social norms in an essay

102 Examples of Social Norms (List)

Social norms are the unspoken rules that govern how people interact with each other. They can vary from culture to culture, and even from group to group within a culture.

Some social norms are so ingrained in our psyches that we don’t even think about them; we just automatically do what is expected of us. Social norms examples include covering your mouth when you cough, waiting your turn, and speaking softly in a library.

Breaking societal norms can sometimes lead to awkward or uncomfortable situations. For example, if you’re in a library where it’s considered rude to talk on your cell phone, and you answer a call, you’ll likely get some disapproving looks from the people around you.

Understanding the social norms of the place you’re visiting is an important part of cultural etiquette to show respect for the people around you.

Examples of Social Norms

Greeting people when you see them.
Saying “thank you” for favors.
Holding the door open for others.
Standing up when someone else enters the room.
Offering to help someone carrying something heavy.
Speaking quietly in public places.
Waiting in line politely.
Respecting other people’s personal space.
Disposing of trash properly.
Refraining from eating smelly foods in public.
Paying for goods or services with a smile.
Complimenting others on their appearance or achievements.
Asking others about their day or interests.
Avoiding gossip and rumors.
Volunteering to help others in need.
Saying “I’m sorry” when you’ve made a mistake.
Supporting others in their time of need.
Participating in group activities.
Respecting authority figures.
Being on time for important engagements.
Avoiding interrupting others when they are speaking.
Showing interest in other people’s lives and experiences.
Refraining from using offensive language or gestures.
Being honest and truthful with others at all times.
Treating others with kindness and respect, regardless of their social status or background.
Putting the needs of others before your own.
Participating in charitable works and activities.
Helping others whenever possible.
Welcoming guests into your home or place of business.
Nodding, smiling, and looking people in the eyes to show you are listening to them.
Following the laws and regulations of your country.
Respecting the rights and beliefs of others.
Cooperating with others in order to achieve common goals.
Being tolerant and understanding of different viewpoints.
Displaying good manners and etiquette in social interactions.
Waiting in line for your turn.
Taking your shoes off before walking into someone’s house.
Putting your dog on a leash in parks and other public spaces.
Letting the elderly or pregnant people take your seat on a bus.

Social Norms for Students

Arrive to class on time and prepared.
Pay attention and take notes.
Stay quiet when other students are working.
Raise your hand if you have a question.
Do your homework and turn it in on time.
Participate in class discussions.
Respect your teachers and classmates.
Follow the school’s rules and regulations.
Use appropriate language and behavior.
Ask permission to be excused if you need to go to the bathroom.
Go to the bathroom before class begins.
Keep your workspace clean.
Do not plagiarize or cheat.
Wait your turn to speak.
Ask permission to use other people’s supplies.
Include all your peers in your group when doing group work.

Related: Classroom Rules for Middle School

Social Norms while Dining Out

Wait to be seated.
Remain seated until everyone is served.
Don’t reach across the table.
Use your napkin.
Don’t chew with your mouth open.
Don’t talk with your mouth full.
Keep elbows off the table.
Use a fork and knife when eating.
Drink from a glass, not from the bottle or carton.
Request more bread or butter only if you’re going to eat it all.
Don’t criticize the food or service.
Thank your server when you’re finished.
Leave a tip if you’re satisfied with the service.

Social Norms while using your Phone

Keep your phone on silent or vibrate mode while in meetings.
Don’t answer your phone in a public place unless it’s an emergency.
Don’t talk on the phone while driving.
Don’t text while driving.
Don’t take or make calls during class.
Don’t use your phone in a movie theater.
Turn off your phone when you’re with someone else.
Place your phone on airplane mode while flying.
Do not look at someone else’s phone.
Ensure your ringtone is inoffensive when in public or around children.

Social Norms in Libraries

Be quiet and respect the other patrons.
Don’t talk on your phone.
Don’t bring food or drinks into the library.
Don’t sleep in the library.
Don’t bring pets into the library.
Return all books to the correct location.
Don’t mark or damage library books.
Make sure your cell phone is turned off.
Return your books on time.

Social Norms in Other Countries

In France, it is considered polite to kiss acquaintances on both cheeks when meeting them.
In Japan, it is customary to take your shoes off when entering someone’s home.
In India, it is considered rude to show the soles of your feet or to point your feet at someone else.
In Italy, it is common for people to give each other a light kiss on the cheek as a gesture of hello or goodbye.
In China, it is customary to leave some food on your plate after eating, as a sign of respect for the cook.
In Spain, it is customary to call elders “Don” or “Doña.”
In Iceland, it is considered polite to say “thank you” (Takk) after every meal.
In Thailand, it is customary to remove your shoes before entering a home or temple.
In Germany, it is customary to shake hands with everyone you meet, both men and women.
In Argentina, it is customary for people to hug and kiss cheeks as a gesture of hello or goodbye.

Social Norms that Should be Broken

“ Women should be polite” – Stand up for what you believe in, even if it makes you look bossy.
“Don’t draw attention to yourself” – Embrace your uniqueness and difference so long as you’re respectful of others.
“Don’t question your parents or your boss” – Protest bad behavior from people in authority if you know you’re morally right.
“Mistakes are embarrassing” – It’s okay to make mistakes and be seen to fail. It means you’re making an effort and pushing your boundaries.
“Respect your elders” – If your elders are engaging in bad behavior, stand up to them and let them know you’re taking note of what they’re doing.

Cultural vs Social Norms

Cultural norms are the customs and traditions that are passed down from one generation to the next. They’re connected to the traditions, values, and practices of a particular culture.

Societal norms, on the other hand, reflect the current social standard for appropriate behavior within a society. In modern multicultural societies, there are different groups with different cultural norms, but they must all agree on a common set of social norms for public spaces.

We also have a concept called group norms , which define how smaller groups – like workplace teams or sports teams – will operate. These might differ from group to group, and are highly dependant on the expectations and standards of the group/team leader.

Norms Change Depending on the Context

Norms are different depending on different contexts, including in different eras, and in different societies. What might be considered polite in one context could be considered rude in another.

For example, norms in the 1950s were much more gendered. Negative gender stereotypes restricted women because it was normative for women to be quiet, polite, and submissive in public. Today, women have much more equality.

Similarly, the norms and taboos in the United States will be very different from those in China. For example, Chinese businessmen are often expected to share expensive gifts during negotiations. In the United States, this could be considered bordering on bribery.

What are the Four Types of Norms?

There are four types of norms : folkways, mores, taboos, and laws.

Folkways are social conventions that are not strictly enforced, but are generally considered to be polite or appropriate. An example of a folkway is covering your mouth when you sneeze.
Mores are social conventions that are considered to have a moral dimension. Due to their moral dimension, they’re generally considered to be more important than folkways. Violation of mores can result in social sanctions so they often overlap with laws (mentioned below). An example of a more is not drinking and driving.
Taboos are considered ‘negative norms’, or things that you should avoid doing. If you do them, you’ll be seen as rude. An example of a taboo is using your phone in a movie theater or spitting indoors.
Laws are the most formal and serious type of norm. They are usually enforced by the government and can result in criminal penalties if violated. Examples of laws include not stealing from others and not assaulting others.

Conclusion: What are Social Norms?

Social norms are defined as the unspoken rules that help us to get along with others in a polite and respectful manner. It’s important to follow them so that we can maintain a positive social environment for everyone involved. Social norms examples include not spitting indoors, covering your mouth when you sneeze, and shaking hands with everyone you meet.

Chris Drew (PhD)

Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

Chris Drew (PhD) https://helpfulprofessor.com/author/chris-drew-phd/ 5 Top Tips for Succeeding at University
Chris Drew (PhD) https://helpfulprofessor.com/author/chris-drew-phd/ 50 Durable Goods Examples
Chris Drew (PhD) https://helpfulprofessor.com/author/chris-drew-phd/ 100 Consumer Goods Examples
Chris Drew (PhD) https://helpfulprofessor.com/author/chris-drew-phd/ 30 Globalization Pros and Cons

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Social Norms

Social norms, the informal rules that govern behavior in groups and societies, have been extensively studied in the social sciences. Anthropologists have described how social norms function in different cultures (Geertz 1973), sociologists have focused on their social functions and how they motivate people to act (Durkheim 1895 [1982], 1950 [1957]; Parsons 1937; Parsons & Shils 1951; James Coleman 1990; Hechter & Opp 2001), and economists have explored how adherence to norms influences market behavior (Akerlof 1976; Young 1998a). More recently, also legal scholars have touted social norms as efficient alternatives to legal rules, as they may internalize negative externalities and provide signaling mechanisms at little or no cost (Ellickson 1991; Posner 2000).

With a few exceptions, the social science literature conceives of norms as exogenous variables. Since norms are mainly seen as constraining behavior, some of the key differences between moral, social, and legal norms—as well as differences between norms and conventions—have been blurred. Much attention has instead been paid to the conditions under which norms will be obeyed. Because of that, the issue of sanctions has been paramount in the social science literature. Moreover, since social norms are seen as central to the production of social order or social coordination, research on norms has been focused on the functions they perform. Yet even if a norm may fulfill important social functions (such as welfare maximization or the elimination of externalities), it cannot be explained solely on the basis of the functions it performs. The simplistic functionalist perspective has been rejected on several accounts; in fact, even though a given norm can be conceived as a means to achieve some goal, this is usually not the reason why it emerged in the first place (Elster 1989a, 1989b). Moreover, although a particular norm may persist (as opposed to emerge) because of some positive social function it fulfills, there are many others that are inefficient and even widely unpopular.

Philosophers have taken a different approach to norms. In the literature on norms and conventions, both social constructs are seen as the endogenous product of individuals’ interactions (Lewis 1969; Ullmann-Margalit 1977; Vandershraaf 1995; Bicchieri 2006). Norms are represented as equilibria of games of strategy, and as such they are supported by a cluster of self-fulfilling expectations. Beliefs, expectations, group knowledge and common knowledge have thus become central concepts in the development of a philosophical view of social norms. Paying attention to the role played by expectations in supporting social norms has helped differentiate between social norms, conventions, and descriptive norms: an important distinction often overlooked in the social science accounts, but crucial when we need to diagnose the nature of a pattern of behavior in order to intervene on it.

1. General Issues

2. early theories: socialization, 3. early theories: social identity, 4. early theories: cost-benefit models, 5. game-theoretic accounts, 6. experimental evidence, 7. evolutionary models, 8. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Social norms, like many other social phenomena, are the unplanned result of individuals’ interaction. It has been argued that social norms ought to be understood as a kind of grammar of social interactions. Like a grammar, a system of norms specifies what is acceptable and what is not in a society or group. And, analogously to a grammar, it is not the product of human design. This view suggests that a study of the conditions under which norms come into being—as opposed to one stressing the functions fulfilled by social norms—is important to understand the differences between social norms and other types of injunction (such as hypothetical imperatives, moral codes, or legal rules).

Another important issue often blurred in the literature on norms is the relationship between normative beliefs and behavior. Some authors identify norms with observable, recurrent patterns of behavior. Others only focus on normative beliefs and expectations. Such accounts find it difficult to explain the complexity and heterogeneity of norm-driven behaviors, as they offer an explanation of conformity that is at best partial.

Some popular accounts of why social norms exist are the following. Norms are efficient means to achieve social welfare (Arrow 1971; Akerlof 1976), prevent market failures (Jules Coleman 1989), or cut social costs (Thibaut & Kelley 1959; Homans 1961); norms are either Nash equilibria of coordination games or cooperative equilibria of prisoner’s dilemma-type games (Lewis 1969; Ullmann-Margalit 1977), and as such they solve collective action problems.

Akerlof’s (1976) analysis of the norms that regulate land systems is a good example of the tenet that “norms are efficient means to achieve social welfare”. Since the worker is much poorer and less liquid than the landlord, it would be more natural for the landlord rather than the tenant to bear the risk of crop failure. This would be the case if the landlord kept all the crops, and paid the worker a wage (i.e., the case of a “wage system”). Since the wage would not directly depend on the worker’s effort, this system leaves no incentive to the worker for any effort beyond the minimum necessary. In sharecropping, on the contrary, the worker is paid both for the effort and the time he puts in: a more efficient arrangement in that it increases production.

Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) view of norms as substitutes for informal influence has a similar functionalist flavor. As an example, they consider a repeated battle of the sexes game. In this game, some bargaining is necessary for each party to obtain, at least occasionally, the preferred outcome. The parties can engage in a costly sequence of threats and promises, but it seems better to agree beforehand on a rule of behavior, such as alternating between the respectively preferred outcomes. Rules emerge because they reduce the costs involved in face-to-face personal influence.

Likewise, Ullman-Margalit (1977) uses game theory to show that norms solve collective action problems, such as prisoner’s dilemma-type situations; in her own words, “… a norm solving the problem inherent in a situation of this type is generated by it” (1977: 22). In a collective action problem, self-centered rational choices produce a Pareto-inefficient outcome. Pareto-efficiency is restored by means of norms backed by sanctions. James Coleman (1990), too, believes that norms emerge in situations in which there are externalities, that is, in all those cases in which an activity produces negative (positive) effects on other parties, without this being reflected in direct compensation; thus the producer of the externality pays no cost for (reaps no benefit from) the unintended effect of their activity. A norm solves the problem by regulating the externality-producing activity, introducing a system of sanctions (rewards).

Also Brennan, Eriksson, Goodin, and Southwood (2013) argue that norms have a function. Norms function to hold us accountable to each other for adherence to the principles that they cover. This may or may not create effective coordination over any given principle, but they place us in positions where we may praise and blame people for their behaviors and attitudes. This function of accountability, they argue, can help create another role for norms, which is imbuing practices with social meaning. This social meaning arises from the expectations that we can place on each other for compliance, and the fact that those behaviors can come to represent shared values, and even a sense of shared identity. This functional role of norms separates it from bare social practices or even common sets of desires, as those non-normative behaviors don’t carry with them the social accountability that is inherent in norms. The distinctive feature of the Brennan et al. account of norms is the centrality of accountability: this feature is what distinguishes norms from other social practices.

All of the above are examples of a functionalist explanation of norms. Functionalist accounts are sometimes criticized for offering a post hoc justification for the existence of norms (i.e., the mere presence of a norm does not justify inferring that that norm exists to accomplish some social function). Indeed, a purely functionalist view may not account for the fact that many social norms are harmful or inefficient (e.g., discriminatory norms against women and minorities), or are so rigid as to prevent the fine-tuning that would be necessary to accommodate new cases. There, one would expect increasing social pressure to abandon such norms.

According to some authors, we can explain the emergence of norms without any reference to the functions they eventually come to perform. Since the norms that are most interesting to study are those that emerge naturally from individuals’ interactions (Schelling 1978), an important theoretical task is to analyze the conditions under which such norms come into being. Because norms often provide a solution to the problem of maintaining social order—and social order requires cooperation—many studies on the emergence and dynamics of norms have focused on cooperation. Norms of honesty, loyalty, reciprocity and promise-keeping are indeed important to the smooth functioning of social groups. One hypothesis is that such cooperative norms emerge in close-knit groups where people have ongoing interactions with each other (Hardin 1982). Evolutionary game theory provides a useful framework for investigating this hypothesis, since repeated games serve as a simple approximation of life in a close-knit group (Axelrod 1984, 1986; Skyrms 1996; Gintis 2000). In repeated encounters people have an opportunity to learn from each other’s behavior, and to secure a pattern of reciprocity that minimizes the likelihood of misperception. In this regard, it has been argued that the cooperative norms likely to develop in close-knit groups are simple ones (Alexander 2000, 2005, 2007); in fact, delayed and disproportionate punishment, as well as belated rewards, are often difficult to understand and hence ineffective. Although norms originate in small, close-knit groups, they often spread well beyond the narrow boundaries of the original group. The challenge thus becomes one of explaining the dynamics of the norm propagation from small groups to large populations.

If norms can thrive and spread, they can also die out. A poorly understood phenomenon is the sudden and unexpected change of well-established patterns of behavior. For example, smoking in public without asking for permission has become unacceptable, and only a few years ago nobody would have worried about using gender-laden language. One would expect inefficient norms (such as discriminatory norms against women and minorities) to disappear more rapidly and with greater frequency than more efficient norms. However, Bicchieri (2016) points out that inefficiency is not a sufficient condition for a norm’s demise. This can be seen by the study of crime and corruption: corruption results in huge social costs, but such costs—even when they take a society to the brink of collapse—are not enough to generate an overhaul of the system. Muldoon (2018a, 2018b, 2020) has argued that social norms are a challenging form of social regulation precisely because there is no simple way to intentionally modify a social norm, as one can with a law or institutional rule. Social norms can even shape one's understanding of how much agency one has (Muldoon 2017).

An influential view of norms considers them as clusters of self-fulfilling expectations (Schelling 1960), in that some expectations often result in behavior that reinforces them. A related view emphasizes the importance of conditional preferences in supporting social norms (Sugden 2000). In particular, according to Bicchieri’s (2006) account, preferences for conformity to social norms are conditional on “empirical expectations” (i.e., first-order beliefs that a certain behavior will be followed) as well as “normative expectations” (i.e., second-order beliefs that a certain behavior ought to be followed). Thus, norm compliance results from the joint presence of a conditional preference for conformity and the belief that other people will conform as well as approve of conformity.

Note that characterizing norms simply as clusters of expectations might be misleading; similarly, a norm cannot simply be identified with a recurrent behavioral pattern either. If we were to adopt a purely behavioral account of norms there would be no way to distinguish shared rules of fairness from, say, the collective morning habit of tooth brushing. After all, such a practice does not depend on whether one expects others to do the same; however, one would not even try to ask for a salary proportionate to one’s education, if one expected compensation to merely follow a seniority rule. In fact, there are behavioral patterns that can only be explained by the existence of norms, even if the behavior prescribed by the norm in question is currently unobserved. For example, in a study of the Ik people, Turnbull (1972) reported that starved hunters-gatherers tried hard to avoid situations where their compliance with norms of reciprocity was expected. Thus they would go out of their way not to be in the position of gift-taker, and hunted alone so that they would not be forced to share their prey with anyone else. Much of the Ik’s behavior could be explained as a way of eluding existing reciprocity norms.

There are many other instances of discrepancies between expectations and behavior . For example, it is remarkable to observe how often people expect others to act selfishly, even when they are prepared to act altruistically themselves (Miller & Ratner 1996). Studies have shown that people’s willingness to give blood is not altered by monetary incentives, but typically those very people who are willing to donate blood for free expect others to donate blood only in the presence of monetary rewards. Similarly, all the interviewed landlords answered positively to a question about whether they would rent an apartment to an unmarried couple; however, they estimated that only 50% of other landlords would accept unmarried couples as tenants (Dawes 1972). Such cases of pluralistic ignorance are rather common; what is puzzling is that people may expect a given norm to be upheld in the face of personal evidence to the contrary (Bicchieri & Fukui 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that people who donate blood, tip on a foreign trip, give money to beggars or return a lost wallet often attempt to downplay their altruistic behavior (by supplying selfish motives that seemingly align their actions with a norm of self-interest; Wuthnow 1991, 77).

In a nutshell, norms refer to actions over which people have control, and are supported by shared expectations about what should or should not be done in different types of social situations. However, norms cannot be identified just with observable behavior, nor can they merely be equated with normative beliefs.

The varying degrees of correlation between normative beliefs and actions are an important factor researchers can use to differentiate among various types of norms. Such a correlation is also a key element to consider when critically assessing competing theories of norms: we begin by surveying the socialized actor theory, the social identity theory, and some early rational choice (cost-benefit) models of conformity.

In the theory of the socialized actor (Parsons 1951), individual action is intended as a choice among alternatives. Human action is understood within a utilitarian framework as instrumentally oriented and utility maximizing. Although a utilitarian setting does not necessarily imply a view of human motives as essentially egoistic, this is the preferred interpretation of utilitarianism adopted by Talcott Parsons and much contemporary sociology. In this context, it becomes crucial to explain through which mechanisms social order and stability are attained in a society that would otherwise be in a permanent Hobbesian state of nature. In short, order and stability are essentially socially derived phenomena, brought about by a common value system —the “cement” of society. The common values of a society are embodied in norms that, when conformed to, guarantee the orderly functioning and reproduction of the social system. In the Parsonian framework norms are exogenous: how such a common value system is created and how it may change are issues left unexplored. The most important question is rather how norms get to be followed, and what prompts rational egoists to abide by them. The answer given by the theory of the socialized actor is that people voluntarily adhere to the shared value system, because it is introjected to form a constitutive element of the personality itself (Parsons 1951).

In Parsons’ own words, a norm is

a verbal description of a concrete course of action, … , regarded as desirable, combined with an injunction to make certain future actions conform to this course. (1937: 75)

Norms play a crucial role in individual choice since—by shaping individual needs and preferences—they serve as criteria for selecting among alternatives. Such criteria are shared by a given community and embody a common value system. People may choose what they prefer, but what they prefer in turn conforms to social expectations: norms influence behavior because, through a process of socialization that starts in infancy, they become part of one’s motives for action. Conformity to standing norms is a stable, acquired disposition that is independent of the consequences of conforming. Such lasting dispositions are formed by long-term interactions with significant others (e.g., one’s parents): through repeated socialization, individuals come to learn and internalize the common values embodied in the norms. Internalization is conceived as the process by which people develop a psychological need or motive to conform to a set of shared norms. When norms are internalized norm-abiding behavior will be perceived as good or appropriate, and people will typically feel guilt or shame at the prospect of behaving in a deviant way. If internalization is successful external sanctions will play no role in eliciting conformity and, since individuals are motivated to conform, it follows that normative beliefs and actions will be consistent.

Although Parsons’ analysis of social systems starts with a theory of individual action, he views social actors as behaving according to roles that define their identities and actions (through socialization and internalization). The goal of individual action is to maximize satisfaction. The potential conflict between individual desires and collective goals is resolved by characterizing the common value system as one that precedes and constrains the social actor. The price of this solution is the disappearance of the individual actor as the basic unit of analysis. Insofar as individuals are role-bearers, in Parsons’ theory it is social entities that act: entities that are completely detached from the individual actions that created them. This consideration forms the basis for most of the criticisms raised against the theory of the socialized actor (Wrong 1961); such criticisms are typically somewhat abstract as they are cast in the framework of the holism/individualism controversy.

On the other hand, one may easily verify whether empirical predictions drawn from the socialized actor theory are supported by experimental evidence. For instance, the following predictions can be derived from the theory and easily put to test. (a) Norms will change very slowly and only through intensive social interaction. (b) Normative beliefs are positively correlated to actions; whenever such beliefs change, behavior will follow. (c) If a norm is successfully internalized, expectations of others’ conformity will have no effect on an individual’s choice to conform.

Some of the above statements are not supported by empirical evidence from social psychology. For example, it has been shown that there may not be a relation between people’s normative beliefs (or attitudes) and what people in fact do. In this respect, it should be noted that experimental psychologists have generally focused on “attitudes”, that is, “evaluative feelings of pro or con, favorable or unfavorable, with regard to particular objects” (where the objects may be “concrete representations of things or actions, or abstract concepts”; Insko & Schopler 1967: 361–362). As such, the concept of attitude is quite broad: it includes normative beliefs, as well as personal opinions and preferences. That said, a series of field experiments has provided evidence contrary to the assumption that attitudes and behaviors are closely related. LaPiere (1934) famously reported a sharp divergence between the widespread anti-Chinese attitudes in the United States and the tolerant behavior he witnessed. Other studies have pointed to inconsistencies between an individual’s stated normative beliefs and her actions (Wicker 1969): several reasons may account for such a discrepancy. For example, studies of racial prejudice indicate that normative beliefs are more likely to determine behavior in long-lasting relationships, and least likely to determine behavior in the transient situations typical of experimental studies (Harding et al. 1954 [1969]; Gaertner & Dovidio 1986). Warner and DeFleur (1969) reported that the main variable affecting discriminatory behavior is one’s belief about what society (e.g., most other people) says one should do, as opposed to what one personally thinks one should do.

In brief, the social psychology literature provides mixed evidence in support of the claim that an individual’s normative beliefs and attitudes influence her actions. Such studies, however, do not carefully discriminate among various types of normative beliefs. In particular, one should distinguish between “personal normative beliefs” (i.e., beliefs that a certain behavior ought to be followed) and “normative expectations” (i.e., what one believes others believe ought to be done, that is, a second-order belief): it then becomes apparent that oftentimes only such second-order beliefs affect behavior.

The above constitutes an important criticism of the socialized actor theory. According to Parsons, once a norm is internalized, members of society are motivated to conform by an internal sanctioning system; therefore, one should observe a high correlation among all orders of normative beliefs and behavior. However, experimental evidence does not support such a view (see also: Fishbein 1967; Cialdini et al. 1991). Another indication that the socialized actor theory lacks generality is the observation that norms can change rather quickly, and that new norms often emerge in a short period of time among complete strangers (Mackie 1996). Long-term or close interactions do not seem to be necessary for someone to acquire a given normative disposition, as is testified by the relative ease with which individuals learn new norms when they change status or group (e.g., from single to married, from student to faculty, etc.). Moreover, studies of emergent social and political groups have shown that new norms may form rather rapidly, and that the demise of old patterns of behavior is often abrupt (Robinson 1932; Klassen et al. 1989; Prentice & Miller 1993; Matza 1964). Given the aforementioned limitations, Parsons’ theory might perhaps be taken as an explanation of a particular conception of moral norms (in the sense of internalized, unconditional imperatives), but it cannot be viewed as a general theory of social norms.

It has been argued that behavior is often closely embedded in a network of personal relations, and that a theory of norms should not leave the specific social context out of consideration (Granovetter 1985). Critics of the socialized actor theory have called for an alternative conception of norms that may account for the often weak relation between beliefs and behavior (Deutscher 1973). This alternative approach takes social relations to be crucial in explaining social action, and considers social identity as a key motivating factor. (A strong support for this view among anthropologists is to be found in the work of Cancian 1975.)

Since the notion of social identity is inextricably linked to that of group behavior, it is important to clarify the relation between these concepts. By “social identity” we refer, in Tajfel’s own words, to

that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership. (Tajfel 1981: 255)

Note that a crucial feature of social identity is that one’s identification with the group is in some sense a conscious choice: one may accidentally belong to a group, but we can meaningfully talk of social identification only when being a group-member becomes (at least in part) constitutive of who one is. According to Tajfel’s theory, when we categorize ourselves as belonging to a particular group, the perception and definition of the self—as well as our motives—change. That is, we start perceiving ourselves and our fellow group-members along impersonal, “typical” dimensions that characterize the group to which we belong. Such dimensions include specific roles and the beliefs (or actions) that accompany them.

