a doubt, impose grave costs on society. First, the death penalty wastes lives. Many of those sentenced to death could be rehabilitated to live socially productive lives. Carrying out the death penalty destroys any good such persons might have done for society if they had been allowed to live. Furthermore, juries have been known to make mistakes, inflicting the death penalty on innocent people. Had such innocent parties been allowed to live, the wrong done to them might have been corrected and their lives not wasted.

In addition to wasting lives, the death penalty also wastes money. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it's much more costly to execute a person than to imprison them for life. The finality of punishment by death rightly requires that great procedural precautions be taken throughout all stages of death penalty cases to ensure that the chance of error is minimized. As a result, executing a single capital case costs about three times as much as it costs to keep a person in prison for their remaining life expectancy, which is about 40 years.

Finally, the death penalty harms society by cheapening the value of life. Allowing the state to inflict death on certain of its citizens legitimizes the taking of life. The death of anyone, even a convicted killer, diminishes us all. Society has a duty to end this practice which causes such harm, yet produces little in the way of benefits.

Opponents of capital punishment also argue that the death penalty should be abolished because it is unjust. Justice, they claim, requires that all persons be treated equally. And the requirement that justice bc served is all the more rigorous when life and death are at stake. Of 19,000 people who committed willful homicides in the U.S. in 1987, only 293 were sentenced to death. Who are these few being selected to die? They are nearly always poor and disproportionately black. It is not the nature of the crime that determines who goes to death row and who doesn't. People go to death row simply because they have no money to appeal their case, or they have a poor defense, or they lack the funds to being witnesses to courts, or they are members of a political or racial minority.

The death penalty is also unjust because it is sometimes inflicted on innocent people. Since 1900, 350 people have been wrongly convicted of homicide or capital rape. The death penalty makes it impossible to remedy any such mistakes. If, on the other hand, the death penalty is not in force, convicted persons later found to be innocent can be released and compensated for the time they wrongly served in prison.

The case for and the case against the death penalty appeal, in different ways, to the value we place on life and to the value we place on bringing about the greatest balance of good over evil. Each also appeals to our commitment to"justice": Is justice to be served at all costs? Or is our commitment to justice to be one tempered by our commitment to equality and our reverence for life? Indeed, is capital punishment our duty or our doom?

(Capital punishment) is . . . the most premeditated of murders, to which no criminal's deed, however calculated . . can be compared . . . For there to be an equivalence, the death penalty would have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim of the date at which he would inflict a horrible death on him and who, from that moment onward, had confined him at mercy for months. Such a monster is not encountered in private life. --Albert Camus

If . . . he has committed a murder, he must die. In this case, there is no substitute that will satisfy the requirements of legal justice. There is no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive even under the most miserable conditions, and consequently there is no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the criminal is judicially condemned and put to death. --Immanuel Kant

For further reading:

Hugo Adam Bedau, Death Is Different: Studies in the Morality, Law, and Politics of Capital Punishment (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987).

Walter Berns, For Capital Punishment (New York: Basic Books, 1979.)

David Bruch, "The Death Penalty: An Exchange," The New Republic , Volume 192 (May 20, 1985), pp. 20-21.

Edward I. Koch, "Death and Justice: How Capital Punishment Affirms Life," The New Republic, Volume 192 (April 15,1985), pp. 13-15.

Ernest van den Haag and John P. Conrad , The Death Penalty: A Debate (New York: Plenum Press, 1983).

This article was originally published in Issues in Ethics - V. 1, N.3 Spring 1988

Protests in and around Columbia University in support of Palestine and against Israeli occupation. A side gate by the bookstore where the crowd is—inside and out. Protests in and around Columbia University in support of Palestine and against Israeli occupation. A side gate by the bookstore where the crowd is—inside and out. Photo by SWinxy, CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

Of the roughly 2000+ stories on protests, conflict and violence on U.S. university campuses during Apr 29-May 3, a mere 23 stories or roughly 1% ran with headlines about agreements and deals universities struck with students.

United States Supreme Court Building. Image by Mark Thomas from Pixabay.

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The research on capital punishment: Recent scholarship and unresolved questions

2014 review of research on capital punishment, including studies that attempt to quantify rates of innocence and the potential deterrence effect on crime.

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by Alexandra Raphel and John Wihbey, The Journalist's Resource January 5, 2015

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Over the past year the death penalty has again come into focus as a major public policy and political issue, catalyzed by several high-profile events.

The botched execution of convicted murderer and rapist Clayton Lockett in Oklahoma in 2014 was seen as a potential turning point in the debate, bringing increased attention to the mechanisms by which persons are executed. That was followed by a number of other closely scrutinized cases, and the year ended with few executions relative to years past. On December 31, 2014, Maryland Gov. Martin O’Malley commuted the sentences of the remaining four prisoners on death row in that state. In 2013, Maryland became the 18th state to abolish the death penalty after Connecticut in 2012 and New Mexico in 2009.

Meanwhile, polling data suggests some softening of public attitudes, though the majority Americans continue to support capital punishment. Gallop noted in October 2014 that the level of public support (60%) is at its lowest in 40 years. A Washington Post -ABC News poll in mid-2014 found that more Americans support life sentences, rather than the death penalty, for convicted murderers. Further, recent polls from the Pew Research Center indicate that only a bare majority of Americans now support capital punishment, 55%, down from 78% in 1996.

Scholarly research sheds light on a number of important aspects of this issue:

False convictions

One key reason for the contentious debate is the concern that states are executing innocent people. How many people are unjustly facing the death penalty? By definition, it is difficult to obtain a reliable answer to this question. Presumably if judges, juries, and law enforcement were always able to conclusively determine who was innocent, those defendants would simply not be convicted in the first place. When capital punishment is the sentence, however, this issue takes on new importance.

Some believe that when it comes to death-penalty cases, this is not a huge cause for concern. In his concurrent opinion in the 2006 Supreme Court case Kansas v. Marsh , Justice Antonin Scalia suggested that the execution error rate was minimal, around 0.027%. However, a 2014 study in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences suggests that the figure could be higher. Authors Samuel Gross (University of Michigan Law School), Barbara O’Brien (Michigan State University College of Law), Chen Hu (American College of Radiology) and Edward H. Kennedy (University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine) examine data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Department of Justice relating to exonerations from 1973 to 2004 in an attempt to estimate the rate of false convictions among death row defendants. (Determining innocence with full certainty is an obvious challenge, so as a proxy they use exoneration — “an official determination that a convicted defendant is no longer legally culpable for the crime.”) In short, the researchers ask: If all death row prisoners were to remain under this sentence indefinitely, how many of them would have eventually been found innocent (exonerated)?

Interestingly, the authors also note that advances in DNA identification technology are unlikely to have a large impact on false conviction rates because DNA evidence is most often used in cases of rape rather than homicide. To date, only about 13% of death row exonerations were the result of DNA testing. The Innocence Project , a litigation and public policy organization founded in 1992, has been deeply involved in many such cases.

Death penalty deterrence effects: What do we know?

A chief way proponents of capital punishment defend the practice is the idea that the death penalty deters other people from committing future crimes. For example, research conducted by John J. Donohue III (Yale Law School) and Justin Wolfers (University of Pennsylvania) applies economic theory to the issue: If people act as rational maximizers of their profits or well-being, perhaps there is reason to believe that the most severe of punishments would serve as a deterrent. (The findings of their 2009 study on this issue, “Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on Murder,” are inconclusive.) In contrast, one could also imagine a scenario in which capital punishment leads to an increased homicide rate because of a broader perception that the state devalues human life. It could also be possible that the death penalty has no effect at all because information about executions is not diffused in a way that influences future behavior.

In 1978 — two years after the Supreme Court issued its decision reversing a previous ban on the death penalty ( Gregg v. Georgia ) — the National Research Council (NRC) published a comprehensive review of the current research on capital punishment to determine whether one of these hypotheses was more empirically supported than the others. The NRC concluded that “available studies provide no useful evidence on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.”

Researchers have subsequently used a number of methods in an effort to get closer to an accurate estimate of the deterrence effect of the death penalty. Many of the studies have reached conflicting conclusions, however. To conduct an updated review, the NRC formed the Committee on Deterrence and the Death Penalty, comprised of academics from economics departments and public policy schools from institutions around the country, including the Carnegie Mellon University, University of Chicago and Duke University.

In 2012, the Committee published an updated report that concluded that not much had changed in recent decades: “Research conducted in the 30 years since the earlier NRC report has not sufficiently advanced knowledge to allow a conclusion, however qualified, about the effect of the death penalty on homicide rates.” The report goes on to recommend that none of the reviewed reports be used to influence public policy decisions on the death penalty.

Why has the research not been able to provide any definitive answers about the impact of the death penalty? One general challenge is that when it comes to capital punishment, a counter-factual policy is simply not observable. You cannot simultaneously execute and not execute defendants, making it difficult to isolate the impact of the death penalty. The Committee also highlights a number of key flaws in the research designs:

There are both capital and non-capital punishment options for people charged with serious crimes. So, the relevant question on the deterrent effect of capital punishment specifically “is the differential deterrent effect of execution in comparison with the deterrent effect of other available or commonly used penalties.” None of the studies reviewed by the Committee took into account these severe, but noncapital punishments, which could also have an effect on future behaviors and could confound the estimated deterrence effect of capital punishment.
“They use incomplete or implausible models of potential murderers’ perceptions of and response to the capital punishment component of a sanction regime”
“The existing studies use strong and unverifiable assumptions to identify the effects of capital punishment on homicides.”

In a 2012 study, “Deterrence and the Dealth Penalty: Partial Identificaiton Analysis Using Repeated Cross Sections,” authors Charles F. Manski (Northwestern University) and John V. Pepper (University of Virginia) focus on the third challenge. They note: “Data alone cannot reveal what the homicide rate in a state without (with) a death penalty would have been had the state (not) adopted a death penalty statute. Here, as always when analyzing treatment response, data must be combined with assumptions to enable inference on counterfactual outcomes.”

Number of persons executed in the U.S., 1930-2011 (BJS)

However, even though the authors do not arrive at a definitive conclusion, the National Research Council Committee notes that this type of research holds some value: “Rather than imposing the strong but unsupported assumptions required to identify the effect of capital punishment on homicides in a single model or an ad hoc set of similar models, approaches that explicitly account for model uncertainty may provide a constructive way for research to provide credible albeit incomplete answers.”

Another strategy researchers have taken is to limit the focus of studies on potential short-term effects of the death penalty. In a 2009 paper, “The Short-Term Effects of Executions on Homicides: Deterrence, Displacement, or Both?” authors Kenneth C. Land and Hui Zheng of Duke University, along with Raymond Teske Jr. of Sam Houston State University, examine monthly execution data (1980-2005) from Texas, “a state that has used the death penalty with sufficient frequency to make possible relatively stable estimates of the homicide response to executions.” They conclude that “evidence exists of modest, short-term reductions in the numbers of homicides in Texas in the months of or after executions.” Depending on which model they use, these deterrent effects range from 1.6 to 2.5 homicides.

The NRC’s Committee on Deterrence and the Death Penalty commented on the findings, explaining: “Land, Teske and Zheng (2009) should be commended for distinguishing between periods in Texas when the use of capital punishment appears to have been erratic and when it appears to have been systematic. But they fail to integrate this distinction into a coherently delineated behavioral model that incorporates sanctions regimes, salience, and deterrence. And, as explained above, their claims of evidence of deterrence in the systematic regime are flawed.”

A more recent paper (2012) from the three authors, “The Differential Short-Term Impacts of Executions on Felony and Non-Felony Homicides,” addresses some of these concerns. Published in Criminology and Public Policy , the paper reviews and updates some of their earlier findings by exploring “what information can be gained by disaggregating the homicide data into those homicides committed in the course of another felony crime, which are subject to capital punishment, and those committed otherwise.” The results produce a number of different findings and models, including that “the short-lived deterrence effect of executions is concentrated among non-felony-type homicides.”

Other factors to consider

The question of what kinds of “mitigating” factors should prevent the criminal justice system from moving forward with an execution remains hotly disputed. A 2014 paper published in the Hastings Law Journal , “The Failure of Mitigation?” by scholars at the University of North Carolina and DePaul University, investigates recent executions of persons with possible mental or intellectual disabilities. The authors reviewed 100 cases and conclude that the “overwhelming majority of executed offenders suffered from intellectual impairments, were barely into adulthood, wrestled with severe mental illness, or endured profound childhood trauma.”

Two significant recommendations for reforming the existing process also are supported by some academic research. A 2010 study by Pepperdine University School of Law published in Temple Law Review , “Unpredictable Doom and Lethal Injustice: An Argument for Greater Transparency in Death Penalty Decisions,” surveyed the decision-making process among various state prosecutors. At the request of a state commission, the authors first surveyed California district attorneys; they also examined data from the other 36 states that have the death penalty. The authors found that prosecutors’ capital punishment filing decisions remain marked by local “idiosyncrasies,” meaning that “the very types of unfairness that the Supreme Court sought to eliminate” beginning in 1972 may still “infect capital cases.” They encourage “requiring prosecutors to adhere to an established set of guidelines.” Finally, there has been growing support for taping interrogations of suspects in capital cases, so as to guard against the phenomenon of false confessions .

Related reading: For an international perspective on capital punishment, see Amnesty International’s 2013 report ; for more information on the evolution of U.S. public opinion on the death penalty, see historical trends from Gallup .

Keywords: crime, prisons, death penalty, capital punishment

About the Authors

Alexandra Raphel

John Wihbey

Arguments for and Against the Death Penalty

Click the buttons below to view arguments and testimony on each topic.