Turner et al.’s (1987) “self-categorization theory” provides a more specific characterization of self-perception, or self-definition, as a system of cognitive self-schemata that filter and process information. Such schemata result in a representation of the social situation that guides the choice of appropriate action. This system has at least two major components, i.e., social and personal identity. Social identity refers to self-descriptions related to group memberships. Personal identity refers to self-descriptions such as individual character traits, abilities, and tastes. Although personal and social identities are mutually exclusive levels of self-definition, this distinction must be taken as an approximation (in that there are many interconnections between social and personal identities). It is, however, important to recognize that we often perceive ourselves primarily in terms of our relevant group memberships rather than as differentiated, unique individuals. So—depending on the situation—personal or group identity will become salient (Brewer 1991).

For example, when one makes interpersonal comparisons between oneself and other group-members, personal identity will become salient; instead, group identity will become salient in situations in which one’s group is compared to another group. Within a group, all those factors that lead members to categorize themselves as different (or endowed with special characteristics and traits) will enhance personal identity. If a group has to solve a common task, but each member is to be rewarded according to her contribution, personal abilities are highlighted and individuals will perceive themselves as unique and different from the rest of the group. Conversely, if all group-members are to equally share the reward for a jointly performed task, group identification will be enhanced. When the difference between self and fellow group-members is accentuated, we are likely to observe selfish motives and self-favoritism against other group-members. When instead group identification is enhanced, in-group favoritism against out-group members will be activated, as well as behavior contrary to self-interest.

According to Turner, social identity is basically a cognitive mechanism whose adaptive function is to make “group behavior” possible. Whenever social identification becomes salient, a cognitive mechanism of categorization is activated in such a way to produce perceptual and behavioral changes. Such categorization is called a stereotype, the prototypical description of what members of a given category are (or are believed to be). It is a cluster of physical, mental and psychological characteristics attributed to a “typical” member of a given group. Stereotyping, like any other categorization process, activates scripts or schemata, and what we call group behavior is nothing but scripted behavior. For example, the category “Asian student” is associated with a cluster of behaviors, personality traits, and values: we often think of Asian students as respectful, diligent, disciplined, and especially good with technical subjects. When thinking of an Asian student solely in terms of group membership, we attribute her the stereotypical characteristics associated with her group, so she becomes interchangeable with other group-members. When we perceive people in terms of stereotypes, we depersonalize them and see them as “typical” members of their group. The same process is at work when we perceive ourselves as group-members: self-stereotyping is a cognitive shift from “perceiving oneself as unique” to “perceiving oneself in terms of the attributes that characterize the group”. It is this cognitive shift that mediates group behavior.

Group behavior (as opposed to individual behavior) is characterized by features such as a perceived similarity between group-members, cohesiveness, a tendency to cooperate to achieve common goals, shared attitudes or beliefs, and conformity to group norms. Once an individual self-categorizes as member of a group, she will perceive herself as “depersonalized” and similar to other group-members in the relevant stereotypical dimensions. Insofar as group-members perceive their interests and goals as identical—because such interests and goals are stereotypical attributes of the group—self-stereotyping will induce a group-member to embrace such interests and goals as her own. It is thus predicted that pro-social behavior will be enhanced by group membership, and diluted when people act in an individualistic mode (Brewer 1979).

The groups with which we happen to identify ourselves may be very large (as in the case in which one self-defines as Muslim or French), or as small as a friends’ group. Some general group identities may not involve specific norms, but there are many cases in which group identification and social norms are inextricably connected. In that case group-members believe that certain patterns of behavior are unique to them, and use their distinctive norms to define group membership. Many close-knit groups (such as the Amish or the Hasidic Jews) enforce norms of separation proscribing marriage with outsiders, as well as specific dress codes and a host of other prescriptive and proscriptive norms. There, once an individual perceives herself as a group-member, she will adhere to the group prototype and behave in accordance with it. Hogg and Turner (1987) have called the process through which individuals come to conform to group norms “referent informational influence”.

Group-specific norms have (among other things) the twofold function of minimizing perceived differences among group-members and maximizing differences between the group and outsiders. Once formed, such norms become stable cognitive representations of appropriate behavior as a group-member. Social identity is built around group characteristics and behavioral standards, and hence any perceived lack of conformity to group norms is seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the group. Self-categorization accentuates the similarities between one’s behavior and that prescribed by the group norm, thus causing conformity as well as the disposition to control and punish transgressors. In the social identity framework, group norms are obeyed because one identifies with the group, and conformity is mediated by self-categorization as an in-group member. A telling historical example of the relationship between norms and group membership was the division of England into the two parties of the Roundheads and Cavaliers. Charles Mackay reports that

in those days every species of vice and iniquity was thought by the Puritans to lurk in the long curly tresses of the monarchists, while the latter imagined that their opponents were as destitute of wit, of wisdom, and of virtue, as they were of hair. A man’s locks were a symbol of his creed, both in politics and religion. The more abundant the hair, the more scant the faith; and the balder the head, the more sincere the piety. (Mackay 1841: 351)

It should be noted that in this framework social norms are defined by collective—as opposed to personal—beliefs about appropriate behaviors (Homans 1950, 1961). To a certain extent, this characterization of social norms is closer to recent accounts than it is to Parsons’ socialized actor theory. On the other hand, a distinct feature of the social identity framework is that people’s motivation to conform comes from their desire to validate their identity as group-members. In short, there are several empirical predictions one can draw from such a framework. Given the theory’s emphasis on identity as a motivating factor, conformity to a norm is not assumed to depend on an individual’s internalization of that norm; in fact, a change in social status or group membership will bring about a change in the norms relevant to the new status/group. Thus a new norm can be quickly adopted without much interaction, and beliefs about identity validation may change very rapidly under the pressure of external circumstances. In this case, not just norm compliance, but norms themselves are potentially unstable.

The experimental literature on social dilemmas has utilized the “priming of group identity” as a mechanism for promoting cooperative behavior (Dawes 1980; Brewer & Schneider 1990). The typical hypothesis is that a pre-play, face-to-face communication stage may induce identification with the group, and thus promote cooperative behavior among group-members. In effect, rates of cooperation have been shown to be generally higher in social dilemma experiments preceded by a pre-play communication stage (Dawes 1991). However, it has been argued that face-to-face communication may actually help group-members gather relevant information about one another: such information may therefore induce subjects to trust each other’s promises and act cooperatively, regardless of any group identification. In this respect, it has been shown that communication per se does not foster cooperation, unless subjects are allowed to talk about relevant topics (Bicchieri & Lev-On 2007). This provides support for the view that communication does not enhance cohesion but rather focuses subjects on relevant rules of behavior, which do not necessarily depend on group identification.

Cooperative outcomes can thus be explained without resorting to the concept of social identity. A social identity explanation appears to be more appropriate in the context of a relatively stable environment, where individuals have had time to make emotional investments (or at least can expect repeated future interactions within the same group). In artificial lab settings, where there are no expectations of future interactions, the concept of social identity seems less persuasive as an explanation of the observed rates of cooperation. On the other hand, we note that social identity does appear to play a role in experimental settings in which participants are divided into separate groups. (In that case, it has been shown that participants categorize the situation as “we versus them”, activating in-group loyalty and trust, and an equal degree of mistrust toward the out-group; Kramer & Brewer 1984; Bornstein & Ben-Yossef 1994.)

Even with stable environments and repeated interactions, however, a theory of norm compliance in terms of social identity cannot avoid the difficulty of making predictions when one is simultaneously committed to different identities. We may concurrently be workers, parents, spouses, friends, club members, and party affiliates, to name but a few of the possible identities we embrace. For each of them there are rules that define what is appropriate, acceptable, or good behavior. In the social identity framework, however, it is not clear what happens when one is committed to different identities that may involve conflicting behaviors.

Finally, there is ample evidence that people’s perceptions may change very rapidly. Since in this framework norms are defined as shared perceptions about group beliefs, one would expect that—whenever all members of a group happen to believe that others have changed their beliefs about core membership rules—the very norms that define membership will change. The study of fashion, fads and speculative bubbles clearly shows that there are some domains in which rapid (and possibly disruptive) changes of collective expectations may occur; it is, however, much less clear what sort of norms are more likely to be subject to rapid changes (think of dress codes rather than codes of honor). The social identity view does not offer a theoretical framework for differentiating these cases: although some norms are indeed related to group membership, and thus compliance may be explained through identity-validation mechanisms, there appear to be limits to the social identity explanation.

Early rational choice models of conformity maintained that, since norms are upheld by sanctions, compliance is merely a payoff-maximizing strategy (Rommetveit 1955; Thibaut & Kelley 1959): when others’ approval and disapproval act as external sanctions, we have a “cost-benefit model” of compliance (Axelrod 1986; James Coleman 1990). Rule-complying strategies are rationally chosen in order to avoid negative sanctions or to attract positive sanctions. This class of rational choice models defines norms behaviorally, equating them with patterns of behavior (while disregarding expectations or values). Such approach relies heavily on sanctions as a motivating factor. According to Axelrod (1986), for example, if we observe individuals to follow a regular pattern of behavior and to be punished if they act otherwise, then we have a norm. Similarly, Coleman (1990) argues that a norm coincides with a set of sanctions that act to direct a given behavior.

However, it has been shown that not all social norms involve sanctions (Diamond 1935; Hoebel 1954). Moreover, sanctioning works generally well in small groups and in the context of repeated interactions, where the identity of participants is known and monitoring is relatively easy. Still, even in such cases there may be a so-called second-order public goods problem. That is, imposing negative sanctions on transgressors is in everybody’s interest, but the individual who observes a transgression faces a dilemma: she is to decide whether or not to punish the transgressor, where punishing typically involves costs; besides, there is no guarantee that other individuals will also impose a penalty on transgressors when faced with the same dilemma. An answer to this problem has been to assume that there exist “meta-norms” that tell people to punish transgressors of lower-level norms (Axelrod 1986). This solution, however, only shifts the problem one level up: upholding the meta-norm itself requires the existence of a higher-level sanctioning system.

Another problem with sanctions is the following: a sanction, to be effective, must be recognized as such. Coleman and Axelrod typically take the repeated prisoner’s dilemma game as an example of the working of sanctions. However, in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma the same action (“C” or “D”) must serve as both the sanctioning action and the target action. By simply looking at behavior, it is unclear whether the action is a function of a sanction or a sanction itself. It thus becomes difficult to determine the presence of a norm, or to assess its effect on choice as distinct from the individual strategies of players.

A further consideration weakens the credibility of the view that norms are upheld only because of external sanctions. Often we keep conforming to a norm even in situations of complete anonymity, where the probability of being caught transgressing is almost zero. In this case fear of sanctions cannot be a motivating force. As a consequence, it is often argued that cases of “spontaneous” compliance are the result of internalization (Scott 1971): people who have developed an internal sanctioning system feel guilt and shame at behaving in a deviant way. Yet, we have seen that the Parsonian view of internalization and socialization is inadequate, as it leads to predictions about compliance that often run counter to empirical evidence.

In particular, James Coleman (1990) has argued in favor of reducing internalization to rational choice, insofar as it is in the interest of a group to get another group to internalize certain norms. In this case internalization would still be the result of some form of socialization. This theory faces some of the same objections raised against Parsons’ theory: norms that are passed on from parents to children, for example, should be extremely resistant to change; hence, one should expect a high degree of correlation between such norms and behavior, especially in those cases where norms prescribe specific kinds of actions. However, studies of normative beliefs about honesty—which one typically acquires during childhood—show that such beliefs are often uncorrelated with behavior (Freeman & Ataöv 1960).

Bicchieri (1990, 1997) has presented a third, alternative view about internalization. This view of internalization is cognitive, and is grounded on the assumption that social norms develop in small, close-knit groups where ongoing interactions are the rule. Once an individual has learned to behave in a way consistent with the group’s interests, she will tend to persist in the learned behavior unless it becomes clear that—on average—the cost of upholding the norm significantly outweighs the benefits. Small groups can typically monitor their members’ behavior and successfully employ retaliation whenever free-riding is observed. In such groups an individual will learn, maybe at some personal cost, to cooperate; she will then uphold the cooperative norm as a “default rule” in any new encounter, unless it becomes evident that the cost of conformity has become excessive. The idea that norms may be “sluggish” is in line with well-known results from cognitive psychology showing that, once a norm has emerged in a group, it will tend to guide the behavior of its members even when they face a new situation (or are isolated from the original group; Sherif 1936).

Empirical evidence shows that norm-abiding behavior is not, as the early rational choice models would have it, a matter of cost/benefit calculation. Upholding a norm that has led one to fare reasonably well in the past is a way of economizing on the effort one would have to exert to devise a strategy when facing a new situation . This kind of “bounded rationality” approach explains why people tend to obey norms that sometimes put them at a disadvantage, as is the case with norms of honesty. This does not mean, however, that external sanctions never play a role in compliance: for example, in the initial development of a norm sanctions may indeed play an important role. Yet, once a norm is established, there are several mechanisms that may account for conformity.

Finally, the view that one conforms only because of the threat of negative sanctions does not distinguish norm-abiding behavior from an obsession or an entrenched habit; nor does that view distinguish social norms from hypothetical imperatives enforced by sanctions (such as the rule that prohibits naked sunbathing on public beaches). In these cases avoidance of the sanctions associated with transgressions constitutes a decisive reason to conform, independently of what others do. In fact, in the traditional rational choice perspective, the only expectations that matter are those about the sanctions that follow compliance or non-compliance. In those frameworks, beliefs about how other people will act—as opposed to what they expect us to do—are not a relevant explanatory variable: however, this leads to predictions about norm compliance that often run counter to empirical evidence.

The traditional rational choice model of compliance depicts the individual as facing a decision problem in isolation: if there are sanctions for non-compliance, the individual will calculate the benefit of transgression against the cost of norm compliance, and eventually choose so as to maximize her expected utility. Individuals, however, seldom choose in isolation: they know the outcome of their choice will depend on the actions and beliefs of other individuals. Game theory provides a formal framework for modeling strategic interactions.

Thomas Schelling (1960), David Lewis (1969), Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1977), Robert Sugden (1986) and, more recently, Peyton Young (1993), Cristina Bicchieri (1993), and Peter Vanderschraaf (1995) have proposed a game-theoretic account according to which a norm is broadly defined as an equilibrium of a strategic interaction. In particular, a Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies (one for each individual), such that each individual’s strategy is a best reply to the others’ strategies. Since it is an equilibrium, a norm is supported by self-fulfilling expectations in the sense that players’ beliefs are consistent, and thus the actions that follow from players’ beliefs will validate those very beliefs. Characterizing social norms as equilibria has the advantage of emphasizing the role that expectations play in upholding norms. On the other hand, this interpretation of social norms does not prima facie explain why people prefer to conform if they expect others to conform.

Take for example conventions such as putting the fork to the left of the plate, adopting a dress code, or using a particular sign language. In all these cases, my choice to follow a certain rule is conditional upon expecting most other people to follow it. Once my expectation is met, I have every reason to adopt the rule in question. In fact, if I do not use the sign language everybody else uses, I will not be able to communicate. It is in my immediate interest to follow the convention, since my main goal is to coordinate with other people. In the case of conventions, there is a continuity between the individual’s self-interest and the interests of the community that supports the convention. This is the reason why David Lewis models conventions as equilibria of coordination games . Such games have multiple equilibria, but once one of them has been established, players will have every incentive to keep playing it (as any deviation will be costly).

Take instead a norm of cooperation. In this case, the expectation that almost everyone abides by it may not be sufficient to induce compliance. If everyone is expected to cooperate one may be tempted, if unmonitored, to behave in the opposite way. The point is that conforming to social norms , as opposed to conventions, is almost never in the immediate interest of the individual. Often there is a discontinuity between the individual’s self-interest and the interests of the community that supports the social norm.

The typical game in which following a norm would provide a better solution (than the one attained by self-centered agents) is a mixed-motive game such as the prisoner’s dilemma or the trust game. In such games the unique Nash equilibrium represents a suboptimal outcome. It should be stressed that—whereas a convention is one among several equilibria of a coordination game—a social norm can never be an equilibrium of a mixed-motive game. However, Bicchieri (2006) has argued that when a norm exists it transforms the original mixed-motive game into a coordination one. As an example, consider the following prisoner’s dilemma game ( Figure 1 ), where the payoffs are B=Best, S=Second, T=Third, and W=Worst. Clearly the only Nash equilibrium is to defect (D), in which case both players get (T,T), a suboptimal outcome. Suppose, however, that society has developed a norm of cooperation; that is, whenever a social dilemma occurs, it is commonly understood that the parties should privilege a cooperative attitude. Should, however, does not imply “will”, therefore the new game generated by the existence of the cooperative norm has two equilibria: either both players defect or both cooperate.

Note that, in the new coordination game (which was created by the existence of the cooperative norm), the payoffs are quite different from those of the original prisoner’s dilemma. Thus there are two equilibria: if both players follow the cooperative norm they will play an optimal equilibrium and get (B,B), whereas if they both choose to defect they will get the suboptimal outcome (S,S). Players’ payoffs in the new coordination game differ from the original payoffs because their preferences and beliefs will reflect the existence of the norm. More specifically, if a player knows that a cooperative norm exists and has the right kind of expectations, then she will have a preference to conform to the norm in a situation in which she can choose to cooperate or to defect. In the new game generated by the norm’s existence, choosing to defect when others cooperate is not a good choice anymore (T,W). To understand why, let us look more closely to the preferences and expectations that underlie the conditional choice to conform to a social norm.

Bicchieri (2006) defines the expectations that underlie norm compliance, as follows:

Note that universal compliance is not usually needed for a norm to exist. However, how much deviance is socially tolerable will depend on the norm in question. Group norms and well-entrenched social norms will typically be followed by almost all members of a group or population, whereas greater deviance is usually accepted when norms are new or they are not deemed to be socially important. Furthermore, as it is usually unclear how many people follow a norm, different individuals may have different beliefs about the size of the group of followers, and may also have different thresholds for what “sufficiently large” means. What matters to conformity is that an individual believes that her threshold has been reached or surpassed. For a critical assessment of the above definition of norm-driven preferences, see Hausman (2008).

Brennan et al. (2013) also argue that norms of all kinds share in an essential structure. Norms are clusters of normative attitudes in a group, combined with the knowledge that such a cluster of attitudes exists. On their account, “A normative principle P is a norm within a group G if and only if:

A significant proportion of the members of G have P -corresponding normative attitudes; and
A significant proportion of the members of G know that a significant proportion of the members of G have P -corresponding attitudes” (Brennan et al. 2013: 29)

On this account, a “ P -corresponding normative attitude” is understood to be a judgment, emotional state, expectation, or other properly first personal normative belief that supports the principle P (e.g., Alice thinking most people should P would count as a normative attitude). Condition (i) is meant to reflect genuine first personal normative commitments, attitudes or beliefs. Condition (ii) is meant to capture those cases where individuals know that a large part of their group also shares in those attitudes. Putting conditions (i) and (ii) together offers a picture that the authors argue allows for explanatory work to be done on a social-level normative concept while remaining grounded in individual-level attitudes.

Consider again the new coordination game of Figure 1 : for players to obey the norm, and thus choose C, it must be the case that each expects the other to follow it. In the original prisoner’s dilemma, empirical beliefs would not be sufficient to induce cooperative behavior. When a norm exists, however, players also believe that others believe they should obey the norm, and may even punish them if they do not. The combined force of empirical and normative expectations makes norm conformity a compelling choice, be it because punishment may follow or just because one recognizes the legitimacy of others’ expectations (Sugden 2000).

It is important to understand that conformity to a social norm is always conditional on the expectations of what the relevant other/s will do. We prefer to comply with the norm as we have certain expectations. To make this point clear, think of the player who is facing a typical one-shot prisoner’s dilemma with an unknown opponent. Suppose the player knows a norm of cooperation exists and is generally followed, but she is uncertain as to whether the opponent is a norm-follower. In this case the player is facing the following situation ( Figure 2 ).

With probability p , the opponent is a norm-following type, and with probability $1 - p$ she is not. According to Bicchieri, conditional preferences imply that having a reason to be fair, reciprocate or cooperate in a given situation does not entail having any general motive or disposition to be fair, reciprocate or cooperate as such. Having conditional preferences means that one may follow a norm in the presence of the relevant expectations, but disregard it in its absence. Whether a norm is followed at a given time depends on the actual proportion of followers, on the expectations of conditional followers about such proportion, and on the combination of individual thresholds.

As an example, consider a community that abides by strict norms of honesty. A person who, upon entering the community, systematically violates these norms will certainly be met with hostility, if not utterly excluded from the group. But suppose that a large group of thieves makes its way into this community. In due time, people would cease to expect honesty on the part of others, and would find no reason to be honest themselves in a world overtaken by crime. In this case, probably norms of honesty would cease to exist, as the strength of a norm lies in its being followed by many of the members of the relevant group (which in turn reinforces people’s expectations of conformity).

What we have discussed is a “rational reconstruction” of what a social norm is. Such a reconstruction is meant to capture some essential features of norm-driven behavior; also, this analysis helps us distinguish social norms from other constructs such as conventions or personal norms. A limit of this account, however, is that it does not indicate how such equilibria are attained or, in other terms, how expectations become self-fulfilling.

While neoclassical economics and game theory traditionally conceived of institutions as exogenous constraints, research in political economy has generated new insights into the study of endogenous institutions . Specifically, endogenous norms have been shown to restrict the individual’s action set and drive preferences over action profiles (Bowles 1998; Ostrom 2000). As a result, the “standard” economic framework positing exogenous (and in particular self-centered) preferences has come under scrutiny. Widely documented deviations from the predictions of models with self-centered agents have informed alternative accounts of individual choice (for one of the first models of “interdependent preferences”, see Stigler & Becker 1977).

Some alternative accounts have helped reconcile insights about norm-driven behavior with instrumental rationality (Elster 1989b). Moreover, they have contributed to informing the design of laboratory experiments on non-standard preferences (for a survey of early experiments, see Ledyard 1995; more recent experiments are reviewed by Fehr & Schmidt 2006 and Kagel & Roth 2016). In turn, experimental findings have inspired the formulation of a wide range of models aiming to rationalize the behavior observed in the lab (Camerer 2003; Dhami 2016).

It has been argued that the upholding of social norms could simply be modeled as the optimization of a utility function that includes the others’ welfare as an argument. For instance, consider some of the early “social preference” theories, such as Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) or Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) models of inequity aversion. These frameworks can explain a good wealth of evidence on preferences for equitable income distributions; they cannot however account for conditional preferences like those reflecting principles of reciprocity (e.g., I will keep the common bathroom clean, if I believe my roommates do the same). As noted above, the approach to social norms taken by philosophically-inclined scholars has emphasized the importance of conditional preferences in supporting social norms. In this connection, we note that some of the social preference theories do account for motivations conditional on empirical beliefs, whereby a player upholds a principle of “fair” behavior if she believes her co-players will uphold it too (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk & Fischbacher 2006; Charness & Rabin 2002). These theories presuppose that players are hardwired with a notion of fair or kind behavior, as exogenously defined by the theorist. Since they implicitly assume that all players have internalized a unique—exogenous—normative standpoint (as reflected in some notion of fairness or kindness), these theories do not explicitly model normative expectations. Hence, players’ preferences are assumed to be conditional solely on their empirical beliefs; that is, preferences are conditional on whether others will behave fairly (according to an exogenous principle) or not.

That said, we stress that social preferences should not be conflated with social norms. Social preferences capture stable dispositions toward an exogenously defined principle of conduct (Binmore 2010). By contrast, social norms are better studied as group-specific solutions to strategic problems (Sugden 1986; Bicchieri 1993; Young 1998b). Such solutions are brought about by a particular class of preferences (“norm-driven preferences”), conditional on the relevant set of empirical beliefs and normative expectations. In fact, we stress that “what constitutes fair or appropriate behavior” often varies with cultural or situational factors (Henrich et al. 2001; Cappelen et al. 2007; Ellingsen et al. 2012). Accounting for endogenous expectations is therefore key to a full understanding of social norms.

Relatedly, Guala (2016) offers a game-theoretic account of institutions, arguing that institutions are sets of rules in equilibrium. Guala’s view incorporates insights from two competing accounts of institutions: institutions-as-rules (perhaps best rendered by North 1990), and institutions-as-equilibria. From the first account, he captures the idea that institutions create rules that help to guide our behaviors and reduce uncertainty. With rules in place, we more or less know what to do, even in new situations. From the second, he captures the idea that institutions are solutions to coordination problems that arise from our normal interactions. The institutions give us reasons to follow them. The function of the rules, then, is to point to actions that promote coordination and cooperation. Because of the equilibrium nature of the rules, each individual has an incentive to choose those actions, provided others do too. Guala relies on a correlated equilibrium concept to unite the rules and equilibria accounts. On this picture, an institution is simply a correlated equilibrium in a game, where other correlated equilibria would have been possible.

Thrasher (2018) offers a comparative-functional analysis of norms that broadly aligns with the Bicchieri (2006) framework to help understand the durability of “bad norms.” Abbink et al. (2017) use public goods-like experiments to show how peer punishment can hold inefficient norms in place. This general framework can be helpful to understand why duels and honor killings can become stable (e.g. Thrasher and Handfield 2018, Handfield and Thrasher 2019). This work explores the signaling function of socially costly norms.

An alternative class of models explains norm compliance in terms of social image or self-image concerns (e.g., Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Bénabou and Tirole 2006, 2011). These models assume that one tries to signal (to others or to one’s future self) that one has good “personal traits”, with such type-specific traits being imperfectly observed. More precisely, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) model the individual’s utility from contributing to a public good as a function of (i) material payoffs, (ii) intrinsic rewards from behaving altruistically, and (iii) reputational returns; in particular, the authors assume that reputational returns depend on the observers’ posterior expectations of the individual’s type. Bénabou and Tirole then consider (a refinement of) signaling equilibria, thereby allowing for multiple solutions to occur as a result of the interplay of individual motivations and of the level of observability of the actions. While models with reputational concerns do not explicitly define normative expectations, they generally posit that players care about their reputation under the assumption that acting altruistically is good or appropriate. Looking ahead, there is still work to do to fully formalize the interplay of (endogenous) normative expectations and empirical beliefs within a general model that is applicable to any game setting. Such a model should probably build on the “psychological game theory” framework (for discussion, see Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2022, p. 857; see also Bicchieri and Sontuoso 2015).

In what follows we focus on lab experiments that identify social norms by explicitly measuring both empirical and normative expectations.

Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) designed an experiment to investigate the impact on trust games of two potentially applicable—but conflicting—principles of conduct, namely, equality and reciprocity . Note that the former can be broadly defined as a rule that recommends minimizing payoff differences, whereas the latter recommends taking a similar action as others (regardless of payoff considerations). The experimental design involved two trust game variants: in the first one, players started with equal endowments; in the second one, the investor was endowed with twice the money that the trustee was given. In both cases, the investor could choose to transfer a preset amount of money to the trustee or keep it all. Upon receiving the money, the trustee could in turn keep it or else transfer back some of it to the investor: in the equal endowment condition (“baseline treatment”), both equality and reciprocity dictate that the trustee transfer some money back to the investor; by contrast, in the unequal endowment condition (“asymmetry treatment”), equality and reciprocity dictate different actions as the trustee could guarantee payoff equality only by making a zero back-transfer. Xiao and Bicchieri elicited subjects’ first- and second-order empirical beliefs (“how much do you think other participants in your role will transfer to their counterpart?”; “what does your counterpart think you will do?”) and normative expectations (“how much do you think your counterpart believes you should transfer to her?”). The experimental results show that a majority of trustees returned a positive amount whenever reciprocity would reduce payoff inequality (in the baseline treatment); by contrast, a majority of trustees did not reciprocate the investors’ transfer when doing so would increase payoff inequality (in the asymmetry treatment). Moreover, investors correctly believed that less money would be returned in the asymmetry treatment than in the baseline treatment, and most trustees correctly estimated investors’ beliefs in both treatments. However, in the asymmetry treatment empirical beliefs and normative expectations conflicted: this highlights that, when there is ambiguity as to which principle of conduct is in place, each subject will support the rule of behavior that favors her most.

Reuben and Riedl (2013) examine the enforcement of norms of contribution to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, such as groups whose members vary in their endowment, contribution capacity, or marginal benefits. In particular, Reuben and Riedl are interested in the normative appeal of two potentially applicable rules: the efficiency rule (prescribing maximal contributions by all) and the class of relative contribution rules (prescribing a contribution that is “fair” relative to the contributions of others; e.g., equality and equity rules). Reuben and Riedl’s results show that, in the absence of punishment, no positive contribution norm emerged and all groups converged toward free-riding. By contrast, with punishment, contributions were consistent with the prescriptions of the efficiency rule in a significant subset of groups (irrespective of the type of group heterogeneity); in other groups, contributions were consistent with relative contribution rules. These results suggest that even in heterogeneous groups individuals can successfully enforce a contribution norm. Most notably, survey data involving third parties confirmed well-defined yet conflicting normative views about the aforementioned contribution rules; in other words, both efficiency and relative contribution rules are normatively appealing, and are indeed potential candidates for emerging contribution norms in different groups.

Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) designed an experiment to investigate norm compliance in ultimatum games. Specifically, their experiment involved a variant of the ultimatum game whereby the proposer could choose one of the following three options: ($5, $5) , ($8, $2) , or Coin (in which case one of the other two allocations would be selected at random). This design allows for two plausible notions of fairness: as an equal outcome ($5, $5) or as a fair procedure (Coin). The experimenters elicited subjects’ normative expectations about the actions they thought would be considered fair by most participants: proposers and responders showed a remarkable degree of agreement in their notions of fairness, as most subjects believed that a majority of participants deemed both ($5, $5) and Coin to be appropriate. Further, the experimenters had subjects play three instances of the above ultimatum game under different information conditions. In the “full information” condition, all participants knew that the Coin option was available, and that responders would know if their respective proposer had chosen Coin. In the “private information” condition, responders did not know that Coin was available to proposers, and proposers were aware of responders’ ignorance. In the “limited information” condition, participants knew that the Coin option was available, but responders would not be able to distinguish whether their respective proposer had implemented one of the two allocations directly or had chosen Coin instead. The experimental results show that when normative expectations supporting the Coin option were either absent (in the private condition) or could be defied without consequence (in the limited condition), the frequency of choice of ($5, $5) and ($8, $2), respectively, were considerably higher than those of Coin. Moreover, the frequency of Coin choices was highest in the public information condition, where such option was common knowledge and its outcome transparent: this shows that there proposers followed the rule of behavior that favored them most, and that such a rule was effectively a social norm. On the other hand, substantial norm evasion characterized proposers’ behavior in the limited information condition, where ($8, $2) was the most frequent choice.

In a subsequent study, Chavez and Bicchieri (2013) measured empirical and normative expectations (as well as behavior) of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of subjects who had participated in an ultimatum game. Third parties tended to reward subjects involved in equal allocations and to compensate victims of unfair allocations (rather than punish unfair behavior); on the other hand, third parties were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. The experimental results further show that third parties shared a notion of fairness (as indicated by their normative expectations), and that such notion was sensitive to contextual differences.

Krupka and Weber (2013) introduced an interesting procedure for identifying social norms by means of pre-play coordination games. In brief, using alternative (between-subjects) variants of the dictator game, Krupka and Weber had participants assess the extent to which different actions were collectively perceived as socially appropriate: subjects providing these ratings effectively faced a coordination game, as they were incentivized to match the modal response given by others in the same situation (such a pre-play coordination game was intended to verify the presence of shared normative expectations). Krupka and Weber went on to use these elicited assessments to predict other subjects’ compliance with the relevant social norm in each dictator game variant (for another application of the same elicitation procedure, see Gächter et al. 2013).

Similarly, Schram and Charness’ (2015) proposed a procedure for inducing a shared understanding of the relevant rule of behavior, in the lab. In short, Schram and Charness had participants in dictator games receive advice from a group of third parties. The information received simply revealed what a group of uninvolved subjects thought dictators ought to do : as such, the information received generated an exogenous variation in the dictators’ normative expectations. Schram and Charness’ results show that choices are indeed affected by this information.

Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) designed an experiment to investigate what happens when empirical and normative expectations conflict. To that end, participants in a dictator game were exposed to different pieces of information. Specifically, two groups of dictators were given some “descriptive information”; that is, they were told what other subjects had done in another session (i.e., one group was told that previous participants had made for the most part a generous offer, while the other group was told that most participants had made a selfish offer). Further, another two groups of dictators were given some “normative information”; that is, they were told what previous subjects said ought to be done (i.e., one group was told that most previous participants thought that one should make a generous offer, while the other group was told that most participants thought that one should make a selfish offer). Other groups were given both descriptive and normative information. The experimental results show that—whenever such information did not conflict—both descriptive and normative messages had a significant influence on dictators’ own expectations and subsequent choices. When messages conflicted in that one indicated generosity and the other indicated selfishness, only the descriptive information affected dictators’ behavior. This suggests that if people recognize that others are breaching the norm, then they will no longer feel compelled to follow the relevant rule of behavior themselves.

To conclude, the studies surveyed here provide evidence of the role played by expectations in affecting behavior in a variety of social dilemmas. In this regard, we note that in contrast to the vast literature on empirical beliefs, the number of lab studies that directly measure normative expectations is relatively limited: more research is clearly needed to investigate the interplay of empirical and normative information about applicable rules of behavior.

Thus far we have examined accounts of social norms that take for granted that a particular norm exists in a population. However, for a full account of social norms, we must answer two questions related to the dynamics of norms. First, we must ask how a norm can emerge. Norms require a set of corresponding beliefs and expectations to support them, and so there must be an account of how these arise. Second, we must investigate the conditions under which a norm is stable under some competitive pressure from other norms. Sometimes, multiple candidate norms vie for dominance in a population. Even if one norm has come to dominate the population, new norms can try to “invade” the existing norm’s population of adherents.

Let us now turn to the question of norm emergence. Here we can see three classes of models: first, a purely biological approach, second, a more cognitive approach, and third, a structured interactions approach. The most famous of the biological approaches to norms seek to explain cooperative behavior. The simplest models are kin selection models (Hamilton 1964). These models seek to explain altruistic tendencies in animals by claiming that, as selection acts on genes, those genes have an incentive to promote the reproductive success of other identical sets of genes found in other animals. This mode of explanation can provide an account of why we see cooperative behaviors within families, but being gene-centered, cannot explain cooperative behavior toward strangers (as strangers should not be sufficiently genetically related to merit altruistic behavior).

Models of “reciprocal altruism” (Trivers 1971, 1985), on the other hand, tell us that cooperative behavior has no chance of evolving in random pairings, but will evolve in a social framework in which individuals can benefit from building reputations for being nice guys. Reciprocal altruism, however, does not require an evolutionary argument; a simple model of learning in ongoing close-knit groups will do, and has the further advantage of explaining why certain types of cooperative behavior are more likely to emerge than others. All that matters in these models is that agents can properly identify other agents, such that they can maintain a record of their past behavior. This allows for the possibility of reputations: people who have the reputation of being cooperative will be treated cooperatively, and those who have a reputation of being unfair will be treated unfairly.

A variation on the idea of reciprocal altruism can be seen in Axelrod (1986). Axelrod presents a “norms game” in which agents probabilistically choose to comply with the norm, or deviate from it, and then other agents can probabilistically choose to punish any deviations at some cost to them. Agents can choose over time to be more or less “bold”, which determines the rate at which they attempt defections, and they can likewise choose to be more or less “vengeful”, which determines how often they punish. Axelrod noted that if the game is left like this, we find that the stable state is constant defection and no punishment. However, if we introduce a meta-norm—one that punishes people who fail to punish defectors—then we arrive at a stable norm in which there is no boldness, but very high levels of vengefulness. It is under these conditions that we find a norm emerge and remain stable. Axelrod’s model aims to illustrate that norms require meta-norms. That is, failure to retaliate against a defection must be seen as equivalent to a defection itself. What Axelrod does not analyze is whether there is some cost to being vigilant. Namely, watching both defectors and non-punishers may have a cost that, though nominal, might encourage some to abandon vigilance once there has been no punishment for some time.

Bicchieri, Duffy and Tolle (2004) present an alternative model of norm emergence to explain how a norm of impersonal trust/reciprocity can emerge and survive in a heterogeneous population. This model does not rely on a meta-norm of punishment; instead, it is purely driven by repeated interactions of conditional strategies. In their model, agents play anywhere from 1 to 30 rounds of a trust game for 1,000 iterations, relying on the 4 unconditional strategies, and the 16 conditional strategies that are standard for the trust game. After each round, agents update their strategies based on the replicator dynamic. As the number of rounds grows, a norm of impersonal trust/reciprocity emerges in the population. Most interestingly, however, the norm is not associated with a single strategy, but it is supported by several strategies behaving in similar ways. This model suggests that Trivers’ basic model works well in normal social contexts, but we can further enrich the story by allowing a social norm to supervene on several behavioral strategies.

Muldoon et al. (2012) explore a simpler approach to norm emergence that relies on individual reasoners weighing their individual interests against their social sensitivity. This is done across a number of model variants based on a simple standing ovation. A striking finding of their “symmetric” model is that norm emergence is fairly rare, but can also be distinguished from merely common behaviors. A more cognitively demanding approach was taken by Muldoon, Lisciandra and Hartmann (2012), in which bayesian reasoners can learn to “discover” norms that were not present, and have no particular value. This can happen when agents think there might be a social rule, and then over-interpret social evidence. These models combine to suggest that we should expect many arbitrary norms, rather than a functionalist argument for the presence of norms.

The third prominent model of norm emergence comes from Brian Skyrms (1996, 2004) and Jason Alexander (2007). In this approach, two different features are emphasized: relatively simple cognitive processes and structured interactions. Both have explored a variety of games (such as the prisoner’s dilemma, the stag hunt, divide the dollar, and the ultimatum game) as exemplars of situations that offer the possibility of the emergence of a moral norm. Though Skyrms occasionally uses the replicator dynamic, both tend to emphasize simpler mechanisms in an agent-based learning context. In particular, learning rules like “imitate the best” or best response are used, as they are much less cognitively demanding. Alexander justifies the use of these simpler rules on the grounds that, rather than fully rational agents, we are cognitively limited beings who rely on fairly simple heuristics for our decision-making. Rules like imitation are extremely simple to follow. Best response requires a bit more cognitive sophistication, but is still simpler than a fully Bayesian model with unlimited memory and computational power. These simpler learning rules provide the same function as the replicator dynamic: in between rounds of play, agents rely on their learning rule to decide what strategy to employ. Note that both Skyrms and Alexander tend to treat norms as single strategies.

The largest contribution of this strain of modeling comes not from the assumption of boundedly rational agents, but rather the careful investigation of the effects of particular social structures on the equilibrium outcomes of various games. Much of the previous literature on evolutionary games has focused on the assumptions of infinite populations of agents playing games against randomly-assigned partners. Skyrms and Alexander both rightly emphasize the importance of structured interaction. As it is difficult to uncover and represent real-world network structures, both tend to rely on examining different classes of networks that have different properties, and from there investigate the robustness of particular norms against these alternative network structures. Alexander (2007) in particular has done a very careful study of the different classical network structures, where he examines lattices, small world networks, bounded degree networks, and dynamic networks for each game and learning rule he considers. A final feature of Skyrms and Alexander’s work is a refinement on this structural approach: they separate out two different kinds of networks. First, there is the interaction network, which represents the set of agents that any given agent can actively play a game with. Second is the update network , which is the set of agents that an agent can “see” when applying her learning rule. The interaction network is thus one’s immediate community, whereas the update network is all that the agent can see. To see why this is useful, we can imagine a case not too different from how we live, in which there is a fairly limited set of other people we may interact with, but thanks to a plethora of media options, we can see much more widely how others might act. This kind of situation can only be represented by clearly separating the two networks.

Thus, what makes the theory of norm emergence of Skyrms and Alexander so interesting is its enriching the set of idealizations that one must make in building a model. The addition of structured interaction and structured updates to a model of norm emergence can help make clear how certain kinds of norms tend to emerge in certain kinds of situation and not others, which is difficult or impossible to capture in random interaction models.

Now that we have examined norm emergence, we must examine what happens when a population is exposed to more than one social norm. In this instance, social norms must compete with each other for adherents. This lends itself to investigations about the competitive dynamics of norms over long time horizons. In particular, we can investigate the features of norms and of their environments, such as the populations themselves, which help facilitate one norm becoming dominant over others, or becoming prone to elimination by its competitors. An evolutionary model provides a description of the conditions under which social norms may spread. One may think of several environments to start with. A population can be represented as entirely homogeneous, in the sense that everybody is adopting the same type of behavior, or heterogeneous to various degrees. In the former case, it is important to know whether the commonly adopted behavior is stable against mutations. The relevant concept here is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS; Maynard Smith & Price 1973; Taylor & Jonker 1978): when a population of individuals adopts such a strategy, it cannot be successfully invaded by isolated mutants, since the mutants will be at a disadvantage with respect to reproductive success. An evolutionarily stable strategy is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium in game theory. Unlike standard Nash equilibria, evolutionarily stable strategies must either be strict equilibria , or have an advantage when playing against mutant strategies. Since strict equilibria are always superior to any unilateral deviations, and the second condition requires that the ESS have an advantage in playing against mutants, the strategy will remain resistant to any mutant invasion. This is a difficult criterion to meet, however. For example, a classic Tit-For-Tat strategy in the prisoner’s dilemma is not an ESS. Many strategies perform equally well against it, including the very simple “Always Cooperate” strategy, let alone Tit-For-Two-Tats, and any number of variations. Tit-For-Tat is merely an evolutionarily neutral strategy relative to these others. If we only consider strategies that are defection-oriented, then Tit-For-Tat is an ESS, since it will do better against itself, and no worse than defection strategies when paired with them.

A more interesting case, and one relevant to a study of the reproduction of norms of cooperation, is that of a population in which several competing strategies are present at any given time. What we want to know is whether the strategy frequencies that exist at a time are stable, or if there is a tendency for one strategy to become dominant over time. If we continue to rely on the ESS solution concept, we see a classic example in the hawk-dove game. If we assume that there is no uncorrelated asymmetry between the players, then the mixed Nash equilibrium is the ESS. If we further assume that there is no structure to how agents interact with each other, this can be interpreted in two ways: either each player randomizes her strategy in each round of play, or we have a stable polymorphism in the population, in which the proportion of each strategy in the population corresponds to the frequency with which each strategy would be played in a randomizing approach. So, in those cases where we can assume that players randomly encounter each other, whenever there is a mixed solution ESS we can expect to find polymorphic populations.

If we wish to avoid the interpretive challenge of a mixed solution ESS, there is an alternative analytic solution concept that we can employ: the evolutionarily stable state. An evolutionarily stable state is a distribution of (one or more) strategies that is robust against perturbations, whether they are exogenous shocks or mutant invasions, provided the perturbations are not overly large. Evolutionarily stable states are solutions to a replicator dynamic. Since evolutionarily stable states are naturally able to describe polymorphic or monomorphic populations, there is no difficulty with introducing population-oriented interpretations of mixed strategies. This is particularly important when random matching does not occur, as under those conditions, the mixed strategy can no longer be thought of as a description of population polymorphism.

Now that we have seen the prominent approaches to both norm emergence and norm stability, we can turn to some general interpretive considerations of evolutionary models. An evolutionary approach is based on the principle that strategies with higher current payoffs will be retained, while strategies that lead to failure will be abandoned. The success of a strategy is measured by its relative frequency in the population at any given time. This is most easily seen in a game theoretic framework. A game is repeated a finite number of times with randomly selected opponents. After each round of the game, the actual payoffs and strategies of the players become public knowledge; on the basis of this information, each player adjusts her strategy for the next round. The payoff to an individual player depends on her choice as well as on the choices of the other players in the game, and players are rational in the sense that they are payoff-maximizers. In an evolutionary model, however, players learn and adapt in a non-Bayesian way, that is, they do not condition on past experience using Bayes’ Rule. In this sense, they are not typical rational learners (Nachbar 1990; Binmore & Samuelson 1992).

In an evolutionary approach behavior is adaptive, so that a strategy that did work well in the past is retained, and one that fared poorly will be changed. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the evolution of strategies is the consequence of adaptation by individual agents, or the evolution of strategies is understood as the differential reproduction of agents based on their success rates in their interactions. The former interpretation assumes short timescales for interactions: many iterations of the game over time thus represent no more than a few decades in time in total. The latter interpretation assumes rather longer timescales: each instance of strategy adjustment represents a new generation of agents coming into the population, with the old generation dying simultaneously. Let us consider the ramifications of each interpretation in turn.

In the first interpretation, we have agents who employ learning rules that are less than fully rational, as defined by what a Bayesian agent would have, both in terms of computational ability and memory. As such, these rules tend to be classified as adaptive strategies: they are reacting to a more limited set of data, with lower cognitive resources than what a fully rational learner would possess. However, there are many different adaptive mechanisms we may attribute to the players. One realistic adaptive mechanism is learning by trial and error; another plausible mechanism is imitation: those who do best are observed by others who subsequently emulate their behavior (Hardin 1982). Reinforcement learning is another class of adaptive behavior, in which agents tweak their probabilities of choosing one strategy over another based on the payoffs they just received.

In the second interpretation, agents themselves do not learn, but rather the strategies grow or shrink in the population according to the reproductive advantages that they bestow upon the agents that adhere to them. This interpretation requires very long timescales, as it requires many generations of agents before equilibrium is reached. The typical dynamics that are considered in such circumstances come from biology. A standard approach is something like the replicator dynamic. Norms grow or shrink in proportion to both how many agents adhere to them at a given time, and their relative payoffs. More successful strategies gain adherents at the expense of less-successful ones. This evolutionary process assumes a constant-sized (or infinite) population over time. This interpretation of an evolutionary dynamic, which requires long timescales, raises the question of whether norms themselves evolve slowly. Norms can rapidly collapse in a very short amount of time. This phenomenon could not be represented within a model whose interpretation is generational in nature. It remains an open question, however, as to whether such timescales can be appropriate for examining the emergence of certain kinds of norms. While it is known that many norms can quickly come into being, it is not clear if this is true of all norms.

Another challenge in using evolutionary models to study social norms is that there is a potential problem of representation. In evolutionary models, there is no rigorous way to represent innovation or novelty. Whether we look at an agent-based simulation approach, or a straightforward game-theoretic approach, the strategy set open to the players, as well as their payoffs, must be defined in advance. But many social norms rely on innovations, whether they are technological or social. Wearing mini-skirts was not an option until they were invented. Marxist attitudes were largely not possible until Marx. The age at which one gets married and how many children one has are highly linked to availability of and education about birth control technologies. While much of the study of norms has focused on more generic concepts such as fairness, trust, or cooperation, the full breadth of social norms covers many of these more specific norms that require some account of social innovation.

This representational challenge has broad implications. Even when we can analytically identify evolutionarily stable states in a particular game, which is suggestive of norms that will be converged upon, we now have a problem of claiming that this norm has prospects for long-term stability. Events like the publication of the Kinsey report can dramatically shift seemingly stable norms quite rapidly. As the underlying game changes in the representation, our previous results no longer apply. In the face of this representational problem, we can either attempt to develop some metric of the robustness of a given norm in the space of similar games, or more carefully scope the claims that we can make about the social norms that we study with this methodology.

Although some questions of interpretation and challenges of representation exist, an important advantage of the evolutionary approach is that it does not require sophisticated strategic reasoning in circumstances, such as large-group interactions, in which it would be unrealistic to assume it. People are very unlikely to engage in full Bayesian calculations in making decisions about norm adherence. Agents often rely on cognitive shortcuts to determine when norms ought to be in effect given a certain context, and whether or not they should adhere to them. Evolutionary models that employ adaptive learning strategies capture these kinds of cognitive constraints, and allow the theorist to explore how these constraints influence the emergence and stability of norms.

The study of social norms can help us understand a wide variety of seemingly puzzling behaviors. According to some accounts, a social norm results from conditional preferences for conforming to a relevant behavioral rule. Such preferences are conditional on two different kinds of beliefs: empirical and normative expectations.

This and other accounts of social norms still leave much to be investigated. Explaining how normative expectations come to exist remains an open question. Another open question to consider is how one could intervene to change socially harmful norms. While there have been initial investigations into these questions (Bicchieri 2016, Muldoon 2018a, 2018b), there is much more work to be done. One frontier in this area is in deploying behavioral tools such as nudging for fostering norm changes (Bicchieri 2022, 2023).

Finally, we stress that different contextual factors (such as the framing and characteristics of the strategic problem, the role one is assigned, the social category with which one identifies, as well as historical and chance events) often come to be associated with different notions of “appropriate behavior”. Accounting for endogenous expectations is therefore key to a full understanding of norm-driven behavior. More research—both theoretical and experimental—is needed to further illuminate the impact of expectations on strategic decisions.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Arló-Costa, Horacio and Arthur Paul Pedersen, “ Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change ”, manuscript, Carnegie Mellon Research Showcase.
Axelrod, Robert, 1992, “ How to Promote Cooperation ”, Current Contents—Social and Behavioral Sciences , 44: 10 (November 2, 1992); this is a scan of the version that appeared in Current Contents—Arts and Humanities , 23: 16 (November 9, 1992).
Selected Papers on Social Norms at EconPapers .
Social Norm , entry in Wikipedia .

Acknowledgments

A portion of section 6 of this entry has been adapted from “Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms”, by Cristina Bicchieri and Alessandro Sontuoso, in The Handbook of Experimental Game Theory , Mónica Capra, Rachel Croson, Tanya Rosenblatt, and Mary Rigdon (eds.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020.

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94 Social Norms Essay Topic Ideas & Examples

🏆 best social norms topic ideas & essay examples, 📌 simple & easy social norms essay titles, 👍 good essay topics on social norms, ❓ questions about social norms.