The death penalty deters future murders.

Retribution

A just society requires the taking of a life for a life.

The risk of executing the innocent precludes the use of the death penalty.

Arbitrariness & Discrimination

The death penalty is applied unfairly and should not be used.

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Journal of Practical Ethics

A journal of philosophy, applied to the real world.

The Death Penalty Debate: Four Problems and New Philosophical Perspectives

Masaki Ichinose

The University of Tokyo

This paper aims at bringing a new philosophical perspective to the current debate on the death penalty through a discussion of peculiar kinds of uncertainties that surround the death penalty. I focus on laying out the philosophical argument, with the aim of stimulating and restructuring the death penalty debate.

I will begin by describing views about punishment that argue in favour of either retaining the death penalty (‘retentionism’) or abolishing it (‘abolitionism’). I will then argue that we should not ignore the so-called “whom-question”, i.e. “To whom should we justify the system of punishment?” I identify three distinct chronological stages to address this problem, namely, “the Harm Stage”, “the Blame Stage”, and “the Danger Stage”.

I will also identify four problems arising from specific kinds of uncertainties present in current death penalty debates: (1) uncertainty in harm, (2) uncertainty in blame, (3) uncertainty in rights, and (4) uncertainty in causal consequences. In the course of examining these four problems, I will propose an ‘impossibilist’ position towards the death penalty, according to which the notion of the death penalty is inherently contradictory.

Finally, I will suggest that it may be possible to apply this philosophical perspective to the justice system more broadly, in particular to the maximalist approach to restorative justice.

1. To whom should punishment be justified?

What, exactly, are we doing when we justify a system of punishment? The process of justifying something is intrinsically connected with the process of persuading someone to accept it. When we justify a certain belief, our aim is to demonstrate reasonable grounds for people to believe it. Likewise, when we justify a system of taxation, we intend to demonstrate the necessity and fairness of the system to taxpayers.

What, then, are we justifying when we justify a system of punishment? To whom should we provide legitimate reasons for the system? It is easy to understand to whom we justify punishment when that punishment is administered by, for example, charging a fine. In this case, we persuade violators to pay the fine by bringing to their attention the harm that they have caused, harm which needs to be compensated. (Please note that I am only mentioning the primitive basis of the process of justification.) While we often generalise this process to include people in general or society as a whole, the process of justification would not work without convincing the people who are directly concerned (in this case, violators), at least theoretically, that this is a justified punishment, despite their subjective objections or psychological opposition. We could paraphrase this point per Scanlon’s ‘idea of a justification which it would be unreasonable to reject’ (1982, p.117). That is to say, in justifying the application of the system of punishment, we should satisfy the condition that each person concerned (especially the violator) is aware of having no grounds to reasonably reject the application of the system, even if they do in fact reject it from their personal, self-interested point of view.

In fact, if the violator is not theoretically persuaded at all in any sense—that is, if they cannot understand the justification as a justification—we must consider the possibility that they suffer some disorder or disability that affects their criminal responsibility.

We should also take into account the case of some extreme and fanatical terrorists. They might not understand the physical treatment inflicted on them in the name of punishment as a punishment at all. Rather, they might interpret their being physically harmed as an admirable result of their heroic behaviour. The notion of punishment is not easily applied to these cases, where the use of physical restraint is more like that applied to wild animals. Punishment can be successful only if those who are punished understand the event as punishment.

This line of argument entirely conforms to the traditional context in philosophy concerning the concept of a “person”, who is regarded as the moral and legal agent responsible for his or her actions, including crimes. John Locke, a 17th-century English philosopher, introduced and established this concept, basing it on ‘consciousness’. According to Locke, a person ‘is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness’ (1975, Book 2, Chapter 27, Section 9). This suggests that moral or legal punishments for the person should be accompanied by consciousnesses (in a Lockean sense) of the agent. In other words, when punishment is legally imposed on someone, the person to be punished must be conscious of the punishment as a punishment; that is, the person should understand the event as a justified imposition of some harm. 1

However, there is a problem here, which arises in particular for the death penalty but not for other kinds of punishment. The question that I raise here is ‘to whom do we justify the death penalty?’ People might say it should be justified to society, as the death penalty is one of the social institutions to which we consent, whether explicitly or tacitly. This is true. However, if my claims above about justification are correct, the justification of the death penalty must involve the condemned convict coming to understand the justification at least at a theoretical level. Otherwise, to be executed would not be considered a punishment but rather something akin to the extermination of a dangerous animal. The question I want to focus on in particular is this: should this justification be provided before administering capital punishment or whilst administering capital punishment?

2. ‘Impossibilism’

Generally, in order for the justification of punishment to work, it is necessary for convicts to understand that this is a punishment before it is carried out and that they cannot reasonably reject the justification, regardless of any personal objection they may have. However, that is not sufficient, because if they do not understand at the moment of execution that something harmful being inflicted is a punishment, then its being inflicted would simply result in mere physical harm rather than an institutional response based on theoretical justification. The justification for punishment must be, at least theoretically, accepted both before and during its application. 2 This requirement can be achieved with regard to many types of punishment, such as fines or imprisonment. However, the situation is radically different in the case of the death penalty, for in this case, when it is carried out, the convict, by definition, disappears. During and (in the absence of an afterlife) after the punishment, the convict cannot understand the nature and justification of the punishment. Can we say then that this is a punishment? This is a question which deserves further thought.

On the one hand, the death penalty, once executed, logically implies the nonexistence of the person punished; therefore, by definition, that person will not be conscious of being punished at the moment of execution. However, punishment must be accompanied by the convict’s consciousness or understanding of the significance of the punishment, as far as we accept the traditional concept of the person as a moral and legal agent upon whom punishment could be imposed. It may be suggested that everything leading up to the execution—being on death row, entering the execution chamber, being strapped down—is a kind of punishment that the convict is conscious of and is qualitatively different from mere incarceration. However, those phases are factors merely concomitant with the death penalty. The core essence of being executed lies in being killed or dying. Therefore, if the phases of anticipation were to occur but finally the convict were not killed, the death penalty would not have been carried out. The death penalty logically results in the convict’s not being conscious of being executed, and yet, for it to be a punishment, the death penalty requires the convict to be conscious of being executed. We could notate this in the form of conjunction in the following way in order to make my point as clear as possible:

~ PCE & PCE

(PCE: ‘the person is conscious of being executed under the name of punishment’)

If this is correct, then we must conclude that the concept of the death penalty is a manifest contradiction in terms. In other words, the death penalty should be regarded as conceptually impossible, even before we take part in longstanding debates between retentionism and abolitionism. This purely philosophical view of the death penalty could be called ‘impossibilism’ (i.e. the death penalty is conceptually impossible), and could be classified as a third possible view on the death penalty, distinct from retentionism and abolitionism. A naïve objection against this impossibilist view might counter that the death penalty is actually carried out in some countries so that it is not impossible but obviously possible. The impossibilist answer to this objection is that, based on a coherent sense of what it means for a punishment to be justified, that execution in such countries is not the death penalty but rather unjustified lethal physical violence .

I am not entirely certain whether the ‘impossibilist’ view would truly make sense in the light of the contemporary debates on the death penalty. These debates take place between two camps as I referred to above:

Retentionism (the death penalty should be retained): generally argued with reference to victims’ feelings and the deterrence effects expected by execution.

Abolitionism (the death penalty should be abolished): generally argued through appeals to the cruelty of execution, the possibility of misjudgements in the trial etc.

The grounds mentioned by both camps are, theoretically speaking, applicable to punishment in general in addition to the death penalty specifically. I will mention those two camps later again in a more detailed way in order to make a contrast between standard debates and my own view. However, my argument above for ‘impossibilism’, does suggest that there is an uncertainty specific to the death penalty as opposed to other types of punishment. I believe that this uncertainty must be considered when we discuss the death penalty, at least from a philosophical perspective. Otherwise we may lose sight of what we are attempting to achieve.

A related idea to the ‘impossibilism’ of the death penalty may emerge, if we accept the fact that the death penalty is mainly imposed on those convicted of homicide. This idea is related to the understanding of death proposed by Epicurus, who provides the following argument (Diogenes Laertius 1925, p. 650-1):

Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.

We can call this Epicurean view ‘the harmlessness theory of death’ (HTD). If we accept HTD, it follows, quite surprisingly, that there is no direct victim in the case of homicide insofar as we define ‘victim’ to be a person who suffers harm as a result of a crime. For according to HTD, people who have been killed and are now dead suffer nothing—neither benefits nor harms—because, as they do not exist, they cannot be victims. If this is true, there is no victim in the case of homicide, and it must be unreasonable to impose what is supposed to be the ultimate punishment 3 —that is, the death penalty—on those offenders who have killed others.

This argument might sound utterly absurd, particularly if it is extended beyond offenders and victims to people in general, as one merit of the death penalty seems to lie in reducing people’s fear of death by homicide. However, although this argument from HTD might sound bizarre and counterintuitive, we should accept it at the theoretical level, to the extent that we find HTD valid. 4 Clearly, this argument, which is based on the nonexistence of victims, could logically lead to another impossibilist argument concerning the death penalty.

There are many points to be more carefully examined regarding both types of ‘impossibilism’, which I will skip here. However, I must stop to ponder a natural reaction. My question above, ‘To whom do we justify?’, which introduced ‘impossibilism’, might sound eccentric, because, roughly speaking, theoretical arguments of justification are usually deployed in a generalised way and do not need to acknowledge who those arguments are directed at. Yet, I believe that this normal attitude towards justification is not always correct. Instead, our behaviour, when justifying something, focuses primarily on theoretically persuading those who are unwilling to accept the item being justified. If nobody refuses to accept it, then it is completely unnecessary to provide its justification. For instance, to use a common sense example, nobody doubts the existence of the earth. Therefore, nobody takes it to be necessary to justify the existence of the earth. Alternatively, a justification for keeping coal-fired power generation, the continued use of which is not universally accepted due to global warming, is deemed necessary. In other words, justification is not a procedure lacking a particular addressee, but an activity that addresses the particular person in a definite way, at least at first. In fact, it seems to me that the reason that current debates on the death penalty become deadlocked is that crucial distinctions are not appropriately made. I think that such a situation originates from not clearly asking to whom we are addressing our arguments, or whom we are discussing. As far as I know, there have been very few arguments within the death penalty debate that take into account the homicide victim, despite the victim’s unique status in the issue. This is one example where the debate can be accused of ignoring the ‘whom-question’, so I will clarify this issue by adopting a strategy in which this ‘whom-question’ is addressed.

3. Three chronological stages

Following my strategy, I will first introduce a distinction between three chronological stages in the death penalty. In order to make my argument as simple as possible, I will assume that the death penalty is imposed on those who have been convicted of homicide, although I acknowledge there are other crimes which could result in the death penalty. In that sense, the three stages of the death penalty correspond to the three distinct phases arising from homicide.

The first stage takes place at the time of killing; the fact that someone was killed must be highlighted. However, precisely what happened? If we accept the HTD, we should suppose that nothing harmful happened in the case of homicide. Although counterintuitive, let’s see where this argument leads. However, first, I will acknowledge that we cannot cover all contexts concerning the justification of the death penalty by discussing whether or not killing harms the killed victim. Even if we accept for argument’s sake that homicide does not harm the victim, that is only part of the issue. Other people, particularly the bereaved families of those killed, are seriously harmed by homicide. More generally, society as a whole is harmed, as the fear of homicide becomes more widespread in society.

Moreover, our basic premise, HTD, is controversial. Whether HTD is convincing remains an unanswered question. There is still a very real possibility that those who were killed do suffer harm in a straightforward sense, which conforms to most people’s strong intuition. In any event, we can call this first stage, the ‘Harm Stage’, because harm is what is most salient in this phase, either harm to the victims or others in society at large. If a justification for the death penalty is to take this Harm Stage seriously, the overwhelming focus must be on the direct victims themselves, who actually suffer the harm. This is the central core of the issue, as well as the starting point of all further problems.

The second stage appears after the killing. After a homicide, it is common to blame and to feel anger towards the perpetrator or perpetrators, and this can be described as a natural, moral, or emotional reaction. However, it is not proven that blaming or feeling angry is indeed natural, as it has not been proven that such feelings would arise irrespective of our cultural understanding of the social significance of killing. The phenomenon of blaming and the prevalence of anger when a homicide is committed could be a culture-laden phenomenon rather than a natural emotion. Nevertheless, many people actually do blame perpetrators or feel anger towards them for killing someone, and this is one of the basic ideas used to justify a system of ‘retributive justice’. The core of retributive justice is that punishment should be imposed on the offenders themselves (rather than other people, such as the offenders’ family). This retributive impulse seems to be the most fundamental basis of the system of punishment, even though we often also rely on some consequentialist justification favor punishment (e.g. preventing someone from repeating an offence). In addition, offenders are the recipients of blame or anger from society, which suggests that blaming or expressing anger has a crucial function in retributive justice. I will call this second phase the ‘Blame Stage’, which extends to the period of the execution. Actually, the act of blaming seems to delineate what needs to be resolved in this phase. Attempting to justify the death penalty by acknowledging this Blame Stage (or retributive justification) in terms of proportionality is the most common strategy. That is to say, lex talionis applies here—‘an eye for an eye’. This is the justification that not only considers people in general, including victims who blame perpetrators, but also attempts to persuade perpetrators that this is retribution resulting from their own harmful behaviours.