Breaching Social Norms Experiment The struggle to violate a social norm and the sharp reaction to it is due to the culture that exists in that particular setting.
Social Norms in “A Streetcar Named Desire” by Tennessee Williams In Blanche’s opinion, beauty is the true value of a woman since it enables her to win recognition of men. The main tragedy of Blanche DuBois is that she was conditioned to act and behave […] We will write a custom essay specifically for you by our professional experts 808 writers online Learn More
Devil’s Playground: Social Norms and Rules of Morality It is the first step to the social chaos and decline which can be observed today in the youth’s alcohol and drugs abuse in spite of all the limitations. According to the Amish people’s visions, […]
Institutions, Social Norms and Rules in U.S. It is important to stress that the American Dream assumes a long-term type of life planning directly reflected in people’s actions and perceptions of society.
Departing From Social Norms Can Lead to Progress Following rules and social norms set by the community is like agreeing to the dictation of the superego. Fear is known to set boundaries and limit the abilities of people.
Creating Social Norms: Gender Depiction in Media Sources Among all types of information and misinformation presented in the media, the issue of gender roles is the most damaging of all.
Researching the Genetic Enhancement: Unethical Practice and Social Norms One of the challenges that have emerged with the advent of genetic enhancement is the inability to ensure that all people have access to the technology.
Social Norms as the Condition for Being Isolated The nature of changes can be traced in Othello who is treated as a person with different color of skin as well as Edna who is not accepted by the Creole community; Gregor Samsa is […]
Social Norms in ‘Bread Givers’ by Anzia Yezierska Sara is shocked at the turn of events and their mother is a mute spectator to her daughters’ miserable lives. The harsh realities of life have made her a mature woman, a Jewish woman of […]
Masculinity as a Social Norms Issue However, the advancements that occurred with the rise of the LGBT movement and the empowerment of women now challenge established ideas.
Breaching Social Norms Experiment and Analysis Additionally, there was a great relief that the experiment was over and I did not have to break social norms anymore.
Social Norms and Privacy Violation Online Being exposed to particular behaviors contributes to the concept of the norm, determines what people think they are expected to do, and can ultimately alter the behavior.
Deviant Law Concepts and Contraries to Social Norms Recently, I broke two norms when my uncle and I went to a movie in a movie theatre. After I had changed my pajamas for nice clothes, some of these people came to compliment me.
Effects of Media on Social Norms This paper aims to examine the influence of media on GCC’s citizens and international partners to determine ways in which it affects social norm changes.
Human Sexual Behavioral Ecology and Social Norms In the vast majority of cultures, females are regarded as major caregivers for their offspring while males may invest less time in the parental effort and spend more time searching for mates.
Breaking Social Norms in United Arab Emirates When I approached an Egyptian family, the mother required me to tell them the dish I wanted to taste and promised to order it for me.
Social Norms and Their Violations A more is a set of norms that promotes moral values in the society, the violation of which is fraught with dire consequences.
Public Policy vs. Social Norms and Corruption Political processes enshrined in democratic values of integrity and accountability must continue to shape the institutional framework in the region. Political and civil institutions in Sierra Leone could stop the escalation of illegal trade to […]
Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms
The Social Norms of Feminine Appearance in Advertisements
The Social Norms And Attitudes Of Dating And Courtship
The Social Status and Adherence of Characters to Social Norms in Sense and Sensibility, a Novel by Jane Austen
The Relationship between Social Norms and Tax Compliance: The Moderating Role of the Effectiveness of Tax Administration
The Social Norms and Their Effects on Society and Human Behavior
The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: Replication of the Social Norms Experiment
The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use
Total Strangers and the Social Norms of Our Culture
The Social Norms of Tax Compliance: Evidence from Australia, Singapore, and the United States
The Violation of Athenian Social Norms and Lysistrata by Aristophanes
The Criminal Law Is Shaped By The Social Norms And Traditions
The Friendship Paradox and Systematic Biases in Perceptions and Social Norms
The Importance of Parental Knowledge and Social Norms: Evidence from Weight Report Cards in Mexico
The Definitions of Abnormality: Deviation from Social Norms and Ideal Mental Health
The Influence of Social Norms on Gender Inequality
The Spirit of the Law over its Letter: The Role of Culture and Social Norms in Shielding Cooperative Banks from Systemic Shocks
Society Is Influenced By Social Norms That Guides Our Everyday Behavior
Work Ethic: Influenced By Learned Culture and Social Norms
Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law
Why do People Punish the Rule Breakers?: The Sustainability of Social Norms
The Use of Power, Influence, and Social Norms in Keeping the Idea of Slavery Alive by the United States Government
Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and the Enforcement of Social Norms
The Emergence and Effects of Social Norms: A Confrontation of Some Hypotheses of Sociology and Economics
The Significant Impact of Technology and Social Media on the Evolution of Social Norms
The Impact of Social Norms on Science and History
The Underground Labor Market between Social Norms and Economic Incentives
Themes of Personal Responsibility, Heroism, Social Norms
What Are the Social Norms Inside a Laundromat
Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game
The Influence of Alcohol Advertisements on Social Norms
Spillover Effects in Healthcare Programs: Evidence on Social Norms and Information Sharing
What Were The Social Norms Of This Consumer Culture?
Tax Compliance Social Norms and Institutional Quality: An Evolutionary Theory of Public Good Provision
What Kind Of Social Norms Do Other Cultures Have?
The Determinants of Misreporting Weight and Height: The Role of Social Norms
Using Social Norms Interventions For Reducing Adolescent
The Impact Of Social Norms On American Society
The Inevitable Outcome Of Fighting Social Norms
The Role of Social Norms in Child Labor and Schooling in India
The Wage Effects of Social Norms – Evidence of Deviations from Peers’ Body Mass in Europe
Social Norms: The Fundamental Building Blocks Of Sociology
The Relevance of Social Norms for Economic Efficiency: Theory and its Empirical Test
Social Norms, Status Spending, and Household Debt: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan
Stability Criteria for Social Norms with Applications to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Tax Law and Social Norms in Mandatory Palestine and Israel
How Durable Are Social Norms?
Why Most People Tend to Conform in Most of Their Social Interactions, While Others Deviate From the Existing Social Norms?
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms?
How Is Breaking Social Norms Understood as Deviant Behavior?
Can Economic Pressure Overcome Social Norms?
How Have Cellphones Impacted Social Norms?
Can Social Norms Affect the International Allocation of Innovation?
How Do Delinquents Violate Social Norms and Still Maintain Positive Self-Image?
What Are the Types of Social Norms?
How Do Individual Habits Fit or Unfit Social Norms?
What Are the Social Norms Inside a Laundromat?
How Does Police Deviance Affect Many Social Norms?
What Sustains Social Norms and How They Evolve?
How Do Social Norms Influence Our Behavior?
What Were the Social Norms of the Consumer Culture?
How Must Social Norms Be Increased From the Feedback Loop?
When Do Social Norms and Self-Image Conflict?
How Do Social Norms Transform as a Result of the Information Age?
Why Do Juveniles Deviate From Social Norms?
How Societies Construct Social Norms?
Are Social Norms a Form of Oppression or a Necessity?
How Do Social Norms Affect Mental Health?
What Is the Importance of Social Norms in Society?
How Do Social Norms Affect Society?
What Is the Problem With Social Norms?
How Do Social Norms Help Keep Our Society Functioning?
What Would Life Be Like Without Social Norms?
How Can Social Norms Change?
What Violates Social Norms Concerning Right and Wrong?
How Do Norms Affect Our Identity?
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Social Roles and Social Norms In Psychology

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Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

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There are many ways that people can influence our behavior, but perhaps one of the most important is that the presence of others seems to set up expectations

We do not expect people to behave randomly but in certain ways in particular situations. Each social situation entails a particular set of expectations about the “proper” way to behave. Such expectations can vary from group to group.

Social roles emphasize the duties and behaviors attached to a specific position, and social norms dictate broader behavioral guidelines within a community or group.

Social Roles

One way these expectations become apparent is when we look at the roles people play in society.

Social roles refer to the behavior patterns expected of individuals in different situations and settings based on their specific position within a social unit. These roles come with rights, responsibilities, expectations, and social norms.

Examples include roles based on family (e.g., parent, sibling), occupation (e.g., teacher, doctor), or societal functions (e.g., leader, citizen).

Social roles help structure interactions within groups, providing a framework for understanding what is expected of individuals in various contexts. They are crucial in shaping individual behavior, identity, and social dynamics.

Social roles can contribute to societal stability by creating predictable behaviors and interactions. In this sense, they serve a functional role that validates their existence and persistence.

Social roles are the part people play as members of a social group. With each social role you adopt, your behavior changes to fit the expectations both you and others have of that role.

In the words of William Shakespeare:

All the worlds a stage,

And all the men and women merely players:

They have their exits, and their entrances;

And one man in his time plays many parts.

These lines capture the essence of social roles. Think of how many roles you play daily, e.g., son, daughter, sister, brother, student, worker, friend, etc. Each social role carries expected behaviors called norms.

While social roles provide a framework for behavior, they can also be limiting. They can perpetuate stereotypes, hinder personal expression, and promote inequalities. For instance, rigid gender roles can limit opportunities and potentials for individuals.

Social Norms

Social norms are the unwritten rules of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that are considered acceptable in a particular social group or culture.

Norms provide us with an expected idea of how to behave and function to provide order and predictability in society. For example, we expect students to arrive at a lesson on time and complete their work.

Norms provide order in society. It is difficult to see how human society could operate without social norms. Humans need norms to guide and direct their behavior, provide order and predictability in social relationships, and make sense of and understand each other’s actions. These are some of the reasons why most people, most of the time, conform to social norms.

The idea of norms provides the key to understanding general social influence and conformity. Social norms are the accepted standards of behavior of social groups.

These groups range from friendship and workgroups to nation-states. Behavior that fulfills these norms is called conformity , and most of the time, roles and norms are powerful ways of understanding and predicting what people will do.

Norms are defining appropriate behavior for every social group. For example, students, neighbors, and patients in a hospital are all aware of the norms governing behavior. As individuals move from one group to another, their behavior changes accordingly.

These norms can vary widely between cultures, regions, and individual societies, and what’s considered normal or acceptable in one context may not be so in another.

Greetings : Shaking hands when meeting someone in many Western cultures, while bowing is customary in countries like Japan.
Dining : Using forks and knives for eating in Western societies, whereas chopsticks are used in many East Asian countries.
Dress Code : Wearing formal attire in corporate settings, or covering one’s head in places of worship in certain religions.
Queueing : Waiting in line for one’s turn, such as at a supermarket checkout or bus stop.
Hygiene : Covering one’s mouth when coughing or sneezing.
Punctuality : Being on time for appointments or meetings is expected in many cultures.
Personal Space : Maintaining a certain distance when speaking to someone, with variations based on cultural norms.
Public Behavior : Keeping voice volume down in public places like libraries or cinemas.
Reciprocity : Sending a thank-you note after receiving a gift.
Digital Etiquette : Not looking over someone’s shoulder while they’re on their phone or avoiding loud phone conversations in public transport.

There is considerable pressure to conform to social roles. Social roles provide an example of social influence in general and conformity in particular. Most of us, most of the time, conform to the guidelines provided by the roles we perform.

We conform to the expectations of others. We respond to their approval when we play our roles well and to their disapproval when we play our roles badly.

But how far will conformity go? Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment illustrates the power of social roles in relation to conformity.

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Published: 17 December 2018

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social norms and how they impact behaviour

Katherine J. Reynolds 1

Nature Human Behaviour volume 3 , pages 14–15 ( 2019 ) Cite this article

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There is wide interest in the social norms construct across psychology, economics, law and social marketing. Now a study investigates an important missing piece in the social norms’ puzzle: what is the underlying process that explains how norms impact behaviour? The answer: self–other similarity (self-categorization) and internalization.

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Conform to the social norm: why people follow what other people do

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Senior Lecturer in Psychology, The University of Melbourne

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Why do people tend to do what others do, prefer what others prefer, and choose what others choose?

Our study, published today in Nature Human Behaviour , shows that people tend to copy other people’s choices, even when they know that those people did not make their choices freely, and when the decision does not reflect their own actual preferences.

It is well established that people tend to conform to behaviours that are common among other people. These are known as social norms .

Yet our finding that people conform to other’s choices that they know are completely arbitrary cannot be explained by most theories of this social norm effect. As such, it sheds new light on why people conform to social norms.

Read more: Digital assistants like Alexa and Siri might not be offering you the best deals

Would you do as others do?

Imagine you have witnessed a man rob a bank but then he gives the stolen money to an orphanage. Do you call the police or leave the robber be, so the orphanage can keep the money?

We posed this moral dilemma to 150 participants recruited online in our first experiment. Before they made their choice, we also presented information about how similar participants in a previous experiment had imagined acting during this dilemma.

Half of our participants were told that most other people had imagined reporting the robber. The remaining half were told that most other people had imagined not calling the police.

Crucially, however, we made it clear to our participants that these norms did not reflect people’s preferences. Instead, the norm was said to have occurred due to some faulty code in the experiment that randomly allocated the previous participants to imagining reporting or not reporting the robber.

This made it clear that the norms were arbitrary and did not actually reflect anybody’s preferred choice.

Whom did they follow?

We found that participants followed the social norms of the previous people, even though they knew they were entirely arbitrary and did not reflect anyone’s actual choices.

Simply telling people that many other people had been randomly allocated to imagine reporting the robber increased their tendency to favour reporting the robber.

A series of subsequent experiments, involving 631 new participants recruited online, showed that this result was robust. It held over different participants and different moral dilemmas. It was not caused by our participants not understanding that the norm was entirely arbitrary.

Why would people behave in such a seemingly irrational manner? Our participants knew that the norms were arbitrary, so why would they conform to them?

Is it the right thing to do?

One common explanation for norm conformity is that, if everyone else is choosing to do one thing, it is probably a good thing to do.

The other common explanation is that failing to follow a norm may elicit negative social sanctions, and so we conform to norms in an effort to avoid these negative responses.

Neither of these can explain our finding that people conform to arbitrary norms. Such norms offer no useful information about the value of different options or potential social sanctions.

Instead, our results support an alternative theory, termed self-categorisation theory. The basic idea is that people conform to the norms of certain social groups whenever they have a personal desire to feel like they belong to that group.

Importantly, for self-categorisation theory it does not matter whether a norm reflects people’s preference, as long as the behaviour is simply associated with the group. Thus, our results suggest that self-categorisation may play a role in norm adherence.

The cascade effect

But are we ever really presented with arbitrary norms that offer no rational reason for us to conform to them? If you see a packed restaurant next to an empty one, the packed restaurant must be better, right?

Well, if everyone before you followed the same thought process, it is perfectly possible that an initial arbitrary decision by some early restaurant-goers cascaded into one restaurant being popular and the other remaining empty.

Termed information cascade, this phenomenon emphasises how norms can snowball from potentially irrelevant starting conditions whenever we are influenced by people’s earlier decisions.

Defaults may also lead to social norms that do not reflect people’s preferences but instead are driven by our tendency towards inaction.

For example, registered organ donors remain a minority in Australia, despite most Australians supporting organ donation . This is frequently attributed to our use of an opt-in registration system.

In fact, defaults may lead to norms occurring for reasons that run counter to the decision-maker’s interests, such as a company choosing the cheapest healthcare plan as a default. Our results suggest that people will still tend to follow such norms.

Conform to good behaviour

Increasingly, social norms are being used to encourage pro-social behaviour.

They have been successfully used to encourage healthy eating , increase attendance at doctor appointments , reduce tax evasion , increase towel reuse at hotels , decrease long-term energy use , and increase organ donor registrations .

Read more: Sexual subcultures are collateral damage in Tumblr’s ban on adult content

The better we can understand why people conform to social norms, the able we will be to design behavioural change interventions to address the problems facing our society.

The fact that the social norm effect works even for arbitrary norms opens up new and exciting avenues to facilitate behavioural change that were not previously possible.

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How norm violators rise and fall in the eyes of others: The role of sanctions

Florian Wanders

1 Work and Organizational Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Astrid C. Homan

Annelies e. m. van vianen, rima-maria rahal.

2 Social Psychology, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

Gerben A. van Kleef

3 Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Associated Data

Data and analysis code are available through https://osf.io/xjpe5/ .

Norm violators demonstrate that they can behave as they wish, which makes them appear powerful. Potentially, this is the beginning of a self-reinforcing loop, in which greater perceived power invites further norm violations. Here we investigate the possibility that sanctions can break this loop by reducing the power that observers attribute to norm violators. Despite an abundance of research on the effects of sanctions as deterrents for norm-violating behavior, little is known about how sanctions may change perceptions of individuals who do (or do not) violate norms. Replicating previous research, we found in two studies ( N 1 = 203, N 2 = 132) that norm violators are perceived as having greater volitional capacity compared to norm abiders. Qualifying previous research, however, we demonstrate that perceptions of volition only translate into attributions of greater power in the absence of sanctions. We discuss implications for social hierarchies and point out avenues for further research on the social dynamics of power.

Introduction

Social norms—implicit or explicit rules or principles that are understood by members of a group and that guide and/or constrain behavior [ 1 ]–create a shared understanding of what is acceptable within a given context and thereby contribute to the functioning of social collectives [ 2 – 4 ]. Accordingly, research has documented that people who violate norms tend to elicit negative responses in others, including unfavorable social perceptions [ 5 ], negative emotions [ 6 – 8 ], scolding [ 9 ], gossip [ 10 ], and punishment [ 11 – 13 ]. Intriguingly, however, research has also demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful [ 5 ], high in status [ 14 ], and influential [ 15 ]. This possibly opens the door to a “self-reinforcing loop” (p. 351 [ 16 ]): Norm violators appear powerful and bystanders may submit to powerful others [ 17 ], thereby inviting further norm violations and consolidating norm violators’ power [ 5 ]. The question then arises: How can we prevent people from gaining unjustified influence through norm violations? Here we investigate whether sanctions reduce the extent to which norm violators appear powerful, thereby breaking the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations can set off.

Norm violations signal power

We define norm violations as any behavior that infringes on a norm [ 5 ], whether informal (i.e., learned by observing others) or formal (i.e., written). Norm violations are ubiquitous, from talking at the movies to using public transport without a ticket. These behaviors violate social norms that are both endorsed and enacted by most members of a group (injunctive and descriptive norms, respectively) [ 4 ]. Injunctive and descriptive norms are individually perceived but when people are cognizant of prevailing norms and endorse these norms, both types of norms can converge and be shared at the collective level [ 18 ]. By ignoring the norms that bind others, norm violators demonstrate that they can act as they wish and do not fear interference from others [ 5 ]. This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank [ 19 ].

The influential approach/inhibition theory of power [ 20 ] states that power, which is commonly defined as asymmetrical control over valuable resources that enables influence, liberates behavior, whereas powerlessness constrains it. Indeed, ample research supports that power renders people more likely to act, even if the resulting behavior is inappropriate or harmful [ 21 , 22 ]. Because behavioral freedom is thus intimately associated with power, people who observe unchecked behavior of others may make inferences about others’ level of power. Indeed, people who act as they wish and disregard social norms are perceived as having high status [ 14 ], influence [ 15 ], and power [ 5 ]. Furthermore, these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement [ 23 , 24 ].

In line with the notion that power liberates behavior, previous research has demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful because they appear to experience the freedom to act as they please [ 5 , 14 , 15 ]–that is, they are high on volitional capacity. In other words, norm violators are perceived as powerful because their behavior signals an underlying quality, namely the freedom to act at will. This argument resonates with costly signaling theory [ 25 , 26 ], which states that any seemingly costly behavior (involving large investments or risks of receiving negative outcomes) functions as a signal of an underlying characteristic [ 25 , 26 ]. An example of costly behavior is the reckless driving of young men as to show their strength and skills to peers and potential mates, risking serious injury or death—a type of behavior that is under particular circumstances “rewarded” with power [ 27 ]. Norm violations are potentially costly as they are frequently sanctioned [ 14 ] by means of formal (e.g., legal) punishment [ 28 ] and/or informal (social) punishment (e.g., anger, social exclusion [ 29 , 30 ]). According to costly signaling theory, people who engage in potentially costly norm-violating behavior signal that they possess traits that allow them not to worry about interferences from others. Because this capacity to do what one wants is typically reserved for the powerful [ 31 ], norm violators appear powerful when there are no additional cues that provide direct information about this attribute [ 5 ].

Sanctions curb norm violators’ perceived power

If norm violations signal power, this opens the door to a self-reinforcing loop [ 5 , 16 ]. Norm violators’ claim to power is likely to be granted because people tend to submit to powerful others [ 17 , 24 , 32 ]. For example, people who interrupt others during meetings may be granted influence by receiving more time to speak [ 14 , 33 ]. As a consequence, their contributions may be noted more readily, which increases their chances for influence and promotion [ 34 ]. Norm violators may therefore climb up in social hierarchies. The question then arises: Can people be prevented from gaining power through norm violations?

Here we adopt a social-perceptual lens and investigate whether sanctions reduce the extent to which norm violators appear powerful. Specifically, we propose that sanctions reduce the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends. Bystanders easily infer that norm violators are free to act according to their own volition [ 5 ]. In the absence of additional information, this inference of volitional capacity functions as a signal of power [ 5 , 16 ]. However, we argue that if bystanders receive information that norm violators are sanctioned, they no longer need to rely on such signals. That is, they may directly conclude that norm violators who are reprimanded for their behavior do not have the power they seemed to have but are bound by the same norms that bind others around them. To summarize, we argue that bystanders perceive norm violators as powerful because they infer that norm violators have the capacity to act according to their own volition (replication of Van Kleef et al [ 5 ]). However, we propose that sanctions reduce the extent to which observers perceive norm violators as powerful by severing the link between volition and power perceptions (see Fig 1 ).

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Object name is pone.0254574.g001.jpg

The goal of the current manuscript was to investigate whether sanctions reduce the extent to which norm violators are seen as powerful. In our experimental design we focus on the violation of a legal norm that most people in society tend to endorse and enact, and sanctions refer to formal rather than informal sanctions. We present the results of two studies which replicate the finding that unsanctioned norm violators appear powerful [ 5 ], and support the current hypothesis that sanctions curb the effect of norm violations on power perceptions. The investigation of the exact mechanism underlying this effect was in part exploratory, and we denote where this was the case when presenting our results.

Participants and design

Study 1 employed a 2 (norm violation: abide vs. violate) × 2 (sanctioning: no sanction vs. sanction) between-subjects design, and participants could win one of four 15€ vouchers. This study was part of a student project using a cell size of about 50 participants and including an additional exploratory condition ( n = 121) which we do not report here (see S1 File for further information). Ethics approval was obtained from the ethical review board, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands (ref.: 2014-WOP-3498). The code of conduct of the German Society for Psychology does not require special permits for international researchers and, for ethical considerations in research, the same codified ethical guidelines apply in Germany as in the Netherlands. All participants provided written informed consent prior to their participation (online, by clicking “yes”).

We recruited 236 participants at a German university campus and through social media, of which 203 were retained for analyses (153 women, 50 men, M age = 23.78, range = 18–59). Seventeen participants were removed because they did not complete the questionnaire, and 16 participants were excluded because they failed attention checks. These exclusion criteria were decided a-priori. A sensitivity analysis conducted in G-power suggested that when testing a moderated mediation model involving 5 predictors (norm violation, volition, sanctioning, norm violation x sanctioning, volition x sanctioning) and α = 0.05 the analysis would have a power of 0.80 to detect a small to medium effect (ƒ 2 = 0.06). In addition, we calculated ν-statistics [ 35 ] for the central tests of our moderated mediation model. The ν-statistic for the regressions of volition on norm violation was ν = 0.897. The ν-statistic for the regression of power on volition, norm violation, sanctioning, and the two-way interactions between violation and sanctioning as well as volition and sanctioning was ν = 1.000. These statistics show that this study was sufficiently powered.

Manipulation

Participants read about a traveler who either purchased a ticket before boarding a train (norm abider) or purchased a snack instead and did not purchase a ticket (norm violator). The norm abider could not find the ticket when approached by a controller on the train but told the controller that he did buy one. Likewise, the norm violator told the controller that he did buy a ticket but said that he had already been checked. The controller then either did not insist on seeing the ticket (no sanction) or did insist and fined the traveler who was unable to show the ticket (sanction; see the S1 File for the full scenarios). Assignment to conditions was random.

After reading about the traveler, participants indicated to what extent they thought the traveler acted out of his own volition, and to what extent they perceived the traveler as powerful. The measures including all items can be found in the supplementary material. Participants answered a set of additional questions (administered as part of a thesis project) before completing manipulation and attention checks.

Volition perceptions . Perceptions of volition (α = .88) were measured with six items [ 1 ]. An example item is: “To what extent does this person feel free to do what s/he wants?” with scales ranging from 1 = not very much , to 7 = very much .

Power perceptions . Perceptions of power (α = .88) were measured with a validated 8-item sense of power scale [ 36 ]. Example items are: “I think this person has a great deal of power” and “I think this person’s wishes do not carry much weight (reverse scored)” with scale anchors ranging from 1 = strongly disagree , to 7 = strongly agree .

Manipulation checks . Two questions each assessed in how far participants thought the traveler violated norms (“To what extent did the traveler violate norms?”; “To what extent did the traveler abide by norms?” [reverse-scored]; r = .87) and in how far participants thought the traveler was sanctioned (“To what extent was the traveler sanctioned?”; “To what extent did the traveler get away unsanctioned?” [reverse-scored]; r = .93). Scale anchors for both manipulation checks were 1 = not at all , and 7 = extremely .

Attention checks . Participants answered two questions each asking whether traveling without a ticket was allowed/prohibited, whether the traveler did/did not buy a ticket, whether the traveler was/was not fined, and whether the traveler was/was not honest. Answer options were yes versus no, and participants who provided incorrect responses were excluded from the analyses.

Manipulation checks

To test whether the manipulations of norm violation and sanctioning were successful, we ran two separate ANOVAs with norm violation and sanctioning as between-subjects factors. First, the ANOVA with the norm violation manipulation check as dependent variable revealed the expected main effect of norm violation, F (1,199) = 1085.56, p < .001, η p 2 = .845. Norm violators ( M = 6.29, SD = 0.78, 95% CI [6.136, 6.442]) were seen as violating norms to a considerably greater extent than norm abiders ( M = 2.14, SD = 1.13, 95% CI [1.916, 2.361]). Unexpectedly, there was also a main effect of sanctioning, F (1,199) = 18.41, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.085, and a significant interaction effect, F (1,199) = 18.52, p < .001, η p 2 = 0.085. Further probing using simple slopes analysis revealed no significant effect of sanctioning for norm violators, t (199) = 0.01, p = .993, 95% CI [-0.348, 0.351], d = 0.002, but there was a significant effect for norm abiders, t (199) = 6.06, p < .001, 95% CI [0.728, 1.429], d = 1.207: Non-sanctioned norm abiders were perceived as violating norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders. Given that the effect sizes of the unexpected effects (both η p 2 = 0.085) were ten times smaller than that of the intended effect ( η p 2 = .845) we consider this manipulation successful.

Second, the ANOVA with the sanctioning manipulation check as dependent variable revealed only the expected main effect of sanctioning, F (1,199) = 1589.38, p < .001, η p 2 = .889. Sanctioned travelers ( M = 5.94, SD = 1.06, 95% CI [5.733, 6.149]) were seen as considerably more sanctioned than non-sanctioned travelers ( M = 1.29, SD = 0.51, 95% CI [1.186, 1.388]). Neither the effect of norm violation nor the interaction between sanctioning and norm violation were significant ( F < 2.85, p >.093). Thus, the manipulation was successful.

Replication of the norm violation-perceived power link

Next, we aimed to replicate Van Kleef et al.’s [ 5 ] norm violation → volition → perceived power links in the absence of sanctions, before investigating how these links are affected by the presence of sanctions. As illustrated in the left-hand panel of Fig 2 , a planned contrast revealed that in the absence of sanctions norm violators appeared more powerful than norm abiders, t (99) = 2.02, p = .047, 95% CI [0.005, 0.690], d = 0.401 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

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Note. Means within a row with a different subscript differ at p < .05.

For testing our directional prediction that volition mediates the link between norm violation and perceived power, we used one-tailed tests [ 37 ]. Norm violators were seen as acting more according to their own volition compared to norm abiders, B = 1.65, SE = 0.19, t (99) = 8.76, p < .001, 95% CI [1.276, 2.023], and greater perceived volitional capacity was, in turn, related to greater perceived power, B = 0.18, SE = 0.09, t (98) = 1.99, p = .025, 95% CI [0.029, Inf]. Bootstrapped confidence intervals indicate that the indirect effect of norm violation on perceived power via volition was significant, B indirect = 0.30, SE = 0.15, 95% CI [0.010, 0.582], υ = 0.029. The effect size υ indicates a sufficient although small indirect effect [ 38 ]. We therefore consider the replication of the norm violation → volition → perceived power links successful.

The role of sanctioning

Concerning the effect of sanctioning on the norm violation → volition → perceived power link, we predicted that sanctioning would reduce the extent to which norm violators appear powerful. Furthermore, we proposed that sanctioning would reduce the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends. We tested this idea in three steps. First, we tested whether sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators were seen as powerful. A planned contrast suggests that sanctioned norm violators were indeed perceived as less powerful than non-sanctioned norm violators t (100) = -10.68, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.114, -1.452], d = -2.115 (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations).

Next, we explored where in the norm violation → volition → perceived power links sanctions exerted their moderating impact. Our theoretical argument suggested that observers perceive norm violators as having greater volitional capacity than norm abiders regardless of whether they are sanctioned, whereas they will perceive norm violators as powerful only if they are not sanctioned. In line with this idea, a mixed-model ANOVA among norm violators with sanctioning (no sanction vs. sanction) as between-subjects factor and scale (volition vs. power) as within-subjects factor revealed—besides significant main effects of sanctioning, F (1,100) = 51.23, p < .001, η p 2 = .339 and scale F (1,100) = 122.81, p < .001, η p 2 = .551—a significant interaction between both, F (1,100) = 47.70, p < .001, η p 2 = .323. As Fig 3 shows, whereas sanctions did not significantly affect the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition, t (100) = -1.50, p = .136, 95% CI [-0.675, 0.093], d = -0.298, they significantly reduced perceptions of power t (100) = -10.68, p < .001, 95% CI [-2.114, -1.452], d = -2.115. This suggests that sanctions reduce the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends.

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Error bars are standard errors around the mean.

In a final step, we tested whether sanctioning moderated the effect of volition on perceived power in the norm violation → volition → perceived power link. Sanctioning moderated the effect of volition on perceived power in the mediation chain when the confidence interval for the product a × b 2 of the effect of norm violation on volition (a in Fig 4 , left panel) and the interaction of volition and sanction on power perception (b 2 ) excludes zero [ 39 ]. See the supplement for a detailed explanation.

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Black arrows in the statistical model highlight relevant effects for moderated mediation (ab 2 ). Simple slopes with standard errors (right) illustrate b 2 , the lack of an interaction of volition and sanctions on power perceptions.

Contrary to our expectations, this was not the case, B = 0.10, SE = 0.2, 95% CI [-0.294, 0.520]. Whereas the effect of norm violation on volition (a) was significant, B = 1.85, SE = 0.15, t (201) = 12.40, p < .001, 95% CI [1.553, 2.141], the interaction between volition and sanctioning on power (b 2 ) was not, B = 0.05, SE = 0.12, t (197) = 0.45, p = .651, 95% CI [-0.181, 0.289], rendering the product a × b 2 nonsignificant. We therefore cannot conclude that sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity translated into power perceptions. Fig 4 (right panel) illustrates this absence of an interaction between sanctions and volition (slopes are similar across conditions) and shows that sanctioning directly reduced perceptions of power.

Study 1 replicated the finding that norm violators are seen as acting more according to their own volition than norm abiders, and that greater volition in turn related to greater inferences of power [ 5 ]. As expected, sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators were seen as powerful. However, sanctioning did not significantly affect the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition. Although this is consistent with our theoretical model, which proposes that sanctioning targets the power-signaling effect of volition in the norm violation → volition → perceived power mediation chain, we found no full support for this pattern. Instead, sanctioning directly reduced perceptions of power irrespective of volition. One explanation for why sanctioning did not moderate the power-signaling effect of volition could be that volition was not strongly linked to power perceptions in this study in the first place. Therefore, we aimed to replicate the norm violation → volition → perceived power chain in a second study which also allowed us to improve the ecological validity of our design.

The 2(violate vs. abide) × 2(no sanction vs. sanction) design of Study 1 allowed us to test our predictions in a single moderated mediation model. Yet, despite its elegance, this design necessitated a compromise: To enable orthogonal manipulations of norm violation and sanctioning, neither the norm violator (who never purchased a ticket) nor the norm abider (who lost it) showed a valid ticket, which is sanctionable behavior. Although this enabled a full-factorial design allowing different comparisons between conditions, including a condition with sanctions for a norm abider who lost the ticket, may have undermined the credibility of the scenario, and renders interpretation of the results less straightforward. First, norm violators might have appeared more powerful than norm abiders not because norm violators demonstrated volitional capacity, but because norm abiders seemed incapable. Second, one might question whether norm abiders who lost their ticket really abided by norms, as, according to German train regulations, travelers must at all times be able to show a valid ticket. Therefore, in Study 2, we let the norm abider buy and show a ticket to the controller, moving from the 2×2 design of Study 1 to a 3-cell design.

Study 2 employed a 3-cell (norm abider vs. norm violator vs. sanctioned norm violator) between-subjects design and relied on a sample of Dutch participants that was collected as part of a larger project. Participants could win one of five 10€ vouchers. Ethics approval was obtained from the ethical review board, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam (ref.: 2017-COP-8050). All participants provided written informed consent prior to their participation (online, by clicking “yes”).

To ensure comparable cell sizes as in Study 1, we recruited 159 participants at the university, of which 132 were retained for analyses (83 women, 49 men, M age = 25.80, range = 18–66). Seven participants were removed because they did not complete the questionnaire, and an additional 20 participants were excluded because they failed attention checks. These exclusion criteria were decided a-priori. A sensitivity analysis conducted in G-power suggested that with 5 predictors (experimental condition 1 [non-sanctioned norm violators vs. abiders], experimental condition 2 [non-sanctioned norm violators vs. sanctioned norm violators], volition, violation x condition 1, volition x condition 2) and α = 0.05 the analysis would have a power of 0.80 to detect a small to medium effect (ƒ 2 = 0.10). In addition, we calculated ν-statistics [ 35 ] to establish sufficient power. The central test in Study 2 constituted the regression of power on the interaction between volition and experimental condition, which resulted in a ν-statistic of ν = .999 (regressing of volition on experimental condition resulted in a ν-statistic of 0.955). This indicates that our study was sufficiently powered.

As in Study 1, participants read about a traveler who either purchased a ticket before boarding a train (norm abider) or purchased a snack instead (and no ticket). When approached by a controller, the norm abider showed the ticket. The norm violator told the controller that he did buy a ticket but said that he had already been checked. The controller then either did not insist on seeing the ticket (norm violator) or did insist and fined the traveler who was unable to show the ticket (sanctioned norm violator; see the S1 File for the full scenarios). Assignment to conditions was random.

After reading about the traveler, participants completed the same measures of perceived power (α = .87) and volition (α = .85) as in Study 1. Besides completing manipulation and attention checks (see below), participants answered a set of additional questions as part of a student project, which were not analyzed (see the S1 File ).

Manipulation checks . Three questions assessed in how far participants thought the norm violator violated norms: “He behaved in line with norms”, “He violated norms”, and “He behaved appropriately” (reverse coded, α = .92; adapted from Stamkou et al [ 23 ]). Three further questions assessed in how far participants thought the traveler was sanctioned: “The traveler was punished”, “The traveler had to pay for his behavior”, and “The traveler was fined” (α = .96). Scale anchors for all scales in this study ranged from 1 = completely disagree , to 7 = completely agree .

Attention check . Participants were asked whether the traveler bought a ticket and whether the controller fined the traveler. Answer options were yes versus no, and participants who provided incorrect responses were excluded from the analyses.

Separate ANOVAs on the manipulation checks with experimental condition as between subjects variable revealed significant differences between conditions on both the norm violation manipulation check, F (2,129) = 161.62, p < .001, η p 2 = .715, and the sanctioning manipulation check, F (2,129) = 179.08, p < .001, η p 2 = .735. Participants perceived both the sanctioned ( M = 5.89, SD = 0.87, 95% CI [5.630, 6.143]) and the non-sanctioned norm violator ( M = 5.91, SD = 1.03, 95% CI [5.585, 6.237]) to have violated norms to a greater extent than the norm abider ( M = 2.41, SD = 1.23, 95% CI [2.036, 2.782]). Participants also perceived the sanctioned norm violator ( M = 5.95, SD = 0.85, 95% CI [5.702, 6.199]) as having been sanctioned to a greater extent than either the non-sanctioned norm violator ( M = 2.28, SD = 1.13, 95% CI [1.927, 2.643]), or the norm abider ( M = 2.20, SD = 1.24, 95% CI [1.821, 2.573]). This shows that the manipulations were successful.

As in Study 1, we aimed to replicate Van Kleef et al.’s [ 5 ] norm violation → volition → perceived power links in the absence of sanctioning, before investigating how these links are affected by sanctioning. As illustrated in Fig 5 , a planned contrast revealed that, in the absence of sanctions, norm violators appeared more powerful than norm abiders, t (83) = 7.27, p < .001, 95% CI [0.697, 1.222], d = 1.579 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).

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Note . Means within a row with a different subscript differ at p < .05.

Concerning the mediating role of volition, norm violators were seen as acting more according to their own volition compared to norm abiders, B = 1.12, SE = 0.15, t (83) = 7.30, p < .001, 95% CI [0.816, 1.427], and greater volitional capacity was, in turn, related to greater perceived power, B = 0.29, SE = 0.09, t (82) = 3.30, p = .001, 95% CI [0.117, 0.471. Bootstrapped confidence intervals showed that the indirect effect of norm violation on perceived power via volition was significant, B indirect = 0.33, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [0.118, 0.623], υ = 0.046. We therefore consider the replication of the norm violation → volition → perceived power chain successful and proceed to investigate how sanctions affect this chain.

We predicted that sanctioning reduces the extent to which norm violators appear powerful. Furthermore, we proposed that sanctioning reduces the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends. First, we tested whether sanctioning reduces the extent to which norm violators are seen as powerful. A planned contrast indicates that sanctioned norm violators were indeed perceived as less powerful than non-sanctioned norm violators, t (86) = -7.38, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.544, -0.889], d = -1.578 (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations).

Second, mixed-model ANOVA among norm violators with sanctioning (no sanction vs. sanction) as between-subjects factor and scale (volition vs. power) as within-subjects factor revealed—besides significant main effects of sanctioning, F (1,86) = 28.66, p < .001, η p 2 = .250 and scale F (1,86) = 64.37, p < .001, η p 2 = .428—a significant interaction between both, F (1,86) = 25.30, p < .001, η p 2 = .227. As Fig 6 shows, whereas sanctioning did not significantly reduce the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition, t (86) = 1.18, p = .241, 95% CI [-0.136, 0.533], d = 0.252, they significantly reduced perceptions of power t (86) = 7.38, p < .001, 95% CI [0.889, 1.544], d = 1.578. As in Study 1, this is consistent with the possibility that sanctioning reduces the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends.

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In a final step, we tested whether sanctioning moderates the effect of volition on power perceptions. Unlike in Study 1, where the 2×2 design allowed us to test this prediction in a moderated mediation model, we now regressed power perceptions on the interaction between experimental condition and volition, overall R adj 2 = 0.401. This analysis corresponds to testing for moderated mediation in Study 1 (specifically, to the b 2 path in Fig 4 ). If sanctioning indeed reduces the signal of power that norm violators’ apparent volitional capacity sends, we should find an interaction between volition and the comparison of sanctioned vs. non-sanctioned norm violators, which is why we chose the latter as reference group. This regression revealed a significant effect of volition, B = 0.50, SE = 0.14, t (126) = 3.50, p = .001, 95% CI [0.218, 0.786], an interaction between volition and norm abidance (vs. non-sanctioned norm violation), B = -0.43, SE = 0.21, t (126) = -2.09, p = .039, 95% CI [-0.838, -0.022], and the expected interaction between volition and sanctioned norm violation (vs. non-sanctioned norm violation), B = -0.41, SE = 0.19, t (126) = -2.23, p = .028, 95% CI [-0.780, -0.046]. This suggests that the relationship between volition and power was different for non-sanctioned norm violators compared to both norm abiders and sanctioned norm violators. As the simple slopes in Fig 7 illustrate, for non-sanctioned norm violators, greater volition inferences translated into greater inferences of power, B = 0.50, SE = 0.14, 95% CI [0.218, 0.786], whereas this was not the case for norm abiders, B = 0.07, SE = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.222, 0.365], or sanctioned norm violators, B = 0.09, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [-0.144, 0.322]. The positive slope for non-sanctioned norm violators significantly differed from the flatter slopes of both norm abiders, t (126) = 2.09, p = .039, 95% CI [0.022, 0.838], d = 0.453, and sanctioned norm violators, t (126) = 2.23, p = .028, 95% CI [0.046, 0.780], d = 0.476, indicating that sanctions indeed attenuated the signal of power that norm violator’s apparent volition sends.

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The labels in the figure correspond to the following labels in Study 1: no sanction (non-sanctioned norm violator in Study 1), sanction (sanctioned norm violator), and control (non-sanctioned norm abider).

Study 2 replicated the finding that norm violators are seen as acting more according to their own volition, and that greater volition in turn relates to greater inferences of power [ 5 ]. As expected, sanctioning reduced the extent to which norm violators were seen as powerful, but it did not significantly affect the extent to which norm violators appeared to act according to their own volition. This suggests that sanctioning specifically targets the power-signaling effect of volition, and the interaction between experimental condition and volition further supported this prediction.

General discussion

Next to eliciting negative responses in observers, people who violate norms also demonstrate that they can behave as they wish, which makes them appear powerful [ 5 ]. This may open the door to a “self-reinforcing loop” (p. 351 [ 16 ]) in which norm violators gain power in the eyes of observers, in turn giving norm violators more leeway to keep violating norms and consolidating their ascribed power. The question then arises: How can we prevent people from gaining influence through norm violations? Here we proposed that sanctioning reduces the extent to which norm violator’s volition signals power, thereby breaking the norm violation → volition → perceived power chain. In two studies we replicated this chain [ 5 ], and in both studies sanctions reduced perceptions of power. In Study 1, in which we prioritized the use of a full-factorial design over ecological validity, sanctioning reduced power perceptions irrespective of volition. In Study 2, in which we employed a one-factor design to enable creating more realistic scenarios, we found support for the idea that sanctioning specifically targets the extent to which norm violators’ apparent volition signals power. Together, the results of both studies suggest that sanctioning can break the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations might set off [ 5 , 16 ].

Theoretical and practical implications

The current findings have a number of implications. From a theoretical perspective, we demonstrated that sanctioning reduces power perceptions, rather than perceptions of volition. By identifying a boundary condition of the power-signaling effect of volition, we expand previous research on this link [ 5 , 31 ] and enrich understanding of costly signaling [ 25 , 26 ]. Our findings suggest that potentially costly behavior (e.g., a norm violation) can only act as a signal of an underlying trait (e.g., power) in the absence of additional cues that provide direct information about that trait (e.g., no sanctions). When translating costly signaling theory from animal to human behavior [ 25 , 40 ], the possibility that additional information (e.g., a sanction) may drown potentially costly indirect signals (e.g., the demonstration of volitional capacity) needs to be taken into account.

From a practical perspective, our findings suggest that sanctions may be effective in breaking the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations may set off [ 5 , 16 ]. This points to ways in which the ascent of norm violators in social hierarchies can be prevented. For example, employees can create a culture in which blatant interruptions are not tolerated by reprimanding interrupters. Should norm violations persist, more formal sanctions may be called for.

Limitations and future directions

The current study has a number of limitations. First, although in both studies sanctioning reduced power perceptions, the results are mixed concerning the underlying mechanism. Whereas in Study 1 sanctioning reduced power perceptions irrespective of volition, Study 2 yielded support for the idea that sanctioning specifically targets the extent to which norm violators’ apparent volition signals power. One explanation for this discrepancy may lie in the different control conditions we employed. In Study 1, norm abiders were—like norm violators—not able to show a valid ticket, and some norm abiders were also sanctioned. Although this design is adequate to test predictions in a full-factorial model allowing different comparisons between conditions, it also made interpretation of the results difficult. We solved this dilemma by running a second study that was more realistic and unequivocal as norm abiders now bought and showed a valid ticket to the controller. Future replication efforts should therefore focus on Study 2 to gain further confidence in the robustness of our findings. Also, although previous research [ 5 , 14 ] confirmed the mediating role of volition in the link between norm violation and perceived power, future research could experimentally manipulate volition as to substantiate a causal relation between volition and perceived power.

A second limitation is our reliance on scenarios. This approach affords experimental control and allowed us to make clear to our participants whether or not norms were violated (by informing participants whether a ticket was bought). Although previous research [ 5 , 8 , 23 , 24 ] has shown that results obtained in scenario studies were very consistent with results obtained in more realistic settings, future studies could investigate and extend the current findings using more ecologically valid procedures. In addition, strong evidence for the effect of norm violation on power perceptions would be if bystanders would submit to the supposed power of norm violators, for example, by following their instructions. Future research could focus on measuring the behaviors of bystanders reflecting their submission to norm violators’ power.

A further complication and next step for future research is that real-life interactions may not terminate after a sanction, but instead the norm violator may object to, or even retaliate against, the punisher. Indeed, previous research already pointed out that enacting sanctions may only be possible for dominant individuals [ 41 ], and characteristics of the punisher therefore also need to be taken into account. Also, future studies could investigate observer responses in situations where the norm violator is a member of an ingroup or outgroup or where norm violators continue their behavior after being sanctioned.

Third, we considered the norm violation in this study as a violation of a descriptive and injunctive legal norm. We assumed that buying a train ticket is a well-known legal norm enacted and endorsed as appropriate by most study participants. Although we did not test this assumption, the results of the manipulation checks in both studies showed that participants perceived the behavior of the norm violator to be violating of norms. Train passengers who do not buy a train ticket transgress a legal norm and run the risk of being formally penalized by means of a fine. Note that laws, as opposed to social norms, are not negotiated through social interaction, which means that people’s responses to violating the legal norm to buy a train ticket may be relatively similar across social contexts [ 42 ]. Prior research has shown that legal norm violations such as financial fraud [ 5 ] or illegal parking [ 23 ] elicit similar responses from observers as non-legal norm violations such as arriving late to a meeting [ 8 ] or putting one’s feet on another’s table [ 5 ]. The recurring pattern across these and various other behaviors is that norm violators are perceived by others as powerful. Future research on norm violation could pay more attention to the actual endorsement and enactment of specific norms among study participants. Additionally, future research could examine situations where the violation of an injunctive norm does not constitute a violation of a descriptive norm and vice versa [ 43 , 44 ] to understand how participants differentially respond to violations of such more complicated normative influences.

In addition, not all norm violations are created equal [ 4 ]. Free-riding on the train is costly to society, and therefore sanctioning may be in order. However, some norms are outright harmful [ 45 ]. Going against such harmful norms may underline norm violators’ apparent conviction of what is right and wrong. When norms are violated for deontological reasons, sanctioning might not reduce inferences of power. On the contrary, sanctions might elevate norm violators to the status of a martyr as they suffer for a cause [ 46 ], thereby allowing them to amass even more influence.

Finally, our studies comprised a majority of female participants from different countries (Germany and the Netherlands). Although this gender composition is not representative for the population, we do not assume gender differences in individual responses to the violation of a legal norm such as buying a train ticket. Moreover, participants were randomly assigned to conditions and our findings corroborate those of previous research. We found that the German participants in Study 1 perceived non-sanctioned norm abiders to have violated norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders. This unexpected finding might stem from a culturally defined norm that a monetary fine should always be imposed when travelers cannot show a ticket. Indeed, cultures vary in norm strength and tolerance of deviant behavior [ 47 ] and may therefore differ in responses to (missing) sanctions. Also, the current studies were conducted in individualistic (as opposed to collectivistic) cultures where there is a positive link between norm violation and power perceptions [ 8 ]. Therefore, future research could address possible cultural differences in responses to the sanctioning of norm violations [ 48 ].

Our results indicate that sanctioning can prevent norm violators from gaining power in the eyes of observers. Sanctions may therefore be effective in breaking the self-reinforcing loop to power that norm violations can set off [ 5 , 16 ].

Supporting information

Funding statement.

The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.

Data Availability

PLoS One. 2021; 16(7): e0254574.

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18 Feb 2021

PONE-D-20-25007

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Reviewer #1: The paper tackles an interesting and important topic, it is well written and all analyses are described clearly, including limitations and indicating which aspects where exploratory or previously hypothesized.

I thus have only a few minor comments:

- the authors remain a bit silent about which online participant pools they use. Is this something comparable to MTurk, or are these student participants?

- Some of the arguments for the difference in effects between the first study and previous studies are based on arguments about the German Railway norms, however, the second study then is (again, as previous studies, I guess) done in the Netherlands. It would be interesting to understand whether this - as opposed to the design differences - plays a role for the effects, whether norms and norm abidance are perceived differently in the two systems.

- the authors themselves discuss that one problem with the results is the hypothetical character. There are by now several studies from the team of Marie-Claire Villeval (Lyon) which use real settings to study similar questions. I am wondering whether the authors are aware of this research and whether they might consider doing more real world studies in the future.

- in their motivational examples, the authors always use firm contexts (interrupting colleagues etc.) - why do they then choose railway examples for the study?

- my main issue is actually with the signaling idea. If norm violation signals power through being a potentially costly volitional behavior, sanctioning should not necessarily reduce perceived power. The study actually cannot scrutinize this link, as it is a one-shot behavior that is being described. If there were no sanctions, it wouldn´t be costly signaling. Thus, the described mechanism could only work if norm violators keep violating even though there is a chance of being sanctioned - which implies, that in some cases they will be fined, in others not. The design is as it is, but I would like to see a more thorough discussion of this.

Reviewer #2: The study deals with an interesting and important topic related to social norms. The methods sound appropriate to test the hypotheses.

I now focus on issues that would help to improve this manuscript:

- One major issue with this paper is the need to explicate social norms. The literature has been well-documented with norms being conceptualized as injunctive norms and descriptive norms. The association between norms and social sanction has been extensively discussed in the work of Cialdini et al. (1990), Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), and Lapinski and Rimal (2005). Injunctive norms refer to what ought to be done while descriptive norms pertaining to the prevalence of a behavior. Thus, this study seems to intend to deal with injunctive norms rather than descriptive norms. Further, social norms and law are distinct concept (see Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). This study does not seem to distinguish law violation from norm violation. I would think this paper focuses on law and legal sanction, rather a norm-based approach.

- Similarly, the explication of the power concept is limited. Authors define power as the perceived potential to influence others, which is not real power (individuals might not actually hold that power, but only are perceived by others). The lack of explication makes the conceptualization and operationalization of this variable sound less convincing. When we read/see a person not buying a bus ticket, there is little ground to argue that others would think the violator has a great deal of power. The authors use an example of people violating the talking norms in meetings to illustrate their point, but these two contexts are fundamentally different: Some people can talk freely in meetings because they either have real power or the behavior could actually be part of the organizational norms (the meeting norm is that you can interrupt others' talk if you do have something important to say). I would not think a traveler who did not conform to the law as having "a great deal of power," not mentioning that they told lies to authorities. I would think that someone escaping a law sanction as a lucky individual and that should be inferred as the person having power, unless he/she has further actions (ex: making a phone call to powerful others, which is a form of reference power). Such definition and operationalization as written in the paper, therefore, do not sound convincing to me.

- I see that it is quite controversial to argue that freedom to do something would always lead to inferences of power possession. It might only signal power as the authors suggest under some certain conditions (there should be boundary conditions). I would think that people can think of someone who acts as she/he wants, which deviates from social approval, as having less power. This rival theory can be illustrated, for example, by historical accounts related to social movements in which less powerful individuals in a society (both real and perceived) violate a political norm/law to gain power. We may also see drivers overspeed and think of them as traffic violators who would likely confront more powerful others (policemen). This social comparison will likely lead to perceptions of the violators as being less powerful, or even having no power and thus defying law to satisfy their desired power. In the same vein, a person did not buy a ticket might mean he/she has no other choice (lack of freedom) and thus violates the law (no power). This line of reasoning shows that the theorization of the model in this paper seems problematic because the authors left too many rival theories unaddressed.

- When theorization is not sound, having supporting data does not help much. The three key variables likely often have some sorts of correlations. A statistical model can be statistically significant without any theoretical background. Plus, the idea that someone has power could have more freedom to do things, even violating a law is not new in the literature. Also, the idea of sanctioning someone reducing his/her power offers no novel theoretical implication (someone goes to jail of course will normally have much less power than before). I do not see how such theorizations add to the literature.

That says, I commend the authors on engaging in a project with a rigorously methodological design. I sincerely appreciate the author(s)’ work, and I wish them the best of luck with this project.

Reviewer #3: This manuscript reports two experiments designed to test the hypothesis that norm violators will appear less powerful when they are punished than when they are not. The experiments build on earlier research showing that norm violators are perceived as more powerful than norm abiders; they introduce sanctions as a moderator of this effect.

The manuscript has a number of strengths: The research is methodologically sound; the analyses are appropriate; the write-up is clear and complete. At the same time, the research makes a very modest contribution to the literature, even more modest than the write-up suggests. It mainly shows that an effect previously demonstrated by these investigators has limited scope. It is good to know that, of course, but it does not represent the level of contribution typically found in PLOS ONE articles.

Let me describe briefly how I would interpret the results of this research, as my interpretation is somewhat different from how the authors frame the results. These results demonstrate that in a situation in which there are rules for how to behave, people are sensitive to where the power lies: with the rules or with the individuals. (I’m using rules here, rather than norms, because the research scenario conflates the two, but the same analysis holds for norms.) To the extent that people follow the rules and violations of the rules are enforced, power lies with the rules; to the extent that people violate the rules and get away with it, power lies with the individuals. Volition, on the other hand, depends on whether people try to follow the rules. Study 1 shows that neither rule-abiders nor rule-violators have much power if the rules are enforced, but if the rules are not enforced, even people who accidentally violate them (by not having their ticket to present to the conductor) have power. Study 2 shows that rules are powerful when people abide by them and when they are enforced; the relationship between individual volition and power is strongest when rules are weak. This summary captures all of the findings of this research and is entirely consistent with current views of how social rules and norms work. They clarify that the earlier finding of greater power attributed to norm violators holds only when norms are weak, but that simply serves to limit the scope and importance of the earlier finding. It does not challenge or extend current understandings of the way norms work.