The final stage in the process concerning the death penalty appears after the execution; in this stage, what matters most is how beneficial the execution is to society. Any system in our society must be considered in the light of its cost-effectiveness. This extends even to cultural or artistic institutions, although at first glance they seem to be far from producing any practical effects. In this context, benefits are interpreted quite broadly; creating intellectual satisfaction, for example, is counted as a benefit. Clearly, this is a utilitarian standpoint. We can apply this view to the system of punishment, or the death penalty, if it is accepted. That is, the death penalty may be justified if its benefits to society are higher than its costs. What, then, are the costs, and what are the benefits? Obviously, we must consider basic expenses, such as the maintenance and labour costs of the institution keeping the prisoner on death row. However, in the case of the death penalty, there is a special cost to be considered, namely, the emotional reaction of people in society in response to killing humans, even when officially sanctioned as a punishment. Some feel that it is cruel to kill a person, regardless of the reason.

On the other hand, what is the expected benefit of the death penalty? The ‘deterrent effect’ is usually mentioned as a benefit that the death penalty can bring about in the future. In that case, what needs to be shown if we are to draw analogies with the previous two stages? When people try to justify the death penalty by mentioning its deterrent effect, they seem to be comparing a society without the death penalty to one with the death penalty. Then they argue that citizens in a society with the death penalty are at less risk of being killed or seriously victimised than those in a society without the death penalty. In other words, the death penalty could reduce the danger of being killed or seriously victimised in the future. Therefore, we could call this third phase the ‘Danger Stage’. In this stage, we focus on the danger that might affect people in the future, including future generations. This is a radically different circumstance from those of the previous two stages in that the Danger Stage targets people who have nothing to do with a particular homicide.

4. Analogy from natural disasters

The three chronological stages that I have presented in relation to the death penalty are found in other types of punishment as well. Initially, any punishment must stem from some level of harm (including harm to the law), and this is a sine qua non for the issue of punishment to arise. Blaming and its retributive reaction must follow that harm, and subsequently some social deterrent is expected to result. However, we should carefully distinguish between the death penalty and other forms of punishment. With other forms of punishment, direct victims undoubtedly exist, and those convicted of harming such victims are aware they are being punished. In addition, rehabilitating perpetrators in order for them to return to society—one aspect of the deterrent effect—can work in principle. However, this aspect of deterrence cannot apply to the death penalty because executed criminals cannot be aware of being punished by definition, and the notion of rehabilitation does not make sense by definition. Only this quite obvious observation can clarify that there is a crucial, intrinsic difference or distinction between the death penalty and other forms of punishment. Theories about the death penalty must seriously consider this difference; we cannot rely on theories that treat the death penalty on a par with other forms of punishment.

Moreover, the three chronological stages that have been introduced above are fundamentally different from each other. In reality, the subjects or people that we discuss and on whom we focus are different from stage to stage. In this respect, one of my points in this article is to underline the crucial need to discuss the issues of the death penalty by drawing a clear distinction between those stages. I am not claiming that only one of those stages is important. I am aware that each stage has its own significance; therefore, we should consider all three. However, we should be conscious of the distinctions when discussing the death penalty.

To make my point more understandable, I will suggest an analogy with natural disasters. Specifically, I will use as an analogy the biggest earthquake in Japan in the past millennium—the quake of 11 March 2011 (hereafter the 2011 quake). Of course, at first glance, earthquakes are substantially different from homicides. However, there is a close similarity between the 2011 quake and homicides, because although most of the harm that occurred was due to the earthquake and tsunami, in fact people were also harmed and killed during the 2011 quake at least partially due to human errors, such as the failure of the government’s policy on tsunamis and nuclear power plants. Thus, it is quite easy in the case of the 2011 quake to distinguish between three aspects, all of which are different from each other.

(1) We must recognise victims who were killed in the tsunami or suffered hardship at shelters. 5 This is the core as well as the starting point of all problems. What matters here is rescuing victims, and expressing our condolences.

(2) Then we will consider victims and people in general who hold the government and the nuclear power company responsible for political and technical mistakes. What usually matters here is the issue of responsibility and compensation.

(3) Finally, we can consider people’s interests in improving preventive measures taken to reduce damages by tsunami and nuclear-plant-related accidents in the future. What matters in this context is the reduction of danger in the future by learning from the 2011 quake.

Nobody will fail to notice that these three aspects are three completely different issues, which can be seen in exactly the same manner in the case of the death penalty. Aspects (1), (2), and (3) correspond respectively to the Harm Stage, the Blame Stage, and the Danger Stage. Undoubtedly, none of these three aspects should be ignored and they actually appear in a mutually intertwined manner: the more successful the preventive measures are, the fewer victims will be produced by tsunami and nuclear-plant accidents in the future. Those aspects affect each other. Likewise, we must consider each of the three stages regarding the death penalty.

5. Initial harm

The arguments thus far provide the basic standpoint that I want to propose concerning the debates on the death penalty. I want to investigate the issue of the death penalty by sharply distinguishing between these three stages and by simultaneously considering them all equally. By following this strategy, I will demonstrate that there are intrinsic uncertainties, and four problems resulting from those uncertainties, in the system of the death penalty. In so doing I will raise a novel objection to the contemporary debate over the death penalty.

Roughly speaking, as I have previously mentioned, the death penalty debate continues to involve the two opposing views of abolitionism and retentionism (or perhaps, in the case of abolitionist countries, revivalism). It seems that the main arguments to support or justify each of the two traditional views (which I have briefly described in section 2 above) have already been exhausted. What matters in this context is whether the death penalty can be justified, and then whether—if it is justifiable—it should be justified in terms of retributivism or utilitarianism. That is the standard way of the debate on the death penalty. For example, when the retributive standpoint is used to justify the death penalty, the notion of proportionality as an element of fairness or social justice might be relevant, apart from the issue of whether proportionality should be measured cardinally or ordinally (see von Hirsch 1993, pp. 6-19). In other words, if one person has killed another, then that person too ought to be killed—that is, executed—in order to achieve fairness. However, as other scholars such as Tonry (1994) have argued, it is rather problematic to apply the notion of proportionality to the practice of punishment because it seems that there is no objective measure of offence, culpability, or responsibility. Rather, the notion of parsimony 6 is often mentioned in these contexts as a more practical and fairer principle than the notion of proportionality.

However, according to my argument above, such debates are inadequate if they are simply applied to the case of the death penalty. Proportionality between which two things is being discussed? Most likely, what is considered here is the proportionality between harm by homicide (where the measured value of offence might be the maximum) and harm by execution. However, I want to reconfirm the essential point. What specifically is the harm of homicide? Whom are we talking about when we discuss the harm of homicide? As I previously argued, citing Epicurus and his HTD, there is a metaphysical doubt about whether we should regard death as harmful. If a person simply disappears when he or she dies and death is completely harmless as HTD claims, then it seems that the retributive justification for the death penalty in terms of proportionality must be nonsense, for nothing at all happens that should trigger the process of crime and punishment. Of course, following HTD, the execution should be similarly regarded as nonsensical. However, if that is the case, the entire institutional procedure, from the perpetrator’s arrest to his or her execution, must be considered a tremendous waste of time, labour, and money.

Some may think that these kinds of arguments are merely empty philosophical abstractions. That may be. However, it is not the case that there is nothing plausible to be considered in these arguments. Consider the issue of euthanasia. Why do people sometimes wish to be euthanised? It is because people can be relieved of a painful situation by dying. That is to say, people wishing to be euthanised take death to be painless, i.e. harmless, in the same manner as HTD. This idea embedded in the case of euthanasia is so understandable that the issue of euthanasia is one of the most popular topics in ethics; however, if so, Epicurus’s HTD should not be taken as nonsensical, for HTD holds in the same way as the idea embedded in the case of euthanasia that when we die, we have neither pain nor any other feeling. What I intend to highlight here is that we must be acutely aware that there is a fundamental problem concerning the notion of harm by homicide, if we want to be philosophically sincere and consistent 7 .

In other words, I assert that the contemporary debate over the death penalty tends to lack proper consideration for the Harm Stage in which victims themselves essentially matter, although that stage must be the very starting point of all issues. We must understand this pivotal role of the Harm Stage before intelligently discussing the death penalty. Of course, in practice, we can discuss the death penalty in a significant and refined manner without investigating the Harm Stage. For example, according to Goldman, one of the plausible positions regarding the justification for punishment in general is a position that combines both retributivism and utilitarianism. Mentioning John Rawls and H. L. A. Hart, Goldman writes (1995, p. 31):

Some philosophers have thought that objections to these two theories of punishment could be overcome by making both retributive and utilitarian criteria necessary for the justification of punishment. Utilitarian criteria could be used to justify the institution, and retributive to justify specific acts within it.

Goldman argues, however, that this mixed position could result in a paradox regarding how severe the punishment to be imposed on the guilty should be, even though this position avoids punishing the innocent (ibid., p.36):

While the mixed theory can avoid punishment of the innocent, it is doubtful that it can avoid excessive punishment of the guilty if it is to have sufficient effect to make the social cost worthwhile.

This argument is useful in providing a moral and legal warning to society not to punish offenders more severely than they deserve, even if that punishment is more effective in deterring future crimes. I frankly admit that Goldman’s suggestion goes to the essence of the concept of justice. However, I must also say that if his argument is applied to the death penalty, then it has not yet touched the fundamental question that forms the basis of the whole issue: whose harm should we discuss? Is it appropriate not to discuss the Harm Stage? Alternatively, I am raising the following question: who is the victim of homicide? At the very least, I think we should admit that this very question is the crucial one constituting the first problem on the death penalty, the Uncertainty of Harm.

6. Feeling of being victimised

Next, I will examine another kind of uncertainty that is specific to the Blame Stage; the idea of retribution matters here. As far as the Japanese context for the death penalty is concerned, according to statistical surveys of public opinion, people tend to strongly support the death penalty in the case of particularly violent homicides in which they are probably feeling particularly victimised. If the death penalty were abolished, it seems that the abolition would be extremely unfair to victims of homicide, as the rights of victims (i.e. rights of life, liberty, property, and so on) would be denied by being killed, whereas those of perpetrators would be excessively protected. Obviously, the notion of retributive proportionality or equilibrium is the basis for this argument. To put it another way, this logic of retribution aims at justifying the death penalty in terms of its achieving equilibrium between the violated rights of victims and the deprived rights of perpetrators in the name of punishment. Is this logic perfectly acceptable? Emotionally speaking, I want to say yes. We Japanese might even say that perpetrators should gallantly and bravely kill themselves to take responsibility for their actions, as we have a history of the samurai who were expected to conduct hara-kiri when they did something shameful. However, theoretically speaking, we cannot accept this logic immediately, because there are too many doubtful points. Those doubts as a whole constitute the second problem concerning the death penalty.

First, we must ask, as well as in the previous section, on the issue of feeling victimised, whom are we discussing? Whose feelings and whose rights matter? Direct victims in the case of homicide do not exist by definition. Then a question arises: why can substitutes (prosecutors and others) or the bereaved family ask for the death penalty based on their feelings rather than the direct victim’s feeling? How are they qualified to ask for such a stringent punishment when they were not the ones killed? The crucial point to be noted here is that the bereaved family is not identical with the direct victim. Second, even if it is admitted that the notion of the victim’s emotional harm are relevant to sentencing (and at least in the sense of emotional harm the bereaved family’s suffering I would agree that this makes them certainly the principal victims even if not the direct victim), it must be asked: can we justify an institution based on a feeling? This question is a part of the traditional debate concerning the moral sense theory. We have repeatedly asked whether social institutions can be based on moral sense or human feeling, when such sense or feeling cannot help but be arbitrary because those, after all, are subjective. The question is still unanswered. Third, if the feelings of being victimised justify the death penalty, then could an accidental killing or involuntary manslaughter be included in crimes that deserve the death penalty? Actually, the feelings of the bereaved family in the case of accidental killing could be qualitatively the same as in the case of voluntary homicide. However, even countries which adopt the death penalty do not usually prescribe that execution is warranted for accidental killing. Fourth, I wonder whether the bereaved family who feel victimised always desire the execution of the killer. It could be that they consider resuming their daily lives more important than advocating the execution of the murderer who killed their family member. As a matter of practical fact, executions of perpetrators need have nothing to do with supporting bereaved families. Fifth, if we accept the logic in which the death penalty is justified by the bereaved family’s feeling of being victimised, how should we deal with cases where the person who was killed was alone in the world, with no family? If there is no bereaved family, then no one feels victimised. Is the death penalty unwarranted in this case? In any case, as these questions suggest, we should be aware that retributive justification based upon the feeling of being victimised is not as acceptable as we initially expected. Once again, there is uncertainty here. Uncertainty of blame leads to the second problem concerning the death penalty.

7. Violation and forfeiture

Of course, the retributive justification for the death penalty does not have to depend upon the feeling of being victimised alone, even if the primitive basis for it might lie in human emotion. The theoretical terminology of human rights themselves (rather than emotional feeling based on the notion of rights) could be used as justification: if a person violates another’s rights (to property, freedom, a healthy life, etc.), then that person must forfeit his or her own rights in proportion to the violated rights. This can be regarded as a formulation of the system of punishment established in the modern era that is theoretically based upon the social contract theory. The next remark of Goldman confirms this point (1995, p.33):

If we are asked which rights are forfeited in violating the rights of others, it is plausible to answer just those rights that one violates (or an equivalent set). One continues to enjoy rights only as long as one respects those rights in others: violation constitutes forfeiture . . . Since deprivation of those particular rights violated is often impracticable, we are justified in depriving a wrongdoer of some equivalent set, or in inflicting harm equivalent to that which would be suffered in losing those same rights.