I will leave to the editor the decision of whether this manuscript makes enough of a contribution to warrant publication in PLOS ONE. Regardless of where it is published, I think some revision is in order to simplify and clarify the presentation and interpretation of the results.

Reviewer #4: Referee report: PONE-D-20-25007

Summary of the paper

The authors (1) replicate previous research that third-party observers believe that norm violators have a greater volition and power than norm abiders, and (2) extend that research to understand whether sanctions can be used to reduce perceptions of power associated with norm violation. The authors conduct two studies: (1) with a German online sample and a 2X2 design (Abiding norm, violating norm)X(Sanctions, No Sanctions) and (2) with a Dutch online sample with 1X3 design (Abiding Norm), (Violating Norm X Sanctions), (Violating Norm X No Sanctions).

The authors use a vignette about a passenger buying or not buying a ticket on a train, and a controller either sanctioning (or not) the passenger who fails to show a ticket. They measure survey respondents’ perceptions of the passenger’s volition and power using survey questions. The authors claim that the main mechanism of how norm violation affects power is through volition i.e., a passenger who violates a norm is considered to act on their own volition, and this belief about volition leads to increased perceptions about the power they possess. The authors find that sanctions reduce the perceptions of power of the passenger irrespective of whether they are norm abiding or not, and irrespective of their volition (Result of Study 1). They find weak evidence for the mechanism that norm violation affects power through volition.

The paper is well-written, and the data collection and analysis are well-done.

Major critique

1. The paper clearly shows that introduction of sanctions reduces power associated with both norm-abiding and norm-violating individuals. However, the mechanism that norm violation leads to increased volition that further leads to increased power is not supported by evidence. The authors cannot claim that the mechanism is true unless they vary volition exogenously and find that perceptions of power are affected by that variation.

2. The results from Study 1 suggest that introduction of sanctions reduce perceptions of passenger’s power irrespective of his/her volition and his/her norm abidance/violation. In study 2, the authors find a different result because that they do not have a treatment with sanctions for norm-abiding behavior in this Study and thus do not have much variation in volition. I don’t think we can conclude from Study 2 that the claimed mechanism (Norm Violation-->Increased volition-->Increased power) is true.

3. Moreover, volition and power are correlated. However, there is no evidence that it is higher volition that leads to greater power. It could be the other way round where higher power leads to having greater volition.

4. It is not clear what “power” means in the context of a passenger who either buys or does not buy a ticket on a train. How does not buying a ticket make one more influential? A better way to measure power in this situation would be to see if the third-party observer is more likely to follow instructions from someone who violated the norm versus who obeyed the norm.

5. The payment to participants is small and probabilistic. For example, the participants had a 20% chance of winning a 10Euro voucher in Study 2. It is unclear how seriously the participants took the survey with these small incentives.

6. The authors use a vignette about the norm of buying a ticket or not on a train. The authors may want to discuss how this specific situation can be generalized to other situations.

Minor critique

1. When you say norms, can you clarify if they are descriptive or prescriptive norms?

2. Both the sanction and no sanction conditions in the paper technically have sanctions, in one case they are enforced and in another they are not. The authors can clarify that by changing their terminology.

3. 75% of the sample is women and is not representative of the German population in Study 1. The authors may want to discuss how the gender composition of their sample may affect the result.

4. Since Study 1 and 2 are conducted with different populations (German vs Dutch online samples), the others should comment on how comparable these studies are. Are there differences in norms of ticket buying in these two populations?

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Reviewer #1: No

Reviewer #3: No

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Author response to Decision Letter 0

28 Mar 2021

Responses to Editor comments

1. Please ensure that your manuscript meets PLOS ONE's style requirements, including those for file naming.

Response: We have carefully checked that our manuscript meets PLOS ONE's style requirements.

Response: The study was approved by the Ethical review board of the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Amsterdam, but data was collected online from a convenience sample of participants in Germany. The Code of Conduct of the German Psychological Society stipulates ethical considerations ( https://www.dgps.de/index.php?id=85 ) for research with human participants, which do not reference special permits required for international researchers. Further, ethical considerations in research in Germany are subject to the same codified ethical guidelines as in the Netherlands, namely the Helsinki Declaration and European data protection regulations. Therefore, no additional permits were required to conduct this research. We have added this information in the ethics statement in both the manuscript (Methods section Study 1) and submission.

'Institutional review board: Ethical review board, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, Approval numbers: 2014-WOP-3498 and 2017-COP-8050

Response: We have amended the ethics statements in the Methods sections of Study 1 (p. 6) and Study 2 (p. 14), respectively and we have added the same text to the “Ethics Statement” field of the submission form.

Responses to Reviewer #1:

The paper tackles an interesting and important topic, it is well written and all analyses are described clearly, including limitations and indicating which aspects where exploratory or previously hypothesized.

Response: Thank you for the overall positive evaluation of our work and your constructive comments.

1. the authors remain a bit silent about which online participant pools they use. Is this something comparable to MTurk, or are these student participants?

Response: The online participant pool (Mage=23.78) was recruited from passers-by at a German university campus as well as through social media. We have added this information on page 6.

2. Some of the arguments for the difference in effects between the first study and previous studies are based on arguments about the German Railway norms, however, the second study then is (again, as previous studies, I guess) done in the Netherlands. It would be interesting to understand whether this - as opposed to the design differences - plays a role for the effects, whether norms and norm abidance are perceived differently in the two systems.

Response: There are cultural differences as well as similarities between the two countries on dimensions that are relevant to norm violation. Germany scores higher than the Netherlands on cultural tightness, which relates to the importance that is attached to rules and the severity of punishment for violations (Gelfand et al., 2011). In Study 1 (German sample) we found that non-sanctioned norm abiders were perceived to have violated norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders, although the effect size was small. We could speculate that participants were aware of the railway operators’ right to fine the traveler and – due to their tightness - were indignant that the traveler got away without this fine.

Germany and the Netherlands are comparable in terms of individualism, the degree to which uniqueness, personal achievement, and self-expression are valued (as opposed to group harmony and collective outcomes). A cross-cultural comparison of responses to norm violations (including data from Germany and the Netherlands) revealed that particularly respondents from individualistic cultures (including Germany and the Netherlands) perceive norm violators as more powerful than norm abiders (Stamkou et al., 2019).

Finally, regarding the specific scenario in this study, we would like to note that Germany and the Netherlands are European Schengen states, allowing free traveling among these states, and therefore use similar terms and conditions for train travel. In the discussion section, we now address the possibility of cultural differences as a subject for future research.

3. the authors themselves discuss that one problem with the results is the hypothetical character. There are by now several studies from the team of Marie-Claire Villeval (Lyon) which use real settings to study similar questions. I am wondering whether the authors are aware of this research and whether they might consider doing more real world studies in the future.

Response: The work by Villeval and her colleagues (e.g., Dai et al., 2018) is very interesting and employs creative methods. Importantly, this work is mainly focused on the intrapersonal drivers of norm breaking behaviors (e.g., what determines cheating behavior in individuals) and not on interpersonal dynamics (i.e., how do others respond to observing individuals who violate the norms), which is the approach we take in our work.

Responses to norm violations can indeed be studied in various ways, which entail different trade-offs between ecological validity and experimental control. We have used a variety of approaches in our work, including scenarios, pictures, video clips, recalled situations, and live interactions with trained actors to investigate responses to norm violations (Stamkou et al., 2016, 2018, 2019; Van Kleef et al., 2011, 2012). Scenarios, pictures, and video clips afford greater experimental control, whereas recalled situations and live interactions afford greater ecological validity. Which method is most suitable in a given study depends on the nature of the research question in combination with the possibilities and constraints of the different methodological approaches. For the current project, we prioritized experimental control to enable causal conclusions about the effects of sanctioning on responses to norm violators. Although we acknowledge the limitations of the scenario approach, we have found in our previous work that results obtained in scenario studies were very consistent with results obtained in richer yet less controlled settings. We are therefore confident in the validity of the current findings. Nonetheless, we see value in validating and extending the current findings using more ecologically valid procedures, and in the revised paper we explicitly call for future research using such procedures (see p. 22).

References (not mentioned in the paper):

Dai, Z., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2018). Cheating in the lab predicts fraud in the field: An experiment in public transportation. Management Science, 64(3), 1081-1100.

Stamkou, E., Van Kleef, G. A., & Homan, A. C. (2018). The art of influence: When and why deviant artists gain impact. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 115, 276-303.

4. in their motivational examples, the authors always use firm contexts (interrupting colleagues etc.) - why do they then choose railway examples for the study?

Response: We have used the railway scenario because all study participants can easily imagine this setting and most likely have experience with the described situation. In our previous work (see references comment 3), we have used organizational, educational, artistic, and personal settings to study responses to norm violators and found that effects were consistent across settings.

5. my main issue is actually with the signaling idea. If norm violation signals power through being a potentially costly volitional behavior, sanctioning should not necessarily reduce perceived power. The study actually cannot scrutinize this link, as it is a one-shot behavior that is being described. If there were no sanctions, it wouldn´t be costly signaling. Thus, the described mechanism could only work if norm violators keep violating even though there is a chance of being sanctioned - which implies, that in some cases they will be fined, in others not. The design is as it is, but I would like to see a more thorough discussion of this.

Response: There is considerable evidence that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as powerful (for a recent review, see Stamkou, Homan, & Van Kleef, 2020). The theoretical rationale underlying this prediction is that people who violate norms signal that they experience the leeway to act as they please despite normative constraints (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that people who violate norms are perceived as having high power (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2011), status (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014), and influence (e.g., Stamkou et al., 2018). Regarding the used scenario, individuals who do not buy a train ticket run a (high) risk of being sanctioned. Therefore, by not buying a ticket they signal to be oblivious to normative constraints and can behave as they wish (volition typically reserved for the powerful), which elicit power perceptions in observers. Our study shows that sanctions attenuated the signal of power that norm violator’s apparent volition sends. Observers likely conclude that the sanctioned norm violator does not have the power he seemed to have. In future studies, it would indeed be interesting to investigate how observers will respond to norm violators who keep violating even after having been sanctioned. We added this suggestion to the general discussion section.

Stamkou, E., Homan, A. C., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2020). Climbing the ladder or falling from grace? A threat-opportunity framework of the effects of norm violations on social rank. Current Opinion in Psychology, 33, 74-79.

Galinsky, A. D., Magee, J. C., Gruenfeld, D. H, Whitson, J. A., & Liljenquist, K. A. (2008). Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1450–1466.

Responses to Reviewer #2:

The study deals with an interesting and important topic related to social norms. The methods sound appropriate to test the hypotheses.

Response: Thank you for this positive comment to our work and your suggestions for improvement.

1. One major issue with this paper is the need to explicate social norms. The literature has been well-documented with norms being conceptualized as injunctive norms and descriptive norms. The association between norms and social sanction has been extensively discussed in the work of Cialdini et al. (1990), Fishbein and Ajzen (2011), and Lapinski and Rimal (2005). Injunctive norms refer to what ought to be done while descriptive norms pertaining to the prevalence of a behavior. Thus, this study seems to intend to deal with injunctive norms rather than descriptive norms. Further, social norms and law are distinct concept (see Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). This study does not seem to distinguish law violation from norm violation. I would think this paper focuses on law and legal sanction, rather a norm-based approach.

Response: Although there is a clear conceptual distinction between descriptive and injunctive norms, many common norm violations fall in both categories (Van Kleef, Gelfand, & Jetten, 2019). This is because behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group (injunctive norms) also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group (descriptive norms). Accordingly, almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms. For instance, studies examined responses to individuals who would come in late for a work meeting (Stamkou et al., 2019), put their feet on someone else’s table (Van Kleef et al., 2011), take someone else’s coffee (Van Kleef et al., 2012), park their bike in an illegal spot (Stamkou et al., 2016), or dress improperly for a (professional) occasion (Bellezza, Gino, & Keinan, 2014; Oostrom, Ronay, & Van Kleef, 2021). These are all behaviors that simultaneously infringe on injunctive norms (most people disapprove of these behaviors) and descriptive norms (most people do not exhibit these behaviors). The same is true for the norm violation examined in the current work: Most people believe it is appropriate to buy a train ticket (injunctive norm) and most people indeed do so (descriptive norm). The current operationalization thus reflects the natural conflation of descriptive and injunctive norms in real life. That said, it would be interesting to investigate in future research whether the moderating effect of sanctioning also applies to “pure” violations of descriptive versus injunctive norms. We now refer to descriptive and injunctive norms in the introduction section and we have added this suggestion for future research in the general discussion section.

The reviewer is correct in noting that we did not draw an explicit distinction between social and legal violations. Conceptually, we see legal violations as a subset of the broader category of norm violations. That is, people may violate norms in ways that are or are not punishable, depending on the nature of the infringement and the broader context (e.g., a national law system). In our previous work, we have seen that legal norm violations such as financial fraud (Van Kleef et al., 2011) or illegal parking (Stamkou et al., 2016) elicit similar responses from observers as non-legal norm violations such as arriving late to a meeting (Stamkou et al., 2019) or putting one’s feet on another’s table (Van Kleef et al., 2011): The recurring pattern across these and various other behaviors is that norm violators are perceived by others as powerful. In the revised introduction, we have made it explicit that our focus in the current research was on legal norm violations. Additionally, in the general discussion section (limitations and future directions) we note that previous research indicates that legal and non-legal norm violations elicit similar social responses (p. 23).

Oostrom, J. K., Ronay, R., & Van Kleef, G. A. (2021). The signalling effects of nonconforming dress style in personnel selection contexts: Do applicants’ qualifications matter? European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 30, 70-82.

2. Similarly, the explication of the power concept is limited. Authors define power as the perceived potential to influence others, which is not real power (individuals might not actually hold that power, but only are perceived by others). The lack of explication makes the conceptualization and operationalization of this variable sound less convincing. When we read/see a person not buying a bus ticket, there is little ground to argue that others would think the violator has a great deal of power. The authors use an example of people violating the talking norms in meetings to illustrate their point, but these two contexts are fundamentally different: Some people can talk freely in meetings because they either have real power or the behavior could actually be part of the organizational norms (the meeting norm is that you can interrupt others' talk if you do have something important to say). I would not think a traveler who did not conform to the law as having "a great deal of power," not mentioning that they told lies to authorities. I would think that someone escaping a law sanction as a lucky individual and that should be inferred as the person having power, unless he/she has further actions (ex: making a phone call to powerful others, which is a form of reference power). Such definition and operationalization as written in the paper, therefore, do not sound convincing to me.

Response: There is considerable evidence that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as powerful (for a recent review, see Stamkou, Homan, & Van Kleef, 2020). The theoretical rationale underlying this prediction is that people who violate norms signal that they experience the leeway to act as they please despite normative constraints (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that people who violate norms are perceived as having high power (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2011), status (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014), and influence (e.g., Stamkou et al., 2018). Furthermore, there is evidence that these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement (Stamkou et al., 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2012). Our two studies have shown that even individuals who did not buy a train ticket were perceived as more powerful. To acknowledge that our research speaks to perceived power, we have made this explicit throughout the paper (e.g., p. 4, pp. 9-13, pp. 15-17, p. 20, p. 22).

3. I see that it is quite controversial to argue that freedom to do something would always lead to inferences of power possession. It might only signal power as the authors suggest under some certain conditions (there should be boundary conditions). I would think that people can think of someone who acts as she/he wants, which deviates from social approval, as having less power. This rival theory can be illustrated, for example, by historical accounts related to social movements in which less powerful individuals in a society (both real and perceived) violate a political norm/law to gain power. We may also see drivers overspeed and think of them as traffic violators who would likely confront more powerful others (policemen). This social comparison will likely lead to perceptions of the violators as being less powerful, or even having no power and thus defying law to satisfy their desired power. In the same vein, a person did not buy a ticket might mean he/she has no other choice (lack of freedom) and thus violates the law (no power). This line of reasoning shows that the theorization of the model in this paper seems problematic because the authors left too many rival theories unaddressed.

Response: Please, see our response to your comment 2 and the recent review of Stamkou et al., 2020. In our paper we recognize that potentially costly behavior (e.g., a norm violation) can only act as a signal of an underlying trait (e.g., power) in the absence of additional cues that provide direct information about that trait (see p. 4). Hence, norm violation may not signal power to the same degree when additional information is available. Yet, if additional information is lacking (which seems also the case in your example of the speedy driver), bystanders tend to ascribe power to the norm violator as has been repeatedly demonstrated in prior research and in the current study. We stress this in the discussion section on pp. 21-22. To our best knowledge, our study is one of the few examining a boundary condition, namely sanctioning. Future research could investigate other boundary conditions, such as the background of the norm violator (which can act as an additional information cue). For instance, if people are aware of the power of the person violating the norm – a situation that you raise in your comment above – this should act as a moderator of the effect. Distantly speaking to your comment, we have some unpublished research that suggests that outgroup members breaking the norm are not seen as more powerful, whereas ingroup members who break the norm are seen as more powerful. We have added this suggestion to the discussion section (p. 22).

4. When theorization is not sound, having supporting data does not help much. The three key variables likely often have some sorts of correlations. A statistical model can be statistically significant without any theoretical background. Plus, the idea that someone has power could have more freedom to do things, even violating a law is not new in the literature. Also, the idea of sanctioning someone reducing his/her power offers no novel theoretical implication (someone goes to jail of course will normally have much less power than before). I do not see how such theorizations add to the literature.

Response: The key contribution of our study is not that sanctioning reduces power per se, but that sanctioning reduces the effect of norm violation on power perceptions. Our work is based on costly signaling theory (Bergmüller et al., 2007; Zahavi, 1995) and prior empirical evidence for the norm violation � volition � power chain (see Stamkou et al., 2020). A robust finding (in individualistic societies) is that norm violators are perceived by others as powerful and high status. This is important, because people often defer to (and are less likely to speak up to) others whom they perceive as powerful (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich 2013). Moreover, norm violators are sometimes granted power and leadership due to the impression they make on others, and this increased power in turn makes future violations more likely (Van Kleef, Wanders, Stamkou, & Homan, 2015). To the degree that this vicious cycle is a cause for concern, it is important to understand how it can be broken. The current research provides first evidence that sanctioning can sever the link between norm violation and power perceptions, thereby disrupting a potentially toxic spiral of norm violation and power abuse. Future research can build on our work and provide further evidence for the role of sanctions or other punishing responses (e.g., informal (social) punishment) in preventing people from gaining influence through norm violations.

Cheng JT, Tracy JL, Foulsham T, Kingstone A, Henrich J. Two ways to the top: evidence that dominance and prestige are distinct yet viable avenues to social rank and influence. J Pers. Soc. Psychol. 2013; 104(1). 103–125. doi: 10.1037/a0030398.

Response: We appreciate your challenging and constructive comments.

Responses to Reviewer #3:

This manuscript reports two experiments designed to test the hypothesis that norm violators will appear less powerful when they are punished than when they are not. The experiments build on earlier research showing that norm violators are perceived as more powerful than norm abiders; they introduce sanctions as a moderator of this effect.

Response: Thank you for your positive but also critical general comment.

Response: Our research is indeed built on solid theory and prior empirical evidence. We believe it is valuable to test theory in different context and with different methods. Also, it is good science to examine the boundary conditions of a theory. In this study, we do both: replicating prior evidence - but now in an experimental context where a legal norm is violated - and testing a boundary condition (sanctioning). Indeed, we show that norm violators gain more power in the eyes of bystanders when norms are not enforced by sanctions, which we believe is a highly relevant finding for dealing with norm violating behaviors in society. This finding may also hold for the violation of non-legal norms where the sanction is not a fine established by law or official rule but rather depends on the responses of bystanders. We plan further research into the ‘self-reinforcing loop’, by which norm violators appear powerful, bystanders submit to and consolidate the power of the norm violators and thus encourage further norm violation, can be broken (see p. 22). Based on your comment and the comments of the other reviewers we revised the text of the paper to clarify our conceptualizations and the interpretation of the results (see pp. 5, 21-24).

Responses to Reviewer #4:

Response: Thank you for your positive assessment of our work and your detailed comments.

Response: There is ample evidence from previous work that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as having high volitional capacity, which in turn fuels perceptions of power and influence (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014; Stamkou et al., 2018; Van Kleef et al., 2011). We replicate this link between volition and power. However, we agree that we didn’t manipulate volition and thus cannot claim causal evidence for this link. We address this point in the limitations and future directions section of the manuscript (see p. 22).

Response: The issue of sanctions for norm-abiding behavior is something we discussed at length in the author team. On the one hand, from the point of view of having orthogonal manipulations and allowing different comparisons between conditions, it is indeed desirable to include a condition in which norm-abiding behavior is sanctioned. On the other hand, from the point of view of validity, including such a condition is not desirable as it undermines the credibility of the scenario and makes the interpretation of comparisons with that condition less straightforward. We solved this dilemma by running two studies, one of each type, so that the disadvantages of one approach are remedied by the advantages of the other approach. We believe that in conjunction the two studies provide reasonable support for the presumed theoretical mechanism of volitional capacity. We have made these considerations more explicit in the revision (introduction Study 2 and limitations in the general discussion section; p. 13 and 21 respectively).

Response: Please, see our response to your comment 1.

Response: There is considerable evidence that individuals who violate norms are perceived by others as powerful (for a recent review, see Stamkou, Homan, & Van Kleef, 2020). The theoretical rationale underlying this prediction is that people who violate norms signal that they experience the leeway to act as they please despite normative constraints (Van Kleef et al., 2011). This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Accordingly, research has shown that people who violate norms are perceived as having high power (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2011), status (e.g., Bellezza et al., 2014), and influence (e.g., Stamkou et al., 2018). Furthermore, there is evidence that these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement (Stamkou et al., 2016; Van Kleef et al., 2012). Replicating previous studies, we also found that norm violation - operationalized as a passenger who did not buy a ticket on a train - elicited perceptions of power. Since people tend to submit to powerful others (DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Epitropaki et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2012) it would indeed be valuable to investigate - in a similar context as in the current study - if observers are also more likely to follow instructions from norm violators (p. 22). Thank you for this interesting suggestion. We have added it to the general discussion section.

Response: We are confident that our findings are based on data of participants who took the survey seriously. First, we excluded participants who did not finish the questionnaire and therefore did not invest enough effort. Second, we excluded participants who failed the attention checks. Third, the manipulation checks showed that the intended differences between conditions in the presence or absence of norm violation and sanctions were achieved. Finally, although we believe that all participants who completed the questionnaire were sufficiently motivated, participants were randomly assigned to conditions and thus we may assume that participants’ motivation is the same across conditions.

Response: Previous work has revealed that very different norm violations across a variety of settings have very similar effects on perceptions of power. For instance, studies examined responses to individuals who would come in late for a work meeting (Stamkou et al., 2019), put their feet on someone else’s table (Van Kleef et al., 2011), take someone else’s coffee (Van Kleef et al., 2012), park their bike in an illegal spot (Stamkou et al., 2016), or dress improperly for a (professional) occasion (Bellezza, Gino, & Keinan, 2014; Oostrom, Ronay, & Van Kleef, 2021). These are all behaviors that people typically neither approve nor exhibit. The same is true for the norm violation examined in the current work: Most people find it appropriate to buy a train ticket and they behave accordingly. All in all, we believe that the findings reported in the current paper are likely to generalize to other types of norm violations and other settings.

Response: Although there is a clear conceptual distinction between descriptive and prescriptive (injunctive) norms, many common norm violations fall in both categories (Van Kleef, Gelfand, & Jetten, 2019). This is because behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group. Accordingly, almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms (see Bellezza et al., 2014; Oostrom et al., 2021; Stamkou et al., 2016; Stamkou et al., 2019; Van Kleef et al., 2011; Van Kleef et al., 2012). The same is true for the norm violation examined in the current work: Most people believe it is appropriate to buy a train ticket and most people indeed do so. The current operationalization thus reflects the natural conflation of descriptive and injunctive norms in real life. We now refer to descriptive and injunctive norms in the introduction section of the revised paper.

Response: We agree that not buying a train ticket carries the risk of a formal penalty that may be enforced or not. The sanctioning in our paper refers to a formal (legal) rather than an informal (social) punishment. Depending on the experimental condition in Study 1, a sanction was imposed or not when the violator exhibited sanctionable behavior, that is, could not show a ticket to the controller (see page 14). In the overview of our study (page 5) we now state that sanctions refer to formal sanctions.

Response: We agree that the gender composition in Study 1 is not representative for the German population. However, we have no specific assumptions about possible gender differences in individual responses to the violation of legal norms. Moreover, participants were randomly assigned to conditions and the findings of the two studies are largely the same and in line with previous research. We now discuss the gender composition of our studies in the general discussion section (p. 23).

Response: There are cultural differences as well as similarities between the two countries in dimensions that are relevant to norm violation. Germany scores higher than the Netherlands on cultural tightness, which relates to the importance that is attached to rules and the severity of punishment for violations (Gelfand et al., 2011). In Study 1 (German sample) we found that non-sanctioned norm abiders were perceived to have violated norms to a greater extent than sanctioned norm abiders, although the effect size was small. We could speculate that participants were aware of the railway operators’ right to fine the traveler and – due to their tightness - were indignant that the traveler got away without this fine.

Finally, regarding the specific scenario in this study, we would like to note that Germany and the Netherlands are European Schengen states, allowing free traveling among these states, and therefore use similar terms and conditions for train travel. In the discussion section (p. 24), we now address the possibility of cultural differences as a subject for future research.

Submitted filename: Response to reviewers.docx

Decision Letter 1

21 May 2021

PONE-D-20-25007R1

In the revised version of the paper, please try to clarify the aspects related to descriptive and injunctive norms, how the perceived power has been measured, the specificity / limitations of the study. When revising the paper, please consider the reviewers' comments listed at the bottom of the email.

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1. If the authors have adequately addressed your comments raised in a previous round of review and you feel that this manuscript is now acceptable for publication, you may indicate that here to bypass the “Comments to the Author” section, enter your conflict of interest statement in the “Confidential to Editor” section, and submit your "Accept" recommendation.

Reviewer #1: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer #2: (No Response)

Reviewer #3: All comments have been addressed

2. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

Reviewer #3: (No Response)

3. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

4. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

5. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

6. Review Comments to the Author

Reviewer #1: Thank you for considering my comments carefully. I do not fully agree with your take on the signaling part, but your arguments are solid, and it is rather an empirical question whether your take is right, I think. As you refer it to further research, I think that´s sufficient.

Reviewer #2: I appreciate the authors’ efforts to address reviewers’ comments. I have these questions for the authors to clarify:

1. Descriptive and injunctive norms were not clearly defined in the revised manuscript. These norms are individually perceived. Social norms can be examined at the collective level, which is different from social norm existing at the individual/perceived level. At the collective level, both types of norms can converge, but not necessarily so at the perceived level. People are not always cognizant of the prevailing descriptive or injunctive norms in certain contexts (please see Tankard & Paluck, 2016). The social norm approach, therefore, suggests that misperception of social norms is a problematic issue for norm-violating behaviors (please see Berkowitz, 2005).

The authors wrote that injunctive norms and descriptive norms almost always work in the same directions. They wrote that behaviors that are endorsed as appropriate by the majority of the members of a group (injunctive norms) also tend to be enacted by the majority of the members of a group (descriptive norms). However, there are many situations where these two types of normative influences do not overlap, such as when people approve of, but do not practice, particular behaviors (Cialdini et al., 1990). Descriptive norms and injunctive norms can also be antagonistic, and they may provide us with conflicting information about normative behaviors in a given context (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). For example, consider these norm-violating behaviors: drinking, smoking, speeding, etc. (please see, for example, Chung & Rimal, 2016; Hue et al., 2015).

The authors responded that “almost all prior research on responses to norm violators has examined behaviors that would be considered violations of both descriptive and injunctive norms.” Perhaps, this manuscript needs to speak for itself as to why these two types of norms are almost all considered in such a way? Also, it might be necessary to address other theoretical frameworks that argue otherwise. For instance, the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990), the theory of normative social behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005), the reasoned action approach (Fishbein, 2009) suggest that violation of injunctive norms does not necessarily go along with violation of descriptive norms, and vice versa.

The authors commented that they see legal violations as a subset of the broader category of norm violations. So, it looks like this research approach suggests that violating the law also means violating social norms. To this point, please address this argument from social norm theorists:

“Different from laws, norms are socially negotiated and contextually dependent modes of conduct; laws are explicitly codified proscriptions that link violations with their corresponding punitive measures. Laws are not socially negotiated (although their enforcement might be), whereas norms and their transgressions, by definition, are negotiated through social interaction. This is an important criterion because it explains why the same mode of conduct (e.g., littering) is acceptable in one social context (littered environment) but not in another (clean environment; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Laws and norms can certainly reinforce each other. For example, smokers may choose to refrain from lighting up in a public place for a number of reasons, including legal (fear of being penalized) or normative (fear of being accosted by someone in the vicinity), both of which lead to the same outcome (not lighting up). At other times, the two may act in opposition to each other, as when underage college students follow alcohol-drinking norms despite this behavior being illegal.” (page 394, Rimal & Lapinski, 2015)

Berkowitz, A. D. (2005). An overview of the social norms approach. Changing the culture of college drinking: A socially situated health communication campaign, 1, 193-214.

Chung, A., & Rimal, R. N. (2016). Social norms: A review. Review of Communication Research, 4, 1-28.

Hue, D.T., Brennan, L., Parker, L. & Florian, M. (2015). But I am normal: Safe driving in Vietnam. Journal of Social Marketing, 5(2), 105-124.

Lapinski, M. K., & Rimal, R. N. (2005). An explication of social norms. Communication Theory, 15(2), 127-147.

Rimal, R. N., & Lapinski, M. K. (2015). A re-explication of social norms, ten years later. Communication Theory, 25(4), 393-409.

Tankard, M. E., & Paluck, E. L. (2016). Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. Social Issues and Policy Review, 10(1), 181-211.

2. This study focuses on the association between norm violation and perception of power. The authors defined power as the perceived potential to influence others. Additionally, they suggested that the perception of someone having the capacity to do what that someone wants, it signals that the person has the capacity to influence others (perception of power; line 58-60, page 4). Following this logic, a person who does not buy a ticket is perceived as having the potential to influence others. I am still confused with this logic. How is it possible that we travel on a bus and witness a stranger not buying a ticket would make us think that that person has the potential to influence us and others? In this scenario, I might think that the person possesses some degrees of autonomy to conduct such a behavior. Yet, autonomy is conceptually different from power and does not always lead to the attribution of power. So, an inference from a high degree of autonomy to a high level of power sounds like a leap in logic. The authors cited several studies to back up this argument in their response, but the manuscript should speak for itself considering that this is a pivotal theorization in this study.

Additionally, the authors wrote that “people who violate norms demonstrate that they can behave as they wish.” How do we tell if people would attribute someone who does not buy a ticket either as the person wishes to do so or that the person has no choice at all? If the attribution is related to the second scenario, does that still mean that the person is perceived to have the capacity to influence others? This situation seems to relate to observers’ perceptions of efficacy of a norm violator as well as observers’ attributions of the norm violator's traits. Attribution theory suggests that human tends to attribute others’ negative behaviors as causally due to internal factors and with less positive traits (e.g., fundamental attribution errors). As such, a norm violator can be attributed with more negative attributes (e.g., poor, desperate) than positive attributes (e.g., rich, high self-efficacy). Isn’t it logical to think that positive attributes would be more likely to associate with higher perception of power?

3. Operationalization of perceived power: It might be helpful to see the specific items used to measure perceived power. Right now, the manuscript says that the authors measured this construct by items like “I think this person has a great deal of power,” which does not tell if participants understood that power was about the potential ability to influence themselves and others. It would also be more informative for reviewers and readers to see the specific items measuring other scales because the items were adapted to this research situation.

4. What has been the common context of the studies the authors cited? Were these studies mostly conducted in the western context where law and order and transportation infrastructure are to some extent more stable than that in developing countries? It is hard to fathom that a thieve on a public bus in a non-western country (norm violator) would be perceived by on-lookers as having the potential to influence others (power). It is also hard to think of an illegal drug user as being someone who has power to influence others. I wonder if there is such a line of research related to this study’s main theoretical framework to be able to be generalized with a global implication. Even in the review of Stamkou et al. (2021) that the authors cited, this norm violation – perceived power linkage was shown to have contradicting effects in India. To this point, I still see that there’s a significant challenge to persuade readers of the causal link between the observation of norm-violation behaviors and perceived power.

5. The citation of perceived norm types should be acknowledged to Cialdini et al. (1990) who coined the terms, which then became widely adopted in social science.

6. The term “costly behavior” should be clearly defined and with an example. Perhaps, not all readers will have the in-depth knowledge of the authors’ research discipline.

7. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article ( what does this mean? ). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

Author response to Decision Letter 1

28 Jun 2021

Response: Thank you for giving us the opportunity to submit a second revised version of our manuscript.

Response: We have carefully considered the comments of Reviewer 2 and clarified the concepts of descriptive and injunctive norms, the measurement of perceived power, and the limitations of the study.

I appreciate the authors’ efforts to address reviewers’ comments.

Response: Thank you for your additional and helpful comments.

Response: Thank you for your concrete suggestion for better defining descriptive and injunctive norms. In the revised manuscript, we now state on page 3: “Injunctive and descriptive norms are individually perceived but when people are cognizant of prevailing norms and endorse these norms, both types of norms can converge and be shared at the collective level [18]”.

Also, please note that in our studies, people did perceive the behavior of the norm violator to be violating of norms (which is evident from the strong main effects on the manipulation check; eta squared = .845 in S1, and eta squared = .715 in S2). So, even though not everyone is always aware of the prevailing (descriptive or injunctive) norms in a certain situation, the behavior we studied in our research seems to be perceived consistently across participants.

Response: We fully agree that there are situations in which descriptive and injunctive norms do not overlap and that violation of injunctive norms does not necessarily go along with violation of descriptive norms. Your comment led us to realize that the claims we made about the frequent convergence of descriptive and injunctive norms we provided in the previous version of the paper may have been too strong, and we have therefore moderated our claims in the new revision. That said, in our studies we explicitly used a scenario in which a formal norm (a contract between the company operating the train and the passenger using its services) is violated (not buying a train ticket) that is likely endorsed and enacted by most members of a (western) society. In the revision, we have connected our claims about convergence of descriptive and injunctive norms more tightly to this specific operationalization so as not to imply that such convergence always occurs. To keep a clear focus in our paper, we decided not to elaborate further on other theoretical frameworks that address conflicting information about normative behaviors and possible discrepancies between the violation of injunctive and descriptive norms. Instead, in our discussion section we now reflect on our assumption that the participants in our study were cognizant of the norm to buy a train ticket and tended to endorse and enact this norm. The added information reads (page 24: “Third, we considered the norm violation in this study as a violation of a descriptive and injunctive legal norm. We assumed that buying a train ticket is a well-known legal norm enacted and endorsed as appropriate by most study participants. Although we did not test this assumption, the results of the manipulation checks in both studies showed that participants perceived the behavior of the norm violator to be violating of norms” and “Future research on norm violation could pay more attention to the actual endorsement and enactment of specific norms among study participants. Additionally, future research could examine situations where the violation of an injunctive norm does not constitute a violation of a descriptive norm and vice versa [43-44] to understand how participants differentially respond to violations of such more complicated normative influences”.

Response: Again, thank you for your concrete input. We now address the difference between laws and norms in the Discussion section. Our text on page 24 reads as follows: “Train passengers who do not buy a train ticket transgress a legal norm and run the risk of being formally penalized by means of a fine. Note that laws, as opposed to social norms, are not negotiated through social interaction, which means that people’s responses to violating the legal norm to buy a train ticket may be relatively similar across social contexts [42]. Prior research has shown that legal norm violations such as financial fraud [5] or illegal parking [23] elicit similar responses from observers as non-legal norm violations such as arriving late to a meeting [8] or putting one’s feet on another’s table [5]”.

Response: In order to better explain the link between norm violation and perceptions of power, we have revised the text on pages 3 and 4. The text on page 3 now reads as follows: “Social norms – implicit or explicit rules or principles that are understood by members of a group and that guide and/or constrain behavior [1] – create a shared understanding of what is acceptable within a given context and thereby contribute to the functioning of social collectives [2-4]. Accordingly, research has documented that people who violate norms tend to elicit negative responses in others, including unfavorable social perceptions [5], negative emotions [6- 8], scolding [9], gossip [10], and punishment [11-13]. Intriguingly, however, research has also demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful [5], high in status [14], and influential [15]”.

The text on pages 3-5 now reads as: “By ignoring the norms that bind others, norm violators demonstrate that they can act as they wish and do not fear interference from others [5]. This is a freedom that typically comes with higher rank [19]. The influential approach/inhibition theory of power [20] states that power, which is commonly defined as asymmetrical control over valuable resources that enables influence, liberates behavior, whereas powerlessness constrains it. Indeed, ample research supports that power renders people more likely to act, even if the resulting behavior is inappropriate or harmful [21-22]. Because behavioral freedom is thus intimately associated with power, people who observe unchecked behavior of others may make inferences about others’ level of power. Indeed, people who act as they wish and disregard social norms are perceived as having high status [14], influence [15], and power [5]. Furthermore, these perceptions can, under particular circumstances, fuel actual granting of power, for instance via the conferral of control over outcomes, voting, and leadership endorsement [23-24]. In line with the notion that power liberates behavior, previous research has demonstrated that norm violators are perceived as powerful because they appear to experience the freedom to act as they please [14-15, 5] – that is, they are high on volitional capacity. In other words, norm violators are perceived as powerful because their behavior signals an underlying quality, namely the freedom to act at will. This argument resonates with costly signaling theory [25-26], which states that any seemingly costly behavior (involving large investments or risks of receiving negative outcomes) functions as a signal of an underlying characteristic [25-26]. An example of costly behavior is the reckless driving of young men as to show their strength and skills to peers and potential mates, risking serious injury or death – a type of behavior that is under particular circumstances “rewarded” with power [27]. Norm violations are potentially costly as they are frequently sanctioned [14] by means of formal (e.g., legal) punishment [28] and/or informal (social) punishment (e.g., anger, social exclusion [29-30]). According to costly signaling theory, people who engage in potentially costly norm-violating behavior signal that they possess traits that allow them not to worry about interferences from others. Because this capacity to do what one wants is typically reserved for the powerful [31], norm violators appear powerful when there are no additional cues that provide direct information about this attribute [5]”.

Thank you for your thoughts about other (than power) perceptions of norm violators. Your intuition that norm violators are generally perceived negatively is borne out by previous research, which we believe makes it all the more interesting that people still perceive norm violators as powerful – except when they are sanctioned, as we demonstrate in the current paper, because sanctioning severs the link between perceived volitional capacity and perceived power. In the introduction section on page 3, we now briefly discuss previous work that has documented negative responses to norm violations to better contextualize the current findings and enable nuanced conclusions. Your comment also led us to think about associations between perceived power and other social perceptions of norm violators more broadly, which we will seriously consider when preparing future research on responses to norm violations.

Response: In the method section of Study 1, we refer to the supplementary material containing the scale items.

Perceived Power (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) was measured with the following items:

1. He can get people to listen to what he says.

2. His wishes do not carry much weight. [reverse scored]

3. He can get others to do what he wants.

4. Even if he voices them, his views have little sway. [reverse scored]

5. He thinks he has a great deal of power.

6. His ideas and opinions are often ignored. [reverse scored]

7. Even when he tries, he is not able to get his way. [reverse scored]

8. If he wants to, he gets to make the decisions.

In addition, we have added one more sample item of the perceived power scale in the Method section of Study 1.

Response: With regard to the question of whether a thieve on a bus would be perceived as being capable of influencing others, we believe the answer is a clear yes. Interpersonal influence stems not only from admirable qualities such as competence, expertise, and skill (which are related to prestige) but also from attributes such as assertiveness, intimidation, and coercion (which are related to dominance); see, for instance, Anderson and Kilduff (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013). With regard to culture, the studies we cite were mostly conducted in a western context, consequently showing a link between norm violation and observers’ power perceptions. Stamkou et al.’s (2019) cross-cultural comparison of responses to norm violations revealed that the link between norm violation and power perceptions is positive in individualistic cultures, but negative in collectivistic cultures (Stamkou et al., 2019). Moreover, individuals in tighter cultures are less willing to endorse norm violators as leaders, compared to those in looser cultures. It is clear from this cross-cultural study that observers’ responses to norm violations are indeed influenced by the cultural context in which the violation occurs. We have addressed this issue in the final paragraph of the Discussion section on page 25.

Response: Thank you for noting this omission. We have included the reference to Cialdini et al. (1990).

Response: We have revised the text on costly behavior. The text on page 5 now reads as: “This argument resonates with costly signaling theory [25-26], which states that any seemingly costly behavior (involving large investments or risks of receiving negative outcomes) functions as a signal of an underlying characteristic [25-26]. An example of costly behavior is the reckless driving of young men as to show their strength and skills to peers and potential mates, risking serious injury or death – a type of behavior that is under particular circumstances “rewarded” with power [27].”

References not included in the paper:

Cheng, J. T., Tracy, J. L., Foulsham, T., Kingstone, A., & Henrich, J. (2013). Two ways to the top: Evidence that dominance and prestige are distinct yet viable avenues to social rank and influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 103-125.

References added to the paper:

1. Cialdini RB, Trost MR. Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and compliance. In Gilbert DT, Fiske ST, Lindzey G, editors. Handbook of social psychology. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill; 1998. pp. 151–192.

2. Jetten J, Hornsey MJ. Deviance and dissent in groups. Annu Rev Psychol. 2014; 65: 461–485. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115151.

3. Tomasello M, Vaish A. Origins of human cooperation and morality. Annu Rev Psychol. 2013; 64: 231–255. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143812.

6. Gutierrez R, Giner-Sorolla R. Anger, disgust, and presumption of harm as reactions to taboo-breaking behaviors. Emotion. 2007; 7(4): 853–868. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.853 853.

7. Ohbuchi KI, Tamura T, Quigley BM, Tedeschi JT, Madi N, Bond MH, Mummendey A. Anger, blame, and dimensions of perceived norm violations: Culture, gender, and relationships. J Appl Soc Psychol. 2004; 34(8): 1587–1603. doi: 10 .1111/j.1559-1816.2004.tb02788.x.

9. Vaish A, Missana M, Tomasello M. Three-year-old children intervene in third-party moral transgressions. Br J Dev Psychol. 2011; 29(1): 124–130. doi: 10.1348/026151010X532888.

10. Beersma B, Van Kleef GA. Why people gossip: An empirical analysis of social motives, antecedents, and consequences. J Appl Soc Psychol. 2012; 42(11): 2640–2670. doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00956.x.

11. Fehr E, Fischbacher U. Third-party punishment and social norms. Evol Hum Behav. 2004; 25(2): 63–87. doi: 10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4.

12. Marques JM, Abrams D, Serôdio RG. Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of ingroup deviants when generic norms are undermined. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2001; 81(3): 436–447. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.3.436.

13. Yamagishi T. The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1986; 51(1): 110–116. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110.

15. Stamkou E, Van Kleef GA, Homan AC. The art of influence: When and why deviant artists gain impact. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2018; 115(2): 276-303. doi: 10.1037/pspi0000131.

18. Tankard ME, Paluck EL. Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. Soc Iss Policy Rev. 2016; 10(1): 181-211. doi: 10.1111/sipr.12022.

19. Galinsky AD, Magee JC, Gruenfeld DH, Whitson JA, Liljenquist KA. Power reduces the press of the situation: Implications for creativity, conformity, and dissonance. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2008; 95(6): 1450–1466. doi: 10.1037/a0012633.

20. Keltner D, Gruenfeld DH Anderson C. Power, approach, and inhibition. Psychol Rev, 2003; 110(2): 265-284. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265.

21. Cho M, Keltner D. Power, approach, and inhibition: Empirical advances of a theory. Cur Opin Psychol. 2020; 33: 196-200. doi: 10.1016/ j.copsyc.2019.08.013.

22. Pike BE, Galinsky AD. Power leads to action because it releases the psychological brakes on action. Cur Opin Psychol. 2020; 33: 91-94. doi: 10.1016/J.COPSYC.2019.06.028.

27. Van Kleef GA, Heerdink MW, Cheshin A, Stamkou E, Wanders F, Koning LF, et al. No guts, no glory? How risk-taking shapes dominance, prestige, and leadership endorsement. J Appl Psychol. (in press).

42. Rimal RN, Lapinski MK. A re-explication of social norms, ten years later. Commun Theor. 2015; 25(4): 393-409. doi: 10.1111/comt.12080.

43. Cialdini RB, Reno RR, Kallgren CA. A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. J Pers Soc Psychol. 1990; 58(6): 1015-1026. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.1015.

44. Lapinski MK, Rimal RN. An explication of social norms. Commun Theor. 2005; 15(2): 127-147. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2005.tb00329.x

Submitted filename: Response to reviewers R2 .docx

Decision Letter 2

30 Jun 2021

PONE-D-20-25007R2

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Read our research on: Gun Policy | International Conflict | Election 2024

Regions & Countries

What public k-12 teachers want americans to know about teaching.

Illustrations by Hokyoung Kim

At a time when most teachers are feeling stressed and overwhelmed in their jobs, we asked 2,531 public K-12 teachers this open-ended question:

If there’s one thing you’d want the public to know about teachers, what would it be?

We also asked Americans what they think about teachers to compare with teachers’ perceptions of how the public views them.

Related: What’s It Like To Be a Teacher in America Today?

A bar chart showing that about half of teachers want the public to know that teaching is a hard job.

Pew Research Center conducted this analysis to better understand what public K-12 teachers would like Americans to know about their profession. We also wanted to learn how the public thinks about teachers.

For the open-end question, we surveyed 2,531 U.S. public K-12 teachers from Oct. 17 to Nov. 14, 2023. The teachers surveyed are members of RAND’s American Teacher Panel, a nationally representative panel of public K-12 school teachers recruited through MDR Education. Survey data is weighted to state and national teacher characteristics to account for differences in sampling and response to ensure they are representative of the target population.

Overall, 96% of surveyed teachers provided an answer to the open-ended question. Center researchers developed a coding scheme categorizing the responses, coded all responses, and then grouped them into the six themes explored in the data essay.

For the questions for the general public, we surveyed 5,029 U.S. adults from Nov. 9 to Nov. 16, 2023. The adults surveyed are members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, a nationally representative online survey panel. Panel members are randomly recruited through probability-based sampling, and households are provided with access to the Internet and hardware if needed. To ensure that the results of this survey reflect a balanced cross section of the nation, the data is weighted to match the U.S. adult population by gender, age, education, race and ethnicity and other categories.

Here are the questions used for this analysis , along with responses, the teacher survey methodology and the general public survey methodology .

Most of the responses to the open-ended question fell into one of these six themes:

Teaching is a hard job

About half of teachers (51%) said they want the public to know that teaching is a difficult job and that teachers are hardworking. Within this share, many mentioned that they have roles and responsibilities in the classroom besides teaching, which makes the job stressful. Many also talked about working long hours, beyond those they’re contracted for.

“Teachers serve multiple roles other than being responsible for teaching curriculum. We are counselors, behavioral specialists and parents for students who need us to fill those roles. We sacrifice a lot to give all of ourselves to the role as teacher.”

– Elementary school teacher

“The amount of extra hours that teachers have to put in beyond the contractual time is ridiculous. Arriving 30 minutes before and leaving an hour after is just the tip of the iceberg. … And as far as ‘having summers off,’ most of August is taken up with preparing materials for the upcoming school year or attending three, four, seven days’ worth of unpaid development training.”

– High school teacher

Teachers care about their students

The next most common theme: 22% of teachers brought up how fulfilling teaching is and how much teachers care about their students. Many gave examples of the hardships of teaching but reaffirmed that they do their job because they love the kids and helping them succeed.

“We are passionate about what we do. Every child we teach is important to us and we look out for them like they are our own.”

– Middle school teacher

“We are in it for the kids, and the most incredible moments are when children make connections with learning.”

Teachers are undervalued and disrespected

Some 17% of teachers want the public to know that they feel undervalued and disrespected, and that they need more public support. Some mentioned that they are well-educated professionals but are not treated as such. And many teachers in this category responded with a general plea for support from the public, which they don’t feel they’re getting now.

“We feel undervalued. The public and many parents of my students treat me and my peers as if we do not know as much as they do, as if we are uneducated.”

“The public attitudes toward teachers have been degrading, and it is making it impossible for well-qualified teachers to be found. People are simply not wanting to go into the profession because of public sentiments.”

Teachers are underpaid

A similar share of teachers (15%) want the public to know that teachers are underpaid. Many teachers said their salary doesn’t account for the effort and care they put into their students’ education and believe that their pay should reflect this.

“We are sorely underpaid for the amount of hours we work and the education level we have attained.”

Teachers need support and resources from government and administrators

About one-in-ten teachers (9%) said they need more support from the government, their administrators and other key stakeholders. Many mentioned working in understaffed schools, not having enough funding and paying for supplies out of pocket. Some teachers also expressed that they have little control over the curriculum that they teach.

“The world-class education we used to be proud of does not exist because of all the red tape we are constantly navigating. If you want to see real change in the classroom, advocate for smaller class sizes for your child, push your district to cap class sizes at a reasonable level and have real, authentic conversations with your child’s teacher about what is going on in the classroom if you’re curious.”

Teachers need more support from parents

Roughly the same share of teachers (8%) want the public to know that teachers need more support from parents, emphasizing that the parent-teacher relationship is strained. Many view parents as partners in their child’s education and believe that a strong relationship improves kids’ overall social and emotional development.

“Teachers help students to reach their potential. However, that job is near impossible if parents/guardians do not take an active part in their student’s education.”

How the U.S. public views teachers

While the top response from teachers in the open-ended question is that they want the public to know that teaching is a hard job, most Americans already see it that way. Two-thirds of U.S. adults say being a public K-12 teacher is harder than most other jobs, with 33% saying it’s a lot harder.

And about three-quarters of Americans (74%) say teachers should be paid more than they are now, including 39% who say teachers should be paid a lot more.

Americans are about evenly divided on whether the public generally looks up to (32%) or down on (30%) public K-12 teachers. Some 37% say Americans neither look up to or down on public K-12 teachers.

A bar chart showing that teachers’ perceptions of how much Americans trust public K-12 teachers to do their job well is more negative than the general public’s response.

In addition to the open-ended question about what they want the public to know about them, we asked teachers how much they think most Americans trust public K-12 teachers to do their job well. We also asked the public how much they trust teachers. Answers differ considerably.

Nearly half of public K-12 teachers (47%) say most Americans don’t trust teachers much or at all. A third say most Americans trust teachers some, and 18% say the public trusts teachers a great deal or a fair amount.

In contrast, a majority of Americans (57%) say they do trust public K-12 teachers to do their job well a great deal or a fair amount. About a quarter (26%) say they trust teachers some, and 17% say they don’t trust teachers much or at all.

Related: About half of Americans say public K-12 education is going in the wrong direction

How the public’s views differ by party

There are sizable party differences in Americans’ views of teachers. In particular, Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to say:

They trust teachers to do their job well a great deal or a fair amount (70% vs. 44%)
Teaching is a lot or somewhat harder when compared with most other jobs (77% vs. 59%)
Teachers should be paid a lot or somewhat more than they are now (86% vs. 63%)

In their own words

Below, we have a selection of quotes that describe what teachers want the public to know about them and their profession.

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About Pew Research Center Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts .

"There’s social status in breaking social norms": When the corrosive effects of Greek life spill out

An interview with max marshall, the author of the new book "among the bros: a fraternity crime story", by chauncey devega.

Investigative journalist Max Marshall’s new book "Among the Bros: A Fraternity Crime Story" is much more than just a “true crime” story about young rich entitled (white) men acting badly. Instead, it is a story that embodies the much larger problem of how elite white men are taught at a very young age that they are above the law and generally can act with impunity. These attitudes, values, behaviors, and beliefs are at the heart of many of America’s greatest problems.

A nationwide drug ring operating out of the Kappa Alpha fraternity at South Carolina’s College of Charleston was caught trafficking millions of dollars in Xanax and other drugs including cocaine, LSD, ketamine, and MDMA. The criminal enterprise ended in spectacular fashion in 2016 with one person being murdered, several students dying from drug use, and one of its leaders being sentenced to prison for ten years. Most of the leaders and members of the Kappa Alpha-based drug ring, however, suffered no serious consequences for their alleged crimes.

"They were still made up of wealthy kids from elite families, but they now asserted their rule by breaking the rules."