However, the situation is not so simple, particularly in connection with the death penalty. In order to clarify this point, we have to reflect, albeit briefly, on how the concept of human rights has been historically established. I will trace the origin of the concept of human rights by referring to Fagan’s overall explanation. According to Fagan (2016, Section 2):

Human rights rest upon moral universalism and the belief in the existence of a truly universal moral community comprising all human beings . . . The origins of moral universalism within Europe are typically associated with the writings of Aristotle and the Stoics.

Followed by the remark:

Aristotle unambiguously expounds an argument in support of the existence of a natural moral order. This natural order ought to provide the basis for all truly rational systems of justice . . . The Stoics thereby posited the existence of a universal moral community effected through our shared relationship with god. The belief in the existence of a universal moral community was maintained in Europe by Christianity over the ensuing centuries.

This classical idea was linked during the 17th and 18th centuries to the concept of ‘natural law’ including the notion of ‘natural rights’ that each human being possesses independently of society or policy. ‘The quintessential exponent of this position was John Locke . . . Locke argued that natural rights flowed from natural law. Natural law originated from God’ (ibid.). Fagan continues (ibid.):

Analyses of the historical predecessors of the contemporary theory of human rights typically accord a high degree of importance to Locke’s contribution. Certainly, Locke provided the precedent of establishing legitimate political authority upon a rights foundation. This is an undeniably essential component of human rights.

Although, of course, we should take post-Lockean improvement including Kantian ideas into account to fully understand contemporary concepts of human rights, we cannot deny that Locke’s philosophy ought to be considered first.

As is well known, Locke’s argument focuses on property rights. He put forth the idea that property rights were based on our labour. Thus, his theory is called ‘the labour theory of property rights’. Let me quote the famous passage I have in mind (Locke 1960, Second Treatise, Section 27):

Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Works of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.

This idea could cover any kind of human rights such as those for living a healthy life, liberty, and property, because human rights are supposed to be owned by us. For example, H. L.A. Hart once argued that legal rights are nothing but legal powers to require others to meet correlative obligations, and then pointed out that; ‘we also speak of the person who has the correlative right as possessing it or even owning it’ (Hart 1982, p.185). If this is the case, we can make property rights representative of all human rights.

However, if we follow Locke’s theory (and many countries, including Japan, still do), then it logically follows that what we cannot gain by our labour by definition cannot be objects of human rights. How does Locke’s idea apply to our life itself (rather than simply living a healthy life)? Are we able to acquire our life itself by our labour? No, we cannot. We can realise a healthy life by making an effort to be moderate, but we cannot create our lives. We are creatures or animals; therefore, our lives are not something that we ourselves made by our labour. Locke uses the concept of power (as Hart does) when he discusses various aspects of property rights. Among those, we should pay particular attention to the following (Locke 1960, Second Treatise, Section 23):

For a Man, not having the Power of his own life, cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases.

Locke also wri tes (1960, Section 24):

No Man can, by agreement, pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a Power over his own life.

Obviously, Locke assumes that we have no property rights over our own lives or bodies themselves, or more precisely, no property rights in controlling and destroying our own lives as a whole; therefore, we cannot alienate those rights to others. We cannot alienate or forfeit what we do not have. If this is the case and we presuppose the formulation of the system of punishment introduced above in terms of violation and forfeiture, what would result? The answer is clear. Our lives themselves are conceptually beyond the terminology of human rights, and thus, if the death penalty is defined as a punishment requiring the forfeiture of the perpetrator’s right to life, the death penalty should be regarded as conceptually contradictory or impossible. We cannot lose tails, as we do not have tails. Likewise, we cannot own our lives (i.e. we have no property rights in our life itself), so we cannot lose our lives, at least in such a sense as forfeiture of human rights. This is the third route to an ‘impossibilist’ view of the death penalty. This argument depends heavily on Locke’s original theory. Nevertheless, as long as we have to consider Locke’s classical view seriously in order to discuss the relation between punishment and human rights, we must be aware that we could be involved in theoretical uncertainty in justifying the death penalty through the notion of human rights in a retributivist flavour, as the argument thus far suggests. This is the very puzzle that I want to propose as the third problem concerning the death penalty debates.

Moreover, we must acknowledge that retributive ideas in the Blame Stage usually include a kind of evaluation of the psychological state of the agent’s behaviour at the time of the crime as a matter of legal fact. In other words, rationality, freedom, or mens rea are usually needed for agents to be judged guilty. However, from a strictly philosophical perspective, we should say that it is far from easy in principle to confirm those states in the past. Indeed, this psychological trend seems to cause controversy in court proceedings, as seen, for example, in the American context known as ‘battered-woman syndrome’. If a woman who has been routinely battered by her partner suddenly fights back and kills her partner, American courts often find her not guilty. People wonder whether such an evaluation concerning battered women could be correctly made without arbitrariness. Additionally, philosophical debates on free will and the development of the brain sciences must be considered. Some philosophers assert that we have no free will because our personality and actions are intrinsically governed by external factors, such as our environments or biological conditions, which are definitely beyond our control. This philosophical standpoint is often called ‘hard incompatibilism’ (see Strawson 2008). In this respect, my analogy to a natural disaster could be seen as appropriate, as our actions might be taken to be just natural phenomena at the end of the day. 8 Furthermore, brain sciences often provide shocking data to suggest that our will may be controlled by brain phenomena occurring prior to our consciousness, as shown by Benjamin Libet. In view of such contemporary arguments, we have little choice but to say that we cannot be perfectly certain whether a given perpetrator who committed homicide is truly guilty, as long as we adopt the present standard for judging the psychological states of offenders in court. To sum up, the third problem for the death penalty is the difficulty in knowing whether someone has property in their life itself as well as uncertainty about the mental state of the accused, this is the Uncertainty of Rights Violation.

8. The deterrent effect

Finally, I will examine some problems in the Danger Stage. What matters in this context is the utilitarian justification for the death penalty; I will focus on what is called the ‘deterrent effect’. Firstly, I would like to say that the death penalty undoubtedly has some deterrent effect. This is obvious if we imagine a society where violators of any laws, including minor infractions such as a parking ticket or public urination, must be sentenced to death. I believe that the number of all crimes would dramatically reduce in that society, although it would constitute a horrible dystopia. The argument for the deterrent effect of the death penalty probably arises from the same line of ‘common sense’ thinking. For example, Pojman says, ‘there is some non-statistical evidence based on common sense that gives credence to the hypothesis that the threat of the death penalty deters and that it does so better than long prison sentences’ (Pojman 1998, pp. 38-39). Specifically, this deterrent effect presupposes the utility calculus that a human being conducts, whether consciously or unconsciously, in terms of ‘weighing the subjective severity of perceived censure and the subjective probability of perceived censure against the magnitude of the desire to commit the offence and the subjective probability of fulfilling this desire by offending’ (Beyleveld 1979, p. 219). Therefore, if we presuppose the basic similarity of human conditions, it may be plausible to state the following about the deterrent effect of punishment: ‘this can be known a priori on the basis of an analysis of human action’ (ibid., p. 215). However, in fact, the death penalty in many countries is restricted to especially heinous crimes, such as consecutive homicides (although some countries apply the death penalty to a wider range of crimes), which suggests that we must conduct empirical studies, case by case, if we want to confirm the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Therefore, the question to be asked regarding the deterrent effect is not whether the death penalty is actually effective, but rather how effective it is in restricted categories of crimes. What matters is the degree.

There are many statistical surveys concerning this issue. In particular, an economic investigation by Ehrlich is often mentioned as a typical example. After examining detailed statistical data and taking into account various factors, such as race, heredity, education, and cultural patterns, Ehrlich suggest s (1975, p. 414):

An additional execution per year over the period in question [i.e., 1935-1969] may have resulted, on average, in 7 or 8 fewer murders.

Of course, this estimate includes too many factors and presumptions to be perfectly correct. Ehrlich himself is aware of this and thus says (ibid.):

It should be emphasized that the expected tradeoffs computed in the preceding illustration mainly serve a methodological purpose since their validity is conditional upon that of the entire set of assumptions underlying the econometric investigation … however … the tradeoffs between executions and murders implied by these elasticities are not negligible, especially when evaluated at relatively low levels of executions and relatively high level[s] of murder.

Ehrlich’s study drew considerable criticism, most of which pointed out deficiencies in his statistical methodology. Therefore, at this moment, we should say that we are able to infer nothing definite from Ehrlich’s study, although we must value the study as pioneering work.

Van den Haag proposes an interesting argument based upon uncertainty specific to the deterrent effect of the death penalty. He assumes two cases, namely, case (1), in which the death penalty exists, and case (2), in which the death penalty does not exist. In each case there is risk or uncertainty. On the one hand, in case (1), if there is no deterrent effect, the life of a murderer is lost in vain, whereas if there is a deterrent effect, the lives of some murderers and innocent victims will be saved in the future. On the other hand, in case (2), if there is no deterrent effect, the life of a convicted murderer is saved, whereas if there is a deterrent effect, the lives of some innocent victims will be lost in the future (Van den Haag 1995, pp. 133-134). Conway and Pojman explain this argument using the following table, ‘The Best Bet Argument’, which I have modified slightly, having DP stand for the death penalty, and DE the deterrent effect:

save: murderers and innocent

victims in the future

lose: convicted murderer

save: nothing affected

lose: convicted murderer

save: convicted murderer

lose: innocent victims in the

future

save: convicted murderer

lose: nothing affected

Following this table, Conway assumes (after Van den Haag’s suggestion that the life of a convicted murderer is not valued more highly than that of the unknown victims) numerical values about each case (each numerical number stands for not a number of people but a hypothetical value for a person to be saved or killed) :

a murderer saved +5

a murderer executed -5

an innocent saved +10

an innocent murdered -10

Moreover, he assumes that for each execution, only two innocent lives are spared (i.e. he assumes the deterrent effect to be almost the minimum). Then, consequently, executing convicted murderers turns out to be a good bet (Conway 1995, pp. 265-266; Pojman 1998, pp. 40-41).

9. Negative causation and where to give priority

Van den Haag’s ‘Best Bet Argument’ sounds quite interesting. However, Conway has already proposed a fundamental challenge to this argument: it mistakenly regards the actual death of convicted murderers as being on a par with the possible death of innocent victims in the future (Conway 1995, pp. 269-270). This is confusing or possibly a rhetorical sleight of hand. I think that Conway’s reaction to Van den Haag’s argument is a reasonable one.

As I approach my conclusion, I will propose two problems with Van den Haag’s argument. First, I want to acknowledge that any arguments, including Van den Haag’s, supporting the death penalty in terms of its deterrent effect seem to presuppose a causal relationship between the existence of the death penalty and people not killing others. For example, Pojman writes, ‘the repeated announcement and regular exercise of capital punishment may have deep causal influence’ (1998, p. 48). However, epistemologically speaking, that presupposition is extremely hard to confirm, because the effect of this causal relationship is not a positive, but rather a negative event, which is the event of not killing others. This has something to do with the philosophical problem of how to understand negative properties. By negative properties we mean that, for example, my room is not full of seawater; my room does not consist of paper; my room is not melting us, etc. Such descriptions by negative properties can be made almost endlessly. In other words, one identical event described by a positive property (e.g., this room is well lit) can be re-described in infinite ways in terms of negative properties. Take the example that I am now at my computer in Tokyo, writing a paper. This event can also be described as ‘I am not eating’, ‘I am not sleeping’, ‘I am not killing others’ (!), etc. The positive event, ‘I am writing a paper now’, can be understood through a causal relationship. The event was most likely caused by my intention to do so, which was caused by my sense of duty as a professor, etc. How, then, could we understand the negative description of my action, ‘I am not killing others’? Was this caused by the existence of the death penalty in Japan?

Perhaps I was completely unaware of the existence of the death penalty in Japan when I wrote a paper without killing others. Could the death penalty be its cause? Could the negative event ‘I am not killing others’ be an effect of the death penalty? It is hard to say so.

This problem is the same as the problem of ‘causation by absence’ or ‘omission-involving causation’. Generally, causation by absence is usually examined in the form of answering a question about whether nothingness can cause something. For example, David Lewis discusses a question about how a void (understood as being entirely empty or nothing at all, differing from a vacuum) is regarded as a cause of something (Lewis 2004). He says, ‘If you were cast into a void, it would cause you to die in just a few minutes. It would suck the air from your lungs. It would boil your blood. It would drain the warmth from your body. And it would inflate enclosures in your body until they burst’ (ibid., p.277). However, the problem is that the void is nothing. ‘When the void sucks away the air, it does not exert an attractive force on the air’ (ibid.). Furthermore, another, perhaps harder problem would arise. We can say, ‘If I defended you from being cast into a void, you would not die’. Namely, my omission to defend you would cause you to die. However, should only my omission matter? What of your brother’s omission to defend you? Or the Prime Minister of the UK’s omission to defend you? Are not all of those qualified to be the cause of your death, as least as long as we adopt a common-sense counterfactual analysis of causation? As this argument suggests, in the context of the current debate on this problem, the most troublesome phase is that ‘too many’ absences can be supposed to cause a particular effect. I quote Menzies, who says (2004, p.145):

I am writing this essay at my computer. If, however, there were nerve gas in the air, or I were attacked with flamethrowers, or struck by a meteor shower, I would not be writing the essay. But it is counterintuitive to say that the absence of nerve gas, flamethrower attack, and meteor strike are causes of my writing the essay.

This example takes the issue of absence as a cause, but simultaneously his example refers to the case of effect as absence (not writing the essay). As this shows, the current debate on the problem of causation by absence could extend to the case of effect as absence. In any case, what matters is a possibility that ‘too many’ absences can cause something, and something can cause ‘too many’ absences (Menzies calls this problem ‘the problem of profligate causation’ (ibid., pp.142-145). Then the deterrent effect of the death penalty is definitely classified as a case of absence as effect rather than cause. In other words, the absence of homicide (as effect) matters, whereas in this case execution (as cause) is presupposed to exist. It seems that the current debate on causation by absence is highly likely to contribute to discussing the problem of the deterrent effect.

Of course, someone may counter my argument by saying that what matters in this context is a statistical correlation between the number of executions and the number of homicides, which could be confirmed in an empirical way. I admit that the statistical correlation plays a crucial role here, even though we must simultaneously acknowledge that what is called ‘randomized controlled trial’, the most reliable, statistical methodology to confirm causal relations, is unfeasible due to the nature of the problem. Actually, this kind of correlation is too rough to predict the causal relationship between those, although the causation really matters. Causes of a reduction or increase in the number of homicides can be interpreted or estimated in various ways, considering confounding factors, such as education, economic situation, urban planning, and so on. Therefore, in principle, there always remains the possibility that the apparent correlation between the death penalty and the reduction of homicides is merely accidental. For example, there may be another, common cause, that brings about both people’s tendency to support the death penalty and the reduction of homicides 9 . We should recognise that there is intrinsic uncertainty here. These difficulties concerning causal relations give rise to a fourth problem related to the death penalty debates – the Uncertainty of Causal Consequences.

Incidentally, let me now return to my distinction of the three stages regarding the death penalty. Obviously, the issue of the deterrent effect belongs primarily to the Danger Stage. Yet it is vital to consider the Harm Stage. How can the deterrent effect affect the Harm Stage? I must say that the retentionist’s argument, in terms of the deterrent effect of the death penalty, completely dismisses this essential point. We need only recall the analogy of the 2011 quake in Japan. ‘Retentionism’ based upon the deterrent effect corresponds to aspect (3), where the improvement of the preventive system matters. This is important, of course, but cannot be a priority. Priority lies in the issues of how to deal with the actual harm that the victims have already suffered (specifically referring to the bereaved family or others in the case of homicide and the death penalty). Without consideration of how to cope with the harm, even if the theory seriously considers the innocent victims in the future, the retentionists’ theory can hardly be persuasive.

It is true that the retentionists’ theory based on the deterrent effect appropriately considers the person harmed in the process of punishment. For example, Walker considers such a phase in the process of punishment as one of the possible objections against retentionism based on the deterrent effect by saying: ‘if the benefit excludes the person harmed this too is nowadays regarded by many people as morally unacceptable’ (Walker 1980, p. 65). However, as the context clearly shows, by ‘the person harmed’ he means the person punished. He does not mention the initial harm suffered by victims. This problem is concerned with my previous claim; that is, we have to consider the ‘whom-question’ when we discuss the justification of punishment. Whom are we discussing? Whose benefit do we consider? In the face of victims before our eyes, can we emphasise only the improvement of preventive systems for the future? Evidently, actual victims are the first to be helped, although obviously it is not at all bad to simultaneously consider the preventive system in the future. It is necessary for us to respect basic human rights and the human dignity of perpetrators and innocent people in the future; however, that respect must be in conjunction with our first taking care of actual victims. We ought not to get our priorities wrong.

10. Prospects

I have indicated that the debates on the death penalty are inevitably surrounded by four problems over specific kinds of uncertainties: uncertainty concerning the victim of homicide, uncertainty in justifying the death penalty from the feeling of being victimised, uncertainty in justifying the death penalty on the basis of human rights, and uncertainty over negative causation. In the course of examining these problems, I have proposed the option of developing an ‘impossibilist’ position about the death penalty, which I am convinced, deserves further investigation. However, being surrounded by theoretical problems and uncertainties might be more or less true of any social institution. My aim is only to suggest how the death penalty should be understood as involving uncertainties from a philosophical perspective. Most likely, if there is something practical that I can suggest based on my argument, then what we might call a ‘Harm-Centred System’ may be introduced as a relatively promising option instead of, or in tandem with, the death penalty. What I mean by this is a system in which we establish as a priority redressing actual harm with regard to legal justice, where ‘actual harm’ only implies what the bereaved family suffer from, as the direct victims have already disappeared in the case of homicide. In other words, I think that something akin to the maximalist approach to restorative justice 10 or some hybrid of the traditional justice system and the restorative justice system should be seriously considered, although we cannot expect perfect solutions exempt from all of the above four problems. It is certainly worth considering whether some element of restorative justice can play a significant role in the best theory of punishment.

In any case, my argument is at most a philosophical attempt to address problems. How to apply it to the practice of the legal system is a question to be tackled in a future project.

Bazemore, G. and Walgrave, L. 1999 (1). ‘Introduction: Restorative Justice and the International Juvenile Justice Crisis’. In Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime , eds. G. Bazemore and L. Walgrave, Criminal Justice Press, 1-13.

———. 1999 (2). ‘Restorative Juvenile Justice: In Search of Fundamentals and an Outline for System Reform’. In Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime , eds. G. Bazemore and L. Walgrave, Criminal Justice Press, 45-74.

Beyleveld, D. 1979. ‘Identifying, Explaining and Predicting Deterrence’. British Journal of Criminology 19:3, 205–224.

Calvert, B. 1993. ‘Locke on Punishment and the Death Penalty’. Philosophy 68:264,, 211–229.

Collins, J., N. Hall, and L. A. Paul. 2004. Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press.

Conway, D. A. 1995 (originally 1974). ‘Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Considerations in Dialogue Form’. In Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader , eds. J. Simmons, M. Cohen, J. Cohen, and C. R. Beitz. Princeton University Press, 261–273.

Diogenes Laertius. 1925. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vol. 2. Trans. R. D. Hicks. Loeb Classical Library. William Heinemann Ltd.

Ehrlich, I. 1975. ‘The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death’. American Economic Review 65:3, 397–417.

Fagan, A. 2016. ‘Human Rights’. In Chase B. Wrenn, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002. Available from http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/#H2 [Accessed 12 June 2017]

Fischer, J. M., ed. 1993. The Metaphysics of Death . Stanford University Press.

Goldman, A. H. 1995 (originally 1979). ‘The Paradox of Punishment’. In Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader , eds. J. Simmons, M. Cohen, J. Cohen, and C. R. Beitz. Princeton University Press, 30–46.

Hart, H. L. A. 1982. Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory . Oxford University Press.

Ichinose, M. 2013. ‘Hybrid Nature of Causation’. In T. Uehiro, Ethics for the Future of Life: Proceedings of the 2012 Uehiro-Carnegie-Oxford Ethics Conference , the Oxford Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, 60-80.

———. 2016. ‘A Philosophical Inquiry into the Confusion over the Radiation Exposure Problem’. Journal of Disaster Research 11: No.sp, 770-779.

Lewis, D. 2004. ‘Void and Object’. In J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul, Causation and Counterfactuals . MIT Press, 277–290.

Locke, J. 1960. Two Treatises of Government , ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge University Press.

———. 1975. An Essay concerning Human Understanding , ed. P. H. Nidditch. Oxford University Press.

Menzies, P. 2004. ‘Difference-Making in Context’. In J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. A. Paul, Causation and Counterfactuals . MIT Press, 139–180.

Pojman, L. P., and J. Reiman. 1998. The Death Penalty: For and Against. Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Scanlon, T. M. 1982. ‘Contractualism and utilitarianism’. In A. Sen and B. Williams, Utilitarianism and Beyond . Cambridge University Press, 103-128.,

Simmons, A. J. 1994. ‘Locke on the Death Penalty’. Philosophy 69:270, 471–477.

Strawson, G. 2008. ‘The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility’. In Real Materialism. Oxford University Press, 319–331.

Tonry, M. 1994. ‘Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of Punishments’. In A Reader on Punishment , eds. A. Duff and D. Garland. Oxford University Press, 133–160.

Van den Faag, E. 1995 (originally 1969). ‘On Deterrence and the Death Penalty’. In Punishment and the Death Penalty: The Current Debate , eds. R. M. Baird and S. E. Rosenbaum. Prometheus Books.

Von Hirsch, A. 1993. Censure and Sanctions. Oxford University Press.

Walen, A, 2015. ‘Retributive Justice’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/justice-retributive/ [Accessed 12 June 2017]

Walker, N. 1980. Punishment, Danger and Stigma: The Morality of Criminal Justice . Barnes & Noble Books.

1. Strangely, few Locke scholars have seriously tried to understand the Lockean meaning of punishment, which is developed in his Second Treatise ,(Locke 1960), in the light of his theory of personal identity based upon ‘consciousness’, which is discussed in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding . Taking into account the fact that ‘person’ appears as the key word in both works of Locke, we must bridge the gap between his two works by rethinking the universal significance of ‘person’ in his arguments. There were, however, some controversies concerning how Locke evaluates the death penalty. See Calvert (1993) and Simmons (1994).

2. There is an additional question about whether justification is needed after the execution when the convict is no longer around, in addition to ‘before’ and ‘during’. According to my understanding of justification, the process of justification must begin with making each person concerned understand what there is no reason to reject, but that is just a starting, necessary point. Justification must go beyond the initial phase to acquiring general consent from society. In this sense, justification seems to be needed even ‘after’ the execution. Actually, if there is no need for justification after the execution, that sounds less like punishment based on a system of justice than merely physical disposal.

3. Is it true that the death penalty is the ultimate punishment? Can we not suppose that the death penalty is less harmful than a life sentence or very lengthy incarceration? However, this view regarding the death penalty as less harmful than a lifelong sentence could lead to a paradox. If this order of severity as punishment is valid, it may be possible to reduce the lifelong sentence (due to an amnesty, some consideration on the prisoner’s rehabilitation, or something like that) to the death penalty. If this is the case, prisoners given the lifelong sentence will not make an effort at all to rehabilitate themselves, due to fear of the sentence being reduced to the death penalty. In addition, if a person is likely to be sentenced to death, the person might try to commit a more heinous crime, perhaps even in the court in order to be given a more severe sentence, i.e. a life sentence in prison. That is a paradox drawn from human nature.

4. On the current debates on ‘HTD’ of Epicurus, see Fischer (1993). Of course, there are lots of objections against the Epicurean view. The most typical objection is that death deprives people of their chance to enjoy life, and therefore death is harmful. However, it seems to me that “whom-question” must be raised again here. To whom is the deprivation of this chance harmful? In any case, the metaphysics of death is a popular topic in contemporary philosophy, which should involve not only metaphysical issues but also ethical and epistemological problems.

5. In fact, the hardships suffered by those forced to flee to shelters constituted the main problem resulting from the nuclear power plants accident. In general, radiation exposure is the most well-known problemarising from nuclear power plant accidents, but it is not always the case. In particular in the case of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan, the overestimation of the danger of radiation exposure, and evacuation activities resulting from that overestimation, caused the biggest and the most serious problems including many of the deaths. We always have to take the risk-tradeoff into account. Radiation exposure is just one risk, and is not the only risk to be considered. See Ichinose (2016).

6. The notion of parsimony was newly offered to avoid a fundamental drawback of the standard retributive system, whether based on cardinal or ordinal proportionality: the standard system tends to inflict excessive, cruel punishment, as its criterion of measuring wrongness is not exempt from being arbitrary. In contrast, the newly offered system could hold inflicted punishment ‘as minimally as possible, consistent with the vague limits of cardinal desert’ (Walen 2015) in terms of introducing an idea of parsimony. The notion of parsimony could make the retributive system of punishment more reasonable and humane while retaining the idea of retribution.

7. Roger Crisp kindly pointed out that it is worth considering an institutional justification according to which punishment wouldn’t have to be tailored to a particular case. In this view, it is sufficient that death is generally bad for both victims and perpetrators. I do not deny the practical persuasiveness of this view. However, from a more philosophical point of view, we should propose a question ‘how can we know that death is generally bad for victims of homicide?’ Following HTD, which is certainly one possible philosophical view, death is not bad at all, regardless of whether we talk about general issues or particular cases, as an agent to whom something is bad or not disappears by dying by definition. Of course, as long as we exclusively focus upon harm which the bereaved family or the society in general suffer, the institutional justification could make good sense, although in that case the issue of direct victims killed would remain untouched.

8. Additionally, my analogy with natural disasters, particularly the case of the 2011 quake, could be re-confirmed to be appropriate in the sense of presenting a similar kind of uncertainty to the case of the death penalty. The danger of constant exposure to low doses of radiation for long periods involves some uncertainty, as far as we now know. Fortunately, however, the dose of radiation to which the people of Fukushima were exposed as a result of the 2011 quake, internally and externally, was low enough for us to be certain, based upon past epidemiological research, that no health problems will arise in the future. Regarding radiation exposure, everything depends upon the level of dose. The smaller the dose, the less dangerous it is.

9. On negative causation and the possibility of common cause, see Ichinose (2013). In particular, my argument on negative causation concerning the death penalty rests on my argument of Ichinose (2013).

10. According to Bazemore and Walgrave, ‘restorative justice is every action that is primarily oriented towards doing justice by repairing the harm that has been caused by a crime (Bazemore and Walgrave 1999 (2), p.48). Restorative justice, that is to say, is a justice system that mainly aims at restoring or repairing the harm of offences rather than punishing offenders as the retributive justice system does. Initially, restorative justice has been carried out by holding ‘a face-to-face meeting between the parties with a stake in the particular offense’ (ibid.) like victim, offenders, or victimised communities. However, this type of justice system works only in a complementary way to the traditional system of retributive justice. Then, the maximalist approach to restorative justice was proposed, which seeks to develop ‘restorative justice as a fully-fledged alternative’(Bazemore and Walgrave 1999 (1). Introduction. P.8) to retributive justice. This approach ‘will need to include the use of coercion and a formalization of both procedures and the relationship between communities and society’ (ibid., p.9.)