Beyond its sharp and darkly humorous writing and propulsive narrative, Marshall’s book is also a rich sociological text about the subculture of elite fraternities and sororities at America’s most exclusive (and predominantly white) universities and colleges. As he details in "Among the Bros," it is not an exaggeration or distortion to describe “Greek life” as an institution on to itself, one that operates according to its own rules, and in many ways controls the social lives of its members and the larger university and college community.

In this conversation, Marshall reflects on white privilege, gender and masculinity, and the culture of crime and other antisocial behavior that operate not just in the events depicted in "Among the Bros," but as signaling to much larger problems across the Greek life system at many of the country’s universities and colleges. He also shares his concerns about how these “leaders of tomorrow” (as shown by how the vast majority of America’s leading politicians and other influentials) are products of the Greek life system and its most problematic values and training.

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Marshall explains how popular culture’s understanding of Greek life as being some version of the movie "Animal House" is largely obsolete. The debauchery and chaos depicted in that movie are almost innocent and childlike compared to what is happening today.

What has the journey been like with the book?

It took about four years, 200 interviews, and a few thousand police documents, but the weirdest phase has been “book publicity.”

Has that novelty worn off?

Absolutely. You can only answer the same question so many times before you just push the “what led you to write this book?” button. But I still hope that the act of writing will always feel novel to me. If I ever delude myself that I’ve become an “expert” at writing, it might be time for the urn.

Your book resonates with and reflects our larger society — especially in the Age of Trump and how we got here – this is so much more than “true crime."

I mostly agree, but I also don’t want to create too big a “lowbrow/middlebrow” distinction. (Crimes always reflect our larger society.) But you’re right, you can’t write about a multi-million-dollar fraternity Xanax network without touching on all kinds of cultural pressure points, especially when nearly everyone involved gets away with it.

After all the discoveries — millions of Xanax pills, student deaths, waterboarding, sweetheart legal deals, etc. — we still haven’t seen very many consequences. Most of the boys got suspended sentences, the Kappa Alpha Order is back on campus, and Sigma Alpha Epsilon never left. The fraternities even have public Instagram accounts, and last time I checked their parties look bigger than ever.

What is the world of Greek life like? What are its rules, both stated and unstated? What do outsiders to that world not understand?

If you ever watch a Hollywood depiction of Greek life, you’ll usually see too much Abercrombie and hair gel. You’ll also see the elite fraternity members wearing sweaters and sucking up to the Dean, while the down-on-their-luck chapters throw the craziest parties.

In reality, it’s flipped. The “best” chapters — the ones with the wealthiest members — have the wildest behavior, and the lower-status chapters take things like philanthropy and academic standing more seriously. For the guys who can get away with it, there’s a lot of social power in saying, “I can black out four nights a week, sleep with girls from all six top sororities, skip class for pledge errands, and my family connections will still get me a better internship than you this summer.”

I am not a joiner. But I also understand, deeply, the power of networks and social capital in determining one’s life trajectory and where it ends up or not. What are the types of personalities that are most compelled to participate in Greek life? What do we know about them?

Fraternities have always been a really efficient way of creating a separate campus for the ruling class. American colleges didn’t even need Greek life (as it’s currently comprised) until the 1800s, when middle-class students from rural backgrounds arrived wanting to learn how to be preachers. I’m not being glib when I say that the founding idea for fraternities was basically: let’s form a secret drinking club and not invite the random farm kids.

From there, they grew in influence. There’s the statistic from the Cornell Greek Life website that we ended up using on the back of the book: “While only 2 percent of America’s population is involved in fraternities, 80 percent of Fortune 500 executives, 76 percent of U.S. senators and congressmen, 85 percent of Supreme Court justices, and all but four presidents since 1825 have been fraternity men.” Greek alumni also give something like 75% of all money donated to universities.

From New Haven to Mississippi, there’s also a false sense that kids are “tricked” into joining these clubs and then thrown into a basement to be traumatized. But like you suggest, there’s a pretty clear reason for joining. Members of Alabama SAE or Ivy at Princeton have the same motivations: the best parties, the best-looking people, the best connections to do whatever you want when you graduate.

Reading your book, I kept thinking of "Animal House," which is one of my favorite movies and really a type of social history of a particular place and time in America.

It’s not an exaggeration to say that "Animal House" saved fraternities. Next to the '60s counterculture, fraternity guys looked like relics of the sweater-wearing, song-crooning past. In 1970, fraternity membership hit an all-time low. Then in 1978 comes this movie that shows two competing fraternity chapters: Kevin Bacon’s Omega Theta Pi, representing the old snooty ways, and John Belushi’s Delta Tau Chi, showing a wild new future. The Omegas made punch and cookies and called the Dean “sir,” and the Deltas burnt stuff and seduced the Dean’s wife.

After that, America’s real-life fraternities had a new way of branding themselves. They joined the counterculture in terms of smoking weed and having lots of casual sex, but they didn’t have to join it in terms of ‘fighting the power.’ (Caitlin Flanagan writes about this with her usual brilliance.) They were still made up of wealthy kids from elite families, but they now asserted their rule by breaking the rules. After "Animal House," fraternity membership boomed, and things ramped up from there. There’s a quote from the website Total Frat Move that I threw in the book: “Greek life today makes Animal House look like a Pixar movie."

"Among the Bros" is not a story of just a few bad actors. It is a story of a criminal culture.

This wasn’t a centralized drug ring like the first season of HBO's "The Wire." These boys never formed a hierarchy with foot soldiers reporting to lieutenants, who sat under capos, and on and up.

Instead, they basically operated a multi-level marketing scheme. You had different kids buying unpressed alprazolam powder from Chinese labs via the dark web, and then they installed their own pill presses in beach houses and dorm rooms. These guys could make Xanax for a few cents a pill, and then they could sell it in bulk for about a dollar a pill. Then the pills moved from campus to campus, often through the fraternity system, with the price going up each time the counterfeit Xanax changed hands. (I met some customers who spent as much as $10 for a pill.)

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One of the dealers told me he really wished he could’ve put the experience on his resume, because he learned so much about sales, marketing, inventory, pricing strategy, and all the rest. He said, “at the end of the day, it’s still a business.”

How is gender operative in "Among the Bros" and the larger Greek life system? What of fraternity “boys” and sorority “girls” vs “men” and “women?" These people are adults, not children. Yet, they are infantilized.

When journalists write about Greek life, they often call fraternity members “fraternity men.” Never in my life have I heard someone in a fraternity use that phrase. It’s always “fraternity boys,” “sorority girls,” and lots and lots of “kids.” I think you’re right to suggest that this language helps keep them from facing adult consequences. Also, given that so many of them grew up on a highly structured, meritocratic hamster wheel, you could argue their college years are more childlike than their childhoods.

If the men involved in the Charleston drug ring were not rich and upper class, and instead were working class or even middle class, never mind Black or brown, would they have been able to get away with these crimes on such a grand scale?

It’s not news to anyone, but it’s still amazing what a well-paid criminal defense lawyer can get you out of. If you have an attorney who can throw resources at a case and play golf with the judge and prosecutor, you’re in a pretty sweet spot. DUIs can disappear, drug dealing charges can get kicked down to simple possession, and multi-million-dollar drug networks can become “my client got caught up with the wrong group of friends and really regrets it.”

What happens when these baby gangsters encounter real gangsters and professional criminals? When fantasy is punched in the face by reality?

I noticed two competing fantasies among the guys who sold Xanax in fraternities. Some of the boys had the idea they weren’t really drug dealers; they were just “middlemen.” They bought something for one price and then sold it for a slightly higher price. (One guy compared it to working in commercial real estate.) Of course, they’re actually just describing the daily work of a drug dealer. Unless you’re farming poppy seeds, everyone in a drug network is a “middleman.”

The other fantasy went the opposite way. Some of the boys thought they lived inside [Grand Theft Auto]. They said things like “I was on my John Gotti,” got bottle service at LIV in Miami, bought a grenade launcher that didn’t have any grenades, or watched a lot of YouTube documentaries about Big Meech. I guess it’s not surprising, but these were the fantasies that sometimes ended in violence. One of the main characters in the book was killed right after watching "The Wire" on the couch. When he got shot, his housemate was playing Call of Duty in another room. He said that compared to the reverb-heavy explosions in the game, the real gun made a numb pop.

What role do women play in the story?

On the one hand, this is a book about all-dude friend groups. The main characters are all guys, and most of the time everyone in the room is male. The book touches on the College of Charleston controversy surrounding Alison Bechdel’s "Fun Home," but it for sure fails the Bechdel Test.

On the other, many of the book’s best reporting sources were women. The College of Charleston is nearly 70% female, and those alumnae opened up my understanding of this whole story. They illuminated things about the boys that the boys would never illuminate about themselves. For example, here’s how one woman described why College of Charleston fraternity kids put Xanax in their punch at date parties:

“For guys, blacking out means there’s no pressure. Then girls won’t say, ‘He tried to sleep with me, but he has a wack penis and couldn’t get hard.’ It’s just like, ‘Oh, he was on Xanax.’ ... Sometimes, I waited until sunrise for their penis to start working, and they’d start talking about their feelings. They'd be like, ‘my mom this and my mom that, and my dad and my brother and whatever.’ And I’m like, ‘I’m not even adding to the conversation. I’m literally a free therapist.’”

What is "Among the Bros" an example of in terms of its broader meaning for American society and culture in this moment and more broadly?

In my freshman year of college, I had a professor who wrote a lot about Imperial Rome. One class he told us that elite, late-Roman families sent their sons to Greece to finish up their educations. This might be apocryphal, but the Greeks apparently complained that the Roman “study abroad” kids got too drunk, looted ancient artifacts, and peed in the fountains. The boys got away with it because all they had to do was say cīvis Rōmānus sum.

I think that’s about where we are in America. (Maybe it explains the TikTok trend .) We’re far past Weber’s “Protestant Work Ethic,” and we’re onto the decadence of a late empire. There’s social status in breaking social norms, in playing the heel. I’ve come to feel that in powerful places, it’s almost like the goal is to show just how much you can get away with.

about this topic

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Chauncey DeVega is a senior politics writer for Salon. His essays can also be found at Chaunceydevega.com . He also hosts a weekly podcast, The Chauncey DeVega Show . Chauncey can be followed on Twitter and Facebook .

The Next Frontier? Philosophy in Space.

An illustration of a human being on Earth, looking at a row of white planets.

By Joseph O. Chapa

Dr. Chapa is a U.S. Air Force officer and the author of “Is Remote Warfare Moral?”

The window to apply to be a NASA astronaut — a window that opens only about every four years — closes this month, on April 16. Though I’ve submitted an application, I don’t expect to make the cut.

The educational requirements for the astronaut program are clear: Applicants must possess at least a master’s degree in a STEM field (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), a doctorate in medicine or a test pilot school graduate patch. Though I have a Ph.D., it’s in philosophy. (And though I’m an Air Force pilot, I’m not a test pilot.)

I hesitate to tell NASA its business. But I think its requirements are closing the astronaut program off from important insights from the humanities and social sciences.

Of course, the requirement for astronauts to have technical training makes some intuitive sense. NASA was founded in 1958 “to provide for research into problems of flight within and outside the earth’s atmosphere.” Who better to solve flight problems than scientists and engineers? What’s more, NASA’s space missions have long conducted science experiments to learn how plant and animal life behaves in the far-flung emptiness between us and the moon.

But the need for STEM in space might be waning — just as the need for humanities and the social sciences waxes. After all, the “problems of flight” that once tethered us to this planet have largely been solved, thanks in no small part to all those scientist and engineer astronauts who blazed the trail to space.

By contrast, the future of our relationship with the cosmos — a colony on the moon? Humans on Mars? Contact with intelligent alien life? — will require thoughtful inquiry from many disciplines. We will need sociologists and anthropologists to help us imagine new communities; theologians and linguists if we find we are not alone in the universe; political and legal theorists to sort out the governing principles of interstellar life.

Naturally, some scholars can study these topics while still earthbound. But so can many of today’s astronauts, who often end up working on projects unrelated to their academic training. The idea behind sending people with a wider array of academic disciplines into the cosmos is not just to give scholars a taste of outer space, but also to put them in fruitful conversation with one another.

My own discipline, philosophy, may be better suited for this kind of exploration than some might think. To be sure, much philosophy can be done from an armchair. Descartes arrived at his famous conclusion, “I think, therefore, I am,” while warming himself by the fire and, as he noted, “wearing a winter dressing gown.”

But some of the greatest philosophical breakthroughs occurred only because their authors had firsthand experience with extreme and uncomfortable conditions. We might not have the Stoic philosophy of Epictetus had he not faced the hardship of slavery in Nero’s court. We might not have Thomas Hobbes’s “Leviathan” (and his principle of the “consent of the governed,” so central to the American experiment), but for his flight from the English Civil War. And we might not have Hannah Arendt’s insights on the “banality of evil” had she not attended the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a chief architect of the Holocaust.

Not all philosophers who want to learn what it means to be human in this vast and expanding universe need to experience living in space. But perhaps some of us should.

Throughout the history of Western philosophy, space has often served as stand-in for life’s deepest truths. Plato thought that the things of this world were mere images of true reality, and that true reality existed in the heavens beyond. What inspired admiration and awe in Immanuel Kant was not just the moral law within all of us but also the “starry heavens above.” The Platos and Kants of today are in a position to take a much closer look at those very heavens.

In general, the work of philosophy is to ask, “And suppose this proposition is right, what then?” When faced with a proposition — say, “The mind and body are separable,” or “One must always act to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number” — the philosopher takes another step and asks, “What are the implications of such a view?”

Though Earth has been our only home, it may not be our home forever. What are the implications of that proposition? What might that mean for our conception of nationhood? Of community? Of ourselves and our place in the world? This would be the work of space philosophers.

These days, unfortunately, the prestige of STEM continues to eclipse that of the social sciences and humanities. It seems unlikely that NASA will buck this trend.

That would be bad news for me, personally — but I think also for humanity at large. One day we may all echo Jodie Foster’s character in the sci-fi movie “Contact . ” When the mysteries of space-time were unfurled before her, all she could manage to say was, “They should have sent a poet.”

Joseph O. Chapa ( @JosephOChapa ) is a U.S. Air Force officer and the author of “Is Remote Warfare Moral?”

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Trump defied political norms. Now he tests the stock market.

Deep Read ( 4 Min. )
By Laurent Belsie Staff writer @lbelsie

April 3, 2024

Ever since its spectacular debut last week, which made former U.S. President Donald Trump one of the world’s 500 richest people, Trump Media & Technology Group has experienced a series of setbacks that would sink ordinary stocks.

But this highly charged social media investment may defy the odds, at least for a time.

Why We Wrote This

Some call Trump Media & Technology Group a “meme stock.” But in financial markets, confidence tends to hinge on fundamentals of finance, not on the risky ground of emotion or personal trust.

Trump Media first appeared on March 25 on the Nasdaq Stock Market, and share prices soared to $79 at one point. Then early Monday, the company revealed it had revenue of only $4 million last year with net losses of nearly $60 million.

The stock lost 21% of its value in a day, closing just below its initial offering price of $49.95. As of Wednesday the stock was holding fairly steady, closing at $48.81 a share.

As an investment, Trump Media was always inherently risky. This was in part because it used an alternative way of going public, known as a special purpose acquisition company, or SPAC. The number of SPACs skyrocketed in 2020 and 2021, but the boom quickly faded as most of those companies’ share prices fell.

Some investors appear to have put their trust in Mr. Trump himself, despite the company’s weak fundamentals so far. Still others may be using their investment dollars to support the presidential candidate, almost like a political donation.

Some are calling it a “meme stock,” or one that attracts investors for emotional reasons. In this case specifically, some point to Mr. Trump’s followers who buy as a political statement. Whatever it is, Trump Media is banking on trust in a single individual, Mr. Trump, at least as much as on the potential growth of an entire company. Trump Media owns Truth Social, Mr. Trump’s social media network.

“I don’t think it has to do with economics,” says Michael Klausner, a professor at Stanford Law School. “It’s all just a cult stock. [And] if the cult following is strong enough ... maybe in the shorter run it isn’t risky, because there’s just such a willingness on the part of these people to keep buying it.”

Trump Media first appeared on March 25 on the Nasdaq Stock Market under the ticker symbol DJT, and share prices soared in its first few days of trading – surpassing $79 at one point. Then early Monday, in a regulatory filing, the company revealed it had revenue of only about $4 million last year and posted net losses of nearly $60 million. “The Company’s operating losses raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern,” the filing warned.

The stock then tanked, losing 21% of its value in a day and closing just below its initial offering price of $49.95. On Tuesday, the stock rallied a bit, closing at $51.60, just minutes after a Bloomberg report that Mr. Trump was suing two of the company’s cofounders for “reckless and wasteful decisions” that damaged the company. The co-founders, in turn, have sued Mr. Trump for trying to dilute their stakes in the company.

Inherent risks test market norms

Heavy losses, warnings of possible insolvency, and legal squabbles among the founders would normally send investors running for the exits. As of Wednesday the stock was holding fairly steady, closing at $48.81, down about 5.4% for the day.

As an investment, Trump Media was always inherently risky, in part because it used an alternative way of going public, known as a special purpose acquisition company, or SPAC. SPACs are pools of money raised in the retail and institutional markets specifically to merge with – or acquire – high-growth companies. They allow a quicker and less cumbersome way for those companies to raise money from the public. They also allow individual investors – rather than venture capital or private equity firms that traditionally provide the money for these companies to grow – to get in on the ground floor.

The number of SPAC deals skyrocketed in 2020 and 2021, but the boom quickly faded as most of those companies’ share prices fell. Professor Klausner calculates that as of two weeks ago, 92% of SPACs that have come online since 2019 have fallen below their original offering price. “They’re losers,” he says. “They have systematically dropped in price.”

Whether Trump Media can buck the trend is anybody’s guess. Other legal action is swirling around the company and its initial public offering. The company is under criminal investigation by federal prosecutors, partly because of two payments from little-known entities with ties to an ally of Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, the British newspaper The Guardian reports . On Wednesday, two investors involved in the SPAC taking Trump Media public pleaded guilty to federal charges of insider trading.

Two other facts stand out about Trump Media. First, it has a very small base compared with its ambitions to compete with social media giants such as Facebook and X (formerly Twitter). When they went public, Facebook had over 800 million active monthly users and Twitter had more than 200 million. Using a much looser definition, Trump Media claims some 9 million people have used it at some point.

Second, the company is way overvalued for its size.

“In terms of fundamentals, this is just crazy and outrageous,” says Minmo Gahng, a professor of finance at Cornell University. Initial public offerings may feature companies with high potential but no profits, which leads to sky-high valuations based on hopes for future profits, but nothing at the level of Trump Media. “The new thing is that this is all about politics.”

Some investors believe that Truth Social will someday reach the same level of popularity as Facebook or X, Dr. Gahng says. Others have put their faith in Mr. Trump himself. Still others are using their investment dollars to support him, Dr. Gahng adds, “almost, if you will, a donation.”

Share price versus fundamentals

This divergence between share price and fundamentals is one hallmark of what people call a meme stock, says Albert Choi, a law professor at the University of Michigan who has studied the phenomenon.

But in other ways, Trump Media isn’t acting like a meme stock at all. There’s been no great surge of investors rushing to buy the stock as there was for earlier meme stocks, such as GameStop and AMC. The volume of trading in the stock has not skyrocketed. There doesn’t appear to be heavy coordination of investors via social media, even on Truth Social itself.

“I’d be hesitant to call this a meme stock, but we’ll see,” says Dr. Choi. “Bottom line is: This stock is kind of weird.”

Ultimately, the future of Trump Media & Technology Group may depend on the financial realities, as well as how much trust and popularity Mr. Trump can generate going forward. “The value of TMTG’s brand may diminish if the popularity of President Trump were to suffer,” Monday’s regulatory filing warned.

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Iran embassy strike shows Israel's growing reach and disregard for norms

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, meets with the family of one of the members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who were killed in the Israeli airstrike on the Iranian embassy complex in the Syrian capital Damascus, during a funeral ceremony in Tehran on Thursday.

Hounded by months of deadly Israeli attacks in Syria, Iranian military commanders thought it safe to convene a top-level meeting inside Iran's embassy compound in Damascus, believing it protected by international norms shielding diplomatic missions, according to a dozen Iranian, Syrian and regional officials.

An airstrike on the compound killed seven Iranian officers on Monday — among them one of Iran's top soldiers, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi, a senior commander in the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). It was the boldest, and deadliest, in a series of attacks that have picked off Iranian officials in Syria since December.

Blamed by Tehran on Israel, the attack was a rare military strike on diplomatic premises anywhere in the world and drew swift condemnation from the U.N. and EU.

Analysts view it as a significant escalation in a wider Israeli campaign to degrade the influence carved out by Iran in Syria over the last decade. Zahedi had arrived in Syria a day or so before the attack and was staying at the embassy compound with two other senior commanders, according to an Iranian source who, like others in this story, asked not be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

The three men were in Syria to discuss operational logistics and coordination, the source said, without elaborating. Zahedi was a top figure in the Guards' Quds Force, which funnels Iranian support to allies around the region, including to Lebanon's Hezbollah. He was the most senior Revolutionary Guards figure to be killed since a U.S. drone strike on Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad four years ago, and the manner of the strike sent shockwaves across a region already roiled by Israel's war in Gaza.

"In my view, it's without precedent," said Gregory Brew, an analyst at Eurasia Group, adding that he could not recall any state directly targeting another's diplomatic presence in this way.

"The IRGC officers likely thought they were safe so long as they remained in the diplomatic compound," he said. "I can't imagine any IRGC officers feel particularly safe at the moment." With Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowing revenge, the fallout risks further escalating the conflict that has spread through the Middle East since the eruption of the Gaza war in October.

However, two Iranian officials indicated Tehran would not veer from the approach it has adopted since October of avoiding direct conflict with Israel and the United States, while simultaneously backing allies who have hit Israel, U.S. troops and Red Sea shipping in attacks they say aim to support Gaza.

A funeral ceremony for those who were killed in an Israeli airstrike on the Iranian embassy complex in the Syrian capital Damascus, in Tehran, on Thursday.

One of those officials, a senior source, said Tehran was compelled to give a serious response to prevent Israel from repeating such attacks or escalating. But the level of retaliation would be limited and aimed at deterrence, the official said, without elaborating.

The public relations office of Iran's Revolutionary Guards declined to comment.

Israel, which rarely comments on its Syria operations, has not declared its responsibility for Monday's attack, which levelled the building where the commanders were gathered adjacent to the main Iranian embassy building. The Israeli military spokesperson's office declined to comment for this story.

Sanam Vakil, deputy head of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, said the attack was the latest to show the precise nature of Israeli intelligence in Syria and the wider region. She noted that a Jan. 2 Israeli strike had killed a senior leader of Palestinian militant group Hamas in Lebanon, the stronghold of Iranian-backed movement Hezbollah. Both groups are part of Iran's regional "Axis of Resistance."

"We have seen very high-level killings of officials with management responsibility across the network," she said, adding that the latest attack targeting Zahedi "speaks to Israel's broader objective of trying to degrade the operational capacities of the Axis of Resistance over the last six months."

Just last week, Israel mounted one of its deadliest strikes in months in Syria, killing 33 Syrians and six Hezbollah fighters, security sources said. Israel has also hit Hezbollah hard in Lebanon during hostilities since the Gaza war began in October, killing some 250 of its fighters including senior commanders.

Israel launched its invasion of Gaza in response to the Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel by Hamas, which killed 1,200 people and captured 253 hostages. Some 33,000 Palestinians have since been killed in nearly six months of warfare, according to medical officials in the enclave.

An Iranian security source said Iran would adjust its tactics in light of Monday's strike, without giving further details. A regional source close to Iran said there was no longer any secure place in Syria after Israel had transgressed diplomatic norms.

In February it was reported that the Revolutionary Guards had scaled back deployments of senior officers in Syria as a result of the wave of Israeli strikes against Revolutionary Guard commanders. Sources said at the time the Guards had raised concerns with Syrian authorities that information leaks from within the Syrian security forces played a part in those strikes.

In the wake of Monday's attack, the Iranian security source said Iran was investigating whether Zahedi's movements were leaked to Israel.

Iran has deployed officers and allied militias to Syria to aid President Bashar al-Assad during the war that began in 2011. The Syrian government say they serve in the capacity of advisers at the invitation of Damascus.

The family of a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was killed in the Israeli airstrike mourn during a funeral ceremony in Tehran on Thursday.

Raz Zimmt, a researcher at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, said Zahedi had played a significant role "managing the entrenchment of Iranian activity both in Syria and Lebanon." He would be hard to replace due to "his long experience and his long presence in Syria," he said, but the main significance of the attack was to show that nowhere was out of bounds.

"I think that perhaps the more important issue is for Israel to relay the message to Iran, saying that Iran can no longer escape the consequences of its major role in the coordination of this Iranian axis in the region," Zimmt said.

An Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity, declined to confirm Israel's involvement in Monday's attack but said that the congregation of several senior Iranian officials in one location was highly unusual.

"Whoever did this clearly did not want to pass up what appears to have been a very, very rare opportunity," he said. "That's not something a country at war would pass up."

U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres condemned the attack on the Iranian diplomatic premises, saying "the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel must be respected in all cases and in all circumstances in accordance with international law," his spokesperson said. The European Union echoed the statement.

However, the Israeli official said the identities of the dead amounted to "an admission that a diplomatic mission in a third-party country is being used as a military headquarters."

The United States has said it has not confirmed the status of the building struck in Damascus, but that it would be concerned if it was a diplomatic facility. Washington warned Iran on Tuesday not to retaliate against it over the attack, telling the U.N. Security Council it had no prior warning of the strike.

A Syrian military intelligence officer said the area near the embassy included buildings previously used by Israel to monitor and plant devices, and that Israel had intensified efforts to develop human intelligence in recent months.

Qasem Mohebali, former director-general for the Middle East and North Africa at Iran’s Foreign Ministry who is based in Iran, called the strike a turning point in Israel's attacks against Iran's presence in Syria.

In an interview with the Iranian news website Jamaran, he said Israel "had previously exercised caution and refrained from targeting official and diplomatic Iranian locations."

But "direct war with Israel is by no means in Iran's interest," he added. "Entering that arena does not just end with war with Israel; the conflict could escalate and involve other players such as the United States," he said.

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