Death Penalty and Ethics Research Paper

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Introduction

Death penalty and ethics, arguments in support of death penalty, arguments against death penalty, my own opinion, reference list.

Philosophy is a very wide discipline with numerous branches and sub disciplines. Some of the sub disciplines include epistemology, which is the study of knowledge for instance its nature, sources and limitation, ethics on the other hand studies morality for instance what is right or wrong or good or evil. Religion is also an essential aspect of philosophy and entails the beliefs that involve the cause, nature and purpose of the universe.

It relates humanity to truths and values. Death penalty can fall well under the ethics and religion branches of philosophy. It is a practice that has been present in many countries around the world although most of them only retain it but do not exercise it. This paper discusses death penalty in relation to ethics emphasizing on what is considered right or wrong based on the arguments supporting and those against it. My own point of view will also be highlighted.

Death penalty is also referred to as capital punishment. It is usually the sternest form of corporal punishment since it entails taking away the lives of the convicted offenders by the law enforcement officers.

It entails the compulsory execution of a criminal offender as a form of punishment for committing crimes that are considered to be serious by the law for instance murder and treason although in some instances, it could include adultery, rape and some form of fraud. It is an act that can only be ordered by the state. There are numerous arguments put forth both for and against the aspect of death penalty.

The issue of whether or not it is right to undertake capital punishment and the circumstances that should necessitate death penalty has brought about a lot of controversy and debates among various people, the ethical aspect being realized in deciding the moral behind capital punishment especially considering the right to deprive a human being of his or her life.

This is the basic dispute over death penalty. The morality behind death penalty is undermined by different views that are brought forward by different theories or schools of thought in the ethical disciplines.

For example, the aspect of killing is considered either right or wrong depending on the circumstances although in the overall view, killing is evil and unethical. Killing for defense purposes and for the overall good of the society for instance to avoid more harm to the innocent citizens is in most cases justified but malicious killing considered wrong (Cohen and Wellman, 2005).

There are various factors attributed to general punishment for offenders for example deterrent and defense where the punishment is aimed at preventing the offenders from engaging in crime in the future, retribution where the punishment is considered as what the criminal offenders deserve and restoration where the punishment is aimed at restoring a good relationship between the offenders, the victims and the society at large.

The individuals and groups who support capital punishment mainly base their argument on retribution and deterrent and defense at the expense of ignoring restoration since it is not practical once execution is carried out. There are arguments that have been put forth in support for capital punishment. The issue, however, varies from country to country depending on the political grounds or foundation.

In the United States for example, a majority of people, adults, seem to support capital punishment although most of the youths and non governmental institutions are strongly not for it. The law is retained in most of the American states. However, the issue has gained a lot of support in some countries for example Taiwan and there seems to be very little campaign against its perpetration (White, 2011).

Some of the general arguments that are common among the supporters of death penalty include the following. The criminal offenders who have perpetrated criminal activities especially murder have violated the victim’s right to life and, therefore, they should also not be left to enjoy life but rather they should also be killed. This falls under the retribution principle.

This is, however, not ethical as two wrongs do not make a right and killing the criminal offender also entails depriving them of their life which is morally wrong. Another argument that supports capital punishment is that death penalty is a way of showing respect to the victims and the rest of the society.

This is because it is deemed to enhance the healing process of the victim and also it is viewed as a source of peace of mind for the victims and their relations. The belief and perception that there should be justice is also a basis for the support of capital punishment as people believe that equal justice should be maintained hence life should cost another life thus death for death.

The practice of death penalty is also taken as a step towards preventing other innocent individuals that could fall victims in future if other alternative punishments are given to the offenders since they would at one time be integrated with the society.

It is viewed as the most effective and appropriate way of ensuring the society is safe from further criminal acts of the particular offender. The supporters also argue that death penalty is also somehow advantageous to the criminal offenders as it is not as cruel as other sentences that are usually prolonged hence making them suffer for long periods of time.

The fact that it is present in law is also a strong view point for the supporters. Housing a prisoner for his entire life is also considered uneconomical as compared to an execution of the criminal offenders. The supporters also argue that some killing is justified in some instances for example when it is conducted for self defense. This is because some difference is usually attached in the circumstances that led to the killing.

When the killing is in defense, the person killed is not innocent as is the case when the murder is perpetrated by a criminal on an innocent individual. The supporters also argue that the killing of criminal offenders is like killing in self defense since the murderer is not innocent hence justifying capital punishment (Banks, 2004).

There are various factors that the people and groups that oppose the issue of capital punishment base their arguments on. Most nations are against the practice of death penalty, for instance, in western Europe, capital punishment is viewed as old fashioned and an act of the past and hence it receives very little public support in regard to its reinstatement. The general arguments against the perpetration of death penalty include the following.

The major argument is that capital punishment entails depriving an individual’s right to life as it involves killing which has never been right as it entails violation of the human right to live. The suffering and pain the criminal offenders face in the event of being sentenced to capital punishment is also too much and considered wrong and unethical as it constitutes a lot of physical and more so emotional anguish which is not right irrespective of what the offenders have committed.

The irregularities and discrimination in the sentencing to death penalty is also a contributing factor towards the campaign against death penalty as the circumstances that lead to its perpetration differ. For instance, if the criminal offence was committed between people of different races or complete strangers, it is more likely to attract capital punishment as opposed to when the crime is committed to people of the same race or with some form of affiliations with the criminal offender.

This aspect brings in some aspects of injustice and unfairness which is wrong and unethical. The issue of death penalty also enhances the chances of police and other law enforcers’ misconduct as they are likely to use some innocent individuals as scapegoats hence face the execution instead of the responsible criminals just because they have some powers and influence in a way.

Statistics have also shown that death penalty is not a solution as the states that advocate and execute it have not shown any significant signs of reduction of violent criminal activities and hence it is more ethical to apply other forms of sentencing other than execution or death penalty as it will eliminate killing which is morally wrong.

The practice of death penalty also shows some negative attributes of the society as it emphasizes on killing as a right act in some situations for instance when offended as is the case for the criminal offenders. The aspect of carrying out the execution is also not morally right or ethical to the executors or the individuals involved in carrying out the act as it affects them psychologically and in some instances, it may affect their perception on life issues as they may not value life as they should.

Death penalty is not only considered unethical by those opposing it but also uneconomical as the cost incurred in it usually exceeds that of trial and life imprisonment. Other forms of preventing criminal activities other than death penalty are also advocated for example education campaigns as they are more effective in preventing other people from indulging in the same as opposed to where the offenders are killed (Oderberg, 2000).

Some of the unique reasons for opposing death penalty include the absolutist view that states capital punishment violates the right to life. The life of a human being should always be preserved unless there is a very good and justifiable reason that dictates otherwise,

The risk of killing the innocent is also so high and the problem comes in since the act is not reversible and once a life is lost it is lost forever making capital punishment even more wrong and unethical.

The side of the death penalty better defended is that opposing the idea of capital punishment. However, there are more arguments that have been put forth in the support of death penalty although I consider them weak as compared to those put forward against death penalty.

For instance the argument that killing the criminal offenders as a way of ensuring justice and respect to the victims does not really work because two wrongs will never make a right. The fact that people consider murder an offence should always stand even in case of execution of the criminal offenders as in both cases, killing and taking of human life is unethical and immoral (Thomson, 1999).

My own view in regard to death penalty is that it is unethical since no matter the circumstances or the factors that facilitates the offenders to be involved in the serious crimes especially murder, the fact remains that killing is wrong as it entails violation of the victim’s human right to live whether the person has committed crime or not.

The arguments for the capital punishment as explained earlier are also extremely weak and the practice of death penalty is morally wrong. Human life is valuable and even the criminal murderers deserve to live and their lives should not be deprived since their criminal acts do not make them less valuable.

The possibility and high chances of execution of innocent individuals also makes the issues seem very wrong as most people who have undergone execution after some investigations been found innocent. Killing is also negative as we cannot teach that the criminal offenders did some wrongs whereas we also kill them in the name of ensuring justice. Undertaking revenge by killing because the person was also involved in killing is also not justifiable.

There should, therefore, be formulation and implementation of laws and sentencing that should replace death penalty as it is not an absolute solution in the minimization of criminal offences especially those that entail murder.

This is evident since research shows that those states that use capital punishment as a way for dealing with murder cases have not shown any signs of reduction of the violent crimes as compared to the states that have abolished it since it does not play a significant part in educating or preventing others from indulging in the same offences.

It is evident the issue of death penalty is associated with a lot of controversy as people differ in regard to whether it is right or wrong. The ethical and religious aspects usually differ with it in most cases as no matter the circumstances, depriving an individual’s right to life is considered evil or wrong. Although most nations retain the death penalty as a punishment for offences deemed to be serious, they do not practice it and there is increasing campaign for the abolition of capital punishment.

The issue of death penalty is, however, very controversial as the fundamental values that are used as the basis for the arguments for and against it are the same which entail the search for justice and respect for human life. Those supporting it argue there should be justice and respect for the victims while those that oppose it argue justice and respect should be shown to the offenders through provision of other sentences other than being involved in depriving the offenders their lives through death penalty.

Banks, C. (2004). Criminal Justice Ethics: Theory and Practice . United Kingdom: SAGE.

Cohen, I. A. and Wellman, H.C. (2005). Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics . USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Oderberg, S. D. (2000). Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach . Oxford: WWiley-Blackwell.

Thomson, A. (1999). Critical reasoning In Ethics: A Practical Introduction . New York: Routledge.

White, D. (2011). Pros & Cons of the Death Penalty . Web.

Debates on Death Penalty in the United States
Capital Punishment Debates: Death Penalty
Death Penalty: Utilitarian View on Capital Punishment
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See Jane Hit by Dr. Garbarino
Lynching, Segregation, and Jim Crow Laws
Criminal Acts as a Threat to Safety of Citizens
What Is the Statute of Frauds?
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Chicago (N-B)

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The Death Penalty: is It Ethical and Effective in Crime Prevention?

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Utilizing the death penalty raises ethical concerns, on the other hand, proponents argue that the death penalty is a necessary tool in the fight against crime, in conclusion.

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Ethics of the Death Penalty, Term Paper Example

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What should we do with murderers and other dangerous criminals? This dilemma has challenged societies since the beginning of their existence but the decision has not gotten any easier. One option is capital punishment, or the death penalty. This allows states to decide on a case by case basis whether to punish a crime with a life sentence or execution. This paper will explore the ethical implications of capital punishment and evaluate its place in a modern society. It will present both Kant’s retributive theory and utilitarianism in relation to capital punishment. Finally I will offer my own opinion on these theories and whether I feel they justify the use of the death penalty in America.

The first execution in the United States was in 1608 following British law. After the Revolutionary War and American Independence, the United States maintained the practice of capital punishment even after it was abolished in Britain in 1964. The decision of capital punishment has always been a state issue. Over the years many states have chosen to individually ban the death penalty with Michigan first in 1846. This trend has been followed by 16 other states including a nationwide moratorium instated by the Supreme Court from 1972-1976. In 1976 the Supreme Court deemed capital punishment legal for certain cases. Currently 34 U.S. states use the death penalty for a small number of aggravated murder cases. According to a 2011 Gallup poll, 61% of the public supports the use of the death penalty although that figure drops to 49% when other options are offered (DPIC).

According to Amnesty International (2010), the United States is 5 th in the world in terms of number of executions per annum after China, Iran, North Korea and Yemen. 97 countries had abolished the death penalty outright by 2012 with around 70 nations retaining the death penalty though many do not actively use it as a punishment. The European Union has a strict anti-death penalty law for all member nations. Practicing nations are also in violation of International Law by the United Nations.

One of the universal trends in capital punishment has been the progression to less brutal and more ‘humane’ methods of execution. The French developed the guillotine during their Revolution for this end and many nations banned the bloodier methods. The United States Constitution prohibits all ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’ The death penalty by ruling does not fall into this category so long as the execution methods remain humane. Most executions in the United States are by lethal injection though other methods are legal and have been used in recent years, including the electric chair, gas chambers, hanging and firing squad.

Other exceptions have been added to the system in recent years to exempt the mentally handicapped from receiving the death penalty in 2002. In 2005 the Supreme Court also abolished all capital sentences for juveniles. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 22 juveniles had been executed since the lift of the moratorium in 1976 though the 1990 U.N. human rights treaty, Convention on the Rights of the Child, put an international ban on the death penalty for juveniles (under 18). Only two nations failed to sign the document- Somalia and the United States.

These are some of the facts about the death penalty in America today but why have we continued with this practice? Why does capital punishment continue in the United States when it has been abolished in nearly every other Western nation? Some of the common rhetoric for supporting the death penalty is that first, it serves as a deterrent for future murderers. This is not corroborated by the criminological community. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, 88% of experts rejected the notion of the death penalty as a deterrent to murder. This is primarily due to the disbelief by criminals that they will actually be caught. For example, the southern states of the U.S. have the highest national murder rates but account for 80% of the nation’s executions. Second, there is in an argument that the death penalty is a cheaper option than keeping a prisoner on a life sentence. This argument is false. The average price tag on a death penalty case is 70% more than a ‘comparable non-capital case.’ In Texas, capital cases cost about $2.5 million which is more than it would cost for the same prisoner to serve a 40-year life sentence. These ‘hidden costs’ are in the multiple appeals courts’ costs incurred in capital cases, the years of incarceration on death row as well as the actual execution.

As one can see the logistical arguments for the death penalty often fall short. The fact is that the death penalty in the United States is more of an emotional issue. The most common justification is simply that it is the just desert of a murderer is that he also be murdered. It is a timeless sentiment of retribution- that an ‘eye for an eye’ is the just course. Kantian theory is in line with this thought. Kantian ethics revolve around the idea of the Categorical Imperative which is the idea that morality of any maxim or action can be evaluated on its ability to be applied on a universal level. Kant is a promoter of retributivism. This theory is difficult to pinpoint and very case-dependent but overall it is the idea of concretely linking punishment with moral violations. Kant uses the ‘principle of equality’ in relation to punishment. He does not, like a Utilitarian, take into account the overall general happiness or unhappiness of the majority in decisions of punishment instead he seeks punishment for every crime that gives the criminal the just desert of their crime. Society has a moral obligation to inflict this retaliation upon them.

There are several solid arguments against Kant’s theory. First, the idea of identical retaliation is currently only used for murderers. We do not rape rapists or kidnap a kidnapper and Kant surely would not advocate that we did for it strips the criminal of their humanity. Some argue that capital punishment also does this and is in fact a worse affliction that the original murder and therefore unfair retribution. The French philosopher Albert Camus was an active critic of the death penalty and expressed the sentiment of unfair retribution eloquently in his book, Reflections on the Guillotine (1959), writing:

But what is capital punishment if not the most premeditated of murders, to which no criminal act, no matter how calculated, can be compared? If there were to be a real equivalence, the death penalty would have to be pronounced upon a criminal who had forewarned his victim of the very moment he would put him to a horrible death, and who, from that time on, had kept him confined at his own discretion for a period of months. It is not in private life that one meets such monsters.

Philosophy is functioning on a purely theoretical basis in terms of capital punishment. One can debate indefinitely the morality of the death penalty but the reality is that there are too many problems with the system to administer these abstract ideas. Kantian theory makes several assumptions that do not mesh well with the current state of affairs in the U.S. system. The first is that the murderer in question is indeed guilty. In the past decade there has been an average of 5 exonerations per year based on evidence of the accused’s innocence. These men spent years on death row before their release for committing no crime whatsoever. Is this not criminal in itself and who should be punished but the state for incarcerating someone without spending the money to have DNA or other expensive tests done to categorically prove their guilt?

The second assumption is that capital punishment is evenly distributed. This is the most troubling problem in the United States. Kant is talking about applying an equal punishment for every crime but in today’s system factors such as the race of the victim and the location of the crime play a much larger role in the fate of the murderer than the crime he committed. In its current form the death penalty is not administered in any kind of fair or logical way. For example, Texas carries out fully 1/3 of all executions in the United States. A criminal might commit a heinous crime next door in Oklahoma but suffer none of the consequences of a similar crime 20 miles away in Texas. The question of race is also undeniable. A 1998 report revealed a pattern of race-victim or race-defendant discrimination in 96% of cases. The racism generally revolves around the race of the victim with criminals being 4 times more likely to receive a capital sentence if the victim was white over any other race.

In conclusion, Kant’s theory does not stand up in reality. It is almost impossible to concoct a perfectly equal punishment for every crime. Capital punishment is a painful process of years of incarceration and dread and this pushes it beyond the bounds of the original crime. The current broken system of capital punishment in the United States also makes the philosophical consideration of its ethical validity a moot point. With such uneven distribution of the punishment by race and location, not every criminal is subject to the same considerations. It would be better for the United States to let go of the emotional argument of a life for a life and follow in the footsteps of the rest of the modern world on the path towards a system of justice that focuses on rehabilitation rather than retribution.

“Abolish the Death Penalty.” Amnesty International . Web. 19 Mar. 2012.

Camus, Albert. Reflections on the Guillotine; an Essay on Capital Punishment. Michigan City, IN: Fridtjof-Karla Publications, 1959. Print.

“Death Penalty Information Center: Facts About the Death Penalty.” Deathpenaltyinfo.org . DPIC, 23 Mar. 2012. Web. 19 Mar. 2012.

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“Death Note”: Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance

This essay about the ethical dilemmas presented in the “Death Note” series examines the implications of power and surveillance in the modern age. It compares Light Yagami’s use of the Death Note to eliminate criminals with contemporary surveillance technologies, highlighting the dangers of unchecked power and the potential for misuse. The essay contrasts Light’s vigilante justice with L’s commitment to due process, reflecting current debates on privacy and security. It also explores themes of identity, punishment, and retribution, suggesting that “Death Note” serves as a profound commentary on the ethical complexities of power dynamics in today’s digital society.

How it works

The “Death Note” series, a Japanese manga and anime phenomenon created by Tsugumi Ohba and Takeshi Obata, stands as a narrative powerhouse that provokes deep contemplation on the ethical implications of power and justice. Central to its story is Light Yagami, a high school student who stumbles upon a supernatural notebook granting him the power to kill anyone whose name he writes in it. This extraordinary premise is not just a fictional thrill ride but also a profound commentary on contemporary issues of surveillance and control in the digital age.

Imagine Light Yagami in the context of today’s world, where data is the new currency, and surveillance technology is ubiquitous. The “Death Note” becomes a metaphor for modern-day surveillance tools, raising questions about privacy, ethical governance, and the power dynamics between the watched and the watchers.

Light Yagami’s journey begins with a seemingly noble intent: to rid the world of criminals and create a utopian society. By assuming the alias “Kira,” he embarks on a mission to eliminate those he deems unworthy of life. This mirrors the intentions behind many modern surveillance programs designed to enhance security and prevent crime. Governments and corporations argue that increased surveillance can lead to safer societies, much like Light believes his actions will usher in a new era of peace.

However, the story of “Death Note” reveals the slippery slope of such power. Light’s transformation from an idealistic student to a megalomaniacal figure underscores the corrupting influence of absolute power. The gradual shift from targeting criminals to eliminating anyone who poses a threat to his authority echoes concerns about the misuse of surveillance data. In our world, where data breaches and unauthorized data use are increasingly common, the series serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of unchecked power.

The ethical questions surrounding justice are another central theme of “Death Note.” Light’s version of justice is swift and merciless, reflecting a utilitarian approach where the ends justify the means. This raises significant ethical concerns about due process and the right to life. Is it ever justifiable for an individual—or an entity—to take the law into their own hands? This question is especially pertinent in today’s society, where artificial intelligence and surveillance technologies can potentially bypass traditional legal systems.

Contrasting Light’s vigilante justice is the character of L, the enigmatic detective determined to stop Kira. L represents a more traditional view of justice, one that values due process and the rule of law. His relentless pursuit of Kira highlights the tension between these two philosophies. In modern terms, this can be seen as a debate between privacy advocates and proponents of surveillance. While some argue that surveillance is necessary for security, others warn of the loss of personal freedoms and the potential for abuse.

The intellectual battle between Light and L is a microcosm of the larger ethical conflict at play. Light’s superior intellect and strategic mind clash with L’s deductive reasoning and commitment to justice. This dynamic not only drives the narrative but also serves as a platform for exploring deeper ethical questions. The series forces viewers to consider the moral implications of surveillance and the broader societal consequences of such power.

Identity and its fluidity are also explored in “Death Note.” Light’s dual existence as a brilliant student and a feared vigilante reflects the dual nature of online identities in the digital age. Just as Light maintains a public persona while hiding his true intentions, individuals today curate their online identities, often presenting a facade that differs from their private selves. This duality is further explored through characters like Misa Amane, who becomes a fervent supporter of Kira while grappling with her own moral dilemmas. The series suggests that identity is not fixed but rather shaped by choices and circumstances.

The supernatural elements of “Death Note” serve as a vehicle for exploring human nature and ethical dilemmas. The Shinigami, or death gods, who provide the Death Note, are indifferent observers, highlighting the uniquely human capacity for moral reasoning. Their detachment contrasts sharply with the intense ethical debates among human characters, emphasizing the weight of ethical decision-making.

The series also raises questions about punishment and retribution. Light’s use of the Death Note to dispense what he views as justice can be seen as a form of extrajudicial punishment, echoing modern concerns about the ethics of surveillance and capital punishment. As Light’s methods become increasingly ruthless, the line between justice and vengeance blurs. This ambiguity prompts viewers to reflect on the ethical implications of such power and the potential for abuse.

“Death Note” thus serves as a rich narrative for exploring contemporary issues of power, surveillance, and justice. Light Yagami’s descent into tyranny is a cautionary tale about the corrupting influence of power, while the intellectual and moral battles between characters underscore the importance of ethical principles in guiding human actions. In an age where surveillance technology is pervasive and data privacy is a growing concern, “Death Note” remains a timeless and thought-provoking work that invites reflection on our own beliefs about morality and justice.

Ultimately, the series challenges us to consider the ethical ramifications of surveillance and the nature of justice. It suggests that while technology can offer solutions to societal problems, it also poses significant ethical dilemmas that must be carefully navigated. “Death Note” is more than just a story about a supernatural notebook; it is a profound commentary on the power dynamics of our digital age and the moral complexities of wielding such power.

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"Death Note": Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance. (2024, Jun 17). Retrieved from https://papersowl.com/examples/death-note-ethical-dilemmas-through-the-lens-of-modern-surveillance/

""Death Note": Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance." PapersOwl.com , 17 Jun 2024, https://papersowl.com/examples/death-note-ethical-dilemmas-through-the-lens-of-modern-surveillance/

PapersOwl.com. (2024). "Death Note": Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/death-note-ethical-dilemmas-through-the-lens-of-modern-surveillance/ [Accessed: 25 Jun. 2024]

""Death Note": Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance." PapersOwl.com, Jun 17, 2024. Accessed June 25, 2024. https://papersowl.com/examples/death-note-ethical-dilemmas-through-the-lens-of-modern-surveillance/

""Death Note": Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance," PapersOwl.com , 17-Jun-2024. [Online]. Available: https://papersowl.com/examples/death-note-ethical-dilemmas-through-the-lens-of-modern-surveillance/. [Accessed: 25-Jun-2024]

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Arizona Supreme Court will decide who can order an execution

Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes and Maricopa County Attorney Rachel Mitchell are squabbling over who gets to decide when to execute Aaron Gunches.

And the question the Arizona Supreme Court will have to decide is which of them represents “the state of Arizona.”

The attorney general filed legal papers this week asking the justices to ignore the request by the Maricopa County attorney to schedule a hearing to get a warrant of execution. Put simply, Mayes is telling the judge that while Mitchell’s office did prosecute Gunches, her purview ended when he was sent off to death row.

“Thus, the authority to request a warrant of execution ... rests exclusively with the attorney general,” she told the court.

But more than the future of Gunches is at stake here. There is still the open question of whether the state will ever resume executions after Mayes, shortly after taking office in January 2023, told the justices she won’t seek new warrants, at least for the time being.

Specifically, the attorney general said she is waiting for the findings of the Death Penalty Independent Review commissioner named at the same time by Gov. Katie Hobbs, also new to her office.

That report, however, may not be done until the end of this year. And, depending on the findings, it could lead to the conclusion that there is no acceptable way to put inmates to death.

That commissioner is tasked with conducting a full review of the process, ranging from how and where the state gets its execution chemicals to transparency and media access and the procedures and protocols used by the Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry used to put condemned inmates to death, including the training of those prison officials involved.

Arizona resumed executions in 2022 after an eight-year pause following the botched procedure when Joseph Wood was given 15 doses of a two-drug combination over two hours. Three inmates were put to death in 2022.

Hobbs, however, said the process has remained plagued by questions.

“Recent executions have been embroiled in controversy,” she said in appointing retired Judge David Duncan. That included reports that prison employees had repeated problems in placing the intravenous line into the veins of the condemned men.

“The death penalty is a controversial issue to begin with,” the governor continued. “We just want to make sure the practices are sound and that we don’t end up with botched executions like we’ve seen recently.”

Hobbs made it clear at the time that none of this means the state will never resume executions of the 107 men and three women on “death row,” now up to 109 and three.

“That is not up to me,” she said. “It is up to the attorney general.”

“We just want to review the practices and make sure that if we are conducting executions that they’re done as humanely and transparently and as consistently with the law as possible,” Hobbs said at the time.

But the governor has repeatedly refused to divulge her own beliefs on the death penalty, saying they are not relevant.

In fact, the governor has no role at all in deciding who does or does not get executed.

It is solely up to the attorney general to ask the Arizona Supreme Court for the necessary warrant to execute someone once all appeals have been exhausted. And unlike some states, the governor here cannot unilaterally pardon someone or commute a sentence without first getting a recommendation to do so from the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency.

All that leads to the current dust-up.

Gnches pleaded guilty to first degree murder and kidnapping in the 2002 death of Ted Price, his girlfriend’s ex husband.

His convictions were affirmed but the death sentence was thrown out. A new jury, however, reinstated the death penalty.

Gunches waived his right to post-conviction review and in November 2022 filed a motion on his own behalf seeking an execution warrant. That was joined the following month by then-Attorney General Mark Brnovich.

But Gunches withdrew that request in January 2023 and Mayes sought to withdraw the warrant.

The high court refused. Only thing is, the warrant — which has a fixed time limit — expired before the execution was carried out. And Mayes has refused to seek a new one.

Mitchell last month asked the Supreme Court to issue a new warrant. And now Mayes telling the justices to ignore her request.

What it all comes down to, the attorney general said, is that it is her office that represents the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry which has legal custody of Gunches and represents the state in all post-conviction proceedings in cases of capital punishment.

“Maricopa County Attorney’s Office does not represent the state, is not a party to this case, and is not authorized to seek a warrant of execution,” she said. And, legal authority aside, Mayes said having Mitchell’s office involved “would invite chaos into legal proceedings before this court and others in the capital context, and beyond.”

Mitchell, for her part, said there are other things to consider like the Victims’ Bill of Rights which is part of the Arizona Constitution.

One of the provisions says that victims are entitled “to a speedy trial or disposition and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence.” And the Karen Price, Ted’s sister, as well as Bittney Kay, his daughter, filed suit to allow the execution to proceed.

That lawsuit went nowhere as a trial judge said he was helpless to provide any immediate relief as the death warrant was expiring.

Mitchell also noted that state law directs prosecutors like those in her office to assist victims in enforcing their rights. And she disputes Mayes’ contention that only the Attorney General’s Office has authority in this area.

The next move in Gunches’ cases is up to the justices. But other, broader issues remain.

Duncan, in his most recent interim report obtained by Capitol Media Services, said he already has identified problems with conducting executions “particularly in the areas of the involvement of the appropriate personnel and training..

The judge said he saw nothing but “good faith and well-intentioned efforts” by those involved.

“But due in good part to the hobbling effect of the absence of transparency, these efforts fell short,” he wrote.

And then then there is what happens when putting inmates to death.

“Many of the problems which have plagued past executions were associated with the unavailability of preferred drugs used for lethal injections,” Duncan said. That goes to Hobbs’ direction to him to examine is how the state has been acquiring the drugs it has been using to put people to death.

Corrections officials have been less than transparent — and at least once in violation of federal regulations — in their practices.

In 2015, Arizona ordered 1,000 vials of sodium thiopental, a muscle relaxant used in the execution process, from a supplier in India. That came after a domestic manufacturer refused to sell it for executions.

That decision to order the drugs came despite warning from the federal Food and Drug Administration that buying the drug from India-based Harris Pharma would be illegal. That followed a 2012 decision by a federal judge, ruling in a lawsuit brought by inmates, requiring the federal agency to block importation of the drug as unapproved.

It ended up with Customs and Border Protection seizing the drugs at Sky Harbor International Airport. And in 2017 the FDA refused a request by Arizona to release them.

Capitol Media Services subsequently obtained a heavily redacted document showing the state spent $1.5 million in 2020 to buy 1,000 vials of pentobarbital sodium salt and had it shipped to the Department of Corrections in “unmarked jars and boxes.”

State officials have repeatedly declined to identify where they have attempted to purchase supplies of lethal chemicals. And the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that Arizonans have no right to know where the state obtains its drugs to execute its inmates.

Hobbs said that Duncan is charged not only with finding out exactly how the state is getting the drugs it needs but also make that information publicly available.

Corrections officials have argued in the past that companies will not sell drugs to the state that have other useful purposes, like as an anesthetic or sedative, if their products are publicly linked to putting people to death. Hobbs said none of that is an excuse for hiding the information from taxpayers.

“If the state of Arizona is executing people in the name of Arizonans, Arizonans deserve transparency around that process,” she said.

In seeking a review, Hobbs acknowledged she is examining only a portion of the process, covering the time from when a person is sentenced to death to when the penalty is carried out.

Not part of the study is the larger question of whether the death penalty is imposed fairly. That includes differences in sentences depending on things like the race of the defendant and the financial ability to hire the best available counsel.

Of the 112 inmates who have been sentenced to death, 64 are classified as Caucasian, 22 Mexican Americans, 17 Black inmates, with four who are Native American, three Asians and two who are simply listed as “other.”

“That’s certainly a conversation worth having,” Hobbs said, saying it goes beyond the scope of the order she issued Friday. But the governor said at the time she is “certainly would be willing to entertain further action on the broader issue of the whole process.”

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Future horizons: the potential role of artificial intelligence in cardiology.

1. Introduction

1.1. terminology, 1.1.1. machine learning (ml), 1.1.2. deep learning (dl), 1.1.3. artificial neural networks (anns), 1.1.4. convolutional neural networks (cnns), 2. materials and methods, 3.1. electrocardiography (ecg), 3.1.1. echocardiography.

Assessing and monitoring the left ventricular systolic and diastolic function;
Evaluation of the right ventricular function;
Evaluation and quantification of the cardiac chamber size;
Assessing the functional significance of a valvular lesion and the evaluation of the prosthetic valve structure and function;
Identification of the cardiac source of embolism and the evaluation of the cardiac masses;
Evaluation of pericardial diseases [ 58 ].

3.1.2. Coronary Angiography

3.1.3. cardiac computed angiography, 3.1.4. computed tomography, 3.1.5. cardiac mri, 4. discussions, 4.1. challenges in ai implementation, 4.2. limitations, 5. conclusions, author contributions, institutional review board statement, informed consent statement, data availability statement, conflicts of interest.

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Click here to enlarge figure

Author	Year of Study	Application
Herman R. [ ]	2024	Detection of occlusion myocardial infarction.
Nogimori Y. [ ]	2024	ECG-derived CNN is a novel marker of HF in children with different prognostic potential from BNP.
Hillis J. [ ]	2024	Identification of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy on a 12 lead ECG. Classification of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, cardiac amyloidosis, and echocardiographic LVH. Detection of cardiac amyloidosis.
Haimovich J. [ ]	2023
Harmon D. [ ]	2023
Butler L. [ ]	2023	Early Heart Failure prediction using ECG-AI models.
Awasthi S. [ ]	2023	Assessing the risk stratification of CAD.
Lee Y. [ ]	2023	Assessing the risk stratification of CAD.
Valente Silva B. [ ]	2023	Diagnosis of Acute Pulmonary Embolism.
Sau A. [ ]	2023	Distinguish AVRT from AVNRT.
Shimojo M. [ ]	2024	Identification of the origin of outflow tract ventricular arrhythmia.
Shiokawa N [ ]	2024	Automatic measurements of transthoracic echocardiography.
Sveric K. [ ]	2024	Calculation of left ventricular ejection fraction.
Slivnick J. [ ]	2024	Detection of Regional Wall Motion Abnormalities.
Kampaktsis P. [ ]	2024	Quantification of the right ventricle.
Murayama M [ ]	2024	Measuring the right ventricle ejection fraction.
Hsia B. [ ]	2023	Assessing the parameters of right ventricular dysfunction.
Anand V. [ ]	2024	Diagnosis of pulmonary hypertension.
Oikonomu E. [ ]	2024	A video-based biomarker for detection of severe aortic stenosis.
Krinsha H. [ ]	2023	Assessment of aortic stenosis.
Guo Y. [ ]	2023	Detection of coronary artery disease.
Molenaar M. [ ]	2024	Identifying high-risk chronic coronary syndrome patients.
Lu N. [ ]	2024	Detection of atrial fibrillation on echocardiography without ECG.
Brown K. [ ]	2024	Detecting rheumatic heart disease.
Steffner K. [ ]	2024	Identification of standardized Transesophageal Echocardiography views.
In Kim Y. [ ]	2024	Quantitative assessment of coronary lesions.
Rinehart S. [ ]	2024	Plaque quantification.
Omori H. [ ]	2023	Morphology of coronary plaque.
Toggweiler S. [ ]	2024	Planning of transcatheter aortic valve replacements.
Salehi M. [ ]	2024	Automated segmentation of both ventricles on CMR by an automatic tool.
Ghanbari F. [ ]	2023	Prediction of major arrhythmic events by analyzing cardiac MRI scar.

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Share and Cite

Patrascanu, O.S.; Tutunaru, D.; Musat, C.L.; Dragostin, O.M.; Fulga, A.; Nechita, L.; Ciubara, A.B.; Piraianu, A.I.; Stamate, E.; Poalelungi, D.G.; et al. Future Horizons: The Potential Role of Artificial Intelligence in Cardiology. J. Pers. Med. 2024 , 14 , 656. https://doi.org/10.3390/jpm14060656

Patrascanu OS, Tutunaru D, Musat CL, Dragostin OM, Fulga A, Nechita L, Ciubara AB, Piraianu AI, Stamate E, Poalelungi DG, et al. Future Horizons: The Potential Role of Artificial Intelligence in Cardiology. Journal of Personalized Medicine . 2024; 14(6):656. https://doi.org/10.3390/jpm14060656

Patrascanu, Octavian Stefan, Dana Tutunaru, Carmina Liana Musat, Oana Maria Dragostin, Ana Fulga, Luiza Nechita, Alexandru Bogdan Ciubara, Alin Ionut Piraianu, Elena Stamate, Diana Gina Poalelungi, and et al. 2024. "Future Horizons: The Potential Role of Artificial Intelligence in Cardiology" Journal of Personalized Medicine 14, no. 6: 656. https://doi.org/10.3390/jpm14060656

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The death penalty in the United States has been under attack for decades now. Throughout its history, state governments have adopted varying modes of execution, justifying each on the basis that it provided a more civilised and humane method of putting inmates to death (Sarat, 2016).At the end of the nineteenth century, execution by hanging was replaced with the electric chair, making the ...
Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and
None of this is true. The condemned must do this, and no one is there for them. Nothing that is said or done by others in the death house matters in any material way; nothing changes the inexorable killing routine. Words and gestures of ersatz humanity are but a gloss over the workings of a modern-day charnel house.
PDF Cruel Choice: The Ethics and Morality of the Death Penalty
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the death penalty on the families of the executed, families of the murder victim and the executed or murderer. This paper is an in-depth analysis of various facts and evidence focusing on the death penalty in the USA. Special attention is paid to the 31 states whose laws permit death ...
Facing the Death Penalty: Essays on a Cruel and Unusual ...
From that time until 1 November 1987,265 death sentences or resentences have been meted out, all for the crime of murder. One of the condemned, Chol Soo Lee, had his death sentence reversed and was later acquitted of the crime for which he was sent to prison. Four others committed suicide on death row.
Capital Punishment
Capital Punishment. Capital punishment, or "the death penalty," is an institutionalized practice designed to result in deliberately executing persons in response to actual or supposed misconduct and following an authorized, rule-governed process to conclude that the person is responsible for violating norms that warrant execution.
BBC
Japan uses the death penalty sparingly, executing approximately 3 prisoners per year. ... From an ethical point of view this is the totally consequentialist argument that if executing a few people ...
Arguments for and Against the Death Penalty
Arbitrariness & Discrimination. The death penalty is applied unfairly and should not be used. The Death Penalty Information Center is a non-profit organization serving the media and the public with analysis and information about capital punishment.….
The Death Penalty Debate: Four Problems and New Philosophical
The Journal of Practical Ethics is an open access journal in moral and political philosophy ... the death penalty would not have been carried out. The death penalty logically results in the convict's not being conscious of being executed, ... I am writing this essay at my computer. If, however, there were nerve gas in the air, or I were ...
The Death Penalty
The Death Penalty. 28 July 2019 ~ 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Author: Benjamin S. Yost. Category: Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy. Word Count: 992. The death penalty—executing criminals, usually murderers—is more controversial than imprisonment because it inflicts a more significant injury, perhaps the most ...
Ethics
The gap between death penalty states and non-death penalty states rose considerably from 4 per cent difference in 1990 to 25 per cent in 2010. Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report, from Death Penalty ...
Death Penalty and Ethics
Death penalty and Ethics. Death penalty is also referred to as capital punishment. It is usually the sternest form of corporal punishment since it entails taking away the lives of the convicted offenders by the law enforcement officers. It entails the compulsory execution of a criminal offender as a form of punishment for committing crimes that ...
The Death Penalty: is It Ethical and Effective in Crime Prevention?
The death penalty has been a topic of debate for decades and is currently implemented across the globe. Supporters of the death penalty believe it acts as a deterrence to heinous crimes, such as murder, while opponents argue that it is morally wrong and ineffective in preventing crime.
Is the Death Penalty Ethical? Essay examples
Essay examples. "More than 4,500 people have been executed in the United States since 1930. There is no way of knowing how many have been executed in U.S. history because executions were often local affairs, with no central agency keeping track of them (Maloney, 1999)." Over 4,500 people were executed and this doesn't even include the ...
PDF Death Penalty: An Unethical Punishment
In 1767, Cesare Beccaria challenged the idea of death penalty in his essay, On Crimes and Punishment, which influenced the whole world, including the American intellectuals. As a result, the abolitionist movement of ... Therefore, to decide whether death penalty is ethical or not, we must use the information in modern society.
Ethics of the Death Penalty, Term Paper Example
One option is capital punishment, or the death penalty. This allows states to decide on a case by case basis whether to punish a crime with a life sentence or execution. This paper will explore the ethical implications of capital punishment and evaluate its place in a modern society. It will present both Kant's retributive theory and ...
Ethics Of The Death Penalty Philosophy Essay
The death penalty, as a form of punishment, is given to those who commit crimes deemed by society and government as deserving the infliction of death. Termed "death penalty", "death sentence", and "execution", the issue is not a newfangled idea, rather a form of punishment that actually dates back to the ancient laws of China.
"Death Note": Ethical Dilemmas through the Lens of Modern Surveillance
This essay about the ethical dilemmas presented in the "Death Note" series examines the implications of power and surveillance in the modern age. It compares Light Yagami's use of the Death Note to eliminate criminals with contemporary surveillance technologies, highlighting the dangers of unchecked power and the potential for misuse.
Arizona Supreme Court will decide who can order an execution
The attorney general filed legal papers this week asking the justices to ignore the request by the Maricopa County attorney to schedule a hearing to get a warrant of execution. Put simply, Mayes is telling the judge that while Mitchell's office did prosecute Gunches, her purview ended when he was sent off to death row.
JPM
Cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) are the leading cause of premature death and disability globally, leading to significant increases in healthcare costs and economic strains. Artificial intelligence (AI) is emerging as a crucial technology in this context, promising to have a significant impact on the management of CVDs. A wide range of methods can be used to develop effective models for medical ...